Best and worst commanders of WWII

[bz249]

Thus Montgomery's strategy was not to punch through the German forces, but to engage him and defeat his force and not simply punch through, but to keep this defeated force engaged and keep advancing without allowing him to disengage, reform and regroup. This means slow advances that allow operational success to turn into strategic success. This is why the back and forth of the desert war finally ended in victory. No, it didnt have the deep armoured penetrations that capture the imagination of the Rommel fanboys, but it was hugely successful.

Yes it was hugely successful in the sense that Rommel pulled back to Tunesia which was anyway the place they wanted to defend. After that Monty had a genious plan to get bogged down... sorry to blood the Germans via attrional warfare at the Mareth Line.

The game changer was not a genious British Field Marshall, but Operation Torch. Lybia was impossibe to be hold after that anyway.

 

[Henry IX]

Montgomery was not a genius, but he was solidly competent with a clear understanding of how to win with the forces under his command. That's all the Western Allies needed - not a flashy, risk taking genius but someone who could win repeatedly with superior forces.

 

[bz249]

Montgomery was not a genius, but he was solidly competent with a clear understanding of how to win with the forces under his command. That's all the Western Allies needed - not a flashy, risk taking genius but someone who could win repeatedly with superior forces.

Ok, but to get a clear picture of his impact in Africa the setting after el-Alamein have to be analyzed.
- Could his superior forces eliminate the old DAK for all?
- What kind of effects did it produce the arrival of the DAK to Tunisia (having both Rommel and von Arnim there to command might result in a net minus for the Axis)?

Finally: was an earlier Sicily landing and shaking the alliance system of Germany within the reach if the African Campaign concluded earlier? If yes then Monty might have prolonged the war.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Yes it was hugely successful in the sense that Rommel pulled back to Tunesia which was anyway the place they wanted to defend. After that Monty had a genious plan to get bogged down... sorry to blood the Germans via attrional warfare at the Mareth Line.

I am not quite sure what you are trying to say here. The British objective wasn't to capture 'that wiley scoundrel Rommel's but to secure their colonial holdings in the middle East and North Africa. The allied efforts at the second battle of El Alamein were decisive in that they destroyed the German forces as a fighting entity and caused the Germans to suffer the largest defeat and longest withdrawal of the war to that point. German forces withdrew to Tunisia and would no longer pose a threat to British interests there.

The game changer was not a genious British Field Marshall, but Operation Torch. Lybia was impossibe to be hold after that anyway.

The advance of allied forces into Tunisia was part of operation torch? German forces were not going anywhere near Lybia once they had been pushed into Tunisia.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Ok, but to get a clear picture of his impact in Africa the setting after el-Alamein have to be analyzed.
- Could his superior forces eliminate the old DAK for all?

It destroyed the force in that it had the effect of removing it as a fighting force. This is the textbook definition of 'DESTROY' as an EFFECT in NATO doctrine.

- What kind of effects did it produce the arrival of the DAK to Tunisia (having both Rommel and von Arnim there to command might result in a net minus for the Axis)?

I am not sure what the question is here ... Could you perhaps reword it. What is the point that you wish to gett across here?

 

[bz249]

It destroyed the force in that it had the effect of removing it as a fighting force. This is the textbook definition of 'DESTROY' as an EFFECT in NATO doctrine.


I am not sure what the question is here ... Could you perhaps reword it. What is the point that you wish to gett across here?

Ok first point to address: how much of that long withdrawal was due to El-Alamein and how much it was due to Torch?
Second point: in the bigger picture would a more vigorous action resulting in not a withdrawal but surrender of these in Lybia nov 1942 would have helped later in Tunisia?

 

[Fanstar1]

Ok first point to address: how much of that long withdrawal was due to El-Alamein and how much it was due to Torch?
Second point: in the bigger picture would a more vigorous action resulting in not a withdrawal but surrender of these in Lybia nov 1942 would have helped later in Tunisia?

The retreat from El-Alamein to Tripoli was because to El-Alamein. further retreat was forced by torch. How would Monty had destroyed Rommel's forces? They already destroyed much of it at El-Alamein, but logistics got in the way of catching Rommel east of Tunisia.

 

[Henry IX]

Ok first point to address: how much of that long withdrawal was due to El-Alamein and how much it was due to Torch?
Second point: in the bigger picture would a more vigorous action resulting in not a withdrawal but surrender of these in Lybia nov 1942 would have helped later in Tunisia?

The capture of the AK in Libya would only have occurred if Monty had been prepared to throw unsupported armored forces well in advance of his supply lines. That could have lead to a more complete destruction of the AK or allowed Rommel to concentrate his remaining forces against an outnumbered and poorly supplied armored thrust and inflict yet another painful and demoralizing advance on the British army. But what's the chance of Rommel seizing the chance for a risky counterattack as a method to restore the situation... ?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Or . . . .

Ultra intercepts uncovered a hole in the allied communications network, revealing that Rommel's intelligence staff was deciphering coded transmissions. This is what gave Rommel such an uncanny understanding of what the British were doing before they did it. SOE plugged the hole, and the flow of information to Germany stopped.

At roughly this point, Alexander was put in theatre command, Montgomery command of Eighth Army. Rommel received reinforcements he could barely feed and tanks with enough fuel to drive from here to there but not enough to get back. Germany's hand forced by the Fuhrer's will, Rommel assaulted the prepared British positions at El Alamein. And Bounced. Hard. Monty successfully defended a well prepared defensive line. Bravo.

Monty, who now has Rommel's orders while Rommel does not have his, manages a pursuit that follows the Germans to where they want to go. And fails to distinguish himself in any conflict thereafter.

Britain needed a hero, and Monty was happy to play the role, whether it was deserved or not. I am reminded that after the war, Montgomery petitioned the government for a simple country house in the spirit of those given to John Churchill and Arthur Wellsley, and was simply refused.

Merely my opinion, take it for what it is worth.

 

[Henry IX]

And fails to distinguish himself in any conflict thereafter.

Ummm, D-Day. The best planned operation of the war, a massive success and largely Monty's work. Once again, he wasn't great, but he was good.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Ummm, D-Day. The best planned operation of the war, a massive success and largely Monty's work. Once again, he wasn't great, but he was good.

'D-Day' covers a lot of water. Operation Bodyguard, and all the SOE subplots. Operation Neptune. Operation Point Blank. Et al.

While in nominal command of the 21st Army when it lands, that day belongs to a lot more people than Sir Bernard Law Montgomery - who fails to take his primary objective of the first day until a month and a half later.

Montgomery is a servicable commander, he has his moments, but he seems to be more interested in not losing a battle than in winning it.

 

[Henry IX]

but he seems to be more interested in not losing a battle than in winning it.

That I can agree with, and is what I would argue is what was needed. Given the massive material superiority the Allies possessed all they had to do is avoid defeat and they would win. In the German army of the same period his caution and insistence on meticulous planning would have been considered serious drawbacks but they had a very different set of strategic constrains.

 

[bz249]

The capture of the AK in Libya would only have occurred if Monty had been prepared to throw unsupported armored forces well in advance of his supply lines. That could have lead to a more complete destruction of the AK or allowed Rommel to concentrate his remaining forces against an outnumbered and poorly supplied armored thrust and inflict yet another painful and demoralizing advance on the British army. But what's the chance of Rommel seizing the chance for a risky counterattack as a method to restore the situation... ?

Note that Rommel inflict a painful and demoralizing defeat on the British (via alien space bat help... because IRL it was due to being closer to his supply base, which is not the case after the Tunis events) is still a strategic gain due to the fact that he is not doing what he supposed to do. His job is to reinforce the Tunis bridgehead. Though yet another defeat by the British Army is going to undermine the Empire even more (which we know was anyway doomed, but was not clear in 1942)

 

[Acheron]

Wasn't Montgomery trying to avoid being one of these WWI generals who wasted thousands of men for progress measured in feet? Didn't he say so himself? If so, his role in Market-Garden is outright tragic.

 

[Fanstar1]

Wasn't Montgomery trying to avoid being one of these WWI generals who wasted thousands of men for progress measured in feet? Didn't he say so himself? If so, his role in Market-Garden is outright tragic.

Market garden did take land 50 miles into enemy lines up to Nijmegen, but it failed at going anywhere.

 

[Acheron]

I think there ought to be agreement here that Montgomery can hardly be considered the worst commander of WWII, no? As for best, personally I don't see him there quite either. Two names I would like to throw into the ring for either position, Slim and Gamelin.

 

[donaldcapazzo]

Franz Halder has to be the worst. Actually much of the German generals lacked the knowledge of economic aspects of war, an aspect which was critically important to factor in their offensives.
He influenced much the post-war opinion that everything was Hitler's fault and the generals did nothing wrong, while in reality it was the complete opposite. Hitler, actually, took much strategically sound decisions, for example, focusing on Ukraine and Caucausus, but Halder had none of it and wanted Moscow. Moscow was of no importance to the Germans, they needed Ukraine and the oil fields in Maikop and Grozny, which Hitler wanted from the get-go, but his plan wouldn't be fulfilled until Case Blue.


For the best, I'd have to go for Gotthard Heinrici, he was brilliant and very underrated. He had a knack for logistics, was brilliant in the defense and also offense, he cared about his troops well being, and along with Model and some others apart from being good commanders, was /loved/ by the troops, which was rare at those circumstances *cough* Vatutin *cough*

 

[Acheron]

For the best, I'd have to go for Gotthard Heinrici, he was brilliant and very underrated. He had a knack for logistics, was brilliant in the defense and also offense, he cared about his troops well being, and along with Model and some others apart from being good commanders, was /loved/ by the troops, which was rare at those circumstances *cough* Vatutin *cough*

Model beloved by the troops? I am surprised, he wasn't portrayed very well in "A bridge too far", and seemed rather aristocratic in general.

 

[Easy-Kill]

'D-Day' covers a lot of water. Operation Bodyguard, and all the SOE subplots. Operation Neptune. Operation Point Blank. Et al.

While in nominal command of the 21st Army when it lands, that day belongs to a lot more people than Sir Bernard Law Montgomery - who fails to take his primary objective of the first day until a month and a half later.

Montgomery is a servicable commander, he has his moments, but he seems to be more interested in not losing a battle than in winning it.

I think you are focussing on maps as opposed to objectives. Caen was a focal point by which the British/Canadians could shield the invasion area while the invasion forcesfmysteres and established themrselves, and the US forces captured Cherbourg. Yes, Caen wasn't captured on the first day (mostly because there was an entire as panzer division in the vicinity), but the battles around Caen sucked in huge numbers of German divisions in concentrations not seen on almost any front.

The place wasn't captured, but it acted as a focal point prevented German forces freedom of manoeuvre while the US forces undertook Cobra. The city wasn't taken, but the objective was fulfilled and I believe it acted as an indicator of Monty's flexibility.

I also think that the failure to occupy the city on the first day was hardly his fault. Firstly there were Germans there and secondly, it was a divisional objective and nothing to do with a theatre commander.

 

[Fanstar1]

I think you are focussing on maps as opposed to objectives. Caen was a focal point by which the British/Canadians could shield the invasion area while the invasion forcesfmysteres and established themrselves, and the US forces captured Cherbourg. Yes, Caen wasn't captured on the first day (mostly because there was an entire as panzer division in the vicinity), but the battles around Caen sucked in huge numbers of German divisions in concentrations not seen on almost any front.

The place wasn't captured, but it acted as a focal point prevented German forces freedom of manoeuvre while the US forces undertook Cobra. The city wasn't taken, but the objective was fulfilled and I believe it acted as an indicator of Monty's flexibility.

I also think that the failure to occupy the city on the first day was hardly his fault. Firstly there were Germans there and secondly, it was a divisional objective and nothing to do with a theatre commander.

The Panzer division wasn't at Caen when it all began, but by the time the british reached Caen on day 1 it had just started reaching it and stopped the allied attack in the area. Caen not being taken didn't matter ultimately.