John Quitman, former Governor of Mississippi and Hispaniola
John Quitman was not quite forty years old when he stepped ashore in Hispaniola. He was respected as a rising young Whig in Mississippi politics, having just completed a term as Acting Governor of Mississippi. With a Whig administration in the White House, a young and ambitious politician could expect to achieve great things.
Despite his New York birth and early legal career in Ohio, Quitman had moved south and west as many young men would, in search of fame and fortune. He established a law practice atop the river bluff in Natchez, Mississippi, and in only five years was elected to the state legislature. His time among the slave-owning planters of the Natchez elite may have changed him, but it is certain that by 1839 he had become a confirmed champion of slavery and the Southern way of life.
The Clay administration’s refusal to intervene in Texas had puzzled and then enraged him. Almost he resigned his post as governor to join the Texans himself, but at the last he confined himself to actively recruiting men, money and arms for the Texan army. Its eventual defeat by Mexico, and the humiliating peace that forbade owning slaves in Texas, convinced Quitman that the existence of the South would in time be endangered. If slavery could not expand to the west, he reasoned, it must go south instead. “We must make a dozen or more new states from the Caribbean islands,” he said, “and fill up Latin America with Southern men. By these new states we will enlarge the Union, and make it safe for ourselves and our property.”
Suiting actions to words, Quitman embarked on a speaking tour of the South. At every stop he was greeted with offers of money and promises of participation. When at last he gave the signal, almost a thousand young men converged upon the port of New Orleans and took passage on the two little ships chartered for the purpose.
His original targets were found unsuitable. The United States of Central America was enjoying a rare quiet moment of internal politics, and Cuba was ruled out because of reports of fevers there. Years of revolt, rebellion and invasion had led to rapid changes of control in Hispaniola, and Jean Pierre Boyer’s recent invasion and conquest of the eastern half of the island seemed to provide a pretext for intervention. The island nation was laboring under an immense indemnity owed to France, and the resulting repressive taxation left the population hostile to Boyer’s rule. After two days of discussion the matter was settled, and the little troop descended on the north coast of Haiti.
Seizing Cap-Haitien proved easy. Quitman established a mild rule and deceptively concealed his ultimate intentions while flying columns of lightly-equipped infantry marched overland. The Haitian troops were met and defeated piecemeal at Port-de-Paix and Gonaives, and President Boyer took ship to Jamaica rather than stay and rally the nation.
In the interim, President Clay had issued orders through the War Department, promoting Zachary Taylor to Brigadier General and authorizing him to detach troops from the Seminole War in Florida for the purpose of ‘returning the American citizens from Haiti and restoring the government’. In later years, Taylor would claim to have been given additional, purely verbal instructions from the Secretary of War. In any event, he loaded two brigades of troops at the little port of Tampa and set sail for Haiti.
Arriving to find Quitman’s men had tenuous control over perhaps one-third of the country, and with Boyer and principal officers of his government having fled, Taylor made common cause with Quitman and used his troops to secure the island for the new administration. By November a semblance of calm and order had been restored.
Not so in Washington, where President Clay reportedly erupted in frightful oaths when he heard the news. Calhoun, of course, brought out every weapon in his formidable political arsenal: Hispaniola must be annexed and brought in as a slave-holding state to balance the recent admission of Michigan. An open break with Calhoun would mean losing support of Southern Whigs; pro-expansion Democrats, already inflamed over the administration’s refusal to assist Texas, would have a field day with the issue. And, damningly, Taylor’s report blandly asserted that, in the absence of any Haitian government, the use of American troops to support the Quitman administration was the best that could be accomplished.
Clay recognized early on that he could not simply give back what was, in actuality, conquered territory. Popular opinion would not allow it, and there was no Haitian government to accept authority if he tried. A return to civil war would be the inevitable result. But he refused to be the dupe of Calhoun’s machinations – he could not, and retain any control over his own administration and party. Poinsett could be shuffled off to Georgia and Florida to supervise the Cherokee removal and the Seminole War; Taylor could relieve Patterson on the Sabine River. Dealing with Calhoun, and settling the ultimate fate of Haiti, thus remained as the principal problems of Clay’s last year in office.
With characteristic aplomb, Clay waited for the crisis to reach its climax before delivering his riposte. In his December 2nd, 1839 address to the joint houses of Congress the President laid out the bones of what would become yet another masterful compromise. Haiti was in fact no longer independent: very well. But having been ruled by dictators for generations, it was not quite ready to be a state. Let it then be administered as a territory, in trust for the future time at which the Haitians themselves might choose statehood or independence. Haiti was ‘conceived in liberty, in revolt against oppression, as were the United States’. Slavery had been outlawed in Haiti in 1804 and the results of French attempts to reimpose it were well known. Recent revolts around Santo Domingo were proof that slavery could not be reinstated without a large American army – an army, and an occupation, antithetical to American principles. Haiti must therefore keep its existing laws, and its status as a territory, rather than a state, would serve to maintain the balance of interests in the United States. Rather than become a new slave state, Clay intoned, Haiti would become a beacon for free blacks. He reminded Congress of his long commitment to the American Colonization Society. Rather than return slaves to Africa, he offered, let us bequeath them to the assistance and improvement of the people of Haiti.
Calhoun and the Southern Whigs and Democrats were outraged; rather than a new slave state added to their ranks Clay had endorsed an entire territory full of freed blacks! Northern Whigs were outraged in their turn at the deceit and naked ambition shown by Calhoun, Poinsett and Taylor, and were satisfied that Clay had dealt them a well-deserved setback. But the split in the party would not soon heal, and as Clay was pledged not to run for a second term the advantage in the upcoming elections lay squarely with the Democrats.