Osmanli Military Reforms, Part I
Failure and a New Beginning
Every since Mahmud el-Hababi's attack on Rumelia failed the year prior, the Osmanli military had been deprived of glory and more importantly - of loot. Why is it that the finest army in all of Islam could not tackle a petty and isolated fortress? It was unanimously decided by Sultan Mehmed and his close staff that it was time for reform. Mahmud al-Hababi himself had been removed as
Bey Rumelia (Governor of Thrace) and replaced by Kaziglu, who was perhaps more commonly known as Vlad Tepes.
Mehmed's revised military staff was composed of: Candarli Halil, marshal of the West; Ibrahim el-Trabelsi, marshal of the East; Giovanni Doria, admiral of the fleets of the sultan; and Kaziglu Bey, Imperial field lieutenant.
Reassuring Victories & Past Defeats
Obviously, the first thing necessary in restoring the morale of an army and a nation is a great victory. To arrange this it would be necessary to assemble a vast army, plan a large campaign, and take many cities into the empire. All of the most recent campaigns on this scale had been large successes, but past defeats like that in Constantinople over a decade prior still loomed in the nation's history. What of the Franks? They were always known for getting their noses in other people's business. Was it not the far off nation of Gelre that did in the sultan's army before? True, this was the army of the usurping Armenian line of the Osmans, but nevertheless it was not satisfactory for such a mighty empire to be defeated at the hands of an insolent duke and a roving horde of mercenaries.
A New Approach?
What the army needed was new weapons and new tactics. The Osmanli army had always been a little bit ahead of the armies it was facing technologically, except at Angora in 1405 when the armies of Tamerlane made the finest Osmanli marshals look like childish idiots.
Osmanli artillery was perhaps the finest in the world. It had distinguished itself during the Siege of Constantinople. Laying waste to most of the city walls of Constantinople prior to the defeat there at the hands of Gelre, the various artillery pieces employed by Muslim army along with the sultan's
Basilic had proven their worth in siege. The large and more or less immobile Basilic could not likely be reused, however. The use of such a large gun was only appropriate for such a large siege as Constantinople, where it could be shot from across the Bosphorus.
Turkish Soldiers Firing Artillery at the Siege of Constantinople
Mehmed and his staff, after reviewing the Osmanli army, found that an abundance of
bashi-bazouks was at hand. The bashi-bazouks were brutal and irregular soldiers; their armies were comparable in composition with several of the divisions fighting in the St. Claude campaign in Gaul. The primary difference between the bashi-bazouks and other irregular infantry units found all over the world was their extreme brutality. These men were recruited from the homeless, criminals, and prisoners of war. The last of these groups was the main reason that the ranks of the bashi-bazouks had swollen recently. Keeping prisoners of war hostage and executing them were both expensive and wasteful practices. They were more useful as men to serve on the front lines in the Osmanli military.
The defeat in Rumelia had been largely due to the fact that the invading army was almost completely composed of bashi-bazouks. The overall morale and resolve of Mahmud al-Hababi's force of Thracian irregulars paled in comparison to that of the steadfast German defenders. For these kind of operations in the future Kaziglu Bey recommended to Mehmed the janissaries.
An experimental tactic also suggested by Kaziglu Bey was definitely going to be put into use in Mehmed's next campaign. It would later be detailed to the more prominent army officers as it developed into a working strategical plan.
