The air updates in BBA are very promising, but there is a part of land combat that could be made much more realistic and impactful with only moderate changes to the game - namely artillery. I currently have a lot of things requiring my attention irl, so am not planning to do a lot of detailed follow-up posts, but I wanted to make a few suggestions. The current system is a little limited in three ways.
1. Organization (division vs corps level)
2. Stratification (both light and heavy artillery has its uses)
3. Prime movers
For HOI, which includes a fairly extensive economic model, the last point is by far most important and impactful, so let me just mention the first two more briefly.
Historically, artillery was the primary killer of infantry in both world wars, and remains so today in large-scale operations. And in contrast to common myths, German tank doctrine during WW2 did, in particular, not focus on tank vs tank or tank vs infantry combat, but the goal of the armor was to quickly take out enemy artillery following a breakthrough. Thus, all armies deployed significant artillery assets, and the idea of having divisions without artillery or with only a support company does not adequately reflect the historic balance between infantry and artillery.
1. However, the way artillery was distributed varied significantly. The USSR deployed only moderate quantities of relatively light (122 mm) artillery at the division level - and instead had the bulk of its artillery in independent formations at corps and army level. This made it possible to easily mass artillery where it was needed, with the only limitation being logistics in-between the railway stations and the units in question. Germany, on the other hand, assigned almost all its artillery to divisions, and even then tended to earmark an abteilung of light (105 mm) artillery to each regiment. This very dispersed use of artillery enabled a quick tactical response, but made it very difficult to reach sufficient quantities to achieve a breakthrough against an opponent of comparable strength, which greatly diminished the ability of the German army to carry out offensive operations from 1943 and onwards. The allies, and in particular the US, were due to their superior logistics able to deploy significant artillery resources at division level (which, in combination with very effective forward observer teams, was extremely responsive), but also had large amounts of corps-level artillery that could be assigned as required. Since HOI4 supports formations above division level, incorporating the a balance between tactical responsiveness and strategic concentration should be relatively straightforward.
2. In general, allied and German artillery came in three guises: light (105 mm or 25-pdr), medium ("light" 150-155 mm or 4.5-in such as), and heavy (155 mm and above, including the super heavy railway guns that were recently added to the game). Light artillery was mostly used at division level, although the US and German divisions also had a battalion of "light" 150-155 mm (M1 & s.FH18) howitzers. Heavy artillery was only attached to high-level formations - although these often also had lots of medium artillery. The soviets opted for an in-between level with their 122 mm divisional piece, but two or three levels would already be a major improvement over the current single type system.
3. As noted above, the potentially greatest impact would be to include the impact of different choices of prime movers. Currently, infantry divisions have horse-drawn artillery, while motorized have motorized artillery - but this is a great simplification both in terms of capabilities and economy. Motorized prime movers not only allow fro quick re-deployment to avoid counter-battery fire, and significantly reduce personnel and supply use (transporting artillery and its ammunition requires a lot of horses), but also greatly reduces artillery losses in retreat. "Light" artillery can be towed by regular 2-ton trucks (or simple tracked vehicles like the RSO). Heavier pieces do, however, require dedicated prime movers. The high-quality wheeled prime movers deployed by the allies proved very cost-effective and was a key ingredient in the very good battlefield performance exhibited by western armies. The Germans, on the other hand, had a good design in the Opel (a GM brand) Blitz light truck, but suffered from poor quality heavy trucks. Thus, before WW2 it was decided to develop a line of very expensive half-tracks for medium and heavy artillery. Each of these was not only very fuel-inefficient, but also cost about half as much as a tank. And as a consequence of this decision, a larger fraction of German industrial production was assigned to heavy prime movers than actual tanks. And since these unarmored vehicles were extremely vulnerable to air attack, they were destroyed by the allies in large numbers, forcing the Germans to revert to relying almost exclusively on horses in the later stages of the war. Incidentally, this also shows the inflexibility of the German industrial program, since the Czech Tatra company made excellent 6x6 heavy trucks that could have been used instead. The Tatra 111 from 1943 was, for instance, one of the best trucks of the war and was later used within the Soviet block for a very long time with great success. But despite their potential these powerful cross-country trucks were only built in small quantities during the war, and most chassis were used for armored cars (including the Puma).
Introducing stratified artillery that could be organized for tactical or strategic impact, in combination with the need for prime movers (which were very vulnerable to strafing by fighters on air superiority missions) should make it possible to recreate a much more historically accurate battlefield model with only limited changes to the current game mechanics. And it would also show why the Soviets were so utterly reliant on lend-lease for battlefield success, since their domestically produced trucks were extremely unreliable. Even the iconic Katyushas were mounted exclusively on Studebaker US6 trucks when these became available through lend-lease. But without this massive allied support, Soviet logistics would never have been able to support the large-scale (WW1-style) artillery use that came to dominate the war on the eastern front from 1943 onwards (and remains the most important part of Soviet doctrine to this day). Even Stalin admitted this during the Tehran conference (although the wikipedia entry is not well translated, since mashina in Russian most commonly refers to a motor vehicle rather than the abstract idea of a "machine.")
1. Organization (division vs corps level)
2. Stratification (both light and heavy artillery has its uses)
3. Prime movers
For HOI, which includes a fairly extensive economic model, the last point is by far most important and impactful, so let me just mention the first two more briefly.
Historically, artillery was the primary killer of infantry in both world wars, and remains so today in large-scale operations. And in contrast to common myths, German tank doctrine during WW2 did, in particular, not focus on tank vs tank or tank vs infantry combat, but the goal of the armor was to quickly take out enemy artillery following a breakthrough. Thus, all armies deployed significant artillery assets, and the idea of having divisions without artillery or with only a support company does not adequately reflect the historic balance between infantry and artillery.
1. However, the way artillery was distributed varied significantly. The USSR deployed only moderate quantities of relatively light (122 mm) artillery at the division level - and instead had the bulk of its artillery in independent formations at corps and army level. This made it possible to easily mass artillery where it was needed, with the only limitation being logistics in-between the railway stations and the units in question. Germany, on the other hand, assigned almost all its artillery to divisions, and even then tended to earmark an abteilung of light (105 mm) artillery to each regiment. This very dispersed use of artillery enabled a quick tactical response, but made it very difficult to reach sufficient quantities to achieve a breakthrough against an opponent of comparable strength, which greatly diminished the ability of the German army to carry out offensive operations from 1943 and onwards. The allies, and in particular the US, were due to their superior logistics able to deploy significant artillery resources at division level (which, in combination with very effective forward observer teams, was extremely responsive), but also had large amounts of corps-level artillery that could be assigned as required. Since HOI4 supports formations above division level, incorporating the a balance between tactical responsiveness and strategic concentration should be relatively straightforward.
2. In general, allied and German artillery came in three guises: light (105 mm or 25-pdr), medium ("light" 150-155 mm or 4.5-in such as), and heavy (155 mm and above, including the super heavy railway guns that were recently added to the game). Light artillery was mostly used at division level, although the US and German divisions also had a battalion of "light" 150-155 mm (M1 & s.FH18) howitzers. Heavy artillery was only attached to high-level formations - although these often also had lots of medium artillery. The soviets opted for an in-between level with their 122 mm divisional piece, but two or three levels would already be a major improvement over the current single type system.
3. As noted above, the potentially greatest impact would be to include the impact of different choices of prime movers. Currently, infantry divisions have horse-drawn artillery, while motorized have motorized artillery - but this is a great simplification both in terms of capabilities and economy. Motorized prime movers not only allow fro quick re-deployment to avoid counter-battery fire, and significantly reduce personnel and supply use (transporting artillery and its ammunition requires a lot of horses), but also greatly reduces artillery losses in retreat. "Light" artillery can be towed by regular 2-ton trucks (or simple tracked vehicles like the RSO). Heavier pieces do, however, require dedicated prime movers. The high-quality wheeled prime movers deployed by the allies proved very cost-effective and was a key ingredient in the very good battlefield performance exhibited by western armies. The Germans, on the other hand, had a good design in the Opel (a GM brand) Blitz light truck, but suffered from poor quality heavy trucks. Thus, before WW2 it was decided to develop a line of very expensive half-tracks for medium and heavy artillery. Each of these was not only very fuel-inefficient, but also cost about half as much as a tank. And as a consequence of this decision, a larger fraction of German industrial production was assigned to heavy prime movers than actual tanks. And since these unarmored vehicles were extremely vulnerable to air attack, they were destroyed by the allies in large numbers, forcing the Germans to revert to relying almost exclusively on horses in the later stages of the war. Incidentally, this also shows the inflexibility of the German industrial program, since the Czech Tatra company made excellent 6x6 heavy trucks that could have been used instead. The Tatra 111 from 1943 was, for instance, one of the best trucks of the war and was later used within the Soviet block for a very long time with great success. But despite their potential these powerful cross-country trucks were only built in small quantities during the war, and most chassis were used for armored cars (including the Puma).
Introducing stratified artillery that could be organized for tactical or strategic impact, in combination with the need for prime movers (which were very vulnerable to strafing by fighters on air superiority missions) should make it possible to recreate a much more historically accurate battlefield model with only limited changes to the current game mechanics. And it would also show why the Soviets were so utterly reliant on lend-lease for battlefield success, since their domestically produced trucks were extremely unreliable. Even the iconic Katyushas were mounted exclusively on Studebaker US6 trucks when these became available through lend-lease. But without this massive allied support, Soviet logistics would never have been able to support the large-scale (WW1-style) artillery use that came to dominate the war on the eastern front from 1943 onwards (and remains the most important part of Soviet doctrine to this day). Even Stalin admitted this during the Tehran conference (although the wikipedia entry is not well translated, since mashina in Russian most commonly refers to a motor vehicle rather than the abstract idea of a "machine.")
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