Barbarossa

[Ulatersk]

The USSR never had to resort to such desperate measures as recruiting militias of teenagers and grandpas like Germany was forced to do with its Volkssturm.

Except for People's Militia and Partisans.

According to the training program adopted by Stavka in 1942, forming and training of an infantry division was supposed to take 780 hours (3 months). The schedule has always been fictitious, and in 1943 Stavka acknowledged this by reducing the number to 504 hours (2 months: 306 hours tactics, 100 hours shooting, 74 hours general, 24 hours politics). Training of individuals supposed to be sent to already existing units was scheduled to last 15 days for infantry and 30 days for divisional units (respectively 30 and 60 if an individual has not undergone the basic military training in the peacetime).

Please note that contrary to the British or German systems and alike the American system, in the Red Army there was no unit rotation. Divisions were not withdrawn from the front for rest, re-organisation or re-supply. Freshly recruited individuals were meeting their brothers in arms under the enemy fire. It does not take much to imagine how, under these circumstances, the company, platoon or batallion training looked like; and from 1943 onwards vast majority of those who ended up facing the Nazis were trained following an individual programme.

How did it work? Notorious shortages of everything made hardware-related training a mockery; like in case of the Americans, there are also accounts of commanders complaining about new soldiers unable to dismantle a gun. I know cases of 20-25% trainees not even leaving the barracks due to … lack of shoes. Under extreme pressure from the front the schedules were being trimmed or condensed; if in case of forming entire units the training somewhat resembled what it was supposed to be, in case of individuals it was often reduced to few days (if any). Oleg is quoting a sample of a protracted, 6-month long training of a single division. Surprising, though possible. But I think it does not take much effort to find divisions formed and sent to fight in less than a month.

So a huge pool of manpower is very, very nice. But what good is it with these standards.

I would be interested in the impact of targetting soviet industry faster, or limiting the lend-lease.

 

[CruelDwarf]

Except for People's Militia and Partisans.

And why it is important to count partisans? As for the People's Militia units - they never had children or old people in them. And only Leningrad ones actually saw any combat.

 

[Ulatersk]

And why it is important to count partisans?

Because Soviet partisans were a government institution, centrally coordinated and supplied.

As for the People's Militia units - they never had children or old people in them. And only Leningrad ones actually saw any combat.

Yes, 70 000 worth of people in People's Militia Leningrad divisions saw combat. Among other units elsewhere.

As far as I know, all of them were used to form regular units later.


And seeing that both of them were recruiting from Komsomol, there were bound to be teens as young as 14.

 

[CruelDwarf]

Because Soviet partisans were a government institution, centrally coordinated and supplied.

In post-war Soviet histories - maybe. There are plenty of people who wanted to mill some good PR on that subject in the Soviet bureaucracy. In practice both supplies and coordination was non-existant.

Yes, 70 000 worth of people in People's Militia Leningrad divisions saw combat. Among other units elsewhere.

As far as I know, all of them were used to form regular units later.

Yeah, and because of that vast majority of them already accounted as regulars.

And seeing that both of them were recruiting from Komsomol, there were bound to be teens as young as 14.

There was never any provisions which allowed recuitment of the 14-years old (or 15 or 16 years old) into the military neither by draft nor as volunteers. Only 17+ years old men were recruited under special provision that they would be kept in the training units until they reach 18.
Of course plenty of volunteers lied about their age but it wasn't any sort of centralized policy. Such things were common for all warring countries.

 

[Ulatersk]

In post-war Soviet histories - maybe. There are plenty of people who wanted to mill some good PR on that subject in the Soviet bureaucracy. In practice both supplies and coordination was non-existant.

Yes, except for guiding documents, limited supplies, weapons and food. Also making damn sure that partisan movement was as party as it could be. They even did some preparatory work in advance of the war to form detachments.

A directive was passed on 29th june 1941 concerning "The organisation of the struggle in the rear of German forces."

Nevermind the forming of detachments to fight paratroopers landing in the soviet territory,destruction battalions and militia units whose roles were redefined.

Yeah, and because of that vast majority of them already accounted as regulars.

Remnants that were refilled wih new manpower were "regular."

There was never any provisions which allowed recuitment of the 14-years old (or 15 or 16 years old) into the military neither by draft nor as volunteers. Only 17+ years old men were recruited under special provision that they would be kept in the training units until they reach 18.
Of course plenty of volunteers lied about their age but it wasn't any sort of centralized policy. Such things were common for all warring countries.

Good to know.

 

[Henry IX]

As for the People's Militia units - they never had children or old people in them. And only Leningrad ones actually saw any combat.

Milita units saw service in several battles including Starlingrad. The static anti-aircraft units were always manned with milita, some by school children (although they were likely 16+ years old). Many of these formations saw combat. In addition, there were a significant number of factory militia that included older men and many of these were redesignated as regular divisions and used in front line roles.

However, there was never a systematic attempt to raise forces explicitly manned by men over 40 and boys under 18 which is in starck contrast to Germany. While people in these age catagories certainly fought and even some units that made use of under- and over- aged recruits were formed this was never policy for the Soviet Union.

 

[chepaeff]

The static anti-aircraft units were always manned with milita, some by school children (although they were likely 16+ years old).

I think you are confusing actual AA units and civilian AA defence service.

 

[Henry IX]

I think you are confusing actual AA units and civilian AA defence service.

Nope. The fixed units were manned by civic defence units. The actual AA units were army/airforce/navy formations manned by military personnel. However, the fixed units saw extensive action against German forces when they attempted to take Soviet cities including the crucial intial defence of Stalingrad. Although they were not doctrinally intended for action against enemy groud forces they were used in that role when they found themselves in the path of German forces, with variable results.

 

[chepaeff]

Nope. The fixed units were manned by civic defence units. The actual AA units were army/airforce/navy formations manned by military personnel.

Nope. Air defence forces were part of armed forces, ergo no civilians.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Air_Defence_Forces

 

[Drakken]

The basic issue with any situation where the Germans win Barbarossa is that they need a bunch more things to go right for them, where as for it to fail only a very small number of things need to occur. If even one of the Soviet mechanised corps had been well deployed, properly fueled and supplied and well led then it is probable that at least one panzer spear head would be badly mauled and held up for a significant period of time. If Stalin had given the mobilisation orders even just a few days earlier then the crushing of the first echelon of Soviet forces would have taken considerably longer and the crippling C&C isses that plagued the Red Army for the first year or so of the war would have been significantly lessoned. If Stalin had been slightly less paranoid or less impatient or more militarlily competent then the Soviet forces would have been considerably stronger than they were by the end of 1941...

That it did not go right for the Germans in real life, does not mean that things might not have gone right for the Germans if the choices and events of Operation Barbarossa had been different. That is why the "Germany was doomed to lose from day 1" argument is so stupid from an intellectual point of view. It is a pure teleological fallacy: Because it went that way, it was bound to go that way.

If Hitler hadn't diddle-daddled with his main theater objectives, switching from Moscow to Ukraine then Moscow again, if he had listened to his panzer commanders who were begging him to let them run deeper into enemy territory after their breakthrough, if Hitler had agreed to take steps from the start to make sure his front troops had adequate winter clothing and supplies in preparation for making war passed the Rasputitsa, etc. All of these above were things well within Hitler's control. If Hitler had even relented to his advisors' advice on any of these, odds are significant that Stalin would have effectively lost Moscow.

 

[CruelDwarf]

If Hitler hadn't diddle-daddled with his main theater objectives, switching from Moscow to Ukraine then Moscow again

He never actually 'switched' any goals because Barbarossa as operative plan failed within a month from the very beginning. Anything after that wasn't 'switching goals' but reacting to a changing circumstances.

if he had listened to his panzer commanders who were begging him to let them run deeper into enemy territory after their breakthrough,

You mean pushing further into the enemy territory without securing your own flanks first? Yeah, advancing towards Moscow while having about 700 thousand strong South-Western Front at the left flank is a really smart idea.

if Hitler had agreed to take steps from the start to make sure his front troops had adequate winter clothing and supplies in preparation for making war passed the Rasputitsa, etc

You have a choice what to send further from the Warsaw railroad junction - ammunition, fuel and spares or winter clothing? What would have the priority?

If Hitler had even relented to his advisors' advice on any of these, odds are significant that Stalin would have effectively lost Moscow.

Neither of these 'choices' was actually a choice. It is a very much a post-war conjectures based on the hindsight.

 

[Easy-Kill]

There was never any provisions which allowed recuitment of the 14-years old (or 15 or 16 years old) into the military neither by draft nor as volunteers. Only 17+ years old men were recruited under special provision that they would be kept in the training units until they reach 18.
Of course plenty of volunteers lied about their age but it wasn't any sort of centralized policy. Such things were common for all warring countries.

Just to point out that even modern armies recruit soldiers of <18 years old. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukn...f-17-sent-to-war-in-Afghanistan-and-Iraq.html

 

[BaronNoir]

I would point out, again, that the Nazis simply under-estimated to a criminal degree the capacities of the Red Army and of Soviet industry. Once the initial shock was absorbed, the Red Army was remarkably adept at achieving total strategic surprise and the so-called genius generals of the Heer kept being fooled by astute deceptions.

If the Red Army managed to produce ten of thousands of tanks at least as good as Germans ones within improvised factories with no less improvised workforce working in appaling conditions, I would say that there was really something amiss within the supposedly ''superior'' German tank industry.

 

[cpreston5]

That it did not go right for the Germans in real life, does not mean that things might not have gone right for the Germans if the choices and events of Operation Barbarossa had been different. That is why the "Germany was doomed to lose from day 1" argument is so stupid from an intellectual point of view. It is a pure teleological fallacy: Because it went that way, it was bound to go that way.

If Hitler hadn't diddle-daddled with his main theater objectives, switching from Moscow to Ukraine then Moscow again, if he had listened to his panzer commanders who were begging him to let them run deeper into enemy territory after their breakthrough, if Hitler had agreed to take steps from the start to make sure his front troops had adequate winter clothing and supplies in preparation for making war passed the Rasputitsa, etc. All of these above were things well within Hitler's control. If Hitler had even relented to his advisors' advice on any of these, odds are significant that Stalin would have effectively lost Moscow.

Everything you posited could have went the Germans way and the odds of their overall victory would still be so infinitely small that it would still be within reason to say their victory was impossible.

It's true that humans commonly make the error of ascribing inevitability to events in hindsight, but if somebody runs starts running towards a concrete wall, and the wall wins, it's still valid to say "he was never going to break the wall".

The reason Barbarossa went ahead was because Germany was not being led according to rational political objectives, or a realistic strategic vision. It was a plainly desperate operation. It was only granted a brief semblance of viability by the incredible overperformance of the invading forces, and the near collapse of the Red Army in the opening phases of the war.

People often bring up things that they feel could have gave the Axis some improved chance of winning the war, without realising that there are twice as many easily remedied faults on the Allies' side that could have led to the Axis being crushed far, far quicker.

What if the Soviets had prepared themselves properly when they were tipped off about the invasion? What if border forces had been clearly ordered to resist from the start? What if the Red Air Force had been withdrawn out of range of German attack? What if the Red Army had been permitted to perform a fighting withdrawal?

What if Stalin had never purged the military?

 

[thedarkendstar]

Everything you posited could have went the Germans way and the odds of their overall victory would still be so infinitely small that it would still be within reason to say their victory was impossible.

It's true that humans commonly make the error of ascribing inevitability to events in hindsight, but if somebody runs starts running towards a concrete wall, and the wall wins, it's still valid to say "he was never going to break the wall".

The reason Barbarossa went ahead was because Germany was not being led according to rational political objectives, or a realistic strategic vision. It was a plainly desperate operation. It was only granted a brief semblance of viability by the incredible overperformance of the invading forces, and the near collapse of the Red Army in the opening phases of the war.

People often bring up things that they feel could have gave the Axis some improved chance of winning the war, without realising that there are twice as many easily remedied faults on the Allies' side that could have led to the Axis being crushed far, far quicker.

What if the Soviets had prepared themselves properly when they were tipped off about the invasion? What if border forces had been clearly ordered to resist from the start? What if the Red Air Force had been withdrawn out of range of German attack? What if the Red Army had been permitted to perform a fighting withdrawal?

What if Stalin had never purged the military?

But you see the reason those questions aren't ask is because the Soviets weren't the ones who lost the reason people say what if this went right for there Germans i because they lost and want to know if the possibility of victory even existed.

I for one don't believe Barbarossa was a forgone conclusion however the Germans were already lucky it would have taken even more luck for them to win. (and thank god they didnt)

 

[Ulatersk]

What if the Soviets had prepared themselves properly when they were tipped off about the invasion?

With a deficit of thousands of combat ready tanks and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies, not really.

What if border forces had been clearly ordered to resist from the start?

If they were actually alarmed and concentrated to resist on the border, the Barbarrosa migh just have been succesful.

You know, with commanders commanding two level above their station, no supplies, the general zerg rush, no combined arms.

Instantaneous numbers made little difference, since they made little difference in Barbarrosa itself.

What if the Red Air Force had been withdrawn out of range of German attack?

Soviets had no early warning system.

Also, they largely sacrificed a lot of junk aircraft they kept on strength, instead of modern fighters. And the "destruction" of VVS is largely a meme anyway, since it doesnt line up with actual data.

Soviets got hit, yes, but they bled the VVS in much the same manner as RKKA, though senseless attacks, poor servicability, and no tactics. The airforce certainly did not stop existing in the first week of Barbarrosa,

 

[Rustaveli]

By the beginning of the Second World War, Germany had fewer people (88 million) against Poland (35 million) + France (41 million) + England (46 million) = 122 million. But on the main economic indicators she was on par with the three powers (!), And in some cases even surpassed them.

After the victory over Poland, Germany's human resources increased to 107 million people, and allies (without colonies) fell to 87 million. The economic resources of the Reich also surpassed the resources of the Allies. Therefore, the victory over the allies (1940) - was largely predetermined: the Reich had more people, better industry, a more experienced army, a more united people. After achieving this victory, the Reich became even stronger. Hitler did not in vain consider in mid-1940 that the war was largely won: it remained only to persuade Britain to peace. This country has no chance against the Reich and it hopes for two potential allies - the US and the USSR. Destroy the US - Germany does not have the opportunity, but you can try to destroy the USSR. Thus the Barbarossa plan is born.

After a short campaign in the Balkans and before the attack on the USSR - the Reich had 114 million of their population. (In the game for Germany, you mistakenly lack such national areas as Danzig, Poznan, Alsace-Lorraine, part of Belgium, part of Denmark - they are designated as occupied, although in fact they have already become part of the Reich). Germany was superior to the USSR in terms of its main economic indicators, except oil production and number of population (196 million).

(The industrial revolution ended in Germany by 1870, in the USSR by 1940, the difference was ~ 70 years.The number of industrial workers in Germany (in early 1941) was 34 million, the USSR - 31 million. Labor productivity in the Reich was higher, but this was offset by the simplicity of Soviet technology. After the outbreak of the war, the number of Soviet workers was reduced to 17 million people (they were replaced by women and teenagers, and in Germany - foreign workers and prisoners).

The German army has a rich experience of modern war (1939-1941), while in the USSR the last major war is civil war. The German people are more united than ever and believe in victory. Therefore, Hitler does not doubt the victory. Together with the countries of the allies (Romania, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia) - the Reich has 148 million people. These are allies for the eastern front (formally Finland was not part of the axis, but who cares?), But in total in occupied Europe the Reich owns from 247 to 270 million people). It seemed that the USSR had no chance ...

But we survived. Despite the great human, material and territorial losses - the USSR was able to destroy the German war plan - Barbarossa. Only from that moment (late 1941) the anti-Hitler coalition begins to surpass the resources of its enemies: the USSR (after the occupation) - 140 million + England (46 million) + US (132 million) = 318 million plus minors. Against the Reich (113 million) + Italy (44 million) + Japan (73) = 230 million plus minors and the occupied part of Europe. The ratio of human resources 1.38: 1 in favor of the Allies. However, on the eastern front, the ratio remains tense: 147 million of axis against 140 million USSR - 1.05: 1 in favor of the Axis countries.

When Germany began a new offensive in the summer of 1942 - the maximum number of soviet people (79 million) fell under the German occupation. This was one of the reasons for the appearance of the famous order No. 227, which explicitly states that the USSR no longer has superiority in human and agricultural resources over the enemy, so the Red Army must harden its resistance and keep the enemy from advancing to the east.

Only the heroic struggle of the Soviet people (and not a set of random events, such as: mudslide, cold winter, stupid Hitler) and the economic support of the Allies (but this assistance was insignificant in 1941-1942) were able to reverse the situation in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition. But despite this, the consumption of artillery ammunition on the eastern front - was higher overall in the German army: the Reich was still very strong and intended to fight to the end ...

And he did this: as a result, the entire German people were killed / captured / maimed mainly on the eastern front (75-80%), and the Reich was forced to call the adolescents and the elderly into the militia - it was a payment for the idea of the domination of some people over others.

 

[RichStrat]

Hitler's problem wasn't victories, it was knowing what to do with his victories. we see this same pattern from his successful acquisition of the Sudetenland through to the great successes of Barbarrossa. He should have restored Polish independence on day 1 of Barbarrossa. He should have given independence to the Baltic States and the Ukraine, but above all he should have treated the captured POWs well. All is fog in war, but how POWs are treated is one thing that spreads fast in war. There were millions upon millions of Soviet citizens just gaging to collaborate with a German invader, Hitler did his absolute best to alienate them. I mean did Hitler sit down and think what's the best way possible to get these troops to fight to the last man?

Captured POWs were an immense resource. Could they have been organised into front line divisions for use within the time scale of the campaign, no probably not. but they could have been used for fighting partisans, guard duty and logistic tasks. Indigenous forces would have been far better at fighting partisans than German troops, they know the language, they know the culture, and the collaborators would be far, far better at rooting out Communists and Communist sympathisers than the Germans ever could be. We saw this with Vichy, there were far less problems with partisans in Vichy territory than there were in German administrated France.

 

[Rustaveli]

Hitler's problem wasn't victories, it was knowing what to do with his victories

He knew and strictly adhered to his policy, he simply did not succeed.

He should have restored Polish independence on day 1 of Barbarrossa

This is madness. Why destroy Poland, and then give it independence? About 2/3 of the territory and population of Poland - the Reich took it, and the rest - was used as a source of cheap labor. Even if you give independence - this does not help the struggle and strongly contradicts Hitler's convictions.

He should have given independence to the Baltic States and the Ukraine, but above all he should have treated the captured POWs well.

Good treatment means that you need to give these people food, and the Reich has a significant deficit of agricultural products. If you give part of the food to prisoners of war, then there will be less to provide for an army that will adversely affect the economy of the Reich. Why feed "subhumans" if this contradicts the convictions of the Nazi elite of Germany?

There were millions upon millions of Soviet citizens just gaging to collaborate with a German invader, Hitler did his absolute best to alienate them

It is necessary to share ideological fighters with the Soviet authorities and "hostages of circumstances." The first was relatively small (the strength of Vlasov's army is 120-130 thousand people). The second was larger (the maximum number was 800-900 thousand), but these people had no choice: either to die of hunger, or to agree to help the German army and survive. They chose life.
Percentage of traitors from each people in the USSR:
Russians - 0.4%
Ukrainians - 0.7%
Belarusians - 0.8%
Armenians - 1%
Georgians - 1.1%
Azerbaijanis - 1.7%
Lithuanians - 2.5%
Kalmyks - 5.2%
Estonians - 7.9%
Latvians - 9.2%
Crimean Tatars - 15%
Chechens - 20%
The last two nationalities were deported for their policy of cooperation with the enemy. Now, when some people say that a lot of Slavs were for cooperation with Hitler - you can see that only 0.4 - 0.8%.

Captured POWs were an immense resource. Could they have been organised into front line divisions for use within the time scale of the campaign, no probably not. but they could have been used for fighting partisans, guard duty and logistic tasks

In part this was done (the collaborators were used in punitive actions against civilians), but this did not help Germany.