Account of the RCAF Bomber Command

[stnylan]

February 1944

As agreed with the Committee of War we switched our campaign to the Alpine OA on the first day of the month, and we have continued the campaign the entire month. It has been the most successful month we have achieved - for the loss of 22 bombers we inflicted 38 FEU and killed 19 enemy fighters.

Unfortunately the Army had to tear up their initial invasion plans for Italy and reform them, meaning the proposed invasion has been put back into March. We will continue, if possible, to bomb railways and the like to make the Axis job of transferring troops into the theatre after the landing as hard as possible, even if we bloody our knuckles in the process.

The Committee also notes the report of Mr Laurence and we look forward to further such reports in future.

 

[stnylan]

March 1944

Editor's Note - When we were given access to these records, the summary of the month of March 1944 was missing. The military achivists were apologetic, but they had no record that might suggest the location of this. They did produce documentation from the early 1970s showing the section had been missing at that time too.

We have chosen not to insert our own coverage of this month, to keep the impression of the sources, but we did want to explain the lacuna in material.

 

[stnylan]

April 1944

After the disappointments of the previous month operations began anew again the Eastern Balkans. It was decided to try to maintain the pace of operations for at least a month and perhaps more, accepting potentially higher losses into the bargain.

Over the course of the month we did indeed suffer 23 losses, for 10.8 FEU and twenty-five enemy fighters. Somewhat creditable work. By the end of the month also 130/800 active bombers were Lincolns

The Committee has decided to continue the campaign on the Eastern Balkans for a further month, and then to re-assess. The Commitee notes the deteriorating position on the Eastern Front, but respects the views of General Hoffmeister on - and we quote - "throwing our troops onto Italian beaches unsupported by the bloody idiots in Horse Guards and the [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] Pentagon". We defer to the General's experience.

 

[stnylan]

May 1944

As planned we continued the bomber campaign against the Eastern Balkan OA throughout the month. During some portions of the month enemy fighter activity become very intense, twice almost bringing the campaign to an early conclusion, but in each case enemy fighters were redeployed.

In total we lost a further 22 bomber, caused 8.9 FEU of damage (the lower value to last month a result of those times of exceptional enemy opposition) and killed twenty-five enemy fighters.

In the cold light of day operations in the Eastern Balkans have never been entirely satisfactory, and what interruptions we have managed of the Romanian oil supplies has always been limited. We have already given orders for the squadrons to rest for a number of days before commencing their next set of sorties in the Greek OA.

As of the end of the month there were 173 Lincolns operational in the bomber fleet.

As a final note we have received a dispatch from General Hoffmeister regarding the American attacks in and around the Anzio area that briefly even captured Rome. The dispatch simply reads "To the honourable members of the Bombing Committee. I am aware that some questions have been raised regarding army operations in the Italian theatre. In light of recent events I rest my case, and presume no further argument is necessary."

We commend the General's use of language and, with regret, agree.

 

[stnylan]

June 1944

A new operation in the Greek Operational Area began on the 6th of the month. This continued until the end of the month, by which time we have suffered 17 losses whilst inflicting 10.2 FEU and shooting down 23 enemy fighters. By this time 217 of our bomber fleet were Lincoln '44s.

The Bombing Committee is aware there have been very significant discussions of a strategic nature in the Committee of War, and thus this Committee is being careful not to make any plans or presumptions until those discussions are resolved.

 

[stnylan]

July 1944

On the 26th July the Committee for War issued the Directive No. 12 on the conduct of the war. For our concerns this confirmed matters that were already in progress, and is being referred to in general discussions as the Pacific Pivot.

The Greek OA campaign wound up on the 11th July, for a further 13 losses whilst causing 3 FEU and nine enemy fighters.

The Pacific Pivot was not a surprise - the Committee for War had already asked for briefings on the logistics of transferring Bomber Command to the Pacific Theatre. Indeed early stages of this began mid-month, and by the time the Directive were issued all 8 squadrons of Bomber Command were starting to transfer to bases in the Philippine Islands.

We note that orders are being issued for all Canadian Military units to follow the Pacfic Pivot, apart from the newly formed Canadian 2nd Army under General Anderson, which will be remain to help defend Sicily. This will consist of three reserve divisions already on the island, and three more in training. The bulk of the Canadian 1st Army is transferring to the East under General Hoffmeister.

 

[stnylan]

August 1944

Our first bombing campaign against the Japanese Home Islands began on the 5th August. It should be noted that the Philippine bases are not ideal. There remains significant fighting on Luzon and the surrounding islands, and a procedure has been implemented for rapid evacuation. Also the Lancaster Bs do not have sufficient range for all targets in Honshu, and Hokkaido is at hte edge of the Lincoln's range. This naturally degrades the effectiveness of our operations. We also choose to widen our operational targets to include Military

That said by the end of the month we had suffered 12 losses, inflicted 6.2 FEU of damage and killed 16 enemy fighters. Japanese fighter opposition maxed out at an estimated fifteen hundred - less than half of what we sometimes faced in the European theatre. By the end of the month we had 317 operational Lincoln '44s.

It has been decided that the 1st Army should try to contain some of the Japanese landings in Burma and Indochina, with a possibility of liberating some of the Dutch East Indies. The exception to this will be looking at the Marine divisions to hopefully secure for us an airfield closer to the site of our opposition.

 

[stnylan]

September 1944

Operations against the Home Islands continued until 22nd September, when we had to do an emergency evacuation of the Phillipines. In that time we took 13 losses, inflicted 6.8 FEU and killed 11 fighters. Given the constraints under which we are operating in theatre we regard this as satisfactory.

By the month the Phillipine airbases had been resecued, and the newly formed No.6 and No.13 fighter squadrons to provide support for Phillipine and American forces. Our own forces have helped stabilise the front in Indochina and prevent the Cambodian landings from linking up with the Bangkok landings.

Our bombing squadrons will return to the Phillipines as soon as is practicable.

 

[stnylan]

October 1944

The new Home Island bombing campaign commenced on the 10th October, and this continued until the very end of the month when we again had to evacuate the airfields. During the three-week campaign though we suffered 9 losses, caused 6.7 FEU of damage and killed 18 fighters.

The Committee also marks that the Statute of Toronto, whereby Canada isformally declared a Kingdom in its own right not just a Dominion. We hope to make to prove ourselves a truly equal partner to the Mother Country.

 

[stnylan]

November 1944

From the point of view of Bomber Command this has proven to be an exceptionally quiet month. The bomber squadrons were all based in Australia, and no sorties were undertaken. Towards the end of the month the eight squadrons again rebased towards the Phillipines, but the resumption of bombing operations was not due until the start of December.

In other news the Marine Corps of the 1st Army is due to make an attempt to seize Marcus Island, where we know there is a small Japanese airstrip. There are plans in place to expand this airbase substantially if we manage to seize it, and it should provide us a better and (hopefully) more secure base of operations.

 

[stnylan]

As this is an account of a Canadian arm, it seems fitting on this day (Rememberance Sunday) and for tomorrow, to quote the following

In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row,
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie,
In Flanders fields.

Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.


And because it is that time of year:

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.


This AAR will re-commence on Tuesday

 

[stnylan]

December 1944

Operations against the Japanese Home Islands recommenced at the start of the month. Another pause was instituted on from the 15th to the 26th as the Phillipine airbases were once more under threat, but raids continued thereafter. Overally this rather disrupted month of activity resulted in nine losses, for 4.1 FEU of damage and 8 enemy fighters downed. By the end of the month we also had around 550 Lincoln aircraft in operation.

The Committee notes that a planned attack on Marcus Island has been launched, and that troops are due to land shortly. We hope for a easy capture. It is excepted considerable resources will initially need to be deployed to expand the airbase there to be sutiable for our purposes.

 

[stnylan]

January 1945

Marcus Island proved to be only be extremely lightly held and our Marine divsions had finished securing it in its totality by nightfall on the 2nd January. Work began almost immediately on expanding the airbase. By the end of the month we had tripled the capacity of the airbase, though so far other arms of the Air Force are making use of it. We understand the necessity of this, and will continue to use the Phillipine bases for the moment.

Despite continued fighting on the Phillipines the airbases were themselves not threatened, so we achieved a full month of activity. During this time we lost sixteen aircraft, but inflicted 11 FEU and shot down sixteen enemy fighters.

The Committee notes the successes of the 1st Army in its activities liquidating the Japanese enclaves around Saigon and Bangkok. We hope that this means forces might soon be available to liquidate Japanese conquests in the Dutch East Indies, as that would certainly dramatically impact Japan's resource situation.

 

[stnylan]

February 1945

The Marcus Island facilities continued to expand throughout the month, so much so that we started to transfer bomber squadrons to the island. In this the Commitee as to acknowledge its own errors: we had been warned that the logistical setup in the island was insufficient to our requirements, something we largely ignored. And yet it proved to be absolutely the base, and operations over the Home Islands were gravely disrupted for several weeks. A devision was made to return the bombers to the Philippines until this can be improved. There is now capacity in the island for approximately a thousand aircraft. We have also began to expand port capacity to improve the overall logistical capacity of the island.

The consequences of all this was we only inflicted 4.6 FEU of damage this month, although we also only suffered 3 losses (and shot down 4 enemy fighters). On the other than the pause allowed us to continue expand our Lincoln fleet - out of 800 opertional bombers 665 are now Lincolns as of writing.

The Japanese have made one spirited attack to retake the island, but with four marine divions and two reserve visions as a garrison, and plans to fortify the island before the Marine divisions depart, matter seem secure.



OOC Note - given the real-life size of Marcus Island (1.5km2/0.58miles2)one has to be somewhat somewhat creative on how on earth 1000 aircraft are meant to even fit on the island, not to mention operate, along with 6 divisions totalling almost 40,000 men. I think Paradox needs to impose a size cap for facilities on certain places.

 

[stnylan]

March 1945

From the perspective of the Bombing Committee this month was rather quiet. Operations against the Japanese Home Islands continue, as do our efforts to properly turn Marcus Island into an effective base of operations. As to the former we had a successful month - 13 losses for 12.2 FEU and downing 19 enemy fighters. We also have now over 700 Lincolns in action.

As regards to Marcus Island we have expanded the Port facilities there and continue to do so.

We note the unfortunate develops in Europe however, especially the German-backed coup within Turkey causing that nation to join the Axis and join the war at the start of the month. This Commitee understands that General Anderson's 2nd army will abandon Sicily to our erstwhile allies, and see if it possibly to hold the Suez Canal. Meanwhile Prime Minister King appears to have finally gotten wide agreement regarding the necessary conscription requirements of the war, and political tension (especially amongst the Quebecois) have started to ease.

 

[stnylan]

April 1945

The writing has been on the wall for a considerable period of time, but on the 13th the USSR formally surrendered to the European Axis powers. To say this is a disaster of the first order would be understating the case, but to say it was unexpected would likewise be wrong. This Committee notes the words of Prime Minister Churchill of the United Kingdom - the Commonwealth will continue this fight, "if necessary, for years - if necessary, alone" - the last no doubt a sharp reminder to our fairweather friends down south.

This month saw a considerable success within our purview however, in that by the 24th April all 8 squadrons of the Bomber Fleet had been successfully transferred to Marcus Island - the previous logistical problems having been entirely resolved by the massive expansion of fort and airbase.

The movement of aircraft did cause some minor hiccoughs in our operations, but nothing of great signifigance. The monthly tally was 12 losses, 13.8 FEU inflicted, and 18 enemy fighters downed.

We have been wondering for some time about the impact of our operations on the Home Islands, but this intelligence has been difficult to obtain. However, by the end of the month we received a glowing (if redacted) account from the Special Sub-Committee for Pacific Intelligence of the Committee of War. It paints us a picture of how our bombing campaign has forced the Japanese Empire to redirect nearly a full 75% of its industrial capacity merely to keep apace of repairs. This includes active political management. Thus whilst overall production is only minimally impacted Japanese industrial expansion has greatly reduced.

We shall bear this in mind.

Plans are afoot to try and seize the island of Iwo Jima even closer to Japan, but we must bide our time for the most appropriate moment.