A think a big problem here is that we run up against the limitations of the war support system.
The nuclear bombs dropped on Japan were very destructive and probably had an exceptional psychological impact given how unexpected and how horrible they were. However, Japan at the time was run by the military, and the military basically didn't care about a bunch of civilians being bombed. It's the same problem with the logic of stategic bombing in Europe, because it turns out if you bomb people in autocratic regimes, those people can't vote to end the conflict because they can't vote. They can't speak out in favor of peace, because the government will arrest and probably kill them. This whole idea that you can end a war by breaking the civilian morale doesn't really work if those civilians can't do anything about their broken morale. Meanwhile, their leaders can just choose not to care, which is what the Japanese government did.
The writing was on the wall long before the bombs were dropped, and it was obvious to the Japanese leadership that they had lost the war. The problem was that the US would only accept unconditional surrender, and the Japanese government really, really didn't want to give that, so they kept holding out that if they just continued the war eventually the US would change its mind and agree to more favorable surrender terms.
The war ended because the US (who unlike the Japanese government were actually worried about the invasion of Manchuria because it could mean the Soviets siezing land in East Asia) sent a note specifically demanding that the Emperor give the order to Japanese troops to surrender. The implication was meant to be taken that the Emperor would not be harmed or deposed, thus satisfying the main condition for Japanese surrender. Even then, large sections of the Japanese cabinet didn't want to accept, and the deadlock had to be broken by Emperor Hirohito himself, who stated his belief that they should accept the US' terms.
So basically, the war was already lost. Japan was already ready to surrender, but the military government was fanatically opposed to the idea of any surrender that might threaten the Emperor's position. They were quite happy for massive numbers of civilians to die if it meant avoiding that outcome, and I'm pretty sure some of them would have been perfectly content with every single person in Japan dying before accepting that outcome. The nuclear bombs didn't really influence the decision at all, beyond being a convenient thing for Hirohito to lay the blame on in his speech announcing the surrender, because the members of the government in charge of making the decision weren't the ones suffering the effects.
The nuclear bombs dropped on Japan were very destructive and probably had an exceptional psychological impact given how unexpected and how horrible they were. However, Japan at the time was run by the military, and the military basically didn't care about a bunch of civilians being bombed. It's the same problem with the logic of stategic bombing in Europe, because it turns out if you bomb people in autocratic regimes, those people can't vote to end the conflict because they can't vote. They can't speak out in favor of peace, because the government will arrest and probably kill them. This whole idea that you can end a war by breaking the civilian morale doesn't really work if those civilians can't do anything about their broken morale. Meanwhile, their leaders can just choose not to care, which is what the Japanese government did.
The writing was on the wall long before the bombs were dropped, and it was obvious to the Japanese leadership that they had lost the war. The problem was that the US would only accept unconditional surrender, and the Japanese government really, really didn't want to give that, so they kept holding out that if they just continued the war eventually the US would change its mind and agree to more favorable surrender terms.
The war ended because the US (who unlike the Japanese government were actually worried about the invasion of Manchuria because it could mean the Soviets siezing land in East Asia) sent a note specifically demanding that the Emperor give the order to Japanese troops to surrender. The implication was meant to be taken that the Emperor would not be harmed or deposed, thus satisfying the main condition for Japanese surrender. Even then, large sections of the Japanese cabinet didn't want to accept, and the deadlock had to be broken by Emperor Hirohito himself, who stated his belief that they should accept the US' terms.
So basically, the war was already lost. Japan was already ready to surrender, but the military government was fanatically opposed to the idea of any surrender that might threaten the Emperor's position. They were quite happy for massive numbers of civilians to die if it meant avoiding that outcome, and I'm pretty sure some of them would have been perfectly content with every single person in Japan dying before accepting that outcome. The nuclear bombs didn't really influence the decision at all, beyond being a convenient thing for Hirohito to lay the blame on in his speech announcing the surrender, because the members of the government in charge of making the decision weren't the ones suffering the effects.
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