Apparently the Sherman tank was a good tank

[sam spade]

. So exactly what does it prove?

That 3 Jagdpanther did not 'float' as well as the crews thought.

.

So first you say that type of terrain is not important and then it is...

I say nothing other than knocking down trees looks good on film but it is somethng real tankers ln real tanks should not try .


Again:

The preferences of the crew for lighter, more maneuverable Panzers was recorded in a report written on 1 November 1944 by Albert Speer on his trip to Italy during 19 to 25 October 1944:

On the Southwest Front, opinions are in favor of the Sherman tank and its cross-country ability The Sherman tank climbs mountains that our Panzer crews consider impassable. This is accomplished by the especially powerful engine in the Sherman in comparison to its weight. Also, according to reports from the 26.Panzer-Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers. The Sherman tanks drive freely cross· country while our Panzers must remain on trails and narrow roads and therefore are very restricted in their ability to fight.

All Panzer crews want to receive lighter Panzers, which are more maneuverable, possess increased ability to cross terrain, and guarantee the necessary combat power just with a superior gun. This desire by the troops corresponds with conditions that will develop in the future as a result of the drop in production capacity and of the fact that, because of a shortage of chrome, sufficient armor plate can’t be produced to meet the increased production plans. Therefore, either the number of Panzers produced must be reduced or it will be necessary to reduce the thickness of the armor plate. ln that case, the troops will unequivocally ask for a reduction of the armor thickness in order to increase the total number of Panzers produced

Jentz, Panzertruppen 2 page 150-151

 

[Jorgen_CAB]

That 3 Jagdpanther did not 'float' as well as the crews thought.

Panthers could not float... why should they?!?

I say nothing other than knocking down trees looks good on film but it is somethng real tankers ln real tanks should not try .

It is important if you are to traverse areas of heavy vegetation that the vehicles will not become stuck or immobilized. A heavier tank with low ground pressure can traverse through heavier terrain without risking getting stuck. Even if you normally avoid such terrain it is still sometimes very beneficial to make tactical use of it.

Again:

The preferences of the crew for lighter, more maneuverable Panzers was recorded in a report written on 1 November 1944 by Albert Speer on his trip to Italy during 19 to 25 October 1944:

On the Southwest Front, opinions are in favor of the Sherman tank and its cross-country ability The Sherman tank climbs mountains that our Panzer crews consider impassable. This is accomplished by the especially powerful engine in the Sherman in comparison to its weight. Also, according to reports from the 26.Panzer-Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers. The Sherman tanks drive freely cross· country while our Panzers must remain on trails and narrow roads and therefore are very restricted in their ability to fight.

All Panzer crews want to receive lighter Panzers, which are more maneuverable, possess increased ability to cross terrain, and guarantee the necessary combat power just with a superior gun. This desire by the troops corresponds with conditions that will develop in the future as a result of the drop in production capacity and of the fact that, because of a shortage of chrome, sufficient armor plate can’t be produced to meet the increased production plans. Therefore, either the number of Panzers produced must be reduced or it will be necessary to reduce the thickness of the armor plate. ln that case, the troops will unequivocally ask for a reduction of the armor thickness in order to increase the total number of Panzers produced

Jentz, Panzertruppen 2 page 150-151

It seems logical that they would like to have a vehicle that could move quicker with a big gun, everyone would like to have that... including the Americans.

The Panther actually had more power per ton than the Sherman but the Panzer IV was a little lacking and was at this stage rather old and much heavier then when the war started. I have not read the book so I would like to read the entire section the quote is taken from before I draw any further conclusion from it.

The Sherman surely was faster than the Panzer IV with roughly the same mobility capability. The lower weight to power of the Panzer IV would have an adverse effect in the steep landscape of Italy which had less impact in most other Theaters.
Since the Panzer IV had gotten heavier and heavier through the years its no wonder they complained and wanted a lighter vehicle for that reason. With resources being limited its also no wonder they rather had lighter armour, was faster and more vehicles meant more guns.

Even the Tiger I was faster than a late war Panzer IV due to the extra weight put on that little tank over the years.

 

[Zinegata]

"Required something closer to a total redesign of the tank" because of the final drive used?
Can you back that up with any source?
As I wrote several times by now, the Panther was designed and tested with planetary drive similar to Tiger. And just later got that flawed one.

Not any source that you'll accept anyway, so why bother?

And you're aware that the Pershing started as 30 ton design too and ended up similar weight as the Panther for same reasons of design progress?

The Pershing was rejected for service at least once and the deployment was delayed precisely because the requirements changed. And then it ended up having a very short career in Korea where it was replaced by, guess what, Shermans!

But no apparently you didn't even bother watching the video. Otherwise you'd know that the US Army had very good reasons for delaying the Pershing. The Pershing in 1945, was in fact not really an effective weapon (which is why it lost its engagements against 1942 vintage Tiger Is) and was only rushed into service.

 

[Zinegata]

Now the Panther's rating improves if you consider it a heavy tank, a heavy tank has a different set of responsibilities that play to the Panther's strengths and mitigate its weaknesses. But as a medium tank, considering the entire spectrum of roles a medium tank is expected to perform, both the Sherman and the T-34 trounce the Panther which is only superior to them at the one facet of being a tank that matters the absolute least (tank dueling from the front).

Even as a heavy it's still pretty bad. IS-2 beats it in every way possible.

 

[Zinegata]

Since the Panzer IV had gotten heavier and heavier through the years its no wonder they complained and wanted a lighter vehicle for that reason. With resources being limited its also no wonder they rather had lighter armour, was faster and more vehicles meant more guns.

Even the Tiger I was faster than a late war Panzer IV due to the extra weight put on that little tank over the years.

As heavy as the Mk IV got it never achieved the same level of stupidity that was the +11 ton obesity that was the Panther; and again all of the complaints about mobility in Italy refer specifically to Panthers having horrible mobility just as Panzer-Lehr reported the same problems in Normandy.

===

And really, I have to note: None of those insisting the Panther was any good have actually ever named a single engagement - with date, place, and units involved - showing that the Panther actually ever won a major tank battle. They keep hiding behind generalized and unsupported statements, and yet cannot name a single detailed example of the only valid test of a tank - which is actual combat.

 

[Chepicoro]

Since the soviets themselves rated the Panther like superior to any other tank in 1944....

Now if you pretend to know more than the soviets and british teams responsible for the evaluations and reputed historians like Zaloga, without any source except biased opinions... well is your right.

Usually a description too favorable without mention the flaws or too negative without mention the evident strengths is a very clear symptom of "fanboyism".

The sherman was a very good tank in its category and generation, with reasonable protection in 1942 and very good firepower, but obsolete protection by 1944, and mediocre firepower, with a tendency to burn noted by every user and opponent. The Panther was in another category, comparable to the next generation of western tanks like the Pershing and Centurion, in weight, protection and firepower.

And then it ended up having a very short career in Korea where it was replaced by, guess what, Shermans!

Because the Pershing was no longer necessary, after the north koreans run out of tanks. The Pershings performed much better than Chafees and Shermans, against the north koreans T-34/85, once the north koreans had no armor, the sherman was the best option.

 

[Imgran]

It is true that it would have problem with snow and mud turning to Ice if it was not properly maintained and cared for. The Germans did try with a system that did not use the interlocking system but the cross country performance was reduced too much so it was discarded. Even other tanks had these problems so its not exclusive to the Panther or German vehicles in particular.

You should also note that the German half-tracks used this system as well and they had some good experience from them. They also suffered the same issues and was still regarded as having very good cross country performance in comparison with other half tracked vehicles.

You may think and have whatever opinion you want... the tank had excellent mobility in open country which is reflected by everyone that used it... including the French and the one who were up against it and experienced it. The French also actually highlighted the Panthers superior mobility over allied tanks at that time.

If you find any actual evidence to the contrary I would be eager to look at those sources... we all know the weakness of the interleaved wheel system had some issues but in this case the benefit was higher than the drawback.

I almost agree with you. THe Panther, when it worked, had excellent off road performance. The problem lies in two things. First is the italics, since the Panther did not always work second is the fact that off road driving increases the strain on the already strained transmission of a panther. Any tank is more likely to break down driving offroad. Take a tank that was already heavily prone to breaking down and put them in that environment and the risky becomes the inevitable. That off road performance looks a lot worse when the strain of off road performance breaks the tank down (again!)

The Sherman probably had poorer ideal off road performance than other WWII mediums due to its height (which reduces its ability to navigate side slopes) and its narrow tracks. However, the basic design fo the Sherman was so much more reliable that it makes a lot of that back. You can push a Sherman harder and closer to its limits for longer than you can push a Panther or even a T-34. Both other tanks will be superior offroad on a testing ground where you test then maintain, test then maintain, but in field conditions the table is turned because instead of drive and maintain the Sherman can keep on going, or only need a few hours of maintenance where the Tigers and Panthers and Panzer IV's needed days and even the T-34 needed *a* day.

German officers frequently complained about being limited in operations because reckless American commanders could push offroad with impunity and pop up just about anywhere.

Like I said, the telling incident about the advantages of highly mobile, reliable American armor was in the closing of the Falaise gap. Superior American mobility and aggression resulted in the complete destruction of 2 German armies and the utter collapse of German defense in central France. Quite frankly were able to move so much faster than the Germans had anticipated thanks to the quality of their mechanized and armored forces that by the time the order came to withdraw the Germans didn't even know it was too late.

 

[sam spade]

Now if you pretend to know more than the soviets and british teams responsible for the evaluations and reputed historians like Zaloga, without any source except biased opinions... well is your right.

I know of no UK test that did anything like this 'report' Perhaps you could be so good as to check out the footnotes and give the references?

If you post a source then you are responsible for it and you can not say 'take it up with Zaloga'.

 

[sam spade]

, with a tendency to burn noted by every user and opponent.

.

The period data shows your claim to be untrue.

Let us get this straight once and for all.

The report that gave the Sherman an 82% 'burn rate' was one of several done on tank wrecks in Normany.
The results were:

Sherman 82% burned
Pz IV 80% burned
Tiger 80% burned
Panther 63% burned

As can be seen the M4,Tiger & Pz IV had nearly identical 'burn rates so all attempts to portray the Sherman as more succeptable to fire are false.

Further to this later 1945 studies on Sherman fires found that 34% of the Sherman fires (34% of 82% is 27%) were 'minor'

Posting lies in order to bolster the anti-Sherman case is a sign of desperation.

 

[Jorgen_CAB]

I almost agree with you. THe Panther, when it worked, had excellent off road performance. The problem lies in two things. First is the italics, since the Panther did not always work second is the fact that off road driving increases the strain on the already strained transmission of a panther. Any tank is more likely to break down driving offroad. Take a tank that was already heavily prone to breaking down and put them in that environment and the risky becomes the inevitable. That off road performance looks a lot worse when the strain of off road performance breaks the tank down (again!)

The Sherman probably had poorer ideal off road performance than other WWII mediums due to its height (which reduces its ability to navigate side slopes) and its narrow tracks. However, the basic design fo the Sherman was so much more reliable that it makes a lot of that back. You can push a Sherman harder and closer to its limits for longer than you can push a Panther or even a T-34. Both other tanks will be superior offroad on a testing ground where you test then maintain, test then maintain, but in field conditions the table is turned because instead of drive and maintain the Sherman can keep on going, or only need a few hours of maintenance where the Tigers and Panthers and Panzer IV's needed days and even the T-34 needed *a* day.

German officers frequently complained about being limited in operations because reckless American commanders could push offroad with impunity and pop up just about anywhere.

Like I said, the telling incident about the advantages of highly mobile, reliable American armor was in the closing of the Falaise gap. Superior American mobility and aggression resulted in the complete destruction of 2 German armies and the utter collapse of German defense in central France. Quite frankly were able to move so much faster than the Germans had anticipated thanks to the quality of their mechanized and armored forces that by the time the order came to withdraw the Germans didn't even know it was too late.

This I completely agree with... by 1944 the state of the German armoured forces was in such disarray that they could no longer conduct the kind of mobile warfare they did in 1939-1942. This obviously was due to many different factors but mainly due to allied bombing and the fact that Germans was often restricted to night time movement and lack of proper maintenance and supply for their vehicles.

The Panther also was compromised too much during the design stage because Germany needed to mass produce the tank and this produced unnecessary reliability issues which some could never be corrected, such as the drive system. This obviously constricted the army in how they could use the tank.

Although the Germans did fairly well and managed to at least use their vehicles to some degree and by 1944 the Panther had more or less the same reliability as other German vehicles at that time, still poor by western standards mind you.

The Americans could maneuver their armoured forces with impunity since they did not have to worry much about enemy air raids and had more reliable vehicles overall. The Sherman was also a pretty fast vehicle but they still had to maneuver with their infantry and support trailing behind them so their speed was still limited to what the rest of their division could keep up with.

The fact stand that allied tank crew regarded the Panther as a beast in combat when they face it and at that time they did not know about it's poor reliability issues. But that did not matter when they did face it in combat.
The Panther was also primarily designed with the Eastern front in mind and against the more numerous T34 tanks the Russians had. Overall the Panther was not a very good main combat tank since it was engineered with too main constraints due to shortage of the necessary materials and tools to make it reliable. If the Germans had been able to use the drive system the engineers originally wanted (the same as the Tiger II) and both tools and materials had been available for mass production the tank would have been more successful. It was fairly cheap to produce and could have replaced the Panzer IV.

 

[Jorgen_CAB]

The period data shows your claim to be untrue.

Let us get this straight once and for all.

The report that gave the Sherman an 82% 'burn rate' was one of several done on tank wrecks in Normany.
The results were:

Sherman 82% burned
Pz IV 80% burned
Tiger 80% burned
Panther 63% burned

As can be seen the M4,Tiger & Pz IV had nearly identical 'burn rates so all attempts to portray the Sherman as more succeptable to fire are false.

Further to this later 1945 studies on Sherman fires found that 34% of the Sherman fires (34% of 82% is 27%) were 'minor'

Posting lies in order to bolster the anti-Sherman case is a sign of desperation.

The burning of the Sherman tank was an initial problem with how ammunition was stored and a penetrating hit had a very high chance of making the ammunition burn before the crew could bail out of the tank. This flaw was fixed by the time the allied landed in Normandy. The wet storage system on the ammunition compartments meant that tanks would burn less and if the ammunition still caught fire the crew would have time to bail out before being burned alive.

The Sherman was a pretty safe tank from the perspective of surviving a penetrating hit with spacious hatches from which you could quickly escape.

 

[Zinegata]

The period data shows your claim to be untrue.

Let us get this straight once and for all.

The report that gave the Sherman an 82% 'burn rate' was one of several done on tank wrecks in Normany.
The results were:

Sherman 82% burned
Pz IV 80% burned
Tiger 80% burned
Panther 63% burned

As can be seen the M4,Tiger & Pz IV had nearly identical 'burn rates so all attempts to portray the Sherman as more succeptable to fire are false.

Further to this later 1945 studies on Sherman fires found that 34% of the Sherman fires (34% of 82% is 27%) were 'minor'

Posting lies in order to bolster the anti-Sherman case is a sign of desperation.

The reason why the Panther had a lower burn rate in the first place is because so many were abandoned with broken final drives.

 

[Jorgen_CAB]

The reason why the Panther had a lower burn rate in the first place is because so many were abandoned with broken final drives.

I doubt it... I don't know where the numbers come from but it seems quite logical that about 80% of tanks knocked out in the field is burned. The primary way that a tank was knocked out and not simply immobilized or broke down was due to catching fire when hit and penetrated. To me it seems strange that the Panther have such low numbers in that regard but I'm not an expert on how ammunition was stored on the Panther and if it was less prone to catching fire when hit than most their contemporary tanks.

In any way, I don't think the numbers show how easily a tank would catch fire since that is most likely not what they measure. They just measure how many tanks that was knocked out in combat by the enemy who was burned. There are also many factors that decide in which way a tank would catch fire. For example it is very big difference if a tank was hit by an AP round from an anti-tank gun or a weapon like a Panzer Faust/Schreck. The Panzer Faust was very dangerous for the crew but should on the other hand make the tank less likely to burn up completely (I think), while an AP round igniting the ammunition storage would be more devastating to the tank but more likely for the crew to survive.

It make no sense that these numbers are counting immobilized or abandoned tanks damaged in different ways. The burn rate would be much much lower if it did.

 

[philbex]

Actually it does make sense. If you are given the task of counting all abandoned tanks you'll count all of them, you're not going to go 'hmm... that one broke down better not count it'.

 

[Jorgen_CAB]

Actually it does make sense. If you are given the task of counting all abandoned tanks you'll count all of them, you're not going to go 'hmm... that one broke down better not count it'.

Nope... if immobilized and tanks broken down for all reasons are counted the numbers make no sense what so ever... that is just a fact. It was normal to have about half to two third of vehicles as recoverable in general. So no, it makes no sense...

 

[Dina1954]

===

And really, I have to note: None of those insisting the Panther was any good have actually ever named a single engagement - with date, place, and units involved - showing that the Panther actually ever won a major tank battle. They keep hiding behind generalized and unsupported statements, and yet cannot name a single detailed example of the only valid test of a tank - which is actual combat.

How about Pz.Rgt.4 in Italy 0355 hours on 23 May 1944. 5 panthers attacked the allied force from the flank and knocked out 28 tanks which was burning immediately.3 additional enemy tanks
were knocked out but did not burn and were not claimed as kills.One Panther was knocked out.Source Jentz Panther Tank page 144.In this book I eaven saw that 1929 of the produced Panthers
was send to the west front (but in Feb 1945 271 of these Panthers was send to the east front) that means that 1658 was gone to the west front and not 3000 as one of our memer in the forum
stated.

 

[sam spade]

Nope... if immobilized and tanks broken down for all reasons are counted the numbers make no sense what so ever... that is just a fact. It was normal to have about half to two third of vehicles as recoverable in general. So no, it makes no sense...

This s a skewed way of looking at things that has grown up around that favourite excuse to explain away the defeat of the Uber-Panzer- the non-combat loss. In reality it makes no difference to Eisenhower if only 800 of the 1000 tanks lost to the Germans were destroyed by penetrations. 1000 less tanks in German service is 1000 less to fight. Post war excuse-making by the beaten general tries to save some face by claimng vastly overblown total of panzers they say were not lost 'in a fair fight'. All armies in all retreats abandon their equipment. The vast majority of Russian tanks lost in 1941-42 broke down or were abandoned yet I still see affcinado's beavering away making kill-ratio tables for these tanks v German losses. The bulk of the BEF tanks in 1940 were simply left behind during the retreat. Does this mean all the a10 tanks were really powerful because they could not be knocked out in a fair fight? Normandy has two phases. The static phase June /July and the pursuit phase in August. German abandoned numbers rocket in August but account for very few losses in June/July. Thus the reason for the abandonment is not invulnerable unknockoutable panzers but panic stricken crews switchng to foot when their ride runs out of petrol. They always had the option to turn and fight and go down in a blaze of glory with 5 burning shermans marking each Panther loss but they (wisely) decided not to trust in that old wives tale.

 

[Jorgen_CAB]

This s a skewed way of looking at things that has grown up around that favourite excuse to explain away the defeat of the Uber-Panzer- the non-combat loss. In reality it makes no difference to Eisenhower if only 800 of the 1000 tanks lost to the Germans were destroyed by penetrations. 1000 less tanks in German service is 1000 less to fight. Post war excuse-making by the beaten general tries to save some face by claimng vastly overblown total of panzers they say were not lost 'in a fair fight'. All armies in all retreats abandon their equipment. The vast majority of Russian tanks lost in 1941-42 broke down or were abandoned yet I still see affcinado's beavering away making kill-ratio tables for these tanks v German losses. The bulk of the BEF tanks in 1940 were simply left behind during the retreat. Does this mean all the a10 tanks were really powerful because they could not be knocked out in a fair fight? Normandy has two phases. The static phase June /July and the pursuit phase in August. German abandoned numbers rocket in August but account for very few losses in June/July. Thus the reason for the abandonment is not invulnerable unknockoutable panzers but panic stricken crews switchng to foot when their ride runs out of petrol. They always had the option to turn and fight and go down in a blaze of glory with 5 burning shermans marking each Panther loss but they (wisely) decided not to trust in that old wives tale.

Did you actually have a point or are you just ranting?

You obviously did not understand what I wrote.

 

[Imgran]

This s a skewed way of looking at things that has grown up around that favourite excuse to explain away the defeat of the Uber-Panzer- the non-combat loss. In reality it makes no difference to Eisenhower if only 800 of the 1000 tanks lost to the Germans were destroyed by penetrations. 1000 less tanks in German service is 1000 less to fight. Post war excuse-making by the beaten general tries to save some face by claimng vastly overblown total of panzers they say were not lost 'in a fair fight'. All armies in all retreats abandon their equipment. The vast majority of Russian tanks lost in 1941-42 broke down or were abandoned yet I still see affcinado's beavering away making kill-ratio tables for these tanks v German losses. The bulk of the BEF tanks in 1940 were simply left behind during the retreat. Does this mean all the a10 tanks were really powerful because they could not be knocked out in a fair fight? Normandy has two phases. The static phase June /July and the pursuit phase in August. German abandoned numbers rocket in August but account for very few losses in June/July. Thus the reason for the abandonment is not invulnerable unknockoutable panzers but panic stricken crews switchng to foot when their ride runs out of petrol. They always had the option to turn and fight and go down in a blaze of glory with 5 burning shermans marking each Panther loss but they (wisely) decided not to trust in that old wives tale.

Not to mention that you die just as dead whether you make Shermans die with you or not

 

[Chepicoro]

Perhaps I should point you to this book:

Montgomery's Scientists
Operational Research in Northwest Europe
The Work of No.2 Operational Research Section
with 2 1 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945 .
Terry Copp, editor


page 11.

Solandt's initial ORG report analysed crew casualties in the Mark III Matilda Infantry Tank

during the first EI Alamein battle, July 1942. Other work focussed on methods of ranging, firing on the

move and the German all-around vision cupola. Studies comparing the gunsights used in German and

British tanks led to important results and an object lesson in OR methods. Solandt recalled this

investigation as one of the highlights of his time at Lulworth. The problem presented to Solandt was

that "the Germans had introduced a new tank gunsight which was vastly superior to the British sight."

Tank crews in the desert were sure that it was the new sight that made it possible for the Germans to

knock out British tanks at long range before they were themselves in danger. However, careful

measurements showed the British gunsight was accurate. The German sight was similarly tested and

found to be inferior. "We were therefore forced," Solandt wrote, "to treat it as an operations research

rather than a technical problem . .

The period data shows your claim to be untrue.

Let us get this straight once and for all.

The report that gave the Sherman an 82% 'burn rate' was one of several done on tank wrecks in Normany.
The results were:

Sherman 82% burned
Pz IV 80% burned
Tiger 80% burned
Panther 63% burned

As can be seen the M4,Tiger & Pz IV had nearly identical 'burn rates so all attempts to portray the Sherman as more succeptable to fire are false.

Further to this later 1945 studies on Sherman fires found that 34% of the Sherman fires (34% of 82% is 27%) were 'minor'

Posting lies in order to bolster the anti-Sherman case is a sign of desperation.

I got the book thank you, now you "forgot" that the sherman study has a sample of 45 tanks

By the way this is another source to show the inflammability of the sherman...

Page 397. "The proportion of brewed up tanks is high and it is therefore important to know whether or not this must be always the case."

Page 12. "This report led to to the armoring of ammunition stowage bins and a decline in the incidence of interior fires. Exterior fires. which were higher, in British and Americans tanks, appeared to be due to the use of gasoline engines instead of diesel engines favoured by the Germans."

By comparison the german study has a sample of just 5 Pz IV, 22 Panthers and 5 Tigers... honestly you can not call that representative, specially about Pz. IV and Tigers.

However you managed to avoid every table favorable to the german tanks in the same study, that talks a lot about your impartiality and objectiveness, for example:

Is simply wrong to discard the sources that disagree with your established bias. I accept that this report mention the british optics like superior compared to german optics, but at the same time there are plenty of testimonies about the quality of german optics compared to the optics used by other nations.

Using the same source, you are trying to discard the information "favorable" to the germans and just pretending the source talks wonders about the sherman, that is untrue. Half truths are just sophisticated lies.