The US wins the war in 1945. Midway was in no way relevant to the overall outcome of the war. The sheer industrial discrepancy between the US and Japan would allow the US to make good any loses they suffered in the battle of Midway, and the island itself does nothing for the Japanese position. This is leaving aside the question if the Japanese even could have taken the island in an opposed landing. As far as I know, the Japanese only managed to carry one opposed landing against the US during the entire war - on the second attempt, at Wake Island.
So, if we were perfectly historical, getting into a war with the US as Japan would require a reload because you just lost the game.
Germany loses. Taking Stalingrad still means they have a gigantic frontline which - in that moment - is hanging in the air in large stretches. They have to garrison an enormous amount of territory full of people who don't like them. The amount of actual production they get out of the occupied territories is appalling. The US is only going to ramp up production in virtually untouchable factories and will continue to supply the Soviet Union with ever increasing amounts of material. Taking the Suez makes the allied position in the Mediterranean untenable - for the moment. However, the Axis forces are at the absolute edge of their logistical capabilities, and taking the Suez will not fundamentally change that. It also does not fundamentally get the Allies any closer to defeat. At best, it keeps Italy in the war long term instead of exposing the weak underbelly of the continent. In many ways, an Axis victory in North Africa only prevents a defeat, not create a victory. Neither scenario allows for an Axis victory.
That is the fundamental crux of the game: the material reasons for the axis defeat are so utterly overwhelming that it would be impossible for a realistic, historic game to have any other outcome but an axis defeat. That means there is no actual strategy involved, the axis player can merely delay the inevitable, the allied player would need to make an active effort to lose the war. That is not the game we are making. Germany being able to win the war is one core pillar of the game experience, and that means it will have to be able to successfully navally invade at least Britain and occupy enough of the Soviet Union to force their surrender, both utterly ludicrous notions for anyone who actually understand the logistical requirements of those undertakings. So at its core, the game already requires us to completely abandon historical accuracy insofar as outcomes are concerned.
The reason why we have this as a core pillar of the HoI experience is because it makes the game a Grand Strategy Game. It requires both sides to use strategic decision making, because there is a real chance for victory and defeat depending on your choices and decisions. We also believe that having different strategic scenarios - with different constellations of alliances and ideally fronts in different parts of the world - dramatically increases replayability. For that, we have to sort of abandon the starting position of 1936 to present a new challenge. We still think that the historical setup is fun and a core part of the experience - can you lead your country through the chaos? - but all hard evidence shows that a large percentage of our playerbase likes the ahistoric scenarios.
It should be noted that the ahistoric scenarios are usually a lot easier to make simply because you aren't constrained by history that needs to be represented through game mechanics.
I am sorry, but you are mistaken. There are several key areas where Germany clearly 'lost the war' or could have 'won' given a realistic appraisal of German war aims.
1) The three choices that Germany faced after the fall of France in 1940: to focus on destroying Britain directly, to focus on destroying Britain indirectly (the Mediterranean strategy) and writing Britain off as militarily irrelevant and instead going east. It is likely that the second option would have been pretty effective, or the first if the Germans built the number of U-Boats Donitz wanted. Taking Suez prior to US intervention would have brought Britain to the edge of defeat and made the Mediterranean the Italian lake Musso always wanted. You have no logistical problems at all when you can simply sail your supplies from Naples to Alex rather than drive them along the single road from Tripoli. Besides, given how HOI deals with logistics in North Africa, what are you implying..?
2) If the Germans win the battle of the Atlantic before the US enters the war, the war in the Pacific may happen but the US would hardly have been in a position to get anywhere near Europe. Why would they want to?
3) The Soviet rail system is a radial one based on the French model. The hub is Moscow. If Moscow had fallen in 1941, the ability of the USSR to get oil from south to north would have been severely constricted and crippled her war effort.
4) If Britain is out then there is no Lend Lease to the USSR: no trucks, Spam, aluminium or aviation fuel. Another dent in the Soviet war effort.
5) Of course, Britain could have gone for a negotiated peace in early summer 1940. It was discussed, and the Swedish Embassy was engaged (I think the man was Bjorn Prits) to put out feelers to the Germans. At the same time cabinet discussed peace for two days just prior to France throwing in the sponge as a result of a demarche from Paris. The idea was proposed by Chamberlain - still in cabinet but no longer PM - to entreat with still neutral Mussolini to use his influence to stop Hitler, offering Musso Gibraltar, Malta and British Somaliland as inducements (which shows how desperate things had become).
6) If Halifax rather than Churchill had succeeded Chamberlain then a compromise peace (which is what Hitler wanted and had repeatedly offered) would have been a real possibility.
There are lots more.
In other words, knock out Britain as a springboard and the US is simply going to focus on the Pacific. Germany is liberated from having to keep so many troops in the west and put so much in the way of air resources in defending Germany from terror bombing. She also has a far stronger claim that the war has become a crusade against Bolshevism.
Of course, would Japan then have done what she did? After all, under these circumstances Germany would have guaranteed the British Empire (part of Hitler's offer) and would have been far keener on having Britain as an ally than Japan. The Dutch would have been a puppet, and Vichy would have been the same but may have been in a stronger position to deny Tokyo the occupation of French Indo-China.
So, no, not a straightforward 'Germany was doomed to lose' at all. Most historians put the tipping point in 1942, especially in the Atlantic when victory there makes it possible for the US to deploy her vast strength in North Africa and Europe. It is sort of why accurate and decent naval game play is critical to Anglo-US strategy in a game like this.
K