Obviously Daniel is a connoisseur of military genius, and puts his study to work.
I viewed the WWW replay after the fact and noted Daniel’s mention of Yi Sun-sin (alt. sun-shin) with interest. Indeed, Yi was born in Korea of good family but without wealth. He was naturally fluent in Chinese as an erudite Confucian scholar but I don’t recall details as to whether he had any Han ancestry. My initial interest was research for wargames armies of the epic but somewhat enigmatic Imjin War (1592-98) in which Yi achieved greatness and lost his life. His story is epic as well, victorious in battle, but battered by abuse from his compatriots.
For its age, the Imjin War bears fair comparison to Operation Barbarosa for the scale of its conception (first Korea, then China, and then on to the west) and the relatively massive forces committed to the invasion (well over 100K Japanese troops landed in Korea in the divisions of the first wave). Hideyoshi’s unification of Japan’s warring daimyos under his personal rule was the culmination of decades of intensive internal warfare that had refined the martial arts and produced an army of veteran soldiers who could be redirected overseas for imperial glory and domestic tranquility. Their tactical drill and fire/shock tactics had evolved over decades of battles and they were armed with the most advanced infantry firearms in the world at that time (Japanese gunmakers were pioneers in mass production runs of teppō with standardized and thus interchangeable parts and lead shot of uniform calibre). A most intriguing hypothetical opponent for contemporary armies, and one that showed some of the same weaknesses in logisitcs and staff work evident in the IJA of WW2.
There was not much available in English on this war, but I found and borrowed Hawley’s then-recently published “The Imjin War” - this was the most valuable source I found (buying a copy was not possible, though now it is out in paperback). The book is a delight for those with an interest in military or regional history, and threaded through the history is basically a full biography of Yi’s career as both a land and naval commander in the service of his country.
Hawley's writing is a pleasure to read while meticulously careful in descriptions and details and with ample citations reflecting heavy reliance on authoritative Korean primary sources. Hawley’s lucid descriptions clarify items of information that are glossed over or roughly sketched elsewhere – such as discrepancies in Turnbull’s battle accounts I had previously noted that turned out to be a confusion of events of one battle with another.
Truth is indeed often more amazing than fiction, and that applies to Admiral Yi’s times as well. I was interested to learn of the historical Korean reverence for contemporaneously recording and preserving through the generations the events of each reign in official annals with scrupulous accuracy. This may not be unique in the world, but is remarkable given that whitewashing facts and censoring, slanting, trimming, and destroying records as well as fabrication is commonplace in history. Japanese and Chinese written records are also extensive. The human and financial costs of the war had a serious impact on the viability of the Ming empire – their role was substantial in both the early and late war phases. Although they were more circumspect than the Koreans wanted them to be, they were the bulk of the allied forces late in the war and strained Imperial finances in prosecuting it.
The result of this is a richness of detail reflecting the many characters and circumstances that affected the Korean side of the war, with no small measures of incompetence, jealousy, politics, sabotage, corruption, intrigue, cowardice, villainy, and good old honest stupidity, as well as fidelity, constancy, heroism, statesmanship and genius. Admiral Yi’s role was pivotal – he was one of those great men of Washingtonian qualities - well worthy of biographies and multiple films.