A short setting of the scene
By early June 1941, diplomatic and political attaches at embassies in Moscow started to notice a very different manner in the Soviet capital. The almost wilful ignoring of German conquests, the build up on the western border, and the potential threat to the USSR was being acknowledged by Soviet officials.
Although Stalin’s ‘no provocation’ order was still in place, and the Soviets continued to ignore minor border violations such as reconnaissance flights. Observers traced this change of attitude to first the Soviet-Yugoslavian Friendship Treaty in April and the subsequent failure to even protest when Germany invaded and overran Yugoslavia. It would appear that events at the Mayday celebrations in 1941 were the catalyst, as it provided an opportunity for many of the senior officers in the armed forces to meet and discuss their plans.
What followed, was not the coup as it was sometimes rather simplistically described. The party remained in power, and Stalin remained de facto leader of the USSR, equally many of his cronies and favourites retained their offices. It was more a rebalancing. Many in the armed forces were convinced that the Germans would attack, and attack soon. If that happened, their lives were on the line, and they wanted influence over such decisions.
At a political level, this saw a general change in the membership of the Sovnarkom (council of ministers) and creation of the GKO (state defence committee) to try and link the military work of the STAVKA with decisions about industrial and scientific policy. Stalin remained at the core of this system but seemed to accept far more guidance and advice than before.
The main change was in Soviet planning for war and organisation of the RKKA (Red Army). All the lessons of Poland, France and Yugoslavia indicated the Germans were more competent than the Soviets in their use of tanks and aircraft. The old illusion that a war would see several days of border battles followed by a quick Soviet advance was abandoned.
The proposed solution lay in a series of apparently minor steps. The problem, as future historians stressed, was that when added to the ‘no provocation’ order, this actually added to the confusion in the RKKA on that fateful Sunday.
A completely new OOB was in the process of being put in place on the western borders. So as to make the best use of the able officers, and to improve the overall officer ratio, a large number of lower level HQs were abolished. A number of commanders such as Gorbatov were released from prison and allocated to combat formations. Thus 4-5 rifle divisions were grouped into an ‘army’, and these armies were clustered into geographically named fronts. The main axes, north and south of the Pripyet marshes were then grouped into ‘strategic directions’.
The reserve formations at Minsk and Kiev were given a priority in terms of reinforcements and ordered to take up more dispersed positions along the old Soviet-Polish border. Equally those formations on the German border were ordered to create a second defensive line using formations drawn back from the front and their own available reserves. Finally the STAVKA reserve formations were ordered to form a new defensive line anchored around Rzhev-Bryansk.
If needed, these multiple reserve groupings would allow the first echelon forces to fall back in some order, and to regroup behind the defence lines rather than a continual process of having to retreat whilst under attack.
The tank, motorised and cavalry formations were also in the process of restructuring. Tank divisions were organised so that all had the advantage of combined arms (ie 1 LArm brg+ 2 mot brgs is not c/arms, 2 LArm + 1 mot brg is).
The prewar planning around active partisan operations were revisited. Long neglected arms dumps were being replenished, but they had to compete with regular units who also needed re-arming. A process not helped by the chaotic procurement system that had left tank brigades with a multiplicity of unit types and no concentration of the new T-34s.
All this was in the process of being introduced when the Germans struck at 2am on 22 June 1941. At least the Red Army had a semblance of a strategic plan, other than to hold fast on the border. In every other sense, it was caught very badly off balance.
By early June 1941, diplomatic and political attaches at embassies in Moscow started to notice a very different manner in the Soviet capital. The almost wilful ignoring of German conquests, the build up on the western border, and the potential threat to the USSR was being acknowledged by Soviet officials.
Although Stalin’s ‘no provocation’ order was still in place, and the Soviets continued to ignore minor border violations such as reconnaissance flights. Observers traced this change of attitude to first the Soviet-Yugoslavian Friendship Treaty in April and the subsequent failure to even protest when Germany invaded and overran Yugoslavia. It would appear that events at the Mayday celebrations in 1941 were the catalyst, as it provided an opportunity for many of the senior officers in the armed forces to meet and discuss their plans.
What followed, was not the coup as it was sometimes rather simplistically described. The party remained in power, and Stalin remained de facto leader of the USSR, equally many of his cronies and favourites retained their offices. It was more a rebalancing. Many in the armed forces were convinced that the Germans would attack, and attack soon. If that happened, their lives were on the line, and they wanted influence over such decisions.
At a political level, this saw a general change in the membership of the Sovnarkom (council of ministers) and creation of the GKO (state defence committee) to try and link the military work of the STAVKA with decisions about industrial and scientific policy. Stalin remained at the core of this system but seemed to accept far more guidance and advice than before.
The main change was in Soviet planning for war and organisation of the RKKA (Red Army). All the lessons of Poland, France and Yugoslavia indicated the Germans were more competent than the Soviets in their use of tanks and aircraft. The old illusion that a war would see several days of border battles followed by a quick Soviet advance was abandoned.
The proposed solution lay in a series of apparently minor steps. The problem, as future historians stressed, was that when added to the ‘no provocation’ order, this actually added to the confusion in the RKKA on that fateful Sunday.
A completely new OOB was in the process of being put in place on the western borders. So as to make the best use of the able officers, and to improve the overall officer ratio, a large number of lower level HQs were abolished. A number of commanders such as Gorbatov were released from prison and allocated to combat formations. Thus 4-5 rifle divisions were grouped into an ‘army’, and these armies were clustered into geographically named fronts. The main axes, north and south of the Pripyet marshes were then grouped into ‘strategic directions’.
The reserve formations at Minsk and Kiev were given a priority in terms of reinforcements and ordered to take up more dispersed positions along the old Soviet-Polish border. Equally those formations on the German border were ordered to create a second defensive line using formations drawn back from the front and their own available reserves. Finally the STAVKA reserve formations were ordered to form a new defensive line anchored around Rzhev-Bryansk.
If needed, these multiple reserve groupings would allow the first echelon forces to fall back in some order, and to regroup behind the defence lines rather than a continual process of having to retreat whilst under attack.
The tank, motorised and cavalry formations were also in the process of restructuring. Tank divisions were organised so that all had the advantage of combined arms (ie 1 LArm brg+ 2 mot brgs is not c/arms, 2 LArm + 1 mot brg is).
The prewar planning around active partisan operations were revisited. Long neglected arms dumps were being replenished, but they had to compete with regular units who also needed re-arming. A process not helped by the chaotic procurement system that had left tank brigades with a multiplicity of unit types and no concentration of the new T-34s.
All this was in the process of being introduced when the Germans struck at 2am on 22 June 1941. At least the Red Army had a semblance of a strategic plan, other than to hold fast on the border. In every other sense, it was caught very badly off balance.
