When news arrived of Richmond’s fall, the North erupted in celebration. Even in New York, the home of ‘Copperhead’ anti-war sentiment, a carnival atmosphere reigned in the spring of 1862. President Lincoln and his Cabinet were less jocular. They too had assumed, had hoped, that the occupation of Virginia would gut the Confederate will to fight. However it was now clear the Southern leadership intended to bleed the Union Army, only total victory would bring the rebels to heel. General Winfield Scott, hero of 1812 and the Mexican War, had drawn up a strategy for the slow strangulation of the south; the Anaconda Plan. Scott had been given command of the Union war effort in June 1861 but the disaster at First Manassas and worries about the old man’s ability to lead had seen him replaced [1]. Now that the knockout blow had failed the Union would go for the throat. Anaconda required the total blockade of the Confederate coastline to deny the rebels money from cotton exports. In this the rebels had obliged the Union, burning vast bundles of the crop in an effort to drive up prices, forcing Britain and France to intervene in the war. Sadly for the South, alternate supplies from Egypt and India were readily available and the fall of Richmond had removed any chance of European assistance [2]. By the time they realised their mistake, the Union blockade was already in place. Part two of the plan called for the bisection of the Confederacy with the occupation of the Mississippi River, the heart of Southern trade, travel and communication.
Amos Morgan, in command of the Army of the Missouri was to march upriver and had tentatively begun so in late February. The far riskier venture was the march downriver, which required the capture of New Orleans. Major General Nathaniel Farnsworth, A Democratic Party lawyer and state legislator from Massachusetts had been given command of land forces for the coming invasion. Totally lacking in military experience, Farnsworth had won the command due to his astute political manoeuvres. He was prescient in raising the Massachusetts militia before the beginning of hostilities and his quick march on Maryland had secured the state for the Union in the early days of the war. Prior to the attack he had commanded garrison troops near Washington and had made the crucial decision to treat Southern slaves as ‘contraband of war’. This act, in effect liberating slaves whilst avoiding the legal ramifications would have a profound impact on the later Union war effort and Reconstruction [3]. Despite Farnsworth’s inexperience, the onus would be on his naval colleague David G. Farragut to breach the forts around New Orleans. Farragut’s strategy was simple; he would charge past the heavy guns at the mouth of the river, the Head of Passes. Beyond lay only rudimentary positions designed to repel infantry and were guarded by only 3,000 Louisiana militiamen.
Farragut attacked on February 25th. The sinking of the USS Brandywine almost blocked the approach to New Orleans but Farragut’s flagship, the steam frigate USS Minnesota was able to barge past the sinking hulk and clear the way. As Farragut had planned, the circumvention of the forts left the defenders in a hopeless position. Major General Mansfield Lovell, to the anger of President Davis, ordered his troops to evacuate the city. The next day Farnsworth began his occupation. The fall of New Orleans, the largest and wealthiest city in the South, was a terrible blow to the Confederacy. However it did little to effect the immediate situation. Farnsworth had only 15,000 men at his command, all of whom were needed to keep the restless population under control and prepare for the assumed counter-attack while the rebels simply did not have the manpower to launch such an assault [4]. Union plans were reliant on Morgan to march south towards New Orleans, however he was having trouble.
‘Granny Lee’, now charged with the defence of Mississippi had quickly blunted Morgan’s advance in March and begun his own attack north. At Malden the Union army was smashed and Lee soon capitalised, hoping to seize Chicago and reach the Great Lakes to provide the Confederacy with a much needed victory. Simultaneously his friend and fellow exile Jackson had crossed into Kentucky. Missouri and Kentucky were home to substantial Southern sympathies. The former had almost fallen to rebel gangs before Morgan had arrived in force, leaving many of the border counties effectively under military occupation. The latter had seen more nuanced power play. Governor Magoffin a slave-owning Southern Democrat had been in deadlock with the staunchly Unionist state assembly for some six months. The assembly had denied Magoffin’s request for a popular vote on secession, fearful of the result. Eventually a unilateral declaration of neutrality had been made by the Bluegrass State, a compromise that pleased no one. While the fighting had focused on Virginia and the hope of a knockout blow, both sides had treaded carefully, not wanting to push Kentucky into the enemy camp. By March 1862 that state of affairs was redundant. Jackson saw the state as ripe for the taking, and anticipated public support for his move, which in turn meant fresh bodies for his army [5].
It would not turn out so clean cut. While Kentucky had declared neutrality, both factions had been preparing troops for the possibility of invasion. Magoffin controlled the official State Guard and had used his influence to ‘purify’ it into a stolidly Confederate force. The state assembly meanwhile had been forming ad-hoc ‘Home Guard’ units on a county level. Though fewer in number, the Home Guard were concentrated in the north of the state and well supplied by Union agents across the Ohio River. As such Jackson rather than liberating Kentucky inadvertently triggered a localised civil war. The State Guard proved unwilling to leave their homes, fearful of Unionist raiders. Few civilians, perhaps put off by the news from Huntington and Staunton, answered Jackson’s call for men either, leaving whole wagons of rifles and uniforms untouched. Undeterred Jackson blitzed north, defeating two small Union corps sent to challenge him at Lexington on March 18th. However as they entered territory loyal to the North, the Confederates were forced to deal with constant guerrilla attacks. Forced to send numerous regiments to engage the Unionists behind his lines, Jackson was greatly outnumbered when confronted by Major General Ambrose Young at Louisville on April 2nd.
The hastily constructed Army of the Ohio numbered over 33,000 men compared to Jackson’s 13,000. Lacking in experience, the fresh conscripts and their equally fresh commander barrelled forward confident of victory. Just like at First Staunton, the rebel cavalry ran rings around their opponents, leading entire brigades of draftees into carefully planned killing zones. Ultimately sheer numbers forced Jackson to withdraw but only at the cost of 10,000 causalities. It was another bloody day for the Union and Jackson would spend the next month leading Young by the nose, sending outriders as far north as Cleveland, Ohio and inflicting a further 10,000 casualties before Washington finally dismissed their general, replacing him with Jackson’s old nemesis, Alexander Clemens. Further west, after being pushed back into Illinois by Lee, Morgan had been replaced Ulysses S. Grant. A former career soldier booted out for drinking, Grant craved the rigid military life and was a keen strategist. Unlike other Northern generals Grant understood were the Union’s strengths lay, manpower and firepower. Following an indecisive engagement at Malden in April, Grant asked for every conscript raised west of the Mississippi. With the focus in the East now on anti-partisan activities and Lee possibly within reach of bisecting the Union, Washington granted the request. As Grant slowly built up his forces he kept Lee occupied with numerous small-scale engagements, trying to pin him down.
On May 7th, the Army of the Missouri finally cornered Lee near Carbondale, a major coal town and the transportation hub of southern Illinois. Outnumbering his foe 2-to-1, Grant progressively squeezed Lee’s position. The Confederates had set up a series of trenches and fortifications in the hills and within the town itself. Over the course of seven days the area was scene to some of the most brutal close-quarter fighting of the war. On May 14th Lee was forced to admit defeat. Almost 35,000 men lay dead or wounded the majority of them Northerners. However while Lee’s invasion had been broken, the crème of his Virginians dead, the Army of the Missouri quickly recouped their losses with fresh conscripts. Seizing his moment, Grant sent 20,000 men south under Sherman to close off the lower of the Mississippi River. Meanwhile he harried Lee, pushing him west into the Indian Territory, away from the focus of the war. At the same time Farnsworth, now reinforced with several brigades, began marching north in June to link up with Sherman. The much vaunted river forts fell one by one to Union gunboats and with Lee on the run and Jackson reeling many wondered how long the secessionists could hold out.
[1] Basically all OTL plus he was a Virginian(!)
[2] The South pursued a commerce war strategy without taking rival markets into account… this is OTL
[3] Farnsworth is more than a game generated leader; he is my ersatz Benjamin Butler. Butler was such a ‘dynamic’ figure it would be a shame to miss out plus several of my generals will move into politics post-war and I plan on using ‘I can’t believe it’s not Butler’ quite a bit.
[4] Poor AI mimicking real life.
[5] This is all basically all OTL except it was the Union that ‘invaded’ Kentucky first.