Best and worst commanders of WWII

[Acheron]

If hear this statement so often. And every time I am completely confused as it seems to to be talking about some alternate universe:

1. Britain didn't fight alone. The naval and economic power of the Empire was behind it.
   
2. The odds were always in Britain's favor. Short of a sequence of miracles in which Germany manages a landing and somehow defeats the Royal Navy, Britain was never under threat of defeat.

I would agree it was a strategic decision, though. Probably the easiest one of the war.

Yes, the empire was behind Britain, but Nazi-controlled Europe was in front of it. And if Germany had not gone for the USSR but instead focused on Britain, I fear the situation would have become dire. With the resources of the continent behind their enemies, Britain would either have lost the battle of the Atlantic or fallen to invasion, the RN was powerful, but if Germany had focused on building up the Luftwaffe to it, after one or two years it would IMHO probably be powerful enough to keep the channel clear

 

[D Inqu]

Imagine if Edward VIII, a known Nazi sympathizer, was still on the throne along with that bitch of his who was receiving flowers daily from Ribbentropp. And Churchill had been 'quieted' by extralegal means that the known Nazi's in England were by special operations units?

The problems between Britain and Germany were no more likely to be resolved as the problems between Germany and USSR. Britain could not afford a hegemon on the continent, no matter whether it was under a french, german or russian flag. Britain could also not afford the economic competition from a unified continent. Even modern day Britain was easily whipped into the insanity known as brexit with a handful of cheap propaganda slogans. The Empire would not stand it either.

Even if hypothetically Britain accepted a german peace they would immediately launch a trade war with germany to contain the threat. And break the peace the moment the first german Carrier is laid down. We are talking at most an MR-style short-term armed neutrality that both sides know cannot last.

 

[Easy-Kill]

To be fair by that definition Barbarossa was the greatest strategic success of the German war; they destroyed the Russian army in place and then destroyed half of Russia's fighting ability. That the other half was still a relevant threat isn't the same as a strategic failure.

I am going by memory here and typing on a phone from a balcony in Costa Rica ... According to Fisher (who extensively examined the remaining Wehrmacht archives), the German Wehrmacht strategy for 1941 was 2x500km advances (as in sequential advances across the whole front not individual army group) that would see the principal destruction of Soviet forces in the Western Soviet Union. To my knowledge, both of goals were accomplished. What Germany failed to do was to turn these into victory. However, I think that our concepts or definitions of 'strategy' are different. Continued below.

Or, in other words, I disagree with your definition of strategic; the combination of El Alamein, Torch, and Husky was strategic (freeing up the logistics chain through the Mediterranean and incidentally also knocking out Italy), but none of those three operational successes was a strategic success by itself. The German invasion of Western Europe in 1940 was a strategic success (knocking out the western front, i.e. France and support) with a two-stage operational success underpinning it (Fall Rot and Fall Gelb), but neither of them alone would have been - you could pin all the strategic success on the last part (i.e. Husky and Rot) but that seems unfair.

I think what you are talking about are grand geopolitical aims ... From my perspective, strategy are the actions you take to achieve those aims. And, the leaders of the time agree with me ... At the Arcadia conference (the first strategic planning between UK and USA), British Chiefs of Staff communicated their strategy to the USA as that of: maintaining the naval blockade and stepping up the strategic bombardment to economically cripple Germany; to sustain the Russian front by arming and supporting them; and to regain full control of the North African coast to fence in the Axis; all with the aim of limited land invasion of Europe in 1943. See allied strategy in world war II by Dr. Lemar Jensen (who directly cites the Arcadia minutes).

In response to both yourself and @Graf Zeppelin , all of these strategic objectives were met. The battles that followed Alamein allowed Britain to reinforce it's position in the middle East, recapture the North African coast line (withTorch/husky completing the job) and support closing the ring around Germany. Again, the aim was to defeat Germany, the strategy is how you achieve this. Even the planners at the time considered the 'how you achieve your aims' to be what constitutes strategy. Alamein Was decisive battle, through which operational planning ensured the tactical success supported the strategic aims. The whole concept of the 'set piece' here was that it was really a 'decisive battle' supported by operational planning.

How did Alamein relate to strategic success ... Closing the Mediterranean allowed the axis powers to be isolated, and allowed the allies to better concentrate their available forces (particularly the landing craft necessary for Neptune). It economically isolated the axis and provided the opportunity to knock one of the axis powers out of the war (further isolating Germany and forcing her to further dilute her own strength).

As for Britain having no strategic balance to the defeat of Germany/Japan. After Dec 1941, the geo-imperial-political aims changed from how do we defeat Germany to how does Britain maintain global standing in the post war era. Thus, things like the reconquest of Burma and Malaya are strategic successes from that context.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Yes, the empire was behind Britain, but Nazi-controlled Europe was in front of it. And if Germany had not gone for the USSR but instead focused on Britain, I fear the situation would have become dire. With the resources of the continent behind their enemies, Britain would either have lost the battle of the Atlantic or fallen to invasion, the RN was powerful, but if Germany had focused on building up the Luftwaffe to it, after one or two years it would IMHO probably be powerful enough to keep the channel clear

This is something that Tooze goes into at great length. It may be of interest to note that the occupied continent was rather paltry in its contribution to the war effort. Considering that the Luftwaffe was Germany's principal weapon against the UK, occupied France (by far the biggest industry captured by Germany) produced only a few hundred aircraft for Germany in the period between surrender and the USA joining the war. The UK on the other hand purchased tens of thousands of aircraft and tens of thousands more aircraft engines on the open market (paid in cash up front ... Not lend lease).

Germany was already lagging behind Imperial aircraft production and that is without counting the additional aircraft that the UK purchased. I struggle to see any scenario where Germany is able to force a military solution the UK, the only option is a political one.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Literally nothing you said has anything to do with set piece battles.

If you think it means logistical preparation for a 2,500km advance then you don’t even have the most basic understanding of military operations.

Instead all military operation requires logistical preparation. Patton is not a setpiece battle type of commander - he is indeed the very antithesis of it in pop culture - but he was actually pretty good in the logistics preparations department which is why his tanks kept advancing.

In short, stop throwing around terms you don’t understand because you are literally embarassing the British Army by implying they have very ill informed people supposedly graduate from their learning institutions. If you were a really a Sandhurst graduate as you implied you are clearly a very inattentive one.

This is the simple realities of who you really are despite all your feigned attempts at pretending to be the victim or having the moral high ground. Indeed, that you keep crying wolf instead of going to a mod like the rules state is a very telling indicator of how you’re well aware that the mods already recognize that your real problem is your inability to accept when you are wrong and instead pretend you are being victimized when you are simply being corrected.

I am very sorry Zinegata, but I dont actually understand the point you are trying to make other than to make a poor parody of the Downfall meme video. Could you possibly rephrase the point you are trying to make without implying that I am implying something about sommit or nuffin?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

To be fair by that definition Barbarossa was the greatest strategic success of the German war; they destroyed the Russian army in place and then destroyed half of Russia's fighting ability. That the other half was still a relevant threat isn't the same as a strategic failure.

Or, in other words, I disagree with your definition of strategic; the combination of El Alamein, Torch, and Husky was strategic (freeing up the logistics chain through the Mediterranean and incidentally also knocking out Italy), but none of those three operational successes was a strategic success by itself. The German invasion of Western Europe in 1940 was a strategic success (knocking out the western front, i.e. France and support) with a two-stage operational success underpinning it (Fall Rot and Fall Gelb), but neither of them alone would have been - you could pin all the strategic success on the last part (i.e. Husky and Rot) but that seems unfair.

So, clearing the African coast of Axis resistance, thereby creating the base of operations for the invasion of Sicily and Italy, was not strategic?

Husky, the landings in Sicily, correspond EXACTLY with the battle of Kursk, requiring Hitler to pull armored forces off the line at the high point of the battle, thereby bringing offensive operations to a halt and opening the German army for the inevitable Soviet counterattack. In his memoirs, Manstein is livid about this removal of his forces and blames that specific fact on the failure of the offensive.

I am not sure you quite understand the term.

 

[Easy-Kill]

None of these battles led to a real strategic advantage bar Normandy and that was basically an US affair with British help. I cant think of any land battle solely fought by the UK in ww2 which had a strategic effect.

I think the comment about Normandy is a bit disingenuous to say the least and somewhat insulting to the thousands of British and commonwealth soldiers burries in cemeteries across Normandy. The land forces were roughly 50-50 and the naval forces were a majority British (from the top of my head). The all important landing craft were of course American, but that was a strategic decision for the US to concentrate on their production.

What made Normandy so successful was the unique military-political combination of the commonwealth and USA. For every Eisenhower, you needed a Monty and for every Month, you needed a Patton.

 

[Acheron]

This is something that Tooze goes into at great length. It may be of interest to note that the occupied continent was rather paltry in its contribution to the war effort. Considering that the Luftwaffe was Germany's principal weapon against the UK, occupied France (by far the biggest industry captured by Germany) produced only a few hundred aircraft for Germany in the period between surrender and the USA joining the war. The UK on the other hand purchased tens of thousands of aircraft and tens of thousands more aircraft engines on the open market (paid in cash up front ... Not lend lease).

Germany was already lagging behind Imperial aircraft production and that is without counting the additional aircraft that the UK purchased. I struggle to see any scenario where Germany is able to force a military solution the UK, the only option is a political one.

The primary contribution of an occupied Europe to Germany in a war against Britain would IMHO not be the military production to the Nazi war machine, but simply that by being occupied, less military force is required to keep the rest of Europe down. An independent France and allies requires a sizeable land army, but after defeat, this can be invested instead in naval and aviation assets instead, provided one does underestimate the Soviet Union, as German leadership did.

As for Britain's purchase of foreign military assets, I understand that these were paid for with substantial credit the UK took at a rate not sustainable for much longer? IIRC, Britain sold or pawned so much, it put a serious dent in her post-war role.

 

[Avernite]

So, clearing the African coast of Axis resistance, thereby creating the base of operations for the invasion of Sicily and Italy, was not strategic?

Husky, the landings in Sicily, correspond EXACTLY with the battle of Kursk, requiring Hitler to pull armored forces off the line at the high point of the battle, thereby bringing offensive operations to a halt and opening the German army for the inevitable Soviet counterattack. In his memoirs, Manstein is livid about this removal of his forces and blames that specific fact on the failure of the offensive.

I am not sure you quite understand the term.

At least, if I get your point right it's "Torch/El Alamein together were strategic because they allowed Husky which had the strategic impact of diverting significant forces from the Russian front". My point, as above, was "Torch/El Alamein/Husky together were a strategic success". Now we can quibble if there is a significant need to dissect the argument and fight over that distinction, but couldn't we rather more easily agree to agree?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

[

The primary contribution of an occupied Europe to Germany in a war against Britain would IMHO not be the military production to the Nazi war machine, but simply that by being occupied, less military force is required to keep the rest of Europe down. An independent France and allies requires a sizeable land army, but after defeat, this can be invested instead in naval and aviation assets instead, provided one does underestimate the Soviet Union, as German leadership did.

As for Britain's purchase of foreign military assets, I understand that these were paid for with substantial credit the UK took at a rate not sustainable for much longer? IIRC, Britain sold or pawned so much, it put a serious dent in her post-war role.

Not to mention Operation Fish, whereby Britain moved its entire bullion reserve to Canada in the greatest movement of wealth in history.

Just in case.

But, you are very correct, Roosevelt opened up the lines of credit to Britain, whether they could pay it back or not. If they could put it on a boat and sail away, they'd worry about repaying the US later. Which was done at 10% of face value, leaving Britian with a post war debt just over a billiion pounds, iirc; which was paid out over fifty years and ended in the early part of this century.

This also brings about the Reverse Lend-Lease where much of the product of the British Empire is funneled into the US to both accelerate war production and to reduce her debt after the war. Engines, radars, raw materials, spark plugs; there was a wholesale sharing of resources with the goal of ending the war and dealing with the financial ramifications after the fact.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

At least, if I get your point right it's "Torch/El Alamein together were strategic because they allowed Husky which had the strategic impact of diverting significant forces from the Russian front". My point, as above, was "Torch/El Alamein/Husky together were a strategic success". Now we can quibble if there is a significant need to dissect the argument and fight over that distinction, but couldn't we rather more easily agree to agree?

Actually, I will offer you an apology because I misread your post. Perhaps it was lost in translation, perhaps I was distracted. Regardless, re-reading it and accompanying it with your explanation, I see the point you were making. And, yes, we can agree to agree.

 

[Porkman]

Snip

You misunderstand my point in asking for definitions. The definitions being used were broad and I wanted to see where people actually disagreed. Seeing where your definition and someone else's definition differed would be helpful.

Now, we are all "Amateurs." As far as I know, neither Robert Citino nor James Mattis has an account on the Paradox forums. (Though maybe there are some former Yugoslavians who had a brigade back in the bad times...)

I very much agree with the larger point about logistics and such and the obsession with the Hollywood version of war.

That said, I fail to see what the actual disagreement here is.

What is even the question?

"Was Monty good at set piece battles?"

Then we need to have agreed ideas about what good and set piece battle mean in that sentence.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

I think the comment about Normandy is a bit disingenuous to say the least and somewhat insulting to the thousands of British and commonwealth soldiers burries in cemeteries across Normandy.

Alright alright I exaggerated.

 

[Easy-Kill]

The primary contribution of an occupied Europe to Germany in a war against Britain would IMHO not be the military production to the Nazi war machine, but simply that by being occupied, less military force is required to keep the rest of Europe down. An independent France and allies requires a sizeable land army, but after defeat, this can be invested instead in naval and aviation assets instead, provided one does underestimate the Soviet Union, as German leadership did.

As for Britain's purchase of foreign military assets, I understand that these were paid for with substantial credit the UK took at a rate not sustainable for much longer? IIRC, Britain sold or pawned so much, it put a serious dent in her post-war role.

The first part is a very good point, but do not underestimate the huge manpower requirements of occupying a country and garissoning it against potential invasion. Going from memory, there were at least 10 divisions occupying Norway in 1944, a further 50+ in France. Yes, having conquered Europe frees up fighting forces, but it also ties down both fighting forces and economic manpower. Already in 1941 Germany was facing a coal and food shortage and the question becomes whether Germany can leverage its military might against the UK before it collapses economically.

To the second point ... Yes the UK was in considerable debt after the war, but they were always in a far better economic position than Germany, to the point that after the war they maintained the world's second largest navy, the third nation to develop nuclear weapons etc. The UK was not in a bad position post war, it wasmore that the Soviet Union and USA had accelerated substantially.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Alright alright I exaggerated.

In fairness ... Its always good to have some balancing views and I appreciate that mine can often be overly positive in some respects

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Every human has a blind spot and prejudices for and against certain things. it is a wise man who knows what his are.

This forum is always more pleasant when people argue out of logic rather than emotion and get their feelings hurt because someone disagrees with their position.

If I went after everyone on this forum who gave me push back to some of my more, unique, understandings of history; I’d have no friends at all.

Certainly, misunderstandings occur. Taking the high road, rather than assuming a scorched earth policy, is always preferable. And safer, if you enjoy being a member of this forum.

 

[Vlad_Dracul1989]

What about to think in matter of men, resources and tactical position used during particular battles?

Which commanders were able to do the more with the less? And just as same, who sucked the most even when he had everything? (plenty of men, materiel and favourable position)

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

What about to think in matter of men, resources and tactical position used during particular battles?

Which commanders were able to do the more with the less? And just as same, who sucked the most even when he had everything? (plenty of men, materiel and favourable position)

Good idea.

I'll go back to my original point about Kesselring being pound for pound maybe the best defensive commander of the war, who arguably won the battle of Italy by tying up the Allied advance utilizing the natural terrain and his knowledge of air tactics. A bit of a genius imho.

 

[Vlad_Dracul1989]

I wrote in my first post here, that I feel he was most capable commander: unlike all these pompous glory seekers with napoleonic plans, he clearly understood that total victory is not necessary - just never allow enemy to have decisive victory and draw his resources and manpower far greater than your own.

Monte Cassino was a clear mistake of Allies, a mistake at the start, and horrible mistake in the end.

Of course they needed to go further north eventually, but it could be done smarter. Belief, that overwhelming firepower can do everything, all the dirty work, was proved wrong on Somme and Verdun. And it was too personal for Freyberg, who clearly pushed others to throw everything into it.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I wrote in my first post here, that I feel he was most capable commander: unlike all these pompous glory seekers with napoleonic plans, he clearly understood that total victory is not necessary - just never allow enemy to have decisive victory and draw his resources and manpower far greater than your own.

Monte Cassino was a clear mistake of Allies, a mistake at the start, and horrible mistake in the end.

Of course they needed to go further north eventually, but it could be done smarter. Belief, that overwhelming firepower can do everything, all the dirty work, was proved wrong on Somme and Verdun. And it was too personal for Freyberg, who clearly pushed others to throw everything into it.

If you have ever seen Monte Cassino from the ground, it is one of the most impressive, daunting, sights you will ever see. It was used by the Germans as a forward observer post, and even when it was bombed into oblivion it just made it that much tougher to assualt.