Best and worst commanders of WWII

[JakeTheDoge]

1st Forum post, don't rip me a new one.
It's very tough to compare armies like this. Every army had varying degrees of success, but this variation is due to an enormous multitude of factors, from training, leadership, equipment, logistics through to doctrinal approaches to combat. There's been a huge amount written about the American concerns that the Australians weren't pulling their weight in New Guinea.

MacArthur even stated to the Australian PM that he doubted the fighting resolve of the Aussies, a move that saw Blamey (Aussie General) make a speech to his own men that nearly ended in mutiny. After having received an earful from the PM, Blamey insinuated that the Aussie divisions were cowardly, or at least more interested in self-preservation that fighting the Japanese. This was, rightly, treated as a slap in the face for men who faced pestilential swamps, monsoon rains that lasted months, and an enemy who rarely surrendered, vanishing through disengagement into the jungle. What was later found out, when the Americans attacked Jap positions at Buna-Gona, was that the perceived deficiencies in the Allied troops was not limited to the Australians. The Americans suffered terribly when faced with significant fortifications that had been built, and the lack of progress made was picked up by Blamey, who at this point suggested that maybe they be replaced with Australians.

The majority of Chinese armies of WW2 were not armies in the Western (or Japanese) sense. Warlords would swear fealty to a side (Chiang Kai-Shek or Mao Zedong) and then their only further tasks would be to raise their troops, and keep them fed until they were delivered to the army. At this point, the men were "ready" for combat; despite having little to no formal training, little to no equipment and little to no nourishment. In Eagle Against The Sun (Spector), the author describes some of Vinegar Joe Stilwell's staff officers seeing the Chinese recruitment process in action. The young men's families were threatened that if he didn't enlist, he would be killed. The medical corps reported widespread malnutrition, troops were poorly fed and in many cases their pay went to their officers or warlord. Whilst the Americans would be wooed by tales from Madame Chiang of the millions and millions of troops available in China, if only they were to be fed, clothed and armed, the reality was that the quality of the troops was extremely poor.

The Japanese gained great experience fighting its campaigns in China but for much of this war, they were an occupation force, suppressing any and all forms of dissent. Burma and Malaya and the naval invasions gave the Japanese a chance to flex their muscles against relatively well equipped armies (Khalkin Gol excepting). They took this opportunity to prove themselves against the "whites" or colonial powers with gusto.

At the end of the day, Japanese forces were fanatical, led by brutal officers and leaders. Victory through death was perfectly achievable to them, whilst other nations would begin to focus on troop preservation. The Japanese were simply more willing to die for their goals.

The Allies, including their dominions, remembered the 1st World War, and wanted to avoid the horror and losses. They arguably had more to lose.

 

[Acheron]

@JakeTheDoge well said, though commanders know (or at least really ought to) what sort of armies they have and make the best of it, There are commanders where one can almost assuredly say that they not only did not make the best of their situation but came pretty damn close to making the worst out of it.

 

[Easy-Kill]

The early mistake in Burma was British... the total strategic collapse was American.

The British had rebuffed Chinese aide when it was first offered in late 1941. They accepted it eventually, but it meant that Chinese troops were still marching on foot to get from Yunnan to Burma in January and February of 1942.

So I did a bit of digging in my books in the Malayan campaign and in the academic paper, but couldn't find any mention of the British rebuffing Chinese efforts. From what I read, the contributions were almost one way, with Britain providing material aid and training to China prior to the outbreak of war (lead by Brigadier Denny). Of note was the point that China refused to send it's soldiers clothed, with many of them freezing to death when they made the flight into Burma/British India.

The British strategic plan for Burma was Singapore, which was weakened by the point that the UK were fighting across multiple theatres of war in 1941. Particularly, the fall of France meant that British naval and air power was focussed on the Mediterranean instead of the far East.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Just checked out the wikipedia article on the Battle of Singapore. Unless it is widely inaccurate, everyone stop bitching about the Indian units. The Japanese had 36,000 men, the British 85,000. The later included the Australian 8th division (about 20,000) and the British 18 Division (about 15,000). So completely discounting non-white forces, the British still had numerical parity with the Japanese. Laying all the blame on the Indians is awfully convenient for the British and Australians to cover that their men there didn't quite put up much of a heroic resistance themselves.

And yes, all British forces were probably noticeably greener than the Japanese, but again, they had to defend a relatively small area. In Europe, the British and French lost to the Germans, because the former were ready for a remake of WWI. At Singapore, it seems to me the British lost to the Japanese because the later were coming in for some actual war, while the former, I don't know, expected cricket?

This is hugely unfair and if you look further into the numbers you will note their disparity. Yes, there were only 30000 Japanese attacking directly in the battle, but there were a further 80,000 supporting. Furthermore, the allied forces were not all concentrated into the direct defence but into a supporting role.

Further, the newly arrived British 18th division had freshly arrived after being first equipped for fighting in the desert and instead re routed to Singapore and spent months at sea. They were expecting to fight Germans in the sand, not Japanese in the trees. The Australian division was definately one of the (hence why they defended the least probable direction of attack in the north east).


The Australian 8th division was undoubtedly the best allied formation in Singapore, but it had been beaten down the peninsula and had numerical inferiority at the point of Japanese attacks on the island. It was forced into static defence in a poorly defensible area that the well trained Japanese forces utilised excellently.

Given that Japan had complete naval superiority, superb and unchallenged air support, and numerical parity across the theatre it is no wonder they won. Once the Australians had lost the major fresh water reservoir, and with any counter attacks being interdicted by Japanese air power, the battle was already lost.

The Indian troops were inferior by virtue of them being garrison troops with little training, less equipment and the enthusiasm of an underfed sloth. This isn't a slight on them (and there were some fantastic Indian soldiers) it is simply as it was.

 

[Porkman]

So I did a bit of digging in my books in the Malayan campaign and in the academic paper, but couldn't find any mention of the British rebuffing Chinese efforts. From what I read, the contributions were almost one way, with Britain providing material aid and training to China prior to the outbreak of war (lead by Brigadier Denny). Of note was the point that China refused to send it's soldiers clothed, with many of them freezing to death when they made the flight into Burma/British India.

The British strategic plan for Burma was Singapore, which was weakened by the point that the UK were fighting across multiple theatres of war in 1941. Particularly, the fall of France meant that British naval and air power was focussed on the Mediterranean instead of the far East.

Ok, let's go back to the academic papers.

From Lathrop, A. (1981). The Employment of Chinese Nationalist Troops in the First Burma Campaign. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(2), 403-432. doi:10.1017/S0022463400009954

The military responsibility for Burma's defence rested with Far East Command from 1937 to 1941, headquartered in Singapore under Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. The plan of defence, such as it was, never seriously considered the possibility of an enemy invasion and called for the establishment of fixed defences along the Thailand frontier where roads usable as invasion routes led into Burma. The British counted upon launching a counter-offensive into Thailand; if that failed, they would fight a delaying action from strongpoint to strongpoint across southeastern Burma, falling back eventually to the Salween River. What the British failed to realize, and consequently were unable to cope with throughout the campaign, was the ability of the Japanese to operate successfully off the roads and tracks with mobility and independence of communication, while they were forced by lack of training to move by vehicular routes. The Allied high command tended to discount the toughness and capabilities of the Japanese troops: British complacency and haughty disregard for their enemy surfaced as early as 1938 when a British air attache in China misguidedly reported that the Japanese had inferior planes, employed bad tactics, had poor coordination between service arms, and underestimated their enemy, the Chinese

Again, they never took the Japanese seriously... and they never considered that the Japanese could invade.

But it wasn't just the British.

Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, who arrived from Egypt in July 1941, to become Commander-in-Chief, India, "never lost his complete contempt for the Japanese
soldier", an opinion which was, however, not shared by commanders in the field. Although he later "confessed to a serious error of judgement in underestimating the danger to Burma" and the weakness of British troops defending the country, "his failure to recognize the degree of superiority of the Japanese forces led him into unjustified optimism," wrote the official British historian.

Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, underestimated the enemy, too, and felt that the Japanese had been successful in China not because of superior fighting ability but because of the Chinese Army's lack of willingness to fight an aggressive
action.

Now as to the point about when China offered military aid to Britain.

The Generalissimo had first offered Chinese troops to support the defence of Burma the day the war began.

Chiang Kai Shek offers on December 8th.

and had repeated it on 15 and 16 December. At the conference on 22 December, Chiang Kai-shek offered his Fifth and Sixth Armies to the British for use in Burma, but on condition that they not be committed piecemeal but rather en masse, that they not be mixed with Imperial troops, and that they be given their own area of operations, supplies, and line of communications. General Wavell, attending for Britain, accepted only the Ninety-third Division and a regiment of the Forty-ninth, both of which he asked be kept in reserve at Wanting near the Burmese border, and which were components of the Sixth Army; the Fifth Army was being assembled near Kunming and he asked that it remain there because he could not provide it with a separate line of supply and wanted it to be in position to either support operations in Burma, move against any possible Japanese invasion of Yunnan, or enter offensive action in Indochina. His acceptance was also tinged with hesitancy stemming from a fervent hope that "foreign" troops would not be necessary to defend Burma and that Malaya might be held. The Chinese and Americans, however, interpreted Wavell's hesitancy as a refusal of aid and never forgave what they felt was an unnecessary insult.

Nevertheless, the British did subsequently set up efficient supply and liaison nets down to the battalion level, as well as a workable medical evacuation system for the Chinese. The question of command was not discussed, either for Burma or for the theatre as a whole, and later devolved into a very touchy issue among the Allies as the campaign progressed.

China offered two armies on December 8th... Britain reluctantly accepted two divisions on December 22nd.

Once the campaign began, the British didn't appreciate how much better trained and equipped the Japanese were.

The Japanese Thirty-third Division, which had entered Burma on the twenty-sixth, moved rapidly up the Salween to secure the ford at Pa-an three days later, after a brisk engagement with troops of the Seventh Gurkha Rifles. Wavell, who visited the front on 6 February with Lt.-Gen. T.J. Hutton, General Officer Commanding, Burma, advised that the Japanese "not be regarded as supermen" and unrealistically urged a counterattack to recapture lost areas in Tenasserim.

The Chinese forces sent to Burma were ill equipped because Chinese forces were ill equipped. They had 300+ divisions running off of an industrial base smaller than Belgium's. What you're referring to is flying Chinese troops over the Hump to Ramargh in India in 1942-1944 after the fall of Burma.

"The contributions were one way." In the first Burma campaign, the Japanese lost 4,500 killed and wounded, the British lost about 10,000, the Chinese lost 25,000. China didn't have the material to contribute much beyond people in uniform.

 

[Holmes]

Just checked out the wikipedia article on the Battle of Singapore. Unless it is widely inaccurate, everyone stop bitching about the Indian units. The Japanese had 36,000 men, the British 85,000. The later included the Australian 8th division (about 20,000) and the British 18 Division (about 15,000). So completely discounting non-white forces, the British still had numerical parity with the Japanese. Laying all the blame on the Indians is awfully convenient for the British and Australians to cover that their men there didn't quite put up much of a heroic resistance themselves.

And yes, all British forces were probably noticeably greener than the Japanese, but again, they had to defend a relatively small area. In Europe, the British and French lost to the Germans, because the former were ready for a remake of WWI. At Singapore, it seems to me the British lost to the Japanese because the later were coming in for some actual war, while the former, I don't know, expected cricket?

Not inaccurate at all, with a large overall numerical superiority, (2.5:1) the Uk/CW found itself outnumbered in actual combat. It ought to have inflicted a 5:1 loss on the IJA but instead achieved parity in combat infliction despite being in defensive posture. Rather a bad batting collapse, which was why Percy did not get a knighthood.

"...the reason [why we lost Malaya] was that the people we sent out were an inferior troop of military and naval men." Winston Churchill, 1949

 

[Acheron]

This is hugely unfair and if you look further into the numbers you will note their disparity. Yes, there were only 30000 Japanese attacking directly in the battle, but there were a further 80,000 supporting. Furthermore, the allied forces were not all concentrated into the direct defence but into a supporting role.

What is meant with "supporting role"? The Japanese had launched an invasion of the peninsula and advanced towards Singapore, naturally they needed supporting forces for guarding their rear areas and to provide logistics, but forces such employed only sustain the power of other forces they do not increase it. And the allies at Singapore had fallen back to their logistical base, so that should have favored them massively.

Further, the newly arrived British 18th division had freshly arrived after being first equipped for fighting in the desert and instead re routed to Singapore and spent months at sea. They were expecting to fight Germans in the sand, not Japanese in the trees. The Australian division was definately one of the (hence why they defended the least probable direction of attack in the north east).

If it had been reversed, if troops expecting to defend Singapore had suddenly found themselves squaring off in the North African desert, I would be more sympathetic, I would find it plausible that the conditions of the deserts would be difficult, especially if they lacked necessary equipment. As it is, I must ask for elaboration, what made fighting at Singapore so much more difficult? Where the bullets for Europe incompatible with Asian targets?

The Australian 8th division was undoubtedly the best allied formation in Singapore, but it had been beaten down the peninsula and had numerical inferiority at the point of Japanese attacks on the island. It was forced into static defence in a poorly defensible area that the well trained Japanese forces utilised excellently.

I look at WWI and see troops that, given similar time to prepare, would require to be massively disadvantaged in manpower to be dislodged from their positions. What made their defensive position so bad? Wasn't it adequately prepared? How badly were they beaten down during the previous fighting on the peninsula and why? AFAIK, static defense in the best job you can hope for. digging in and letting the other side advance towards you in the open.

Given that Japan had complete naval superiority, superb and unchallenged air support, and numerical parity across the theatre it is no wonder they won. Once the Australians had lost the major fresh water reservoir, and with any counter attacks being interdicted by Japanese air power, the battle was already lost.

How did the Japanese naval superiority show itself apart from allowing them to bring in the troops and sustain them in the first place? As for air superiority, AFAIK, experience in Northafrica and France showed that it was most effective at stopping enemies mobile operations but was considerably less good at dislodging enemies in static, fortified positions, as was regular artillery (Caen).

The Indian troops were inferior by virtue of them being garrison troops with little training, less equipment and the enthusiasm of an underfed sloth. This isn't a slight on them (and there were some fantastic Indian soldiers) it is simply as it was.

No idea how good or bad the Indians were, I just take issue with harping on their supoossed deficiencies when the "white troops" counted as many as the Japanese, but them not putting up a fight in apparently impolite to mention.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Japanese naval superiority was limited anyway since they could not cross Malacca strait safely which is a big deal.

Infact it was ABDA who had naval superiority in the Area untill PoW and Repulse got sunk. (I know ABDA was founded after her sinking but you get the picture)

But stating the Japanese had naval superiority while the British threw away their battleships is bold. I mean yes, after the British lost their battleships the Japanese had indeed a limited naval superiority.

What the Japanese however had in the area from the start is air superiority. British and Dutch aircraft could not compete at all due to numerous reasons.

 

[Henry IX]

Yes Guderian was a great back bencher and theorist, if they only kept him away from the fron lines.

The victory in the Battle of France was largely of his making, and it was the most important single military action of the century (with only the Battle of the Marne and the 1941 winter counter-attack at Moscow coming close). It was a massively improbable victory and permanently changed how military operations are undertaken. While he was certainly a prima donna and was a classic case of the Wehrmacht general who used his memoirs to propagate the 'lost victories' narrative of the war, his impact on operational warfare should not be underestimated.

In terms of Singapore, I find the passivity of the British defence to be the most damning factor. The defenders never mounted a counteract in anything larger the battalion strength and only two of them. Given that there were entire intact divisions who sat unengaged in defensive positions while the Japanese captured the only sources of fresh water on the island, the management of the defence deserves to be castigated.

Percival tends to get blamed, and while he was an incompetent who surrendered far to easily, the campaign took a real team effort to be stuffed up so badly. The officer corps was incompetent and complacent from top to bottom and the fighting quality of the soldiers reflected this. Even the Australians, who generally had a good reputation as tough, capable soldiers, didn't fight particularly well, allowing the Japanese to infiltrate around their positions and failing to aggressively counter their landing in the first 24hrs, when it was still weak.

The Japanese were undoubtedly better soldiers, man for man, than the Commonwealth forces but the British took no real efforts to counter this and totally failed to turn their significantly greater paper strength into any real advantage in combat, consistently allowing their forces to be outnumbered at the point of the Japanese attack.

 

[bz249]

The victory in the Battle of France was largely of his making, and it was the most important single military action of the century (with only the Battle of the Marne and the 1941 winter counter-attack at Moscow coming close). It was a massively improbable victory and permanently changed how military operations are undertaken. While he was certainly a prima donna and was a classic case of the Wehrmacht general who used his memoirs to propagate the 'lost victories' narrative of the war, his impact on operational warfare should not be underestimated.

Till about the Moscow counterattack the Germans always shoot themselves out of trouble, so it is hard to find why the Battle of France would be an exception from the rule (ok France was at least in the same weight class). Let's say Guderian fails to consolidate the bridgehead at Sedan and/or make no aggressive reconnaissance. Now what? So Battle of Hannut and Gembloux Gap is costly draw, but nevertheless the third German Panzer Korps got it's home run and had its operational breakthrough. It can either swing right and proceed historically, or swing left to help Guderian out. Result: German victory, instead of Guderian we have Hoth/Rommel as the "hero".

 

[Henry IX]

Till about the Moscow counterattack the Germans always shoot themselves out of trouble, so it is hard to find why the Battle of France would be an exception from the rule (ok France was at least in the same weight class). Let's say Guderian fails to consolidate the bridgehead at Sedan and/or make no aggressive reconnaissance. Now what? So Battle of Hannut and Gembloux Gap is costly draw, but nevertheless the third German Panzer Korps got it's home run and had its operational breakthrough. It can either swing right and proceed historically, or swing left to help Guderian out. Result: German victory, instead of Guderian we have Hoth/Rommel as the "hero".

The Blitzkrieg Legend by Karl-Heinz Frieser details the critical role Guderian had on shaping German panzer doctrine and how his influence transformed German operational methods. Without Guderian's constant championing of high tempo armoured operations with deep penetrations leaving open flanks, there is virtually no chance of the Germans achieving the breakthrough fast enough to encircle and destroy the cream of the French army. His methods were opposed consistently by much of the German command staff, including Halder until virtually the beginning of the operation. As a commander he was good, but not amazing, but as a developer of doctrine and trainer of soldiers he was transformative.

 

[bz249]

The Blitzkrieg Legend by Karl-Heinz Frieser details the critical role Guderian had on shaping German panzer doctrine and how his influence transformed German operational methods. Without Guderian's constant championing of high tempo armoured operations with deep penetrations leaving open flanks, there is virtually no chance of the Germans achieving the breakthrough fast enough to encircle and destroy the cream of the French army. His methods were opposed consistently by much of the German command staff, including Halder until virtually the beginning of the operation. As a commander he was good, but not amazing, but as a developer of doctrine and trainer of soldiers he was transformative.

ok i thought it was his role as a field commander in France... if his role as a staff/theory officer then i completely agree

 

[Acheron]

[...]Without Guderian's constant championing of high tempo armoured operations with deep penetrations leaving open flanks[...]

Heard about that, concerns that the penetrating units might be caught in the flanks and end up being encircled themselves. Seems like a valid concern, has it actually happened though?

 

[bz249]

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debrecen

The battle of Debrecen, or the who is encircling who... this was one of the most fluid battle of ww2.

In general it happened many times, however as long as the Panzer divisions were well supplied and had their mobility they had every means to react to changing battlefield conditions. That was the magic behind: those are temporary setbacks which can be solved by concentrating firepower.

 

[JakeTheDoge]

A 1979 study by the U.S. army found that an armoured division in 1944 could sustain itself for around 48-54 hours before it would need to wait for logistics to catch up. That's at least 2 days of aggressive advancing in the enemy's rear areas before the formation needs to stop and wait. In a country like France, where petrol and other supplies (food, water) were in readily available, the only thing stopping a rapid advance was lack of ammunition.

The breakthrough is important but its the exploitation that makes all the difference.

 

[Holmes]

A 1979 study by the U.S. army found that an armoured division in 1944 could sustain itself for around 48-54 hours before it would need to wait for logistics to catch up. That's at least 2 days of aggressive advancing in the enemy's rear areas before the formation needs to stop and wait. In a country like France, where petrol and other supplies (food, water) were in readily available, the only thing stopping a rapid advance was lack of ammunition.

The breakthrough is important but its the exploitation that makes all the difference.

No sure what study you refer to, but there were two forms of AD in the USA Army in ww2, only one had organic logistical support of 336 ton forward lift, (the Heavy AD with a supply Bttn) and of the 16 AD, only two, 2nd and 3rd had this logistical support to allow deep penetration/pursuit independent from the supply net for distance of 250 miles.

There was not a single self sufficient US AD in France in 44, all were logistically sustained by QM GTR companies, typically 4 munition and 1 POL.

In France, the limiting factor was fuel not munitions, no idea where you got that from but its simply nonsense.

 

[JakeTheDoge]

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION IN A DEEP ATTACK-
ANTHONY H. KRAL, MAJ, USA
B.S., CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, NEW YORK, 1988

"Deighton talks about the French petrol stations being used because not only were the tanks were well ahead of the supply lines, but also because ammunition replenishment was prioritized over fuel supplies.

"After the breakthrough, the German's carried three days' rations with them. Sometimes they even fuelled their armour and transport by breaking the locks off roadside filling station pumps. Teams of mechanics pressed enemy civilian trucks or transport into service if they could be put into working order or plundered for spare parts. Such measures enabled the supply services to devote their maximum efforts to ammunition replenishment.". (P.234).

At no point do I mention self-sufficiency. At no point do I specify U.S. armoured divisions. At this point, I pass over the buck. It is now your turn to argue why what I got is

simply nonsense

.

Can't believe I'm justifying myself.

 

[Holmes]

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF AN ARMORED DIVISION IN A DEEP ATTACK-
ANTHONY H. KRAL, MAJ, USA
B.S., CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, NEW YORK, 1988

This was not a study by the US army. Its not even from 1979 but 1988. But does conforms what i posted. You did read it right?.

"Deighton talks about the French petrol stations being used because not only were the tanks were well ahead of the supply lines, but also because ammunition replenishment was prioritized over fuel supplies.

"After the breakthrough, the German's carried three days' rations with them. Sometimes they even fuelled their armour and transport by breaking the locks off roadside filling station pumps. Teams of mechanics pressed enemy civilian trucks or transport into service if they could be put into working order or plundered for spare parts. Such measures enabled the supply services to devote their maximum efforts to ammunition replenishment.". (P.234)..

Er that second quote is for German AD in 1940, not US AD in 1944. Aparanttly you did not read it or understand that a German 1940 AD is not the same as as US 1944 AD. The first quote is not even in the PDF, but is from Len Deigtons Blitzkreig and is again refering to German Pzr III using petrol from french petrol stations, by 1944 there were no french petrol stations to so use, as fuel was at 10% of 1940 levels in France for civilian usage.

At no point do I mention self-sufficiency. At no point do I specify U.S. armoured divisions. At this point, I pass over the buck. It is now your turn to argue why what I got is .

"A 1979 study by the U.S. army found that an armoured division in 1944 could sustain itself for around 48-54 hours before it would need to wait for logistics to catch up."

If you cant see where your contradicting your own source, thats your problem to rectify, not mine. Your PDF contadicts your nonsense and explains there were two forms of US AD only one of which had organic logistical capability, and that the limiting factor for US AD in France was lack of fuel not munitions.

Can't believe I'm justifying myself.

But you can believe you dont know the difference between US and German divisions,and the difference between 1940 and 1944, or that the PDF you cite in no way supports your post but contradicts in in every way possible.

Try reading it, there is good info in it. Unlike your garbage of a post. What is not in it is any reference to any AD supplying itself for "48-54 hours" in ww2, there is a reference to a 1980s US AD M1 equipped divison having that capability. Your funny, but not in a good way.

In a country like France, where petrol and other supplies (food, water) were in readily available, the only thing stopping a rapid advance was lack of ammunition.

Except your pdf explains for the US 1944 the problem was fuel not ammunition.

 

[Henry IX]

Heard about that, concerns that the penetrating units might be caught in the flanks and end up being encircled themselves. Seems like a valid concern, has it actually happened though?

All the time. Standard procedure for most armies to deal with penetrations was to seal the gap and cut off and destroy the penetrating units. The question was really related to how quickly the penetrating formations could destabilise the front compared to how quickly the defender could respond with sufficient reinforcements to cut off and destroy the penetration.

With hindsight it turns out that the French and British response times were far too slow to seal off the German penetrations before they compromised the whole defence. It took the French around 24hrs to organise a counter-attack at an operational level in 1940. With the German panzer spearheads moving over 50km per day in the French rear lines this was hopelessly too slow. However, the Germans (except Gudarian and his panzer leaders) neither realised how fast a mechanised spearhead could move nor appreciated how sluggish the French response would actually be, and the result caught the most of the Wehrmacht by surprise as well as the British and French.

 

[Porkman]

"After the breakthrough, the German's carried three days' rations with them. Sometimes they even fuelled their armour and transport by breaking the locks off roadside filling station pumps. Teams of mechanics pressed enemy civilian trucks or transport into service if they could be put into working order or plundered for spare parts. Such measures enabled the supply services to devote their maximum efforts to ammunition replenishment.". (P.234).

.

As @Holmes said, this quote is wrong.

THere weren't petrol stations with spare fuel in 1944 German occupied France. It makes much more sense if it's referring to a German divisions in 1940.