Thanks for your kind words

I try and make sure everything I write is either backed up, or clearly labelled as the possible errant thoughts of a lunatic

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On that - even in WW1, battleships needed screening from both submarine and destroyer torpedo attacks. The locomotive torpedo was the weapon that put an end to a big line of big ships being the only counter to another big line of big ships (and it also put paid to close blockade as well) - and it was the torpedo that saved the German fleet at Jutland. WW2 didn't change the need to screen BBs, but it added in the need for them to be screened against aircraft as well (although BBs did 'chance their arm' and operate without air cover, under enemy air attack, on more than a few occasions successfully, although they were also punished severely for it on others). But the aircraft carriers also needed their screens against enemy surface forces (just ask poor old
Glorious, or the lucky-but-would-rather-have-not-had-to-take-on-the-
Yamato Taffy 3), so there was a bit of give-and-take going on.
That said, there is definitely no question that the core of a battle fleet by about mid-1942 revolved around the aircraft carrier.
As an aside, it's easy to forget (hopefully I'm not forgetting any of them!) that aircraft sank 5.5 BBs/BCs at sea in WW2 (Prince of Wales, Repulse, Roma, Musashi, Yamato, with Bismarck as the 0.5) - coincidentally (assuming I haven't had a shocker) the same as surface actions between capital ships (Hood, Scharnhorst, Kirishima, Yamashiro, Fuso and Bismarck as the 0.5) - so despite the far shorter range of a BB/BC main armament, they actually did as much 'capital ship sinking' as aircraft did (at sea - it's a bit unfair to count BBs/BCs bombed in harbour as they're stationary, and in more than a few cases weren't even putting up much in the way of AA). On the other hand, what's often not mentioned nearly as much is the sheer number of warships sunk by submarines, which although they were no good for a fleet action or much in the way of sea control, were able to exert a phenomenal 'attritive' force that caused substantial difficulties for most of the major navies.
What never happened, but could have made the discussion far more complex, was that two fleets with equal capabilities in aircraft, pilots, AA and radar-directed fighter control met - in this situation, it's not unlikely that the aircraft of both sides would have been unable to land decisive blows (iirc - and I might not - no fleet with effective radar-directed fighter control of carrier-based fighter aircraft in the fleet was put out of action in WW2, and that includes the likes of Pedestal, or the air battle off Formosa, both of which involved large numbers of aircraft attempting to attack the fleets in question). Carrier battles went through carrier aircraft very quickly (and carriers only carried enough ordnance for a limited number of sorties - sometimes as few as 3-4), and a situation like this could have left the fleet with less surface firepower as the one yielding sea control. It's all a bit theorycrafting though, due to Japan's carrier air forces being in somewhat rough shape by the time the US had its fighter-control ducks in a row.
Then there are the people that talk of laser-based weapons disabling missiles and aircraft alike, bring back the idea of a large, armoured ship with a large power source and powerful lasers

(Note, I've no idea how realistic this is, I've just heard it spoken of).