This is an article about the specific logistics for driving across French Equatorial Africa (some jungle, the Sahel, then the Sahara) from a WW2 intelligence bulletin magazine produced by the US Army. It generally took a month to cover 1,000 miles against no opposition and required a whole lot more trucks than usual. Which jibes with Leclerc having a truck per 9 men to move ~3,000 light infantry and some camelry 1,500 miles against essentially no opposition (just a few Auto-Saharan companies of 120 men) in 6 weeks.
That's about the largest force you can move and supply at that time which amounts to a few mot inf batt., maybe 1 cav, and a couple support companies smacking into units too small to represent. As an example the Italians had 4,000 trucks in Libya in 1940 which at Leclerc's rate would have allowed 36,000 troops to be motorized leaving the other 214,000 completely stuck and likely starving. Or the other way they would have needed 30,000 trucks to motorize all of their troops (plus tens of thousands of more trucks to carry the fuel, water, spare parts, and extra soldiers for all the extra trucks), which in either case it can easily be imagined what a nightmare of a traffic jam that would have made the desert tracks through the Sahara.
There is really no reason to waste time modeling what is best done via recon buffs if anything and auto-occupation of impassable provinces just to represent a single raid by one unit at the very low end of the unit scale that had almost no impact.
As for Arctic Canada, all you need to do is read an account of the US/Canadian operations on Attu and Kiska or the US/UK invasion of Archangelsk in 1919 to know why no operations larger than platoon or so would be conducted there ever.