2 short interludes
An extract from the diary of Maj General Kreizer, 48th Rifle Division, 10th Army, Riga.
By 01.00 on 24 July all three rifle divisions had escaped German encirclement at Riga and reached the relative safety of the 24th Army's rifle pits guarding the bridges over the Daugava. Our comrades treat us as well as possible and officers accept all the information we can give them on the German OOB and tactics - already the battle for the bridges has commenced, we then pull back to the rear - to the inevitable and uncomfortable meeting with the NKVD - with the accusations of cowardice and sabotage. Hopefully they decide we did what we could and that they need us to return to the front.
We held Riga for 5 days against 15 German divisions, incl Pzrs & constant air attacks, but neither in terms of losses (3000 Soviet, incl air attacks, 1400 German) nor more importantly in terms of organisational disruption, did we achieve our primary goals - the hope was to further damage the organisation of the German assault troops and force them out of the offensive, judging by the initial battle reports of the 24th Army we failed in that.
However, it appears that the 11th Army to our east has done all that and more. So far the battle for Aizkraukle has rarely featured in front reports but STAVKA now sees it as a model, along with the results of an offensive down south, in how to slowly deny the Germans operational mass for further attacks. They have skillfully absorbed the blows of 5 Pzr divisions, and, from the available reports, some of those German divisions will not be contributing to their offensive for some time:
General Popov is sitting in the Smolny Institute in Leningrad pouring over his situation map for south Finland. So near but so far from victory. His 19 rifle and 1 (lt) armoured division are almost utterly exhausted - only 2 would be treated as combat ready in better times. His only re-assurance is the 15 German and Finnish divisions he faces are in the same state.
He has begged STAVKA to raise additional Army HQs to improve co-ordination and been turned down. He begged them not to withdraw 19th Army, but that is now in reserve near Smolensk. He has been asking for specialist mountain divisions to operate in the Arctic and finally been told that 2 will be sent - from the Caucasus! If he is lucky they will arrive before the winter snows that far north.
Suddenly his door is flung open without knocking or any acknowledgement. To his shock and dismay Mekhlis (note he was the commissar Stalin used to instill terror in the red army at this period) and a 'special section' squad of NKVD troops stood there - his own staff standing to the side looking cowed.
Mekhlis turns on him - "Comrade General you are accused of being a German spy who abused the trust of the people by sabotaging the Finnish campaign - what do you say"
Poplov was stunned, he knew from the tone of STAVKA imperatives that the 'failure' was deemed his, not theirs for pulling out the 19th after the initial victories. He explains some of this to Mekhlis.
Mekhlis - "so, you wish not only to lose us the war in the north, but also to fatally weaken the defences guarding Moscow, you are more than a traitor, you must be one of the few fascist agents and saboteurs we missed in 1937"
The room falls quiet - all know this is usually a death sentence.
Mekhlis - "However, Comrade Stalin is also understanding, maybe you are not a spy or a trotskyist, maybe just incompetent? You have 10 days to force the surrender of Finland, if you fail, we will assume the charges against you have been proved - and as a testament of our good faith, a squadron of Sturmoviks have been ordered to support your assault on Turku - remember Comrade General, only by success can you convince Comrade Stalin that his fears are unfounded ... Good day"