A Nazi Superweapon - the "Elektroboot"

[Antediluvian Monster]

Calculating and doing the math for a torpedo attack - it’s easy to pause a game and do the geometry on the computer screen, but on which pad captain or officers drew their lines and angles?

There is a navigational plot somewhere on the sub which is used to track own ship and designated targets. There are various instruments and charts to help with the task, as well as transmitters for ranges and bearings. This was quite important job and closely tied with accurate estimates of target's course and speed. I belive some submarine captains preferred to work here.

Torpedo Data Computer - how does this thing work? Manually input the critical values, flip the swich and you just get the correct answer or what?

The inputs concerning own ship were automatic (i.e. had automatic follow-up). Target information (course, speed, bearing, range and length) was inputted manually. On US subs this resulted in a continuous generated solution that predicted where the target was in relation to own ship at any given time, provided the target kept stable course and speed (the sub itself could change course and speed, or dive deeper, without ruining the solution). The prediction of the generated solution was visually indicated and could be compared with subsequent observations of the target, thereby forming a feedback loop. The information on relative position was then fed into an angle solver which converted it into torpedo gyro angles needed to actually hit the target, this was then set into the torpedos. Both of these were automatic and continuous, so the torpedos were theoretically ready to fire at any time.

Other navies' torpedo fire control instruments were somewhat more rudimentary. They universally lacked the feature of the continuously generated solution and instead worked in the moment. If the relative position changed, the inputs of the computer had to be altered. They also lacked the feedback loop between prediction and observation. Some of them (Japanese in particular) probably had less or no automatic follow-ups.

While the US system in particular was quite advanced, submarine fire-control problem was still comparatively difficult due slow speed and limited availability of the ordnance and relatively slim sensor suite.

 

[Rubidium]

@Kovax

Spain was approached by Germany on the subject of an alliance and the capture of Gibraltar was discussed. Franco reeled off a massive list of resources he would need if he cut relations with the Allies and the idea was abandoned. It's another of those ideas that look great until you factor in logistics. And then, too, the Spanish Army was a lot worse off than even the Italian, so the value of a Spanish Axis is questionable.

Yeah, Franco was no idiot, and had just gone through a half-decade of nasty civil war that had devastated his country. Republican guerillas were still operating, he was still consolidating political power and he couldn't feed his people/supply his army without access to the international market. Gibraltar and a few colonies wouldn't be enough of a bribe to take Spain back to war and risk upsetting the apple cart.

He had a good thing going for him, and there is nothing either side could offer him to risk that. Which is why every other fascist dictator ended up shot by 1945, whereas he ended up dying in bed in 1976.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Be it the Type XXI U-Boat, the Pzkpwf V "Panther" or the Me 262 "Schwalbe".

All of these have in common that they are superior to their respective counterparts from other armed forces of their time. All of them are or were considered the transition between "late war" and "modern" equipment in their respective area. And many were "the first". The first submarine for long term operations while being submerged, the first (proto-)MBT, the first operational jet fighter.*

Woah there cowboy. Not even with all the salt in Salzburg can this be taken without any form of disagreement.

There is a good reason why the allies didn't develop a lot of the technological advantages of submarines and that is because they didn't need them in the same way that Germany did. Principally, the Royal Navy was fully able to prevent the convoys from being useful and was strong enough to operate on the surface in the numbers necessary to do this. As for the USA (and to an extent British) in the Pacafic, Japan had no really effective anti-submarine capability (certainly not as effective as the Allied one). Further, it is important to consider that Germany was forced to innovate in their submarine technology due to the overwhelming advantage given by the Allied anti-submarine technology and doctrine.

As for tanks - the Panther is a great prototype but it was a prototype that was rushed into service without the technology development necessary to iron out the bugs. The TRL scale would be an interesting friend here - if you consider that many of the design features were proposed, approved and then put into mass production, you end up with a Panther. A great tank on paper, but one that doesn't quite work. What is quite telling here, is that the tank really began its life as a serious design in 1941, was prototyped in September 1942 and only 4 months later was put into mass production and operationally deployed (four months from prototype to operational deployment ... Jan 1943). Compare this to the British Comet Tank (which probably is the closest to a WW2 MBT) was first prototyped in Feb 1944, was not in production until September 1944 (50% longer prototyping) and then not deployed operationall until December 1944. It should also be noted that this was relatively fast for Britain. I am also sure that people could look at the USSR/USA in the same light (I am just familiar with the British picture).

As for the Me262 ... I would like to introduce you to its more reliable cousin the Glostor Meteor. While not as operationally apparent (the Allies didn't need a Jet Fighter in 1944 as the Luftwaffe had already been effectively destroyed as a fighting force when these fighters existed. The Me262 was again, plagued by design problems due to rushing from the drawing board, to prototype and onto the operational deployment.

So no, contemporary German technology didn't outperform allied technology, the Germans did have a tendency to deploy prototypes while the Allied powers were still developing their own prototypes. This has more to do with putting an architect in charge of the armaments industry as opposed to somebody more qualified.

 

[bz249]

So no, contemporary German technology didn't outperform allied technology, the Germans did have a tendency to deploy prototypes while the Allied powers were still developing their own prototypes. This has more to do with putting an architect in charge of the armaments industry as opposed to somebody more qualified.

I guess it has more to do with two facts:
- the trendline has said that Germany is going to lose the war unless some miracle happens... and while those half-cooked prototypes were unlikely to be miracles at least they had the Epsilon chance for that (unlike the proven ones which contributed to the trendline)
- the proven designs were anyway older and smaller than their Allied version and achieved whatever was possible in "facelift" (like PzIVF2 conversion)

 

[Easy-Kill]

However, the Type XII was very hard to detect while submerged as being much more quiet that the earlier U-Boots. XIIs were also equipped with a creep motor, particularly used when silent running was necessary. Furthermore, the ability to run at much higher speed than its predecessors while submerged made the Type XII much more difficult to pursue and destroy for the Allied escort vessels.

Sorry if this sounds harsh, but I call BS. What do you base this statement on other than to make it up in an effort to prove your point? The thing about stealth isn that it isn't actually very stealthy - it trades a lower probability of detection across a lot of angles against a higher probability of detection at a limited subset of angles. This means that you need to 'stalk' the target by pursuing a trajectory which avoids exposing your highly detectable areas to the adversary. This is easily achievable against small flotillas of ships - the unverified HMS Norfolk incident, but as soon as the flotilla expands, your angles of approach vary greatly. A convoy will have a number escorts providing picket duty. The idea of a 'stealth sub' zipping in and around escorts unleashing explosive hell is pure fantasy. This is even more so in the deep ocean where the submarine is unable to 'hide' in the clutter caused by the sea bed.

Yes, the ability to run on batteries reduced the probability of detection. Yes the streamlining of the hull reduced the probability of detection. No, it didn't eliminate the probability of detection and it may just force the allies to innovate further to counter the threat.

So unless you give the Nazis late 20th century submarines in numbers sufficient to destroy entire convoys, I don't think that the Type XXI will have any real impact on the war.

 

[Easy-Kill]

I guess it has more to do with two facts:
- the trendline has said that Germany is going to lose the war unless some miracle happens... and while those half-cooked prototypes were unlikely to be miracles at least they had the Epsilon chance for that (unlike the proven ones which contributed to the trendline)
- the proven designs were anyway older and smaller than their Allied version and achieved whatever was possible in "facelift" (like PzIVF2 conversion)

This is of corse a good point. But rushing prototypes into production does not make the technology more advanced or better. The time scales are also pretty impressive - as an example, modern vehicles are under development for years before seeing the light of day.

 

[Jopa79]

Sorry if this sounds harsh, but I call BS. What do you base this statement on other than to make it up in an effort to prove your point? The thing about stealth isn that it isn't actually very stealthy - it trades a lower probability of detection across a lot of angles against a higher probability of detection at a limited subset of angles. This means that you need to 'stalk' the target by pursuing a trajectory which avoids exposing your highly detectable areas to the adversary. This is easily achievable against small flotillas of ships - the unverified HMS Norfolk incident, but as soon as the flotilla expands, your angles of approach vary greatly. A convoy will have a number escorts providing picket duty. The idea of a 'stealth sub' zipping in and around escorts unleashing explosive hell is pure fantasy. This is even more so in the deep ocean where the submarine is unable to 'hide' in the clutter caused by the sea bed.

Stealth ability or remaining stealthy considering U-Boots during the WWII is not only limited at the submarines "sneaking" into attacking position, or remaining as stealthy after the attack, escaping the surface escort detection and sonar. Bay of Biscay was called as the Valley of Death due to the dreadful U-Boot losses at the bay inflicted by the Allied air-coverage over the area. The enormous underwater range compared to the older U-Boot types enabled the Type XXI to submerge far beyond Bay of Biscay while starting the patrol from the French bases. Hence, the Type XXI could avoid the Allied air-coverage and start the voyage remaining its stealth.

The HMS Norfolk incident is not unverified. The event is recorder for instance in The Royal Navy and Anti-submarine Warfare 1917-1949 by Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones. And why would Adalbert Schnee and his crew lie about it. But I'm not talking about this certain incident further due to my feeling that you're absolute in this matter and discussing of it only leads to a never-ending argument.

Being stealthy not only means hiding and remaining in cover. The Type XXI's ability to "sprint" (to accelerate and achieve top speed) while submerged also is a share of the stealth ability. The previous U-Boots had to surface if they liked of trying a top-speed run against a convoy. The Type XXI was able to reach top-speed submerged, attack and then switch to silent running - to 7 knots, which was the top-speed of the earlier Type VII.

Yes, the ability to run on batteries reduced the probability of detection. Yes the streamlining of the hull reduced the probability of detection. No, it didn't eliminate the probability of detection and it may just force the allies to innovate further to counter the threat.

Let's say that a wolfpack of multiple Type XIIs have completed a convoy attack submerged and are now being encountered by the Allied surface vessels. XII's are maneuvering and evading the depth charges in silent running with 7 knots-speed and doing the "sprint" at 20 knots-speed. The XXIs are much more faster and may change their position much more quickly than the older U-Boots with a silent running speed of 1-3 knots and a top-speed of 7 knots. I would say that the XXIs are very stealthy comparing in the VIIs.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

@Kovax - Opinions as to whether the Sherman needed replacement varied, pretty much by rank. Higher echelons agreed that it would do the job for as long as the war was expected to last; the troops on the ground, however, strongly disagreed. Opinions were almost irrelevant in the face of two facts: the US did not have a working model replacement ready to go, and transport capacity could handle (I think I remember) four or five Shermans to two of the proposed replacement.

And you are exactly right: the Sherman was capable of being improved, and was steadily improved to the end of the war. As much maligned as it sometimes was, it was 'good enough'.

@Graf Zeppelin - I agree, but I would expand on that. What became relevant was that, if it took 5 Shermans to kill a German tank, the Allies had five Shermans, in the field, fueled, armed and repaired. All of the Allied armies learned about AT weapons in a very hard German-speaking school. The lessons were expensive and painful, but they did learn. British, Soviet, American and German doctrines are very different - but properly used and supported, they all work.

@Jopa79 - the fire control computers in US subs were among the most complex analog computers ever built. I don't have information on other navies but I assume the German and British fire control computers were very good. Variables were entered - often by expert guesswork - and handles were cranked to produce a continually updated solution as the sub readied its firing. Usually the Exec ran the FC plot while the Captain ran the periscope. The more correct data points they could get, the better the solution and the greater the risk of detection.

Spain was approached by Germany on the subject of an alliance and the capture of Gibraltar was discussed. Franco reeled off a massive list of resources he would need if he cut relations with the Allies and the idea was abandoned. It's another of those ideas that look great until you factor in logistics. And then, too, the Spanish Army was a lot worse off than even the Italian, so the value of a Spanish Axis is questionable.

As far as environmental impact... it was negligible. The oceans are incredibly vast...

Have you ever seen the massive cave used to supply U-boats up in Vigo "allegedly"? The thing is massive with huge blast doors to hold torpedoes and designed to quickly allow submarines to be resupplied offshore.

Or Winter's U-boat supply base down in the Canary Islands?

Franco might not have been an active particpant during the war, but the Nazis never had a better friend. Especially after the war when they could walk about with impunity.

 

[Jopa79]

Or Winter's U-boat supply base down in the Canary Islands?

Here it is - Gustav Winter's Villa Winter in Fuerteventura. Had a turret and an electric lantern to signal U-Boots in the radius

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

View attachment 577889
Here it is - Gustav Winter's Villa Winter in Fuerteventura. Had a turret and an electric lantern to signal U-Boots in the radius

Because no one in his right might would ever build that house that high up on a hill.

Unless . . . . .

 

[Easy-Kill]

Stealth ability or remaining stealthy considering U-Boots during the WWII is not only limited at the submarines "sneaking" into attacking position, or remaining as stealthy after the attack, escaping the surface escort detection and sonar. Bay of Biscay was called as the Valley of Death due to the dreadful U-Boot losses at the bay inflicted by the Allied air-coverage over the area. The enormous underwater range compared to the older U-Boot types enabled the Type XXI to submerge far beyond Bay of Biscay while starting the patrol from the French bases. Hence, the Type XXI could avoid the Allied air-coverage and start the voyage remaining its stealth.

Again, I am going to call you out for making things up.

Yes, the the Bay of Biscay was called the valley of death, but that doesn't make it rightly so. If I read the statistics correctly, 69 submarines were lost in the bay of Biscay - out of total losses of 784. So a tiny tiny portion of them were lost ... <10%. The ability to transit the Bay of Biscay was not a war winning weapon. That is, getting 69 more subs into the Atlantic isn't going to change the price of fish. Assuming Uboat net is correct - https://uboat.net/maps/biscay.htm

You also need to take into account that the allies could also spot uboats, either when they are shallow submerged, or using other technologies like microwave radar for periscope detection (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1003753.pdf) or the sonobuoy technology, or the mark I eyeball. The thing is, all the alterations did was to reduce the likelihood of detection, they didn't limit it entirely. The entire submarine war was about measure, counter-measure, counter-counter-measure and the allies proved time and again to tbe the technological and doctrinal leaders in this field.

If you are interested in learning more about why the allies were effective in the Bay of Biscay - this would be an interesting read:
Developing an Agent-Based Modeling Veri cation and Validation Approach for Improving Air Force Analytical Support by Brian L. Heath and Raymond R. Hill

[PDF] Developing an Agent-Based Modeling Veri cation and Validation Approach for Improving Air Force Analytical Support | Semantic Scholar

This project examined the agent-based modeling problem from a historical, first principles perspective, examines the basic philosophies of model validation, develops and presents via a case study an initial agent- based modeling developmental methodology more amenable to validation (or rather...

www.semanticscholar.org

The HMS Norfolk incident is not unverified. The event is recorder for instance in The Royal Navy and Anti-submarine Warfare 1917-1949 by Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones. And why would Adalbert Schnee and his crew lie about it. But I'm not talking about this certain incident further due to my feeling that you're absolute in this matter and discussing of it only leads to a never-ending argument.

And of course von Manstein wrote about how his victories were stolen by Hitler, senior Wehrmacht commanders claimed they knew nothing of the death squads and Goering claimed that he didn't like to dress up like to call himself Gertrud at the weekends and have Luftwaffe aces urinate on him for pleasure. Just because somebody writes about it ... we should of course believe these things, because they wrote it down ... in a book. Regardless, of the truth of the matter, the war had been won, the Germans had completely and unequivocally surrendered, what is more likely is that Norfolk wasn't actively searching for a submarine in the same way that dedicated ASW ships protecting an Atlantic Convoy was. It makes a great story for 'Hitlers phantom wonderwaffles' but doesn't bear up to much scrutiny.

Being stealthy not only means hiding and remaining in cover. The Type XXI's ability to "sprint" (to accelerate and achieve top speed) while submerged also is a share of the stealth ability. The previous U-Boots had to surface if they liked of trying a top-speed run against a convoy. The Type XXI was able to reach top-speed submerged, attack and then switch to silent running - to 7 knots, which was the top-speed of the earlier Type VII.

Firstly, these uboats were emphatically not stealthy. They were not able to avoid detection like the B2 or F117, Germany had limited understanding of Allied SONAR/ASDIC and the UBOATS did not have sensors capable of blindly plotting the course necessary to present the lowest SONAR cross section to the escorting ASW escorts. We can sit here and make up imaginary engagement scenarios all we like. There is also no such thing as 'silent' running particularly not in WW2. Please stop making stuff up. If you would like to read more on the topic, I would recommend:

- The Principals of Underwater Sound (which discusses some concepts inherent to WW2) - https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/200786.pdf
- The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, Discussions and Arguments by E.V. Miasnikov. Appendix A specifically outlines the noise made by post-war soviet submarines (Hint - Russia had some German Type XXI to study). Turns out them bad boys are noisier than Slavic Hard Bass! http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/snf0322.htm and http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/snf0322.htm.

Let's say that a wolfpack of multiple Type XIIs have completed a convoy attack submerged and are now being encountered by the Allied surface vessels. XII's are maneuvering and evading the depth charges in silent running with 7 knots-speed and doing the "sprint" at 20 knots-speed. The XXIs are much more faster and may change their position much more quickly than the older U-Boots with a silent running speed of 1-3 knots and a top-speed of 7 knots. I would say that the XXIs are very stealthy comparing in the VIIs.

Again ... no such thing as silent running. And again, the existing U-boats were absolutely inefective ... making them less detectable, a bit faster and a bit quieter does not change the price of fish. They would need to launch more attacks by an order of magnitude to have any meaningful effect. And the simple fact is, they couldn't carry enough torpedos to realise this.

 

[Jopa79]

Again, I am going to call you out for making things up.

Yes, the the Bay of Biscay was called the valley of death, but that doesn't make it rightly so. If I read the statistics correctly, 69 submarines were lost in the bay of Biscay - out of total losses of 784. So a tiny tiny portion of them were lost ... <10%. The ability to transit the Bay of Biscay was not a war winning weapon. That is, getting 69 more subs into the Atlantic isn't going to change the price of fish. Assuming Uboat net is correct - https://uboat.net/maps/biscay.htm

You also need to take into account that the allies could also spot uboats, either when they are shallow submerged, or using other technologies like microwave radar for periscope detection (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1003753.pdf) or the sonobuoy technology, or the mark I eyeball. The thing is, all the detections did was to reduce the likelihood of detection, they didn't limit it entirely. The entire submarine war was about measure, counter-measure, counter-counter-measure and the allies proved time and again to tbe the technological and doctrinal leaders in this field.

If you are interested in learning more about why the allies were effective in the Bay of Biscay - this would be an interesting read:
Developing an Agent-Based Modeling Veri cation and Validation Approach for Improving Air Force Analytical Support by Brian L. Heath and Raymond R. Hill

[PDF] Developing an Agent-Based Modeling Veri cation and Validation Approach for Improving Air Force Analytical Support | Semantic Scholar

This project examined the agent-based modeling problem from a historical, first principles perspective, examines the basic philosophies of model validation, develops and presents via a case study an initial agent- based modeling developmental methodology more amenable to validation (or rather...

www.semanticscholar.org

And of course von Manstein wrote about how his victories were stolen by Hitler, senior Wehrmacht commanders claimed they knew nothing of the death squads and Goering claimed that he didn't like to dress up like to call himself Gertrud at the weekends and have Luftwaffe aces urinate on him for pleasure. Just because somebody writes about it ... we should of course believe these things, because they wrote it down ... in a book. Regardless, of the truth of the matter, the war had been won, the Germans had completely and unequivocally surrendered, what is more likely is that Norfolk wasn't actively searching for a submarine in the same way that dedicated ASW ships protecting an Atlantic Convoy was. It makes a great story for 'Hitlers phantom wonderwaffles' but doesn't bear up to much scrutiny.


Firstly, these uboats were emphatically not stealthy. They were not able to avoid detection like the B2 or F117, Germany had limited understanding of Allied SONAR/ASDIC and the UBOATS did not have sensors capable of blindly plotting the course necessary to present the lowest SONAR cross section to the escorting ASW escorts. We can sit here and make up imaginary engagement scenarios all we like. There is also no such thing as 'silent' running particularly not in WW2. Please stop making stuff up. If you would like to read more on the topic, I would recommend:

- The Principals of Underwater Sound (which discusses some concepts inherent to WW2) - https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/200786.pdf
- The Future of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, Discussions and Arguments by E.V. Miasnikov. Appendix A specifically outlines the noise made by post-war soviet submarines (Hint - Russia had some German Type XXI to study). Turns out them bad boys are noisier than Slavic Hard Bass! http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/snf0322.htm and http://www.armscontrol.ru/subs/snf/snf0322.htm.



Again ... no such thing as silent running. And again, the old U-boats were absolutely inefective ... making them less detectable, a bit faster and a bit quieter does not change the price of fish. They would need to launch more attacks by an order of magnitude to have any meaningful effect. And the simple fact is, they couldn't carry enough torpedos to realise this.

Yes, I'm a fraud.

 

[Jopa79]

Again, I am going to call you out for making things up.

A serious accusation and also a false one. Everything I publish or I maintain here is based on something I've studied or read from somewhere.

I'm deeply injured about your allegation, calling me making things up. But I'm also deeply grieved when I must say now, that in the future I'm going to ignore you.

I'm sorry.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Everything I publish or I maintain here is based on something I've studied or read from somewhere.

So prove it and I will apologise with all due humility. You asked something, you made a bold statement and I showed where I believed you to be fanciful in your statement. If you have some basis based on what you have read or studied ... Justify it. The basis of study isn't to repeat but to critically analyse and form an opinion.

For example, I don't believe that the type xxi ran silently. I don't have exact numbers to prove this, but I can show you a modern assessment as to the silence (or rather lack of silence) of later generation (i.e. more advanced and likely more silent) Soviet submarines. This critical analysis leads me to believe that you are making up the idea of a nazi wunderwaffle with silent running.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

And of course von Manstein wrote about how his victories were stolen by Hitler, senior Wehrmacht commanders claimed they knew nothing of the death squads and Goering claimed that he didn't like to dress up like to call himself Gertrud at the weekends and have Luftwaffe aces urinate on him for pleasure.

The only person I have ever heard make this claim is Eddie Izzard. If you have another source that Hermann Meyer - the drug-addled art-thief who never expected to see Allied fighters over Berlin - was given to such proclivities, I would like to hear them. I wouldn't be surprised, I simply do not know. Or are you using this as a 'someone said it so it must be true' example? I am curious.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

A serious accusation and also a false one. Everything I publish or I maintain here is based on something I've studied or read from somewhere.

I'm deeply injured about your allegation, calling me making things up. But I'm also deeply grieved when I must say now, that in the future I'm going to ignore you.

I'm sorry.

So prove it and I will apologise with all due humility. You asked something, you made a bold statement and I showed where I believed you to be fanciful in your statement. If you have some basis based on what you have read or studied ... Justify it. The basis of study isn't to repeat but to critically analyse and form an opinion.

For example, I don't believe that the type xxi ran silently. I don't have exact numbers to prove this, but I can show you a modern assessment as to the silence (or rather lack of silence) of later generation (i.e. more advanced and likely more silent) Soviet submarines. This critical analysis leads me to believe that you are making up the idea of a nazi wunderwaffle with silent running.

I have been around you both and like you both, I would say this is a difference of choice of language and understanding. Not EZK calling you a liar, not saying Jopa made things up - both of you take two steps back, take a deep breath, then try again.

Example: Jopa is FInnish and English is not his first language, his use of 'stealthy' and 'silent running' are him using terms he understands - not forcing 1040s tech into 21st century standards. Every submarine force has a version of 'silent running', but Run Silent Run Deep gets better and better and the dog that drives this technology is the US navy.

Just a friendly suggestion, take it for what it is worth.

 

[Dinglehoff]

The only person I have ever heard make this claim is Eddie Izzard. If you have another source that Hermann Meyer - the drug-addled art-thief who never expected to see Allied fighters over Berlin - was given to such proclivities, I would like to hear them. I wouldn't be surprised, I simply do not know. Or are you using this as a 'someone said it so it must be true' example? I am curious.

This Meyer thing must be some kind of inside joke. Do you know what that's about?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

This Meyer thing must be some kind of inside joke. Do you know what that's about?

Goring once said if Allied fighters entered Berlin's airspace you could call him Meyer.

Hermann Meyer is even a quote inside HOI4, rather well known.

The cross dressing thing I've only heard from Eddie Izzard and can't find it elsewhere, and while he can be very humorous I'm not taking historical tidbits from his tray.

 

[Dinglehoff]

Goring once said if Allied fighters entered Berlin's airspace you could call him Meyer.

Hermann Meyer is even a quote inside HOI4, rather well known.

The cross dressing thing I've only heard from Eddie Izzard and can't find it elsewhere, and while he can be very humorous I'm not taking historical tidbits from his tray.

OK but who is Meyer and why is he the butt of the joke?

I've heard of Kurt Meyer being ridiculed for being stupid, but I wouldn't think it's him.

 

[bz249]

OK but who is Meyer and why is he the butt of the joke?

I've heard of Kurt Meyer being ridiculed for being stupid, but I wouldn't think it's him.

John Doe/Smith depending on your choice. Müller und Meyer representing the boring orthonormal citizen.