Best Generals of ww2 and their role in this game

[Admiral Piett]

I have never really latched onto any particular general as the "best of WWII" since they all operated under different circumstances and systems which makes direct comparison extremely difficult. Montgomery was pretty good, as was Zhukov, Ike and Patton. Most German generals have typically underwhelmed me due to the complete lack of understanding in regards to well...anything that wasn't the operational art. I'm relieved that historians are finally starting to figure out that the Wehrmacht wasn't the greatest thing EVAR. When one digs a little bit into some of the Wehrmacht's greatest 'victories' it doesn't take long to start seeing through the garbage that people like Manstein vomited onto the page in memoirs and have since become accepted 'fact'.

http://www.amazon.com/Operation-Barbarossa-Germanys-Cambridge-Histories/dp/052117015X

Anyway, the only name I can really latch onto is Chester Nimitz. He was an excellent high-level commander, even if orchestrating a war from Hawaii isn't quite as sexy as driving a panzer around Northeastern France.

 

[misterbean]

I have never really latched onto any particular general as the "best of WWII" since they all operated under different circumstances and systems which makes direct comparison extremely difficult. Montgomery was pretty good, as was Zhukov, Ike and Patton. Most German generals have typically underwhelmed me due to the complete lack of understanding in regards to well...anything that wasn't the operational art. I'm relieved that historians are finally starting to figure out that the Wehrmacht wasn't the greatest thing EVAR. When one digs a little bit into some of the Wehrmacht's greatest 'victories' it doesn't take long to start seeing through the garbage that people like Manstein vomited onto the page in memoirs and have since become accepted 'fact'.

http://www.amazon.com/Operation-Barbarossa-Germanys-Cambridge-Histories/dp/052117015X

Anyway, the only name I can really latch onto is Chester Nimitz. He was an excellent high-level commander, even if orchestrating a war from Hawaii isn't quite as sexy as driving a panzer around Northeastern France.

That reminds me: Nimitz was in charge of all forces involved in the Island Hopping, including the ground troops, wasn't he?

 

[Admiral Piett]

That reminds me: Nimitz was in charge of all forces involved in the Island Hopping, including the ground troops, wasn't he?

Yes, all troops regardless of the service or even nation if my memory serves. He was in command of the Central Pacific Area. Of course MacArthur was farting around in his own Southwest Pacific Area HQ and there were two other big commands (Southeast Pacific and North Pacific). As you probably guessed from the wording of the previous sentence I'm not a big MacArthur fan.

 

[Zinegata]

You amuse me.
According to you basically every German general is hyped while, in reality, they were more or less tribal warriors galopping to counting coup.
It certainly is a nice picture but as a hypothesis it suffers from its inability to explain the German successes from 1939 to 45.

German generalship is in fact rather overhyped, and yes their military system had more in common with tribal alpha-male one-upmanship systems (which is why it's so appealing to teenage and young males), that unfortunately also flies in the face of some best-practice managerial styles. You'd know this if you read less self-serving memoirs and read modern analysis like say, Citino's.

German successes from '39 to '45 was not really a product of German leadership alone (the vast majority of its victories being won against weak or badly led enemies; and these string of victories immediately evaporating once they faced half-competent opposition), and in many cases German leadership was directly responsible for the failures.

The only reason why German generalship is considered particularly good in pop-culture and in amateur circles is because of its bragaddacio nature and because very few people actually study German generalship outside of the Cold War version (which encouraged the publishing of self-serving memoirs) that German generals were awesome and therefore it's okay to take lessons from them to stop the Soviet Cold War tank horde (which resulted in some of the most retarded NATO military plans ever like the misbegotten "Forward Defense" strategy).

 

[Zinegata]

Guderian wasn't removed in 1942, it was late 1941, and that decision had little to do with his performance as a general either. In fact, it was Guderian who requested his own removal from position after multiple disagreements with both Hitler and von Kluge. It was the strained relationship between Guderian and von Kluge, including fundamental differences about strategic issues, that led to Guderian's removal. Guderian never got along with much of the higher staff, as he was way too brash for their liking.

Being too brash is in fact not exactly a great quality in a tactical commander, because that's also how you eventually get yourself into a Little Big Horn. Moving Guderian off field command was in fact not a bad move and probably saved him in the long run from a spell of bad luck in the field and getting an entire Panzer Army surrounded and wiped out.

 

[Vanguard44]

One doesn't have to look far to see the influence of certain German generals in the post war Bundeswehr. No names mentioned. Neither does one have to look far to see the influence of Aufstragstaktik on Anglo-American "mission command." Ultimately while one has to acknowledge the skill of an individual wehrmacht soldier or officer, the Germans have never been good strategists and have made some seriously bizarre decisions in their military history. Most of their successes have been due to early exploitation of evolving trends rather than supergenerals: in the later Prussian wars in the 1870s/1880s it was railways and mobilisation timetables, in WWI it was a highly developed staff system and WWII 1939-1940 speaks for itself.

 

[Vanguard44]

To answer the question: as a patriot, my answer must be Wavell. As a person, my answer must be Yamamoto. As a history-enthusiast my answer is Eisenhower.

 

[Vanguard44]

Yamashita took out both heavily defended Singapore and Malayan with under half the strength of the of defending army.
He also wanted to end the war with China and stay on good terms with GB and USA ( this was before 42 )

Fun fact, before the war some British commanders was confident that Japanese would be horrible pilots because Japanese children got carried on the back of their mothers at young age, which made them believe they would have a really bad balance and therefore be inferior pilots...

Yamashita was not the dragon that the post-war made him out to be (similar in breed to Homma in the Philippines), but his success in Singapore was mainly down to Percival being completely incompetent (and quite frankly a coward.)

 

[Zinegata]

One doesn't have to look far to see the influence of certain German generals in the post war Bundeswehr. No names mentioned. Neither does one have to look far to see the influence of Aufstragstaktik on Anglo-American "mission command." Ultimately while one has to acknowledge the skill of an individual wehrmacht soldier or officer, the Germans have never been good strategists and have made some seriously bizarre decisions in their military history. Most of their successes have been due to early exploitation of evolving trends rather than supergenerals: in the later Prussian wars in the 1870s/1880s it was railways and mobilisation timetables, in WWI it was a highly developed staff system and WWII 1939-1940 speaks for itself.

German "tactical skill" and "initiative" were indeed rather good and important for small-unit actions (especially Division-level and smaller), but I really wish that people (including the US and British Armies) would stop pretending that Germany had a monopoly on this during the Second World War, especially by 1944 and that NATO had to learn this from the Germans post-war.

On average, a US Armored "Task Force" or "Combat Command" commander was better than his German counterpart by 1944; and was afforded pretty similar levels of initiative and leeway to conduct his mission. The Soviets similarly had "forward detachments" that were given plenty of leeway as they fought miles ahead of the rest of the army.

And that's really because you can't have an entire army go mission-centric, or else you get a mob instead of an army. Indeed, even the German army was not really mission-centric outside of the Panzers and selected infantry units. If you go mission centric on Volkstrum for instance they'll just agree among themselves to sit in their trenches and tell high command that "bad weather" delayed their attack.

 

[Vanguard44]

And that's really because you can't have an entire army go mission-centric, or else you get a mob instead of an army. Indeed, even the German army was not really mission-centric outside of the Panzers and selected infantry units. If you go mission centric on Volkstrum for instance they'll just agree among themselves to sit in their trenches and tell high command that "bad weather" delayed their attack.

That depends on the size of the Army. The modern British Army consists of three field brigades. There is a level of professionalism there that can allow a mission-centric approach. If you're talking about a full Heeresgruppe in WWII, it's a different matter.

 

[Vanguard44]

Singapore was surrendered in disgrace by yet another incompetent British army officer.

Not before the Australian forces broke into a rout and began looting the city while the Japanese were at their heels. Percival was incompetent but most of his Australians, upon whom he relied, were not fit for combat. Meanwhile the Malay Regiment and Indian troops showed the greatest courage.

 

[Zinegata]

That depends on the size of the Army. The modern British Army consists of three field brigades. There is a level of professionalism there that can allow a mission-centric approach. If you're talking about a full Heeresgruppe in WWII, it's a different matter.

I'm of the opinion that the British/American Army idea that you can train initiative and a mission-centric approach is illusory; even among a self-selecting group of volunteers. Because organizations in civilian life - particularly large corporations - also attempt to inculcate this "initiative" system and yet more often than not fail. Those who succeed, consistently, are organizations that do not attempt to train people to do learn the mission-centric approach, but rather recognize that it takes this approach stems naturally from people of a certain character. In short, you can't train initiative - some people of a specific character have it and others don't.

Unfortunately the institutional hubris of these militaries are insistent on how the norms of civilian life don't apply to them, which more often than not results in leaders that are trained but unable to execute a mission-centric approach.

 

[Porkman]

One doesn't have to look far to see the influence of certain German generals in the post war Bundeswehr. No names mentioned. Neither does one have to look far to see the influence of Aufstragstaktik on Anglo-American "mission command." Ultimately while one has to acknowledge the skill of an individual wehrmacht soldier or officer, the Germans have never been good strategists and have made some seriously bizarre decisions in their military history. Most of their successes have been due to early exploitation of evolving trends rather than supergenerals: in the later Prussian wars in the 1870s/1880s it was railways and mobilisation timetables, in WWI it was a highly developed staff system and WWII 1939-1940 speaks for itself.

Two art of War quotes that seem apt seeing the language of your dismissal.

Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

Having good time tables, using a general staff system, taking advantage of railroads... those are good strategic decisions made by generals during peacetime that allowed them to be successful in war.

 

[Zinegata]

Two art of War quotes that seem apt seeing the language of your dismissal.





Having good time tables, using a general staff system, taking advantage of railroads... those are good strategic decisions made by generals during peacetime that allowed them to be successful in war.

I'm pretty sure we were all talking about generalship in the context of actually fighting battles - after all the German memoirs are focused on them primarily save Guderian's - in which regard the Germans were not particularly better and are overhyped.

And in any case on the strategic level German generals are among the worst violators of Sun Tzu's most overriding precept - which is that war is of virtal importance to the state - leading to its life or death - and must be a last resort. The utter ruin of Germany in 1945 shows how dramatically the German military failed to grasp this concept and allowed itself to be led to an entirely avoidable war.

Sun Tzu, were he alive, would thus praise the German generals for their preparedness for war, but would be utterly horrified by how they kept resorting to it.

 

[Vanguard44]

Having good time tables, using a general staff system, taking advantage of railroads... those are good strategic decisions made by generals during peacetime that allowed them to be successful in war.

They are not strategic decisions. That's just an organisational approach.

 

[Porkman]

I'm pretty sure we were all talking about generalship in the context of actually fighting battles - after all the German memoirs are focused on them primarily save Guderian's - in which regard the Germans were not particularly better and are overhyped.

And in any case on the strategic level German generals are among the worst violators of Sun Tzu's most overriding precept - which is that war is of virtal importance to the state - leading to its life or death - and must be a last resort. The utter ruin of Germany in 1945 shows how dramatically the German military failed to grasp this concept and allowed itself to be led to an entirely avoidable war.

Sun Tzu, were he alive, would thus praise the German generals for their preparedness for war, but would be utterly horrified by how they kept resorting to it.

Oh absolutely, I just found it off putting that this guy was demeaning the peacetime preparations that allowed Germany to do well. Brilliant Generals who can win against incalculable odds on the field are very rare. The army shouldn't be reliant on them to win. Germany was very good at using peacetime to make it easy for its generals, regardless of their abilities, to win in the early war. (The winning with ease part of the quote.)

Institutionalizing excellence is difficult for militaries and was something that the German army did quite well.

I don't blame the generals so much for allowing Hitler to get them into an unwinnable war.

To use a modern example, when the US invaded Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration asked the Pentagon how many troops it would take to do it. The pentagon, full of professional generals who knew what they were doing, said "about 400,000 US and coalition troops."

That wasn't the answer the administration wanted so they went ahead and did the invasion with 170,000. Defeating Iraq's regular military was of course no problem for 170,000 US soldiers. But they had willfully ignored why the Pentagon had given over twice that number. The Pentagon knew that the US invasion was going to destroy the social order of Iraq and send the country into chaos, they saw 200,000 more troops as a necessity to prevent that.

Then events happened exactly the same way that the Pentagon had predicted with insufficient troops. The country descended into chaos, sectarian battles and such. Order wasn't restored until the Surge in 2007, when the administration sent 20,000 additional forces to provide security.

I know that this is massively oversimplified and could be construed as somewhat political, but my point was that the military can do their best and perform extremely well in their preparation and all that, but the ultimate conduct of the war is still up to the civilian leadership.

 

[Zinegata]

I don't blame the generals so much for allowing Hitler to get them into an unwinnable war.

Civilian governments are certainly ultimately responsible for getting into a war, but the complicity of the German Generals in the First and Second World Wars however is somewhat more pronounced compared to the Bush administration's railroading of the Iraq War; the main problem being that the German General Staff for the most part only saw the world from the lens of "military problems" requiring military "solutions". They never really operated as part of an integrated national security apparatus that had a wholistic - meaning military, diplomatic, and economic - approach to managing world crisis; so when a crisis erupted they invariably just pressed for a military solution.

The Schlieffen Plan for instance was planned almost purely from a military perspective with no regard for political considerations, leading to the disastrous violation of Belgian neutrality which triggered a rapid British intervention. Similarly in the Second war there was a lot of politicking by the generals for their own personal favored projects and offensives; and a political solution wasn't really looked at aside from half-hearted "let's kill Hitler and take over" plots and finally considering a peace settlement when the war was clearly lost.

 

[Porkman]

They are not strategic decisions. That's just an organisational approach.

So not strategic that the Treaty of Versailles explicitly banned Germany from having a general staff.

Organization. Is. Strategy.

Take a look at Genghis Khan and his success.

Were his Mongol hordes in the 12th century any more advanced technologically than they had been 100,200, or 500 years before?

Not really.

Was he personally a brilliant general?

Yes.

Did he find other brilliant generals?

Yes.

Did he have a weird string of brilliant generals that lasted consistently for 100 years?

Yes... this suggests something other than luck.

Genghis Khan became an amazing conqueror because he completely reorganized the way Mongol armies fought.

Genghis Khan had observed that inter tribal fights were inconclusive because the victorious side would always stop to loot the camp and let the enemy escape. Genghis Khan fixed this by appointing special officers who's job it was to inventory the goods of a defeated enemy and make sure they were shared out equally, allowing the army to worry about chasing the enemy instead of protecting loot.

Genghis Khan had observed that men were often fearful to fight because they might leave their families behind. So Genghis Khan made it so a warrior's dependents were entitled to his share of the spoils (something only possible because of the previous innovation above.)

Genghis Khan had observed that only princes and nobility were allowed to command troops. He changed it so that soldiers elected their own officers regardless of birth. The commander of the European invasion, Subodei, was not noble, but had gained command on merit.

Genghis Khan knew that his empire was huge and scattered, so he set up a pony express system to keep every part in communication.

Genghis Khan encountered advanced technology like siege weapons and gunpowder in China, and henceforth attached Chinese engineer detachments to all of his armies.

When a merchant entered the Mongol empire, they would be questioned about the roads they travelled, the realms they visited, where the bridges and castles were, who the rulers were and troop strength. This gave the Mongol armies an immense intelligence advantage over their foes. They sent out armies with an actual plan of attack and good intelligence on their enemies.

To see an example, look at this

That's a copy of the extreme west end of a map made in 1402 in Korea. This is before the age of sail and reflects the information that the Mongols had brought back about European geography. (Where they never went further than Poland) They knew about Spain and Africa and Italy.

Anyway, after Genghis Khan died, his heirs were able to use the army that Genghis Khan had organized to go on conquering for decades.

The Mongol empire was successful because Genghis had taken something that already existed for hundreds of years, (fierce steppe horse archers) and organized them into an effective military machine.

That's the point of this digression. Organization is fundamental to being able to have a good strategy. Genghis Khan is just one example. Look at the amazing run of success Rome had after Gaius Marius reorganized the army. Rome's continent spanning empire was built because one guy knew a better way to organize.

Organizational approach is how you win before or without fighting.

 

[yautjasith]

I'm of the opinion that the British/American Army idea that you can train initiative and a mission-centric approach is illusory; even among a self-selecting group of volunteers. Because organizations in civilian life - particularly large corporations - also attempt to inculcate this "initiative" system and yet more often than not fail. Those who succeed, consistently, are organizations that do not attempt to train people to do learn the mission-centric approach, but rather recognize that it takes this approach stems naturally from people of a certain character. In short, you can't train initiative - some people of a specific character have it and others don't.

I absolutely agree. Educational systems have for years identified different types of people with different ways of thinking. Bold, methodical, feeling, thinking, decisive, reflective....we have all seen the tables. Yet Corporate and Military systems completely disregard this. Convergent systems stress one way of doing things, one path to the top. I can't tell you how many times I saw flight instructors who could not instruct, but had to have that billet to further their careers. How many times have people seen excellent technicians promoted to be poor supervisors, simply because they had maxed out as a technician and could not get a pay raise any other way.

What many people forget about the German staff system, is that it was meant to create a system that allowed any type of General to succeed. Clausewitz and his contemporaries understood that you can never count on having a "brilliant" General when you need him for a war. Heck, even the Romans relied more on a system of war than on individual commanders. There are two examples that I like to point to: Hannibal vs Scipio, and Rommel vs Montgomery. Hannibal and Rommel are seen as daring, decisive and creative. Both have been praised for their amazing successes. Scipio and Montgomery are somewhat downplayed, but both fought their opponents in the same way: Systematically. Both Scipio and Montgomery studied their opponents, carefully prepared their forces and planned how to engage the enemy. Both fought to deny their enemies the openings they needed to be "brilliant". They forced their opponents to fight on their terms. Montgomery only truly failed as Napoleon did- when he tried to be the type of General that he was not (Operation Market Garden).

 

[scroggin]

There are two examples that I like to point to: Hannibal vs Scipio, and Rommel vs Montgomery. Hannibal and Rommel are seen as daring, decisive and creative. Both have been praised for their amazing successes. Scipio and Montgomery are somewhat downplayed, but both fought their opponents in the same way: Systematically. Both Scipio and Montgomery studied their opponents, carefully prepared their forces and planned how to engage the enemy. Both fought to deny their enemies the openings they needed to be "brilliant". They forced their opponents to fight on their terms. Montgomery only truly failed as Napoleon did- when he tried to be the type of General that he was not (Operation Market Garden).

Very Good points here I would like to add that the failure of market garden was not just a general trying to be what he wasn't. It was an army trying to fight how it didn't.