just for flavor, what was the size of forces at manzikert? 100,000 byzantines vs. 40,000 turks IIRC why didnt they die on the way?
Akka le Vil said:The second problem, is that, even realistically and historically, it's completely bogus and ridiculous. No army goes down by a fifth in one month, except in exceptionnally dire conditions (and in one month, a real army could at least do more than travel barely one province like in the game, which not only has an insane attrition effect, but make it worse by making troops take age to move, hence taking longer the attrition). Attrition was a nuisance, but in the game, it's simply the main killer of any armed force, and it slaughter at a speed that is beyond absurd
Not to be vindicative, but you obviously didn't bother neither to read the previous posts - which already include, often several times, the counter of most, if not all, your points - neither really thought about what you said.BueDigre said:Sure they do look what happened to Nappies great army. In fact attrition, which includes desertions, were many times lots higher, The vast majority of soldiers have always died from sickness, starvations or deserted. Few died in battles before the raiways changed the consept of warfare logistic. Before the 18th century noone ever tried to support their armies in hostile territory. Armies were feed by plunder and tributs. Which is why you over and over again can see why small commander makes seperate peaces with other small commanders in order to get their supplies. If you study what happend to the forces of Gallas during the thirty years war (a general that regulary tried to enter pilliged land) you will see what I mean.
Finally during the middle age noone ever tried to march a army of teens of thousends. Not even armies of thousands throug roadless territory. Please do remember that for every fighting soldier two other followed the army. Wifes, children, whores, bums etc. So why should you be able to do it in the game. Its not funny, not realistic, not even nessesary. Move your troops in many small stacks instead. And even thougt its true noone could coordinate several forces back then they still moved seperatly, just very uncoordinated.
Edit. An armies average marching distance remained unchanged from the romans up to our times. Is 4.5 kilometers a day. Or so I was taught at the swedish Officers school of Karlsberg.
Exactly. And the amount of money you are talking about to get around the lack of infrastucture, corruption (yea...hmm how easily we forget that little thing), degradation and loss of of supplies in route (from normal use, wear and tear and accidents), weather problems, compendating for illnesses, making sure the troops are happy, and then after all that, making sure that train knows where the hell you're at and your talking bankruptsy not for just a few decades but a few centuries. Even the estates general wouldn't be able to help you out.Woz Early said:Akka, I have to agree with Jinnai on this one. Whilst it would have been technically possible to arrange to supply an army in hostile territory, it didn't happen all that often, and wasn't always all that effective. Plus, warfare wasn't approached in that kind of manner for a lot of the time period. On top of the sheer cost of warfare alone, paying to arrange for regular shipments or trains of food and other supplies from provinces depleted of their normal manpower (as they're now soldiers) would be slow, cumbersome and costly.
The alternative? Have the army live cheaply off the land, pillaging as it goes. No extra cost and who cares what happens to the peasants of the enemy, anyway...that was pretty much the line of thinking throughout the era.
If there were horrific effects to plunging into debt akin to the bankruptcy in EU2, then I might agree with your suggestion to base more of the factors on money, but as it stands the worst that can happen to me for being in debt is that a few buildings might be lost until I can convince the Estates General to bail me out (and it has to be said, its ahistorically easy to convince them...). So what if the war costs 20%-30% more? If that guarantees my victory, it'll easily pay for itself in the future...
My thoughts on using money to soothe attrition were just that - to allow you to support a couple of extra thousand men in one place before attrition kicked in because you were doing your level best to keep them supplied, but I think it would probably cause more issues than it would solve.
At or below the support limit is fine, after all it doesn't have a support limit displayed for nothing. Above that and your straining your resources. You might be able to feed a couple hundred more, for one month or so, but after/more than that things are going to get ugly. The longer and higher the amount the uglier it will get. And this goes for everyone. And that support limit isn't just for your army, its for everyone.Woz Early said:In terms of the attrition curve, bell-shaped is realistic - or, more accurately, steeply curved. If the province can support 4,000 men through either forage or natural supply (which is really what the supportable troop limit is about), then having an extra 1,000 men means that you're 20% short on food. If it was only a hundred men over, people could probably tighten their belts and attrition would scarcely show, but 1,000 would cause health deterioration and death. 2,000 men over would be far worse.
These effects wouldn't be linear in nature. Once you truly reach your maximum limit of supply then every extra person is condemned to death. Plus, the closer you get to that point, and especially beyond it, the effects would become disproportionately worse. The odd bit of starvation here and there might be forgiven, but you can't expect 5,000 people to casually accept their impending doom. And no-one knows which 5,000 its going to be...there would be fights over food, mutinies, mass desertions of mecenaries and peasants alike, rife conditions for disease...in short, its not a linear relationship, and the curve would be likely be steep as hell. The issue is that its almost certainly kicking in at too low a value, and that it can spiral upwards out of control.
On the side issue of leaving men behind in castles, the entire beauty of a castle was that it could be held and defended with very few men at all, yet tie up a far larger force for quite some length of time. Its unlikely that you would leave thousands of men behind unless you were leaving a garrison to prevent against active rebellion or the threat of re-invasion. In these times of swaying loyalties and pre-nationalism, most peasants weren't over-concerned with who ruled them. At least, not at the moment that they'd been conquered. There would be more pressing worries, like not starving. That action is better represented by leaving a regiment behind, rather than deducting troops from the total. At present, that isn't necessary...but who knows what CK2 will bring.![]()
Woz Early said:If the province can support 4,000 men through either forage or natural supply (which is really what the supportable troop limit is about), then having an extra 1,000 men means that you're 20% short on food. If it was only a hundred men over, people could probably tighten their belts and attrition would scarcely show, but 1,000 would cause health deterioration and death. 2,000 men over would be far worse.
These effects wouldn't be linear in nature. Once you truly reach your maximum limit of supply then every extra person is condemned to death.
Yes, which is why, as I said above, only wealthy and organized kingdom could afford such a thing. Which is also why there was usually larger armies in the East, and larger armies in the Antiquity, while medieval Western Europe, still quite poor, couldn't afford that and had essentially pillaging armies.Woz Early said:Akka, I have to agree with Jinnai on this one. Whilst it would have been technically possible to arrange to supply an army in hostile territory, it didn't happen all that often, and wasn't always all that effective. Plus, warfare wasn't approached in that kind of manner for a lot of the time period. On top of the sheer cost of warfare alone, paying to arrange for regular shipments or trains of food and other supplies from provinces depleted of their normal manpower (as they're now soldiers) would be slow, cumbersome and costly.
Yes, and such tactics were still used under Napoléon, who was able to march armies of up to 100 000 soldiers without significant attrition, as I already pointed it out already.The alternative? Have the army live cheaply off the land, pillaging as it goes. No extra cost and who cares what happens to the peasants of the enemy, anyway...that was pretty much the line of thinking throughout the era.
That's the best argument so far, considering all the others were already answered in previous postsIf there were horrific effects to plunging into debt akin to the bankruptcy in EU2, then I might agree with your suggestion to base more of the factors on money, but as it stands the worst that can happen to me for being in debt is that a few buildings might be lost until I can convince the Estates General to bail me out (and it has to be said, its ahistorically easy to convince them...). So what if the war costs 20%-30% more? If that guarantees my victory, it'll easily pay for itself in the future...
Why ?My thoughts on using money to soothe attrition were just that - to allow you to support a couple of extra thousand men in one place before attrition kicked in because you were doing your level best to keep them supplied, but I think it would probably cause more issues than it would solve.
WRONG !In terms of the attrition curve, bell-shaped is realistic - or, more accurately, steeply curved. If the province can support 4,000 men through either forage or natural supply (which is really what the supportable troop limit is about), then having an extra 1,000 men means that you're 20% short on food. If it was only a hundred men over, people could probably tighten their belts and attrition would scarcely show, but 1,000 would cause health deterioration and death. 2,000 men over would be far worse.
These effects wouldn't be linear in nature. Once you truly reach your maximum limit of supply then every extra person is condemned to death. Plus, the closer you get to that point, and especially beyond it, the effects would become disproportionately worse. The odd bit of starvation here and there might be forgiven, but you can't expect 5,000 people to casually accept their impending doom. And no-one knows which 5,000 its going to be...there would be fights over food, mutinies, mass desertions of mecenaries and peasants alike, rife conditions for disease...in short, its not a linear relationship, and the curve would be likely be steep as hell. The issue is that its almost certainly kicking in at too low a value, and that it can spiral upwards out of control.
Hu, well, that's probably why I said "500 men by level of fortification", which isn't several thousands until you reach with the highest-level onesOn the side issue of leaving men behind in castles, the entire beauty of a castle was that it could be held and defended with very few men at all, yet tie up a far larger force for quite some length of time. Its unlikely that you would leave thousands of men behind unless you were leaving a garrison to prevent against active rebellion or the threat of re-invasion.
Well, CK2 is a long way ahead, for now I'm just giving opinion on the next path(s).In these times of swaying loyalties and pre-nationalism, most peasants weren't over-concerned with who ruled them. At least, not at the moment that they'd been conquered. There would be more pressing worries, like not starving. That action is better represented by leaving a regiment behind, rather than deducting troops from the total. At present, that isn't necessary...but who knows what CK2 will bring.![]()
Arasul said:Just slightly off topic -- I was wondering if attrition is at all dependent on the skill of the marshall/ruler leading the army.
Akka le Vil said:2) The Facts
Regardless of the argument and explanations we give, the facts stay, that attrition (except in exceptionnally dire circumstances, which are, well, exceptionnals) DIDN'T reach the levels we see in the game, by whole scales. We can rationnalize all the day long, it's only theorycraft if the reality shows differently, and, well, the reality DOES show differently.
Rome, Greece, Persia, Byzantine Empire, Arabs, Mongols, Chinese and so on WERE able to field hundred-thousands-like armies and to keep them working (and not vanishing out of attrition in a few weeks). It was, in fact, only in Western Europe that it didn't happen, up to the Renaissance, when precisely Europe grew rich again and could afford again big armies (while technologically, supplies were the same than in Middle-ages).
As such, regardless of the arguments we can throw, there is this simple fact we can't go against : history denies such level of attrition. They are unrealistic.
Woz Early said:I agree, joak, it would be very rare for the army to be larger than the number of inhabitants in the province, but there's more to it than that...
If inhabitants knew an army was coming, they wouldn't think "Oh well, never mind" and leave the fields alone. Food would be rapidly harvested, especially by the castles and major towns, which would try to stockpile and then seal themselves off from the invaders outside.
That said, the current level of max support across provinces is, IMO, low if you compare it historically...since testing, I've not disagreed with that at any point, you might note.
In terms of food supply, the same applies. Consider that you have the food for 10,000 men. Not food for 10,000 men (and if we share it round a bit it could stretch to 15,000), but having already done that - 10,000 being the limit of people you can feed and keep healthy enough to march and fight. The 10,001th man is screwed. You simply can't afford to feed him, or else at least two of your men are going to collapse from starvation. So he dies - oh well, that's 0.01% attrition, who cares.
Assume for simplicity that those affected die within a month (with no food...go figure) and scale the figures up: 10,000 = 0%, 20,000 = 50%, 30,000 = 66%, 40,000 = 75%, 50,000 = 80%. 0-50-66-75-80 for equal manpower increments: a non-linear relationship.
Yep. I have not disagreed with attrition grinding armies neither, just the level of it ^^Woz Early said:That said, the current level of max support across provinces is, IMO, low if you compare it historically...since testing, I've not disagreed with that at any point, you might note.
Ah, but well, it WAS the case. But rather in occasions than on regular basis.Akka, whilst I understand the examples of attrition, etc. from Napoleonic and Roman times being comparable, I think if wealth-related issues are to be assessed accurately and fairly then we need to stay within the period. If the overwhelming majority of Europe was incapable of raising the wealth required to supply an army in the field, then it seems nonsensical to implement the ability for them to do so. Its different if it was a matter of choice, that Kings could afford to pay for supplies but chose not to, and there are good examples of Kings that *did* pay for regular supplies in the period, but AFAIK that isn't the case.
No.Psst...and if you do implement a bankruptcy event, I'd have it trigger starting at -1 gold, or the AI will be crippled in every battle.
Yep, all this could be interesting. It's actually not that hard to mod, in fact (though I'm afflicted with the dreaded "lazy" trait and I probably won't do it myself, except for the most basic "regiment killed" ^^).Plus, it should do more than randomly kill a regiment. Bankruptcy should destroy prestige, cause rampant chaos and disorder in the province as the liege and his court scratch around for any money they can, trigger high likelihood of forced acquisition of the Temperate trait or general health loss and higher chance of illness amongst all characters in the court, force changes to elective law as vassals grow tired of their liege's financial ineptitude, etc. Bankruptcy should be terrifically damning if you're going to make military expertise almost entirely dependent on wealth (given that wealth is already what defines army size).
Yep, that's the risk. But I prefer to have a fun game and restrain myself from exploits, than an irritating game without exploits, as I can control the level of exploits, but not the level of fun ^^This is along the lines of what I meant by creating more issues than the slider solution would solve. I haven't completely abandoned the idea as idiotic, but the more I think about it the more I think you'd really need to implement a lot of other features to stop it being a nice, easy exploit for the player.
Well, because it's how it works in reality, simple as thatAnd finally, I think you're grossly mistaken about the attrition curve, and full caps won't make me change my mind.
Hunger isn't a hard-defined threshold, but starvation is. Plus, by the time a good number of people are beyond the starvation threshold. Starving to death will be only one effect, coupled with disease, desertion and rioting. Those factors don't increase gently in a nice linear fashion (oh, two people died, so we'd better have a small fight this evening and draw straws to decide which one of us deserts...oh, four people died? Sorry, we'd better make sure six people get beaten up and draw straws twice). At the lower levels, the odd man or two dying of starvation or deserting are just background noise. These things happen in armies. Fifty men dying or deserting would cause rumours. A thousand could easily cause panic. Morale would be through the floor and given that morale affects desertion and the ability to keep order in the army, visible attrition would rise sharply and people deserted, fought over food and, to boot, began catching diseases from the dead and dying. That's a non-linear relationship.
In terms of food supply, the same applies. Consider that you have the food for 10,000 men. Not food for 10,000 men (and if we share it round a bit it could stretch to 15,000), but having already done that - 10,000 being the limit of people you can feed and keep healthy enough to march and fight. The 10,001th man is screwed. You simply can't afford to feed him, or else at least two of your men are going to collapse from starvation. So he dies - oh well, that's 0.01% attrition, who cares.
Assume for simplicity that those affected die within a month (with no food...go figure) and scale the figures up: 10,000 = 0%, 20,000 = 50%, 30,000 = 66%, 40,000 = 75%, 50,000 = 80%. 0-50-66-75-80 for equal manpower increments: a non-linear relationship.
I don't think that the supply limit in CK is supposed to represent that absolute threshold, hence why initial attrition is fairly light (go a couple of hundred over the threshold and it rarely clears 0.5%), but as you get further over it the problems magnify. Not just starvation, but all of the other effects that we've been mentioning too. I fail to see how that is supposed to make for a linear relationship.
On the contrary. Realism shows that attrition starts quite low, probably even lower than in the game (in fact, it should starts right from the start, with something like 0,5 %), but increase MUCH slower.The key issue is where at what height that curve should be pegged, as I've said several times already. People have yet to come up with any figures. Right now, its pegged pretty much at the supply limits displayed on the provinces (unless they have extensive roadnet, in which case roughly double the value), since that's where the lowest part kicks in. When you're at double the supportable limit with no roads, IIRC then you run at about 10-15% attrition.
I have a strong feeling that its pegged too low, and armies are suffering disproportionate amounts of attrition because they are further up the curve than they should be for their size, NOT because the curve itself is too steep.
Well, I would like a much lower attrition, but it doesn't mean I disagree with what you say.Quarto said:Speaking of attrition... I know this is the exact opposite of what people are asking for in this thread (i.e., lower attrition), but would it perhaps be possible to increase attrition during the winter months, or would that involve too much coding? That was a great feature in EU2, and I don't understand why invading Finland in January would have been easier in 1066 than in 1466.
Sorry, they didjoak said:I'm sorry, I have to completely disagree here--despite having some issue with the CK model (mostly on the way the curve ramps up.)
I'm not an expert on ancient armies, but the great field armies ones I know of Rome, Greece or Byzantium I know of wouldn't exceed 50k.
As I said, Western Europe wasn't very wealthy, and moreover used the feudal system, which was precisely based on "no standing army, call it when you need it".Which is irrelevant anyway, since the test for CK "realism" is what medeival Europeans did, not what historians or poets report or exaggerate about other times and places. Can you give examples of a European state keeping a field army of even 20k in the field indefinitely?
Akka le Vil said:Rome :
The overall standing professionnals armies of Rome were above 500 000 men. Not all in the same province, obviously, but they didn't lived off the land as they were carefully supplied.
Greece :
Alexander led an army of 40-45 000 footmen and about 3-5000 cavalrymen through Persia, Egypt and India. Granted, it was an army living mainly "off the land".
As for armies been on the same battlefield, the battle between Constantine and Lucinus at Hadrianopolis, involved, in total, about 300 000 men. It would be something like 150 % attrition with the CK engine (and perhaps even more ^^).
Byzantium :
Mantzikert saw more than 100 000 men together. The emperor part of the army alone was above 60 000, to which you had to add the ones that never fought, left the field and lead to the defeat.
And it was after the bureaucracy had reduced the military power of Byzantium.
As I said, Western Europe wasn't very wealthy, and moreover used the feudal system, which was precisely based on "no standing army, call it when you need it".
But Byzantium, for example, had such an army. The famous Varangian guard alone, which was an elite troop, the personnal bodyguards of the Basileus, not just regular troops, numbered 6000 soldiers, and was always in service.
Woz Early said:Joak - heh. I wasn't implying that the peasants 'willingly' turned over their food to the local garrisons, or willingly burned their own fields. Those would be the actions of the ruling power in the province, figuring that its better to have the peasants outside the fort starve but make it far more difficult to siege the fort out - since when the fort falls, their heads might well be mounted on spikes, or they might be ransomed for bank-breaking sums of money.
The problem with assuming that having 10% more people means that you have the potential for 10% more forage (or 8% more forage, or however you want to determine efficiency) is that you're assuming that the province has an effectively infinite supply of food that just needs to be harvested. On that point I disagree, but it doesn't really matter.![]()