Interesting paper I found on the web concerning air interdiction, and quite justifies the broad based nature of the area combat system. You can read the whole thing
here, but I'll take a few paragraphs out of it that are especially poigniant, I think:
Because the construction of an AI campaign appears to be straightforward, many people are tempted to meddle in the planning. A number of individuals want to have their hands on the air power throttle--from senior government leaders concerned about the impact of target selection on world opinion to supported surface commanders who feel that they will benefit if they are running the show. The conduct of the campaign requires the expertise and constant attention of both the commander and staff of the air component. Whether the decision to conduct an AI campaign comes directly from the theater CINC, the ACC, or as a request from one of the surface component commanders, the ACC should have responsibility for the mission. Air interdiction is a classic case for the use of mission-oriented command and control, sometimes called mission order tactics.5 This concept of command and control (see table), which stems from German military tradition as far back as Helmuth von Moltke, is designed to give the greatest freedom to the person who knows the situation and emphasizes initiative at the lowest level. It thereby takes advantage of what the US military prides itself on--the initiative of the individual soldier, sailor, or airman.
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Tenets of Mission-Oriented Command and Control
The superior
determines the objectives to be achieved and to this end assigns a clearly defined mission.
ensures that the forces, resources, and the authority required to accomplish the mission are available to the subordinate.
lays down details only to the extent necessary for coordination within a broad scope. These details usually apply to the interaction with such forces and resources not subordinate to the person executing the mission or not immediately available to him.
The subordinate
has extensive latitude in the way he executes the mission. He can use his own initiative to develop his operation plan and determine the necessary details. He has full discretion and freedom of action.
remains--whatever he may do--committed to the substance of his mission and the concept of operations of the higher level of command. In carrying out his operation he never forgets the goals his superior is trying to attain. The Germans would say: "The mission is sacred to him."
combine obedience with thinking in broader terms and a willingness to assume responsibility.
Source: German Military Thinking: Selected Papers on German Theory and Doctrine, Art of War Colloquium (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, May 1983), 95-96.
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This very well justifies the area based mission selection of the air forces, as well as the prioritization given to active combats. Mission based, the interdiction campaign would attempt to influence the Theater Commander's (read: player's) goals, which in our case are to defeat the enemy military and advance on strategic objectives, as is best determined by the Air Commanders (read: the air AI).
Also being mission based, the AI will zero in on active combat provinces and provide the air support needed while the forces are in combat.
This presents a limitation of the AI, admittedly, and is why I always suggest that if you want support in combat, launch your aircraft after combat is engaged. The AI has no way of knowing that you will be launching an attack at said specific province, and indeed in accordance with this can be said to know the forces at it's disposal and how to employ them to greatest effect against the enemy in support of the Theater Commander's goals. The overall goal is not the taking of one province, but the conquest of a nation and a defeat of an enemy's entire military machine. However, the air AI will recognize the need to support active ground operations and put priority on those operations. That being said, many times C3I is seen as the priority target, even in today's military, which might explain the increased priority of bombardment against HQs.
The air interdiction campaign delays, disrupts, diverts, or destroys enemy forces.6 It achieves one or more of these effects by conducting operations against a number of possible targets or target systems, including enemy combat units; transportation networks; command, control, and communications networks; combat supplies; or a combination of them. The specific form of an air interdiction campaign must be derived from the theater CINC's objectives, taking into consideration enemy threats and the opportunities for friendly action.7
If the air AI sees an area, and decides that the enemy threat is in reinforcement and in preventing continued operations after initial breakthrough, then the units behind the front line might be chosen directly for attack rather than front line units which are opposed by a force that can defeat them. I'm not saying this is the way it works, but if an air commander overall is given a strategic plan of "We are going to move out from here to take Hamburg", then he will look not only to the forces directly opposing friendly forces, but at those in the line of advance toward Hamburg and those in the area who might reinforce the front line. Weakening of those forces would serve the Theater CINC's objectives, sometimes moreso than the forces at the front.
The theater CINC's objectives for an interdiction campaign should be broad enough to permit the ACC latitude in meeting them. The CINC should identify these objectives in terms of desired outcomes rather than targets to be attacked or sorties to be flown. Although it may be easier to list targets or detail sorties, presenting the objectives in such terms cripples the planning process and results in a less effective overall air effort.8
So, saying, "Attack right here" is counterproductive.
Not only must ACC's know theater objectives but also they must know the objectives of the surface commanders so that they can provide them the best possible support and help them exploit the results of the AI campaign. Once the objectives are known, the air planners outline the various ways they can be achieved. An attack on bridges and road defiles may be possible, but--as our experience in Vietnam taught us--it may be far more effective to lay mines in harbors and attack docks. The issue is not one of hitting bridges or docks but of finding the best way to achieve the objectives, in view of the existing situation. Attacking supplies in dumps may be the answer, but attacking command and control nets may be equally effective. Selection of target systems should be coordinated with the surface component commanders to ensure that destruction of these targets fulfills land and naval objectives. When reviewing potential targets, however, the air component commander must also consider the threat each one represents.
Now, this paragraph talks about ports, bridges and everything else, which in the game are separate from air interdiciton missions. However the point is quite well made. The subordinate must recognize the threat and operate accordingly, not only in it's threat to the operational goals, but it's threat in disabling the ability of the interdiction campaign to continue effectively. While attacking the front line province might be a desirable goal in preparation for an attack, it isn't if your assets are crippled for advances following the initial attack. Hence the AI's casualty to damage analysis proves a quite effective tool to model air doctrine.
Air interdiction not only assists a surface component commander by reducing the enemy's ability to reinforce and maneuver, but also it helps the commander and subordinates maneuver to defeat enemy forces. For example, a land-force commander, performing at what the Army calls the operational level of war, fights battles of maneuver (fire and movement). In planning and fighting the campaign, the commander needs the cooperation of air power. That cooperation could take the form of counterair operations, air interdiction, close air support, air reconnaissance, or tactical airlift. When a particular scheme of maneuver requires air interdiction, both air and land forces must be closely coordinated. Diversion of air power or the delay of Army defense suppression or unit movements will disrupt the overall effort and put the success of the undertaking at risk. Any changes in air interdiction must be closely worked out with the land commander. Similarly, any changes in the land commander's scheme of maneuver must be coordinated with the air commander.
This again justifies the prioritization of combat, and reinforces the inability of the AI to read our minds. When we talk of manuver on this scale, we talk of within a province. As the AI can't read the minds of us or our land commanders, it cannot attack a province without this coordination, reflected in prioritizing for units on the move. This does also, however, prove another inability of the AI system in HOI2, and that is the ability to think on the fly and rapidly reevaluate a situation. Again why I suggest launching aircraft after combat has begun is that this allows the targeting AI to pick it's target fresh, instead of trying to change targeting on the fly. The air AI might have locked onto a mission objective that it will try and complete, regardless of the changed situation. I could wish it were otherwise, but the way the AI works and scripts is set up in this manner. With combat being over so quickly at times, it might be over before the AI has hit it's "reevaluation" timing. Sucks, but what can you do?
For example, in early World War II when the Allies fought with limited resources, centralized control with decentralized execution was essential for successful operations. Although these assets were capable of doing a variety of missions, priorities had to be set. Granted, the speed and range of air power gave the commander flexibility in deciding where and when to use it. But if air assets were committed in penny packets to meet the needs of many parties, they accomplished little, and air strength was quickly dissipated. The same situation obtains today. To try to operate an air interdiction campaign by parceling out air assets to various surface commanders means that sufficient forces and resources necessary to do the job will not be available. In effect, the principles of mass and economy of force will be violated.
This can be read as "Directing the air force to attack as specific province in preparation of one attack".
In sum, air interdiction must be conducted as an integrated campaign by a single commander who has the tools and authority to accomplish the mission. The ideal candidate for conducting AI is the air component commander because this officer commands or controls most of the applicable assets and has the information to make timely decisions. The ACC should be the coordinating authority for the overall interdiction effort in the theater and must always keep in mind the objectives assigned by the theater CINC. Mission-oriented command and control is fully applicable to air interdiction, and not until it is rigorously applied will we be able to gain the maximum benefit from our efforts.
This again emphasies the importance of the direct command of the air force being in the hands of the one trained to use it most effectively. However, as I've admitted, the AI is a bit slow on the uptake at times, and as such needs a little hand holding. However, allowing an AI to handle the specifics of an air interdiction campaign is quite fitting.
This paper was written in 1989, but draws upon historical factors since the days of WWII, however the principles of air interdiction were formulating then and applied as nodded to in this paper.
Now, many will point out that CAS aircraft shouldn't be limited by this. Note that this paper is NOT about the Interdiction or Ground Attack MISSION in the game, those are simply two methods of attack. The overall conduct of the campaign is in the application of a combined group of missiosn. Ground Attack is simply saying, "The goal is to lower enemy strength on the ground". Interdiction is simply saying, "The goal is to disrupt the enemy on the ground". Both are part of an overall Air Interdiction campaign as discussed in the paper.
The flaw, as I see it, isn't the system in game itself, nor the AI, but in the AI's inability to think quickly enough to keep up with the ever changing situation. The question is begged, though, just how much AI rethinking can be done in a game of this scale without taxing system resources to the max. Already people mention often the slowing of the game as the war progresses. How much more then would it slow if air units were reevaluating the situation every hour, airborne or on land?
The two contentions I guess are that 1) The system itself is based in sound air power theory and IS historical (as most air doctrine developed in the Luftwaffe or response to it) and 2) That the AI isnt' flawed in and of itself in terms of this ideal, but that it cannot think fast enough on it's feet to keep up with proper application of this ideal.
