I guess the lack of access to the sea transport combined with the topography played quite a role in the stalemate in Burma. The British prepared there wonderfully, by planting up to 3000 meter tall mountains with jungles and rivers flowing on the wrong direction to fortify the border between Burma and India proper.
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I guess the lack of access to the sea transport combined with the topography played quite a role in the stalemate in Burma. The British prepared there wonderfully, by planting up to 3000 meter tall mountains with jungles and rivers flowing on the wrong direction to fortify the border between Burma and India proper.
Real hunters don't need a scope on their rifle, for example Häyhä didn't use one despite being offered one. A surprisingly large percentage of the male population of Finland at the time were skilled hunters and skilled skiers, basically already qualifying them as a winter war sniper hunting human targets. I read somewhere that quite a few of these hunters living near the border didn't even enlist, they just grabbed their own hunting rifle in their cabin, their set of skis and set out into the woods to shoot some Russians on their own, but that might be a myth.
On the topic of bad commanders I have recently been reading about the Guadalcanal campaign and Robert L. Ghormley seems to be a good contender for the title of worst commander.
I know Häyhä mostly used Civic Guard rifles with iron sight, but he was so exceptionally successful that he can't really be taken as type example. As far as enlistment goes, there was no enlistment. If you were fit Finnish male citizen of age you either were in active service or in the reserve. Not reporting to your designated unit on mobilization sounds like a dangerous idea in wartime.
In any case, Finnish marksmanship definitely benefitted from the fact that the Civic Guard emphasized marksmanship, organized competitive shooting, comissioned Nagant variants built for accuracy (which were sold to members) and even offered sniping training of some kind. Häyhä did all these thing, he wasn't just some kind of elite hunter who happened to turn out elite sniper in wartime. However neither Mannerheim or the Finnish Army had anything to do with this, beyond donating old equipment for Civic Guard's use.
Your referring to the civil guard, and Finlands lack/scarcity of telescopic sights for military use in winter war. Häyhä as you mention, say never used one.
https://www.jaegerplatoon.net/RIFLES7.htm
Weren't Japanese logistics in general stretched if not overstretched throughout the war? I think it was also during the Japanese advance towards Australia that one overland invasion failed with the attacking Japanese forces suffering badly due to having counted on conquering some harbor and not being able to supply themselves without it. How would the Japanese on the Malayan peninsula have fared if Singapore had not fallen so quickly?
How many telescopic sights did Daniel Morgan have with the Provisional Rifle Corps during the American War of Independence? And yet, they were highly effective at sniping enemy officers at great range; and providing harassing fire to slow the enemy's advance. In Texas there is an old saying: 'it isn't the arrow you need to worry about, it's the Indian'. The same applies here.
Think of the multitude of people who live in semi-wilderness areas whose family's existence depended upon their ability to kill meat on the hoof. Whose ability to use a rifle is unquestioned. Alvin York was a brilliant sniper, using nothing but the iron sights of a bolt action rifle and the tactics he learned hunting using nothing but virtually the same Kentucky Longrifle used by Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett. He is hardly unique to history.
A man who grew up shooting a rifle without a scope may or may not want one when they become available; there are advantages and disadvantages to telescopic sights. Tactically, it takes a two man team to operate one telescopic sight; the sniper and his spotter.
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Japan didn't invade British holdings in China until war was declared on December 7th, 1941. The British had front row seats to the battle of Shanghai... they literally watched it from 100 yards away. Furthermore, the only route for supplies to come to China during the years from 1937 to 1942 was through Burma via the Burma Road. The British were getting information from the Chinese and were kept apprised. Japan had used tanks in the jungles and forests of South China. Japanese tanks were fragile and very under armed compared to European designs... but they were light and portable and Japan had been using them and moving them all around China.
"They didn't know the depths of Japanese savagery."
The Nanjing Massacre happened in 1938. The battle of Shanghai was in direct view of the British concession. The British knew all about Japan's atrocities by 1941.
Second, Chinese formations didn't lose every battle vs. Japan.
The first battle of Changsha happened in 1939. The second battle was in 1941, both were Chinese victories. The battle of Tai'erzhuang in 1937 was a Chinese victory as well as the battle of Kunlun pass. Generally, the Chinese lost, true, and the quality of most of their army and officer corps was bad. The Chinese knew this.
The Chinese weren't being trained in India until after the fall of Burma. They were there because they literally couldn't retreat back to China.
The defense of Singapore was important, the defense of Rangoon was important. But the British didn't defend Singapore or Rangoon, they instead marched their forces 500 km north of Singapore and 150 km east of Rangoon. They had planned to build strong defenses on the borders with Thailand, but the necessary planes and materials had been diverted so none of those defenses were ready. Without those defenses, the British forces were just low hanging fruit to be smashed.
You're whole post is like you are channeling the same kind of oblivious ignorance that must have beset Percival.
It's entirely ignorant of the war Japan had been fighting in China. It discounts Japan's obvious military in China by saying that it doesn't count because the Chinese army was terrible, (Surely, those Japs will crumble when they fight real opposition like our brave Tommies!) Finally, it doesn't hear my main objection which was that the British were TACTICALLY stupid when they shouldn't have been.
Holding Rangoon and Singapore were strategically valid objectives. They were also achievable objectives. However, achieving them required entirely different tactics than the ones the British employed.
I was mainly being flippant at the post opening with the semi ludicrous proposition of describing something as 'real'. Afterall a real hunter would use a tomahawk shaped from bone surely?
The early mistake in Burma was British... the total strategic collapse was American.
The British had rebuffed Chinese aide when it was first offered in late 1941. They accepted it eventually, but it meant that Chinese troops were still marching on foot to get from Yunnan to Burma in January and February of 1942.
Stilwell was the Chinese chief of staff at the time and assumed his post in March. The Chinese and the British had given up on retaking Rangoon at this point as it had been lost. Chiang Kai Shek saw the most important objective as being holding North Burma to keep the route from India open. Once the Monsoon began in May... the Japanese would be forced to stop. The British also were dubious about retaking Rangoon.
Stilwell arrived and thought this rank defeatism (Remember the Japanese have already buzzsawed their way through Malaya and forced the surrender of Singapore by this point.)
He aggressively lobbied to place the Chinese and British divisions close to the Japanese for a possible counteroffensive to retake Rangoon. He wanted them to provide support to each other and work together.
We give Eisenhower credit for being a coalition commander of mostly american and British forces. He had a year to put that together and there was still friction and problems.
Stilwell wanted Indian and Burmese and Australian troops under British command to coordinate with Chinese troops under American command to launch a coordinated counteroffensive with a week's notice because he had a "hunch" the Japanese were weak. (Seriously, he said that after the fall of Singapore proved that they were anything but)
Though the Chinese were very successful in the battle of Toungoo... they couldn't be reinforced and the Japanese were able to surround and defeat allied forces in south Burma and the result was the loss of Burma for the rest of the war.
It was an obviously flawed plan, but, because the US press was so starved for victories in early 1942, they spun it as a totally unavoidable loss by a heroic American general. (See the way MacArthur's loss in the Philippines was spun for a similar dynamic.)
There's gonna be one speed: mine. If you can't keep up, don't step up. You'll just die.
That movie is my top movie in the category :
"Movies I am ashamed of loving !"
Well, I think it needs to be said that the quality of the individual infantryman was also a major factor. The Indian soldiers, especially the Jats, Rajputs and the Madras regiment gave what can only be called an abysmal performance (It needs to be noted that the soliders probably didn't identify with the British empire and for them it was probably a pointless foreign war). The British officer corps and the few ethnic British units in the theatre also shown incopetence, lack of discipline, low moral and low fighting skills.
In contrast, the Punjab regiments fought in an adequate manner, while the Australians, Gurkhas and the Nigerians proved to be above-average.
But all in all, the individual Japanese infantryman proved to be a far superior soldier than the individual Indian or British infantryman. This was a major factor in the outcome of the war in that theatre, even deep down in 1944 where the Japanese supply situation had deteriorated to a pitiful level.
I don't mean to say that Percival or Stillwell were good commanders, they were not. But A lot of the blame lies with the low quality British and Indian troopers in the ranks. Percival was part and parcel of that army as a whole.
Would they have made a difference?
Did the amateurish-style British officer in the Indian army have the necessary military skill and education to make use of advanced tactical doctrines? Doubtful. Did he have the intelligence, popular respect and language skills to pass this on to his Indian troops? Certainly not.
The Indian and British rank and file were not part of the problem, they were THE problem. Even Nigerian troops (The British command initially doubted their capacity and treated them as secondary forces) proved much more efficient.
It very well might have been. The local Malay population was not friendly towards the British. Malaya was certainly less mismanaged than say Bengal, but it was very badly mismanaged nevertheless. The population, save maybe ethnic Han urban middle class, had absolutey no reason to be loyal to the British (and indeed would later assist the Japanese in many cases).
True, but for that would require soldiers that were willing to stand and fight, probably take serious losses. The Indian forces would retreat from one position to another because the alternative was to have them brake and run entirely. The Empire simply lacked the high-morale manpower that would be dedicated and loyal to it.
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@Sabratha sadly, I do not know how to include my quotes in your reply, so hopefully this will not get too disjointed.
Regarding tanks and pamphlets for infantry how to fight them, they might have made a difference. Given the Japanese tanks, it at least seems likely that the pamphlets would at least not be outdated. And it might have given the troops confidence. IIRC, tanks (like cavalry before) were most useful when the enemy panicked and routed. If the enmy staid and fought, they were still of course useful, but usually not quite an instant-win.
Regarding the civilian labor, the problem described was that once Japanese air raids began, the civilian labor could not be gathered because they were afraid of putting themselves in harm's way, it was suggested though that before these raids, civilian labor could easily have been recruited as for any other job.
Regarding the low quality of British Indian units, didn't these fight in other theaters with considerably better result? I am a bit reminded of the French and Italian forces in WWII, leadership both indifferent and incompetent in regards of tactics as well as morale easily results in troops that will run from rumors, but the very same units can fight considerably better once competent leadership is inserted.
Of course, Percival doing better might not have changed things in the end. But that is not the point. As the ever-quotable Churchill reputedly said, "One cannot guarantee victory in war, only deserve it." So what did Percival actually do to improve the situation in Singapore? What did he do to frustrate the Japanese offensive?
Regarding tanks and pamphlets for infantry how to fight them, they might have made a difference. Given the Japanese tanks, it at least seems likely that the pamphlets would at least not be outdated. And it might have given the troops confidence. IIRC, tanks (like cavalry before) were most useful when the enemy panicked and routed. If the enmy staid and fought, they were still of course useful, but usually not quite an instant-win.
Regarding the civilian labor, the problem described was that once Japanese air raids began, the civilian labor could not be gathered because they were afraid of putting themselves in harm's way, it was suggested though that before these raids, civilian labor could easily have been recruited as for any other job.
Regarding the low quality of British Indian units, didn't these fight in other theaters with considerably better result? I am a bit reminded of the French and Italian forces in WWII, leadership both indifferent and incompetent in regards of tactics as well as morale easily results in troops that will run from rumors, but the very same units can fight considerably better once competent leadership is inserted.
Of course, Percival doing better might not have changed things in the end. But that is not the point. As the ever-quotable Churchill reputedly said, "One cannot guarantee victory in war, only deserve it." So what did Percival actually do to improve the situation in Singapore? What did he do to frustrate the Japanese offensive?
It would be interesting to compare and contrast the TO&E of the various Indian units in the various circumstances and see if there is a major difference. But leadership is key.
The real problem, as I see it, is the British Army was a highly professional organization that expected to be treated with respect. Drop your arms and get a golden bridge back home after the war. They were not prepared for the Japanese abuse awaiting them. If they had known how the Japanese played ball, I don't think they would have been so swift to lay down their arms.
This again goes to disregarding the Chinese experience. In Malaya and Burma, what the British viewed as poorly equipped and poorly trained units was actually slightly better than most of the Chinese army.
The Chinese had adapted their tactics to deal with having troops of generally poor quality who were outclassed by the Japanese on a man for man basis.
The Indian and Colonial troops weren't actually that low quality. They were green generally, but it was primarily an issue of leadership and that the Japanese were so much better.
The Japanese soldiers who were sent into Malaya and Burma had 4 years fighting the Chinese and, for some of them, the Soviets. The Americans and the British had criminally discounted that experience because it was against the low quality Chinese. (The Japanese weren't good, the Chinese were just bad.)
Japanese atrocities were well known by this point. Again, they had been fighting in China in full view of the British for 4 years.
The Indian units in Malaya where mostly newly raised units. It also didn't help that a lot of experienced prewar regulars where drafted away to other units fighting in the middle east prior to the Japanese entry into the war.
The army in Malaya also had to content with the Civil authorities who weren't prepared to cooperate because they didn't want to alarm the population.
India raised the largest volunteer army ever to fight the axis in world War 2. It's officers and men had to learn like all other countries. They provided a large part of the manpower for the 14th army. You know the ones that gave Japan largest defeat on land they ever suffered.
I wouldn't be so dismissive of the qualities of the officers and men of the Indian army. They where more than a match for the Japanese.
The army in Malaya also had to content with the Civil authorities who weren't prepared to cooperate because they didn't want to alarm the population.
India raised the largest volunteer army ever to fight the axis in world War 2. It's officers and men had to learn like all other countries. They provided a large part of the manpower for the 14th army. You know the ones that gave Japan largest defeat on land they ever suffered.
I wouldn't be so dismissive of the qualities of the officers and men of the Indian army. They where more than a match for the Japanese.
Just checked out the wikipedia article on the Battle of Singapore. Unless it is widely inaccurate, everyone stop bitching about the Indian units. The Japanese had 36,000 men, the British 85,000. The later included the Australian 8th division (about 20,000) and the British 18 Division (about 15,000). So completely discounting non-white forces, the British still had numerical parity with the Japanese. Laying all the blame on the Indians is awfully convenient for the British and Australians to cover that their men there didn't quite put up much of a heroic resistance themselves.
And yes, all British forces were probably noticeably greener than the Japanese, but again, they had to defend a relatively small area. In Europe, the British and French lost to the Germans, because the former were ready for a remake of WWI. At Singapore, it seems to me the British lost to the Japanese because the later were coming in for some actual war, while the former, I don't know, expected cricket?
And yes, all British forces were probably noticeably greener than the Japanese, but again, they had to defend a relatively small area. In Europe, the British and French lost to the Germans, because the former were ready for a remake of WWI. At Singapore, it seems to me the British lost to the Japanese because the later were coming in for some actual war, while the former, I don't know, expected cricket?