A question for ww2 Eastern Front buffs

[Jon Shafer]

Putting Rommel in control of 6th Army wouldn't have made a difference. The nature of the fighting was not suited to his style. The joke about him being a trickster VS a logistics wizard is actually somewhat accurate.

However, if you'd put Rommel in some of the upper echelon staff of Army Group South during the 1942 breakout, things could have been very different. I forget the specifics, but the staff of AGS managed to clog the offensive over the Dnieper when it wasn't necassary (forces could have been better used elsewhere), and a couple weeks were lost with those forces... forces that could have been driving on Stalingrad. Had they been re-directed, then Stalingrad would have been captured with no resistance. Instead the Soviets managed to put up a defense after their armies were destroyed in the Don river bend.

 

[Jon Shafer]

We can't be sure that the 6th Army would have been capable of breaking out anyways. The 1st Panzer Army was throroughly trounced upon by the Soviets in a fair amount of time, and the 48th Panzer Corps barely managed to hold off a great number of troops from breaking through to the Don and Rostov (cutting off 1st Pz Army and much of Army Group South with it). The situation was very desperate for all of Army Group South, not just the 6th Army. All of Army Group South was fighting for its existence, and it's a miracle that it didn't collapse entirely, and more then 6th Army was lost.

 

[Jon Shafer]

Von Manstein was probably the best commander the Germans ever had. He saved Army Group South (and maybe the entire eastern front) in early 1943... I'm sure he would have found some way to save 6th Army had he been given the authority (the higher up you are, the more influence Hitler had over them), but that would have caused a power vacuum on the entire front that might have cost the Germans even more than it did...

 

[Jon Shafer]

Actually, 6th Army tying up Soviet troops wasn't all that important. A few Soviet corps and armies were actually flung towards Rostov, and had they penetrated the lines and defeated the 48th Panzer Corps holding the area, then it would have been all over for Army Group South. It nearly didn't matter one bit had it not been for the amazing feats of the 48th.

 

[Jon Shafer]

Diverting between the Caucausus and Stalingrad was a bad idea... even worse is that the Caucausus was relatively meaningless (other than the oil, but the Soviets would do anything possible to hold onto it). The war would not be won in the Caucausus, and it's doubtful even the war on the southern front could be either.

 

[Jon Shafer]

I meant that strategically it was a nearly meaningless target to the the incredible cost of acquiring it. To get all the way to Baku would have required Germany to stretch its supply lines to the limit (which were already strained), and developed an even longer front (and we know what happened with the front being the length that it was... 1st Panzer Army was nearly destroyed), making the German forces in the Caucasus even more vulnerable than they were proved to be in the winter of '43.

 

[Jon Shafer]

Originally posted by madner
I don't know why most people assume that Kursk was a German defeat, most German panzer divisions fought on, while the Sovjets had to postpone they offensive and rebuil they tank corps.

Let's look at the numbers here:
At Kursk, the Germans had 900,000 men, 2,500 aircraft, 10,000 artillery pieces and 2,400 tanks. The Soviets had 1,350,000 men, 2,650 aircraft, 20,000 artillery pieces and nearly 4,000 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Losses for the battle were 120,000 men and over 1,500 tanks for Germany, while the Soviets only lost 200,000 casualties and over 1,500 tanks as well. The Soviets could easily replace these losses, as they had been all war. Germany could not.

In addition to the numbers lost, Germany had also lost the initiative, which it was never to regain. Before the battle Germany had one last chance to defeat the Soviets and win the war. Afterwards, they had neither the material nor the initiative to defeat the USSR.

Also, how decesive was Stalingrad? Sure they lost 300 000 men, but the Sovjets lost 420 000! Even more importment the German army was still able to mount successful offensives (see Kharkov).

Only 420,000? That's nothing to the Soviets. They lost 300,000 at Smolensk, 650,000 at Kiev, 240,000 in the Don River bend in the advance to Stalingrad, and these are just large battles... the Soviets lost millions and millions more total, and yet this didn't stop them from rebuilding their army quite easily, and making it much larger than it was before. Numbers were of no concern to the USSR. It was quite a bit different for Germany, who was already running out of manpower by 1943.
The only reason that Germany was able to launch the offensive at Kharkov was because of the brilliance of von Manstein. 1st Panzer Army with a further 350,000 troops in the Caucasus was nearly lost after Stalingrad, and the Soviets nearly reached the Dnieper before their winter offensive was over. Von Manstein allowed them to exhaust themselves driving for the Dnieper, then crushed them after reorganizing. This was due to Von Manstein's plan, not due to the Germans somehow having the ability to launch an offensive because they wanted to.

What truelly messed the German army was Bagration, that almost smashed army group Centar. Germany could have done much more in Afrika, the supply capacity was limited, this effectivly limited the size of the employed forces.

Actually, Bagration did smash Army Group Center. It also trapped Army Group North in the Baltic countries, which nearly didn't escape.

 

[Jon Shafer]

You'll see German tank losses for Kursk anywhere from 200 to 2000. Prohorovka was relatively successful, being that it was a tank VS tank battle. However, Soviet minefields, AT guns, artillery, you name it caused many many many more armor casualties than Soviet tanks did. That's why no one sends a bunch of tanks into well-prepared formations... they do very poorly.

As you said, 3 SS Panzer divisions were not rebuilt while the Soviets were. The SS divisions were the first divisions to get reinforced, and they were given the best men and material available. When they don't get anything, you know the Germans are in trouble...

The Soviets were known for massive attacks that have no concern for losses... they continue their attacks until their manpower is exhausted.

The Germans may not have reached full production until 1943 (1944 really), but the Soviet industry was surpassing that of the Germans, and Germany had to fight 3 major powers, not just 1 like the Soviets. Even if the Soviets took twice as many, or even three times as many casualties as the Germans, they would be in a much better position than the Germans were... Germany was simply running out of manpower, and its enemies were growing too fast in the amount of material they had.

 

[Jon Shafer]

Hitler usually refused to allow any formations retreat. It was only through miracles that Hitler allowed von Manstein to retreat to the Dnieper in early 1943, which saved the German southern flank. After Kursk the Germans were firmly driven back to the Dnieper, and didn't have the strength to do any more than delay the Soviet offensives. After Kursk, most formations were mere shells of what they'd been in the Spring of 1943. If the Germans had pulled back every division that needed to be reinforced, they wouldn't have a front... instead they were withdrawn slowly, trying to keep intact, retreating to the Dnieper. The Germans had simply lost too many men and tanks at Kursk for them to be able to simply withdraw large formations behind the lines for reinforcement. Sure they weren't left in the direct front line when possible, but they weren't brought back 50 miles and returned to full strength, either.