Originally posted by Admiral Yi
Can't argue with this. Maybe time to change the nickname, eh?
"Screaming Eagles flying first-class"
And their dreaded battle-cry:
"Where is my hot napkin?"
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"Screaming Eagles flying first-class"
And their dreaded battle-cry:
"Where is my hot napkin?"
Originally posted by Rictus
Trooper, are you saying this just 'cause you used to be one?
I am slightly biased on this topic.
ex coelis
I seem to recall tham many people during WWll - on both sides - thought that the para concept was obsolete.
In particular, Crete was a wake-up call. Although ultimately successful, it was a very costly victory and came close to total disaster.
In Normandy, the para landings were successful ironically because they were disaterous. Bodly trained aircrews and bad conditions scattered paras all over the map, seriously confusing the German defenders.
At Arnheim, the drops themselves were successful, but the relieving force did not make it.
In essence, the purpose of retaining whole regiments of paras seems less to do with the value of the para concept than with the value of having a body of elite light infantry. The problem with having paras is the same as the problem with all "elite" units - they drain natural leaders from other services (such types tend to relish the thought of being in an "elite" unit), and commanders tend to over-use them to accomplish tough objectives, thus ensuring that these natural leaders do not survive to rise through the ranks (at least, in active wartime).
In particular, Crete was a wake-up call. Although ultimately successful, it was a very costly victory and came close to total disaster.
In Normandy, the para landings were successful ironically because they were disaterous. Bodly trained aircrews and bad conditions scattered paras all over the map, seriously confusing the German defenders.
At Arnheim, the drops themselves were successful, but the relieving force did not make it.
In essence, the purpose of retaining whole regiments of paras seems less to do with the value of the para concept than with the value of having a body of elite light infantry. The problem with having paras is the same as the problem with all "elite" units - they drain natural leaders from other services (such types tend to relish the thought of being in an "elite" unit), and commanders tend to over-use them to accomplish tough objectives, thus ensuring that these natural leaders do not survive to rise through the ranks (at least, in active wartime).
a kind of "fleet" in beeing thing.... interesting concept. I buy it.
who hasreal paras these days anyway ?: (specific units, not para capable, as otherwise most special forces are)
USA : 82nd airborne
France : a few regiments
UK : parachute regiment
Russia : one division left (?) or still the 6 of the old days..
China : 3 divisions ?
Italy : part of the folgore
Germany : still 3 regiments ?
others ?
who hasreal paras these days anyway ?: (specific units, not para capable, as otherwise most special forces are)
USA : 82nd airborne
France : a few regiments
UK : parachute regiment
Russia : one division left (?) or still the 6 of the old days..
China : 3 divisions ?
Italy : part of the folgore
Germany : still 3 regiments ?
others ?
Wauw, there are probably lots of countries with para units (batallion-size or over): Israel, India, Malaysia, Thailand(?), Brazil(?), South Africa(?) etc. etc.
Regards,
EoE
Regards,
EoE
Re: British Paras
Much though I hate to contradict a fellow Brit, rictus is only partly correct with his statements regarding the Parachute Regiment of the British Army. The Paras face no threat of amalgamation or disbandment. HOWEVER they do face the ongoing threat of losing their parachute capacity. The recent Strategic Defence Review discussed this topic at length and it is widely believed in British military circles that that the Paras, in their present form, are living on borrowed time. the regiment does not face a threat of being disbanded, partly because it is highly attractive to bring in recruits and partly because it is regularly deployed in front line operations which receive media coverage (the best way of ensuring survival of a regiment in these cost conscious times). It is highly possible that the Paras will be re-equipped to serve a role other than their theoretical one as paratroops. There is talk of equipping them with attack helicopters as part of Britain's rapid response force. Whether or not this happens or not remains to be seen but come the next defence review the Paras will be digging their heels in very hard indeed if they wish to fight off further assaults on their viability as a parachute deployed force. Incidentally, the last time British troops made a combat parchute drop was in Suez (a common argument towards it being out of date). However, the French made combat drops in the early 1990's and my personal viewpoint is that we would be foolish to do away with something that MAY be useful, just because chances are, fingers crossed, we won't need it. as Baden-Powell would say "be prepared"!
Much though I hate to contradict a fellow Brit, rictus is only partly correct with his statements regarding the Parachute Regiment of the British Army. The Paras face no threat of amalgamation or disbandment. HOWEVER they do face the ongoing threat of losing their parachute capacity. The recent Strategic Defence Review discussed this topic at length and it is widely believed in British military circles that that the Paras, in their present form, are living on borrowed time. the regiment does not face a threat of being disbanded, partly because it is highly attractive to bring in recruits and partly because it is regularly deployed in front line operations which receive media coverage (the best way of ensuring survival of a regiment in these cost conscious times). It is highly possible that the Paras will be re-equipped to serve a role other than their theoretical one as paratroops. There is talk of equipping them with attack helicopters as part of Britain's rapid response force. Whether or not this happens or not remains to be seen but come the next defence review the Paras will be digging their heels in very hard indeed if they wish to fight off further assaults on their viability as a parachute deployed force. Incidentally, the last time British troops made a combat parchute drop was in Suez (a common argument towards it being out of date). However, the French made combat drops in the early 1990's and my personal viewpoint is that we would be foolish to do away with something that MAY be useful, just because chances are, fingers crossed, we won't need it. as Baden-Powell would say "be prepared"!
No worries there, people contradict me all the time. I've got used to it
BUt what you said about the paras, I did NOT know.
BUt what you said about the paras, I did NOT know.
Actually it was in 1978. Rebels had seized the mining town of Kolweizi in Zaire and held Western hostages. 2nd REP (Foreign Parachute Regiment, actually a battalion-sized unit) was dropped on the town (straight from France IIRC) the day after the decision to intervene was made, and put the rebellion down in a few hours.
The French army still has 5 paratroop battalions plus a parachute engineer and a parachute support battalion, all drop-capable. The only thing lacking is enough transport aircraft in the french air force to drop them all at once.
Of course paratroopers alone can't fight regular units from first tier armies. Still, used in conjunction with regular units they can be extremely useful. It takes very good staff work, though.
And against second rate armies, they can do a lot of good work, as long as the place isn't called Dien Bien Phu.
Para
Did anyone ever see that movie where Harrison Ford plays the president and his plane is hyjacked by Russians? I think it is called "Air Force One". In the beginning of the movie, there was a kidnaping of the president of Kazackstan. I think that although the movie may have been totally amateur, it illistrated a viable use for paras. Parachute in at night, silently, in a surprise attack, and then be retreeved by helicopters almost immidiately so that there is minimal casualties.
Creete, in WWII, is looked at as a defeat for paratroopers, and used against them constantly. In reality, there were no Brittish fighter planes in Creete durring the battle, and the anti-aircraft deployments were overcomeable. The reason that the Germans lost so many troops and transports was because they were overrun by ground troops of the UK. This is because, the landing sites for the invasion were obtained through code breaking and spys before it took place, and the Brittish knew where to wait for the Germans. The English had some 35,000 troops on Creete (I think), and the Germans were attacking with 45,000-50,000 paras. The only reason the invasion was a success for the Germans was because of all of the mis-drops that escaped imidiate attack. Had it not been for the secret information obtained by the English, Creete would have been the greatest airborne victory in history.
Did anyone ever see that movie where Harrison Ford plays the president and his plane is hyjacked by Russians? I think it is called "Air Force One". In the beginning of the movie, there was a kidnaping of the president of Kazackstan. I think that although the movie may have been totally amateur, it illistrated a viable use for paras. Parachute in at night, silently, in a surprise attack, and then be retreeved by helicopters almost immidiately so that there is minimal casualties.
Creete, in WWII, is looked at as a defeat for paratroopers, and used against them constantly. In reality, there were no Brittish fighter planes in Creete durring the battle, and the anti-aircraft deployments were overcomeable. The reason that the Germans lost so many troops and transports was because they were overrun by ground troops of the UK. This is because, the landing sites for the invasion were obtained through code breaking and spys before it took place, and the Brittish knew where to wait for the Germans. The English had some 35,000 troops on Creete (I think), and the Germans were attacking with 45,000-50,000 paras. The only reason the invasion was a success for the Germans was because of all of the mis-drops that escaped imidiate attack. Had it not been for the secret information obtained by the English, Creete would have been the greatest airborne victory in history.
Re: Para
Never saw it.
IMO the greatest depiction of the problems with paras was Market Garden. Of course, the plan was shite, but still. Crete made the Germans (Hitler) doubt the strength of paras and made any future German para ops impossible during WW2.
Never saw it.
IMO the greatest depiction of the problems with paras was Market Garden. Of course, the plan was shite, but still. Crete made the Germans (Hitler) doubt the strength of paras and made any future German para ops impossible during WW2.
To explain away the failure of Operation Market Garden by simply saying "The plan was s****" doesn't really cover it. Don't forget it came very close to success. The Paras holed up in Arnhem (go Colonel Frost!) came very close to being relieved. Don't forget, the execution of the plan was plagued by intelligence misinterpretation (deliberate or not), operational conflict between the British and Americans both on the ground and before the plan was put into operation, inter-service wrangling within the forces involved and far more resistance than was expected and yet the Allies still came within an ace of pulling it off. The idea that it was all doomed from the start is misleading. In fact, the reality is that though it was always a risky op, it SHOULD have succeeded had it not been implemented so badly.
Incidentally, the Germans did deploy Paras after Crete, though largely in small scale roles such as the rescue of Mussolini after the initial collapse of Italy.
Incidentally, the Germans did deploy Paras after Crete, though largely in small scale roles such as the rescue of Mussolini after the initial collapse of Italy.
totally agree, the issue with paras in operations is that
1. they don't land on strong opposing forces
2. they can be releived fast (so not to deep a drop)
3. they are strong enough to seize the objective and hold it.
Crete, Arnhem and Kanev are classical example where these 3 elements were not fully there and the operation failed to be a complete success, at various degrees. Successful drops like the LowCountires, Normandy, Ruhr, these elements were there. That said the plans were sound.. and actually Monty's plans (although I don;t think he was that great) were muchmore sound on a strategic level to win the war. passing through the Low Countries and North Germany would have allowed for Allied troops to reach the German'sindustrial heartland faster. Imagine Patton's 3rd army, under 21st Army group command in North Europe, smashing all the way through Hannover to Berlin... instead of central germany where defenses were stronger and fewere key objectives...
so arnhem wanot badly planned (except perhaps the lack of transport.. coudl B-24's be usedfor extra supply/troops drops? and could more air support be allocated? rightfully, it ended up beeing abrdge too far.. but the other bridges were not.
1. they don't land on strong opposing forces
2. they can be releived fast (so not to deep a drop)
3. they are strong enough to seize the objective and hold it.
Crete, Arnhem and Kanev are classical example where these 3 elements were not fully there and the operation failed to be a complete success, at various degrees. Successful drops like the LowCountires, Normandy, Ruhr, these elements were there. That said the plans were sound.. and actually Monty's plans (although I don;t think he was that great) were muchmore sound on a strategic level to win the war. passing through the Low Countries and North Germany would have allowed for Allied troops to reach the German'sindustrial heartland faster. Imagine Patton's 3rd army, under 21st Army group command in North Europe, smashing all the way through Hannover to Berlin... instead of central germany where defenses were stronger and fewere key objectives...
so arnhem wanot badly planned (except perhaps the lack of transport.. coudl B-24's be usedfor extra supply/troops drops? and could more air support be allocated? rightfully, it ended up beeing abrdge too far.. but the other bridges were not.
My opinion is still that the plan was too optimistic. The only thing that saved it from total failure was the courage and experience of the allied paras. The operation was of course plagued by bad circumstances such as bad radios, broken jeeps, Germans who shouldn't have been there, etc. This was partly because of bad luck but also bad planning and and almost foolhardy optimism.
The plan was perhaps good on a strategic scale, finishing the war by christmas and everything, but was not good on the tactical scale.
The plan was perhaps good on a strategic scale, finishing the war by christmas and everything, but was not good on the tactical scale.