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Not at all odd, its not mentioned, so its not cited.
From the pdf conclusion.
Operation FORTITUDE was quite possibly the largest and most successful deception operation during the 20th Century.
Except Major Oskar Steiger was assigned by OKW to study Patton in 1943, advising Rommel in both N Africa and Europe on how to defeat him. Steiger destroyed his vast file, he had studdied him to on Patton to prevent its capture in April of 45. Thats why your link, which is a summation of the book
Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies
is able to claim what it does. Abscence of evidence is not evidence of abscence.
In that book he uses a german acount of Patton in ww1 “The 1st Battalion men could plainly see the officer.… The tall officer [Patton?] stood on the edge of the trench ... gesticulating ... waving a walking stick in the air.... German gunners watched across their sights as the officer and six men rose and came on ... until only the officer and another man were left” but fails to cite it.
http://www.miwsr.com/2012/downloads/2012-050.pdf review of book.
Ok, heres the attention they payed before then. Which btw is nothing compared to their concern about Monty and what they thought he was up to.
23rd march 1944 Patton was associated with FUSAG but they do not believe he is in command.This changes on 1st April,Forgien armies west reported "The arrival of 9th US Army in Greta Britain by mid march by reliable sources. The prescence of two armies 1st and 9th is therfore established, and they are suspected subordinate to First Army Group.In this connection a believiable report from the Abwehr indicates that the former commander of 7th Army Lt Gen Patton has arrived in England with part of his staff. It seems possible that Lt Gen Patton has taken command of either 1st or 9th Army. This changes in May as Germans conclude Patton is in command of FUSAG and BB West terms it Army Group Patton."
When he got to France he certainly gave them good reason to pay attention to 3rd army.
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Top of page 22 in the Fortitude Paper, "This played well to the Germans, who considered Patton the Allies most capable and daring commander. "
The author just asserts that. There is no citation on it. Which is my whole point. I'm trying to track the citation for this.
Major "Oskar Steiger" was an invention of the movie Patton. He never destroyed his files because no files existed in the first place. Francis Ford Coppola is a gifted screen writer but a character he wrote in 1968 doesn't actually get summoned to the Kasserine pass in 1943.
See here and here.
Ok, this is what I mean, the Allies could have substituted Patton for anyone in at the time of the right rank and it would have worked.
Let's say for example, that General Jacob Devers, instead of being sent to North Africa in January of 1944, is instead told to be the commanding officer of FUSAG.
It would have been the same result.
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A historical paper does not footnote every sentence. You footnote direct quotes, and key data. Words must flow for ideas to take root. Otherwise you are left with an unreadable mass of disjointed facts, which is what most history books consist of anyway. Dry dust rather than rich soil.
For example, your friend, Harry Yeide, in his 2011 book "Patton, through the eyes of his enemy" takes special aim at the famous Adolph Hitler quote calling Patton "that crazy cowboy general" as an American myth. He can't prove it was said, therefore it was made up by D'este in his 1995 book, "Patton: A Genius for War", where he says it first appears. And it has been repeated so much, people just assume it is true, despite the fact it was never said.
Problem is, the man who first introduced this story is Paul Carell. Carell is a hard-core Nazi, a member of the SS who works in propaganda for Ribbentrop, whose specialty is The Jewish Question. A man who should have been fucking hung for war crimes against the Hungarian people but was spared because he rolled over and sang like a canary about the men who actually did the killing. He then becomes a federal prosecutor, and later a writer. He rewrites the history of the Wehrmacht during the Third Reich in the most logical manner possible. Welcome to the Kameraden and ODESSA.
Carell is a trained propogandist. He is very effective at this work, and a very good writer. I can vividly remember reading his book, "Hitler Moves East", as my first serious foray into the Eastern Front back in high school. I was too green to notice the thick coat of paint. Back then, I had never heard of EZG, Emigration, or "Evacuation to the East'. The name Heydrich was unknown to me, but I guarantee you it is seared into my memory today. The book is still on my shelf, dog eared and the cover half torn, but it is still there.
Carell is ex-SS, Kameraden. He has first hand sources to draw upon and contacts in both the SS and the Wehrmacht. He is a known quantity.
In the book 'Invasion, They're Coming' (1963), Carell tells the story of Hitler speaking to Jodl in the Wolfschanze while still wearing the bandages from the July 20 General's Bomb Plot: "Just look at that crazy cowboy general, driving down to the south and into Brittany along a single road and over a single bridge with an entire army. He doesn't care about the risk and acts as if he owns the world. It doesn't seem possible".
Here, in 1963, you have a German SS officer who works directly for Ribbentropp quoting Hitler in July of 1944 discussing Patton in the most colorful way possible.
There, in 2011, you have an amateur historian who wants to sell books by breaking the Cardinal Rule of Liberty Valance by trying to tear down a myth to sell a few papers.
Be careful what you ask for.
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This is exactly what I was asking for. A guy who is 1 or 2 degrees away from a primary source saying that Hitler knew who Patton was in October of 1944.
I was objecting to 2 assertions.
1) That the Germans paid Patton special attention, especially before D-day
2) That he struck fear into the hearts of the Germans who faced him.
We like human stories. We like a single general to be the protagonist. It's easier to wrap our brains around than 20,000 troops.
We already know that some commanders on the German side had their influence over inflated after the war. (Guderian wasn't as influential at the time as his later reputation would make it seem.)
If I wrote a history of the Korean War and said that the Americans feared and respected General Chen Geng the most out of all Chinese commanders... you'd expect a citation. Something contemporaneous such as General Ridgeway writing to Truman about it. Something like how a historical army felt about a particular general does require a citation.
If you actually go into Chinese propaganda from the Korean war, you would think that the Americans knew all ten Grand Generals of the PLA and that US troops talked in hushed tones about the fearsome Peng Dehuai! Except it's all junk. The US did start paying attention to the enemy commanders, sure... but not to the extent that the Chinese told their own people the US did.
You cannot find it because that not a cite, its the authors opinion based on his understanding of the topic.
Post war the Allies were interogated, some of what they told has influenced authors acounts of ho wand why the war was fought out the way it did.
Günther Blumentritt,
“We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive Panzer General of the Allies, a man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action…. His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander.”
Alfred Jodl
“He was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes.” Note Jodl could only identify Patton Ike and Bradly.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1001520.pdf
Patton developed a widespread reputation during his long career as a bold and daring leader; however, analysis of WWII campaigns in which he participated reveals that he did not apply what the US Army now refers to as operational art
Patton being describbed as bold/daring appears in vast amount of literature, not least beacause that how both the Germans describbed him, and the Allies
"Where patton was and what he was doing was of constant interest to enemy high command" Col Oscar Koch.
Rommel was dead but his papers were not
“In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience, but it brought rich dividends. Even at that time, the American generals showed themselves to be very advanced in their tactical handling of their forces, although we had to wait until the Patton Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare.”
"Patton," Rundstedt concluded simply, "he is your best."
Rundstedt said:
"Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met".
Eisenhower would write his own tribute: "He was one of those men born to be a soldier, an ideal combat leader...It is no exaggeration to say that Patton's name struck terror at the hearts of the enemy."
Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring noted that “Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare."
Adolf Hitler himself was impressed by Patton, reportedly calling him "that crazy cowboy general", and "the most dangerous man [the Allies] have." AH knew who Patton was in Cobra.
OB West confirmed patton as commanding Third Army on 5th August, on 21st Feuchtinger leading 21st pnz, tells OKW "the situation is completly out of hand,from chartes patton has turned part of his army to Rouen, no one seems able to stop him".
7th September Westphal to Runstedt, at Koblenz, HQ of OB West, on hearing tank tracks that night. "can this be Patton?.
Patton was well know to all.
And Rundstedt said: "Patton! He is your best."
Bayerlein had commented that had Patton been the opposing general at El Alamein, "that they wouldn't have gotten off so easy."
General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, who had fought both Soviet and Anglo-American tank commanders, agreed (withRundstedt) : "Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant panzer army commander."
Oberstleutnant Horst Freiherr von Wangenheim, operations officer of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, stated that "General Patton is the most feared general on all fronts. [His] tactics are daring and unpredictable...He is the most modern general and the best commander of [combined] armored and infantry forces."
Blumentritt revealed that "We regarded Patton extremely highly, as the most aggressive Panzer-General of the Allies. A man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action."
Thats compelling, ill look into that more later.
Er thats a what if. Reality is what i posted and reality is always going to be a better argument than a what if.
It succedded in real life with the sum of its parts, if one or some of the parts are different the end result may not be the same.
This is a counter factual and already answerd three times.
In 43 Uk ran operation mincmeat, using the man who never was ( Ewen Montagu) with full operational plans, to convice the Axis that Greece not Sicily was to be invaded, AH bought into the deception and moved forces from Sicily to Greece and thus made the intended invasion easier to achieve. Remove one part of the sum of the deception and you may get a different outcome. In both sicily and France the allies were successful in deception because the sum of the parts was concvincing to the Axis who acted as intended by the Allies. In sicily by taking 3 div to Greece, and in holding 15Th army where it was as they excepted the real invasion there, only paratialy reacting when leaders of FUSAG and there units where identified in Niomandy.
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Lets not forget about Leslie Morshead and the battles he fought in North Africa, New Guinea and Borneo and how SUCCESSFUL THEY WERE!
Regarding German praise for Patton:
Am I the only one who realises that the German generals mostly compliment themselves when complimenting Patton?
"This is your best general (because) he is like us"
Am I the only one who realises that the German generals mostly compliment themselves when complimenting Patton?
"This is your best general (because) he is like us"
Not too surprising. nationalist army leaders tend to think of themselves as the greatest, thus they will praise the enemy for being like them.
It's also realistic. You know what your own guys have accomplished, and how you might rank them. most of the OTHER guys you don't know very well at all, so can't even make a guesstimate on how successful they have been or why.
On a similar note, didn't allied leaders in North Africa tend to praise German enemies, even where it were Italians who actually fought well?
When you are in captivity you tell your captors what they want to hear. If that means praising a certain general so be it. People seem to put a lot of trust in the opinions of these german generals. Criminals and sycophants the lot of them. But since they where allowed to whitewash their own deeds postwar their accounts are taken as gospel by the fanboys.
There is some truth in this. The performance of Italian units was very mixed. Some formations (such as their mechanised divisions) performed very well, particularly when equipment limitations were taken into account. Many of their infantry formations put in a performance that was at best token, although the dire shortage of trained officers, NCOs, artillery, supplies and support vehicles goes a large way towards explaining this.
In contrast the Germans were consistently good in the desert, giving an impression of competence and skill when compared with the very variable Italian formations.
Though the German operational/tactical methods are really fitting for an army with logistical and C3I advantage... thus the way Patton handled his forces was probably right (there was only one component missing from the Army of the United States that time, a large peacetime US Army to absorb the conscripts)
I don't know... no offense meant to the Americans, but I got the impression that low- to mid-level-leadership was on average inferior to the Wehrmacht, the later of course had more experience, but maybe also the better doctrine regarding low-level initiative? I kinda wonder if Eisenhower's broad front approach wasn't the best for both logistical as well as combat reasons. Lucky German defense manages to repel an American attack? They still better bug out, unless their comrades on their sides were equally lacking. A daring thrust to encircle a chunk of American forces? Like lemmings charging the sea.
Not maybe.
They did.
The German infantry doctrine is and has been the dominant infantry doctrine of the last 100 years, i.e. the concentration of as much authority as (doctrine-wise) possible at the lowest level possible, guns over man, mobility over frontal assault, etc.
But the concept of 'mission command' has been a part of British doctrine since the first lessons of the Boer war (and was arguably already being practiced before Germany was a country in a number of ways), and passed onto the Americans during the first world war. It was generally referred to as the man on the spot.
The popularity of German tactical superiority and Germany's better junior command has generally been ascribed to their totalitarian indoctrination. More specifically, the Germans generally experienced far less of an effect on morale due to mass casualties, which allowed them to 'hang in it's despite being gunned in their hundreds and thousands.
The German officer corps was exceptional at staff work, however didn't seem to be able to adapt that staff in a way that would translate tactical success into strategic success.
If you are interested, I would recommend colossal cracks by Stephen Hart. It examines the differences in the men that made up the armies of ww2 (albeit with a focus on Monty's tactics in NW Europe) and how the man completely changed the outlook of the armed forces. The American army and in particular the infantry was made up of the lower end of the scale, as many of the more intelligebt soldiers were brought into the technical corps, allowing the USA to better bring it's advantages in firepower to bear. This meant that the infantry companies were more affected by limitations in mid level leadership, and that the generally lower level of indoctrination meant that they would rather use their firepower than risk costly actions.
I mean that´s the part where a larger peacetime army would have helped, but later on they incorporated the key elements of the German tactics (to the extremes i.e. low level officers could decide whether to nuke the enemy or not).
In 1944 the vast majority of junior officers in the US army were totally green. In contrast, the Wehrmacht had 6 years of active operations at this point. Regardless of doctrines, society type or any other factor, I would be amazed if the US army officers performed as well as their German counterparts at this point.
Yet in 1944 every nation on pretty much every battlefield out performed the German Army. The German army of 1944 was losing everywhere consistently, from the top of my head, the only engagements where they were victorious were the battles of Hurtgen Forest and Market Garden (technically just the breakthrough to Arnhem).