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Kanitatlan has summed up this discussion well. With Ho2's massive provinces, armor will never work the way some think it should. In a HO2 battle, an infantry division has the same ability to maneuver as an armor division, that is, there is no maneuver capability. This is the problem, not the statistics of the armor division. In game, every gun, rifle, and mortar will somehow be able to concentrate its firepower on the attacking armor force, no matter how many hundreds of square miles the province represents. In real life, most of these formations would never contact the enemy until the armor is already in their rear areas. The game provides instant reserve capability from every division in the province to stop the attack. Game Over.
All you guys who think infantry can't attack are harking back to WWI. You are forgeting that the revolution in warfare that started in the later part of WWI was a revolution. This subject is admittedly very very poorly covered in history books. The theory of warfare gets very little coverage.
WWI was a very special case.
1. The generals did not have a mechanism for commanding their armies in battle. (Consider the difference between a radio controlled car and one on the end of a wire - not subtle is it, especially if someone cuts it)
2. The generals did not have a mechanism for effectively finding out what was happening. (Same issue - not that airpower may be able to see quite a lot but that wire is becoming awful long)
3. The defending army had a massive advantage in strategic mobility (railway versus marching men).
4. The tactical paradign remained napoleonic in basic concept. (French
On the equipment front the most important development was the radio. Not tanks. The radio. The second most important was large scale provision of motor vehicles. Thats trucks, still not tanks. Tanks provided the third and easily least important technology change. The breaking of the trench warfare paradigm was as a result of radios. The ability to exploit a breakthrough was as a result of radios. Add in tanks and you can do it better but they only make it better.
At least equally important was the change in doctrine. There have been several revolutions in military doctrine since the dawn of time (yes I'm looking back that far). The key things that have changed with time are dispersion and articulation. That is, how spread out soldiers are and how flexible is the command structure.
It may seem odd but as weapons have increased in lethality military casualty rates have decreased. This is a consistent pattern throughout history with these nice little blips were casualties go up because doctrine (and dispersion) haven't adjusted to the new weapons. At the start of WWI dispersion was not high enough as clearly indicated by elevated casualty rates. As the war progressed casualty rates rapidly normalised (check the statistics). There were anomalies like the blooding of the new british army on the Somme. This is down to lack of battlefield experience compounded with obsolete training, i.e. lack of new doctrine. Troops with any experience had started to get the idea for themselves. The dispersion levels improved quite quickly. Defensive doctrine deveoped rapidly, led by the germans as usual. If you check casualty rates for WWI against WWII you will find that they are remarkably similar. The main difference in WWII was that certain countries (like the UK) did far less actual fighting. Also casualty rates in WWI are seen artifically as a lot higher since they never resulted in any real geographical success but this lack of success can be assigned to command and control problems.
The other development was in the area of articulation. At the beggining of WWI troops were pretty much utilitsed in company formations (thats right - formations). In particular troops would never operate without direct officer control. i.e. the smallest unit of manouever was a platoon and this was discouraged. Certain other aspects of articulation are visible in the attitude to blockages in an advance. If a regiment advanced on a wide front and a couple of companies were held up then any reinforcements would be sent to the hold up. The idea was that quite large units must advance whilst maintaining some sort of coherent formation. In 1917 general Huitier is generally credited with introducing what came to be called infiltration tactics. This was based on the idea of independent operation of units right down to squad level with the objective of advancing as far and as fast as they can, bypass strong points and generally don't worry too much about everyone else. Typically strong points are simply surrounded and left isolated whilst the advance sweeps on past. In 1918 these tactics enabled the Germans to achieve complete tactical offensive success only to find their offensives suffering failure due to the strategic mobility issue I raised earlier. These tactics are the basis of all standard infantry doctrine ever since. If you want to decide if infantry can succeed then your model should be those German 1918 offensives, not any other part of WWI.
Infantry infiltration is seriously scary and very very hard to defend against. Infantry defensive tactics rapidly developed to a doctrine of assuming that an enemy offensive cannot simply be stopped, it can be slowed down by defence in depth allowing the bringing up of reserves for further depth and or counter attacks.
WWI was a very special case.
1. The generals did not have a mechanism for commanding their armies in battle. (Consider the difference between a radio controlled car and one on the end of a wire - not subtle is it, especially if someone cuts it)
2. The generals did not have a mechanism for effectively finding out what was happening. (Same issue - not that airpower may be able to see quite a lot but that wire is becoming awful long)
3. The defending army had a massive advantage in strategic mobility (railway versus marching men).
4. The tactical paradign remained napoleonic in basic concept. (French
On the equipment front the most important development was the radio. Not tanks. The radio. The second most important was large scale provision of motor vehicles. Thats trucks, still not tanks. Tanks provided the third and easily least important technology change. The breaking of the trench warfare paradigm was as a result of radios. The ability to exploit a breakthrough was as a result of radios. Add in tanks and you can do it better but they only make it better.
At least equally important was the change in doctrine. There have been several revolutions in military doctrine since the dawn of time (yes I'm looking back that far). The key things that have changed with time are dispersion and articulation. That is, how spread out soldiers are and how flexible is the command structure.
It may seem odd but as weapons have increased in lethality military casualty rates have decreased. This is a consistent pattern throughout history with these nice little blips were casualties go up because doctrine (and dispersion) haven't adjusted to the new weapons. At the start of WWI dispersion was not high enough as clearly indicated by elevated casualty rates. As the war progressed casualty rates rapidly normalised (check the statistics). There were anomalies like the blooding of the new british army on the Somme. This is down to lack of battlefield experience compounded with obsolete training, i.e. lack of new doctrine. Troops with any experience had started to get the idea for themselves. The dispersion levels improved quite quickly. Defensive doctrine deveoped rapidly, led by the germans as usual. If you check casualty rates for WWI against WWII you will find that they are remarkably similar. The main difference in WWII was that certain countries (like the UK) did far less actual fighting. Also casualty rates in WWI are seen artifically as a lot higher since they never resulted in any real geographical success but this lack of success can be assigned to command and control problems.
The other development was in the area of articulation. At the beggining of WWI troops were pretty much utilitsed in company formations (thats right - formations). In particular troops would never operate without direct officer control. i.e. the smallest unit of manouever was a platoon and this was discouraged. Certain other aspects of articulation are visible in the attitude to blockages in an advance. If a regiment advanced on a wide front and a couple of companies were held up then any reinforcements would be sent to the hold up. The idea was that quite large units must advance whilst maintaining some sort of coherent formation. In 1917 general Huitier is generally credited with introducing what came to be called infiltration tactics. This was based on the idea of independent operation of units right down to squad level with the objective of advancing as far and as fast as they can, bypass strong points and generally don't worry too much about everyone else. Typically strong points are simply surrounded and left isolated whilst the advance sweeps on past. In 1918 these tactics enabled the Germans to achieve complete tactical offensive success only to find their offensives suffering failure due to the strategic mobility issue I raised earlier. These tactics are the basis of all standard infantry doctrine ever since. If you want to decide if infantry can succeed then your model should be those German 1918 offensives, not any other part of WWI.
Infantry infiltration is seriously scary and very very hard to defend against. Infantry defensive tactics rapidly developed to a doctrine of assuming that an enemy offensive cannot simply be stopped, it can be slowed down by defence in depth allowing the bringing up of reserves for further depth and or counter attacks.
Kanitatlan said:
And a big reason why the Germans were so successful with what really amounted to inferior tanks (at least early war) was their doctrinal utilizations of the radio and an extra man in the turret free to engage in command control and communications.
I've read some of the posts, and scanned through others. I didn't see anyone mentioning something that came to mind when I read through this thread a few days ago. Couldn't, and shouldn't the combat events that happen during combat account for the armor vs. infantry superiority? You know, the encirclement, surprise, etc. bonuses you'd get at the top of a battle break down sometimes based on doctrines and leaders and such? There could be ones for Armor like 'Flanked' that provided a huge bonus for that hour or what not.
Joshua
Joshua
A question if you think armor settings are wrong then what would you set your armors defense, toughness, soft attack, hard attack, and speed?
ARMOUR was not needed, MOBILITY was needed. Armour provided mobility and strength. Tanks were effective in BREAKTHROUGHS, they didn't MAKE them, but EXPLOITED them.
Infantry, and artillery did the brunt of the initial fighting. Once the main lines of defences were broken, armour then poured through.
Tanks are actually a lot weaker than people think they are. They are a big target, and equipped with the right weapons, Infantry are extremely effective at taking them out defensively AND offensively. Tanks sucked on the defensive, as they lost their key attribute, being MOBILITY.
Tanks were not needed in the desert to kill other tanks. Anti-Tank traps (guns, mines, artillery) destroyed more tanks (offensively/defensively) than other tanks.
It is a historic error, made both by military men and amature historians to believe that a tank's worst enemy was another tank. WRONG!
Infantry, and artillery did the brunt of the initial fighting. Once the main lines of defences were broken, armour then poured through.
Tanks are actually a lot weaker than people think they are. They are a big target, and equipped with the right weapons, Infantry are extremely effective at taking them out defensively AND offensively. Tanks sucked on the defensive, as they lost their key attribute, being MOBILITY.
Tanks were not needed in the desert to kill other tanks. Anti-Tank traps (guns, mines, artillery) destroyed more tanks (offensively/defensively) than other tanks.
It is a historic error, made both by military men and amature historians to believe that a tank's worst enemy was another tank. WRONG!
mld0806 said:
No!
If you meant a Russian with an anti-tank mine in his hand then yes.
The Red Army never developed man-portable anti-tank weapons unlike the Germans or the Western Allies. Even as late as Kursk the Red Army was still heavily dependant on the anti-tank rifle and the obsolesent 45mm anti-tank gun.
Cunneda said:
YES.
Close enough, and at the right angle, a 37mm Gun could destroy a Panther. Old weapons were not useless. Ammunition developments kept older guns in the field longer than one might expect. A Russian 45mm of 1941 was different to that of 1943. Many AT gunners had to wait until their targets got closer, to guarantee a kill. While more dangerous for the AT gunners, it was also a very effective tactic. This was what the Japanese did with their 47mm Guns, and the British and Americans can attest to the fact that these guns could destroy late war Allied tanks.
All that matters is if infantry had the wepaonry. Older weponry just had to be used closer, but it could still destroy tanks.
McNaughton said:
Tank on Tank battles are the most spectacular battles of WWII, but I wonder just how many large scale Tank on Tank battles there were during the whole of WWII? As stated elsewhere the tank strategy of WWII was not to use tanks to actually break through the lines of the enem,y, but to exploit gaps made in the lines and cause chaos and confusion in the rear. Or in the case of American units, support the infantry and protect them from enemy hard points and the like.
Jack99 said:
It is a matter that they were written by historians as spectacular. Mainly because they were actually very rare. They tended to be meat-grinders for tanks, and a poor use of a tank anyway. The best, and most effective useage for tanks was to exploit a breakthrough (as you have said), and actually attack light forces. When tanks are up against an organized defence, as the spearhead, their casualties were extremely high. When defending, they were also handicapped, because they lost their mobility. They gave an edge to infantry (as you said), but were not a requirement for success.
McNaughton said:
Defending infantry can be brutal to tanks, personally I would want to be a lowly grunt in the woods with a bunch of explosives and AT weaponry, I could hide from infantry sweeps and take out vehicles in the rear, snipe stragglers and otherwise wreak havoc without ever being seen(Hopefully). If I were in a tank I'd be as good as ground beef, if the tank gets spotted and targeted, you can't just dive behind a tree or rock or something.
As for in game, I build armor sparingly, I use it in conjunction with infantry to punch a hole in the line, then direct the armor unit to move on beyond the initial target province, and then move infantry in behind them, and move the tank forward some more. Eventually the enemy has a wide open flank or gap that even a Mk. I could lumber through easily. I know this works because I used it against the soviets in a game I played, they just could not redeploy forces fast enough to cover the hole I made. In the game I mentioned I ended up encircling about 80 some divisions(I think) of the Soviet army, and then slowly closed the noose on them until they couldn't fight anymore.
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Cunneda said:
You forget that armored forces not actively engaged in combat advanced with hatches open (visibility and comfort being factors). You didn't just have to worry about AT weaponry, you had to worry about all sorts of things. Cap a driver and you stop a tank until they get him unbelted, moved out of the seat, new driver in place and ready to move. Supporting tanks popped off machine gun fire and HE rounds to try and flush out or kill the attacker (usually successful, not always) while other tanks moved to close in and physically overrun the strongpoint (if it was indeed only one position and they didn't have to search. Change it to two or three thickets and a fast firing sniper and you've got a few casualties before they can even locate you and get buttoned up). Happen to have a few mines deployed around the area and you have a chance of at least knocking the track off of, if not killing, the advancing tanks. And even then, it's getting close enough that you can hit it with explosives or other weaponry. In this scenario (an all too real one on the East Front), a small group of men is holding up an entire tank platoon and inflicting losses.
If a few guys with a few weapons and a few trees could do this, what could a whole company in camoflaged positions with a well set minefield do? Or a whole division with artillery and AT support?
I disagree with most of the previous posts.
Again, tanks are only good in open terrain. And in wide plains, I can assure you that tanks do not drive past tree bosquets on purpose to have a look if infantry with bazookas are hiding in it. If it has to drive past a place where infantry can hide, the Panzer Grenadiers will have a look first. It is not true that an armour division is blind, because it is not composed from tanks only!
The main advantage of armour is that it can stay away from trouble. Because it has much a larger range of engagement than infantry and is mobile, it can do that. What they don't see, they avoid and what they see, they destroy. It is not only about mobility, else they could save the steel for something else. Armour is about decreasing the range tanks can effectively be engaged. Which is quite decisive against infantry. If the tanks spot their targets soon enough, they can destroy the best AT tank gun that exist before entering their lethal range.
The possibilities of armour are linked to terrain type and its inherent scouting possibilities. If tanks are supplied and keep maneuvring, the only way to engage them is with other tanks. Stalingrad is an example, I believe. Or aircraft. It is STILL like that today, even with modern handheld AT-missiles. Hard to believe no?
Again, tanks are only good in open terrain. And in wide plains, I can assure you that tanks do not drive past tree bosquets on purpose to have a look if infantry with bazookas are hiding in it. If it has to drive past a place where infantry can hide, the Panzer Grenadiers will have a look first. It is not true that an armour division is blind, because it is not composed from tanks only!
The main advantage of armour is that it can stay away from trouble. Because it has much a larger range of engagement than infantry and is mobile, it can do that. What they don't see, they avoid and what they see, they destroy. It is not only about mobility, else they could save the steel for something else. Armour is about decreasing the range tanks can effectively be engaged. Which is quite decisive against infantry. If the tanks spot their targets soon enough, they can destroy the best AT tank gun that exist before entering their lethal range.
The possibilities of armour are linked to terrain type and its inherent scouting possibilities. If tanks are supplied and keep maneuvring, the only way to engage them is with other tanks. Stalingrad is an example, I believe. Or aircraft. It is STILL like that today, even with modern handheld AT-missiles. Hard to believe no?
I think this is the only realistic way armour could be given some of its true value in HoI2. Who else does agree?jonnyincognito said:
Sorry for the double post, but here are some quotes from the Wikipedia, under Blitzkrieg:
"If the tanks succeed, then victory follows"
"until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that tanks—properly employed, needless to say—are today the best means available for a land attack."
"since reserve forces will now be motorised, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war."
"We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and—what is perhaps even more important—that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made."
Guess who said that?
Guderian of course. And I think his achievements speak for themselves.
"If the tanks succeed, then victory follows"
"until our critics can produce some new and better method of making a successful land attack other than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that tanks—properly employed, needless to say—are today the best means available for a land attack."
"since reserve forces will now be motorised, the building up of new defensive fronts is easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even slighter today than they were in the last war."
"We believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and—what is perhaps even more important—that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been made."
Guess who said that?
Guderian of course. And I think his achievements speak for themselves.
Even the best tank commanders found spotting AT guns difficult. The infantry compontent of armoured divisions is minimal, maybe 1/3 of the total force of the division. There are constant examples when they were not effectively supporting eachother (the Infantry was late, or the tanks were late), and in most of the attacks, the infantry fared better alone than the tanks. Just saying that they could spot AT guns easily, does not mean that they did! Most cases, AT guns were spotted just after they fired.
Tanks may be the only unit able to engage other tanks after a breakthrough, but listen to what I said, am saying, tanks are not the optimal unit for fighting other tanks. Casualties on both sides will be very high in a tank v tank battle, even though there would be no other option. In most cases, tank penetration attacks were stopped because of a stubborn infantry force rather than an effective armoured counter-attack. The Germans wore themselves down on the entrenched Russian Infantry at Kursk (which was a fortress), and both sides suffered equally horrendous losses. If you can easily replace losses, then tanks are a good weapon against tanks.
Tank losses are always high. The Germans lost hundreds of tanks in the Polish campaign, and hundreds more in France. Since they controlled the battlefield, they were able to recover and rehaul many of these lost vehicles, but they were effectively knocked out. These were relatively easy campaigns. The ratio of infantry casualties to total infantry was significantly less than the ratio of tank casualties to the total tanks deployed.
Quoting a tank commander to show the importance of armour is like quoting George W Bush to show the success of the US Federal government in the past few years. Pretty biased in my opinion.
Tanks may be the only unit able to engage other tanks after a breakthrough, but listen to what I said, am saying, tanks are not the optimal unit for fighting other tanks. Casualties on both sides will be very high in a tank v tank battle, even though there would be no other option. In most cases, tank penetration attacks were stopped because of a stubborn infantry force rather than an effective armoured counter-attack. The Germans wore themselves down on the entrenched Russian Infantry at Kursk (which was a fortress), and both sides suffered equally horrendous losses. If you can easily replace losses, then tanks are a good weapon against tanks.
Tank losses are always high. The Germans lost hundreds of tanks in the Polish campaign, and hundreds more in France. Since they controlled the battlefield, they were able to recover and rehaul many of these lost vehicles, but they were effectively knocked out. These were relatively easy campaigns. The ratio of infantry casualties to total infantry was significantly less than the ratio of tank casualties to the total tanks deployed.
Quoting a tank commander to show the importance of armour is like quoting George W Bush to show the success of the US Federal government in the past few years. Pretty biased in my opinion.
McNaughton said:
Sorry, but this gets slowly ridiculous. Guderian was one of the best generals in wwII. I think he knew better than you what tanks could achieve, or not.
Yes tank losses in even/prepared battles are usually high and this could maybe be modelled in HOI in higher arm losses vs entrenched enemies. But not all hits were critical and especially Germany tried everything to secure and repair as much as possible of them. I think von Manstein said that a stopping tank formation is a dead tank formation. Tanks often rolled right into enemy retreating units, looking like captured tanks and sizing critical points like bridges. The main tank weapon is surprise, hitting the enemy unexpected and causing havoc. Against a well prepared enemy tanks suffer huge casualties.
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