III. The Fumbling of Ephron
Aratus’ death was sudden, but it did not leave a power vacuum. His grandson, Ephron, was 17 years of age and had been recognized as his grandfather’s official successor by everyone in the palace. He was a man of high finesse, but cold and distant, and with a complete ineptitude at all things martial.
Perhaps that was why the war with Pontus dragged on for over three years, depleting the League’s manpower reserve with no territorial gains made by either side. Uprisings in Cyrene and Crimaea were put down violently, while a crisis in Illyria prompted Ephron to join Macedonia and the Seleucid Empire in a war against Illyria, even though the latter paid tribute to the League. Even after lavish sacrifices, the League didn’t regain its lost stability. Ephron’s diplomatic skill was widely acknowledged when the Illyrian War ended with no territorial gains for Macedon or the Seleucids, neither the complete annexation of Illyria, which would have furthered Seleucid designs in the region.
This, however, angered the Macedonians, and put strain on their alliance with the Achaean League. The end of the Second Pontic War, together with the repelling of a barbarian horde from Crimaea, left the Achaean League depleted of recruits. It would take years for the population to recover from all those senseless losses. Meanwhile, the Macedonian-Seleucid alliance was more powerful than ever while Egypt, the traditional check to Seleucid expansion, was fragmenting.
The Achaean League was left with only two dependable allies – Bithynia, which was also recovering from the bloody war with Pontus, and tiny Rhodes. The following years would be dangerous, and Ephron would have to tread lightly on the world stage.
In June 558AVC Thracia declared independence from Macedonia. The Achaean League, honouring its alliance, rushed in an army to assist in quelling the rebellion. However, the Macedonian king, Antigonus, was less than grateful for the assistance, even though he was the one who requested it. The Achaean army was told to depart as soon as the Macedonian army had the situation under control, and the abruptness of the situation revealed a growing diplomatic iciness between the kingdom and the dictatorship. That iciness was a prelude to Antigonus’ cancelling of the alliance with Ephron and a declaration of war, on 7 December 558AVC.
The Achaean League had not yet recovered from its previous wars. Although its standing army was large, there were fewer than 10,000 men in reserve and, although Macedonian arms could not endanger Ephron’s dictatorship, the Seleucid Empire was quick to join the Macedonian side. Ephron, being untrained in matters of war, preferred to delegate all tactical matters to his generals, but the Achaean armies were scattered from Crimaea to Egypt, and the Seleucid navy made the seas dangerous for transport. It was decided to divide the mainland army into two parts. One would push north into Macedonia, to attempt to draw the war to a quick end by taking the Macedonian capital, while the other would defend Epirus from the strong Seleucid army in Dardania. While the Macedonians avoided combat, the Seleucids attacked in Epirus before all the Achaean armies could converge there.
The Achaean army had a marked advantage in heavy infantry, but the Seleucids brought thousands of horse archers, plus something the Achaeans had never seen before on the battlefield: elephants. The Achaean forces, led by Atheas Galatid, were defeated and had to retreat to Thessaly. While they were regrouping there, the Seleucids stormed the Epirote capital and quickly subjugated the province. This was an alarming setback for Ephron, since the way was open for an invasion of Aetolia and even the Peloponnese itself. Furthermore, the Macedonian army had maneuvered around the Achaeans and joined up with the Seleucids in Epirus. Faced with such a threat, and with news of Seleucid reinforcements on the way, Ephron felt that he had no choice but to order all armies to converge on Epirus, to force the enemy into a decisive battle. The second Battle of Epirus was the largest battle yet fought by the Achaean League, with 23,000 phalangites supported by 10,000 archers, 8,000 cavalry, and some light infantry.
The Seleucid and Macedonian host was defeated, albeit with great loss of Achaean blood, and Ephron began to hope that the tide of war was changing in Achaea’s favour. That was, until the 29th of August, 559AVC, when an envoy delivered a declaration of war by the Egyptian pharaoh.
With all attention focused on the Macedonian front, there were only 5,000 soldiers stationed in Cyrene. Ptolemy, foolish though he was, managed to recognize an opportunity to reclaim his lost provinces and acted upon it. Thankfully, the only Egyptian army near Cyrene was only 6,000 strong, so the Achaeans could nurture hopes of survival, or even victory in that front until reinforcements could be spared from Greece. Just five days later, news from Epirus gave Ephron cause for joy – the remnants of the Macedonian and Seleucid armies operating in that region had been captured or destroyed.
The Achaean army proceeded to besiege Macedonia. But a neglected front would give fresh cause for concern.
A fresh Seleucid army was pressing hard on the Achaean forces stationed in Crimea. The 12,000 Achaeans were used to fighting unorganized barbarians coming from the west, and they had done an excellent job protecting Crimea from such hordes, as well as protecting the newly founded Achaean colony of Olbia. But faced with an overwhelming Seleucid host, they retreated to the uncharted west. That would prove to be a mistake.
Meanwhile, the main Achaean army was having renewed success in the Macedonian front, but the Achaean navy was not as successful against its Seleucid counterpart.
The loss of 19 ships, one of them captured by the enemy, for only 6 Seleucid ships sunk, was a serious blow to the Achaean operational capacity. The treasury was immediately emptied to finance the construction of new triremes, since even if the Seleucids could be defeated on land, the war with Egypt would necessitate the re-establishment of a naval link to Cyrene. In that theatre, the Achaean army attempted to block an Egyptian incursion, but was unsuccessful.
Cyrenaica was left to the security of its walls, while mercenaries were sought in Barca and Cyrene to bolster the retreating 7th Stratos.
Meanwhile, in the Crimean front, the hapless Achaean armies, pursued mercilessly by the Seleucids, run into an emerging barbarian horde. The desperate Achaeans defeated the barbarians, but were immediately beset by the pursuing Seleucids.
The result was another bloody defeat, while the retreating barbarians found their way back towards Olbia, which was now undefended.
In January 560AVC, Ephron was worried enough about news of Seleucid reinforcements arriving through Bithynia that he called the Bithynians to arms. Those old allies answered the call, bringing over 30,000 men into the fight.
Unfortunately, not only were the Seleucid armies capable of repelling the Bithynians but a barbarian horde seized this opportunity to invade from the north. Back in Crimea, the situation was nightmarish for the Achaeans. The barbarians had razed the Olbia colony to the ground and were moving towards Taurica. A small Seleucid army had taken Ponticapeum and was itself besieging Taurica; while the Bosporan kingdom, which was allied to Egypt, invaded from the east, subduing Maeotae and threatening Tanais. The two Achaean armies, having made their way back from the wilderness, had lost most of their starting men, but could find no new recruits to bolster their ranks with.
A breakthrough finally came in Macedonia. On 14 May 560AVC the whole province was conquered by Achaean troops, even as the Seleucids had routed a smaller Achaean army in Maedi and were maneuvering to invade Epirus again.
One and a half month later, Macedonia agreed to a separate peace with the Achaean League. It would renounce all its claims to Thessaly, Euboea and Argolis and return to the status quo ante bellum. Ephron hoped that by removing the initial cause for the war the Seleucid Empire could be convinced to make a truce for a mere payment of gold. But it would take more than that.
On the other fronts, the remnants of the Achaean armies beat back a barbarian incursion into Alazones, while the 7th Stratos, reinforced with 3,000 mercenaries, lifted the siege of Cyrenaica. The Seleucids were repelled from Epirus once again, but the Achaean League had long since reached its manpower limits.
Ephron had to give extra gold to his mercenaries because they were unconvinced that he could win that war. With the situation in Crimea verging on hopeless and the Seleucid navy in control of the waves, Ephron used all his diplomatic skills to convince king Seleucus to come to an agreement with him. The Achaean League ended up ceding Panticapeum to the Seleucids and paying 100 gold to cover some of the latter’s war expenses.
Although it pained him to give up a lucrative colony that his grandfather had conquered to much acclaim, this opened up the seas again to the Achaean navy, meaning that both Crimea and Cyrene could be reinforced. Ptolemy must have understood the implications of Ephron’s truce with Seleucus, or someone must have explained it really slowly to him, because just two months later he asked for peace, demanding a mere 17 gold in reparations from the League. Ephron was happy to pay, to end the war as quickly as possible. In March 561AVC the situation in Crimea was stabilized again, when the main Achaean army defeated the barbarians, who had by then looted Taurica. The two parallel wars had lasted just two and a half years, but had brought the Achaean League near its breaking point. Worse still, Ephron’s popularity had plunged as a result of his conspicuous absence on the battlefield, and few generals could be trusted to still be loyal to him. This would mark the nadir of his popularity.