From the book Arabs at War I typed a few key pages summarizing Egypt and Iraq into word, and now am posting it here so that they may be of benefit to somebody.
Egyptian Military Effectiveness:
Pages 146-147:
Summary: Egyptian Military Effectiveness 1948-91
Egyptian forces demonstrated remarkably persistent patterns of behavior in combat between 1948 and 1991. This is particularly true at the tactical level, where Egyptian formations performed in an almost identical fashion in virtually every war they fought. Their junior officers consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to maneuver, innovate, improvise, take initiative, or act independently. Egypt’s forces have suffered from the constant manipulation of information and an inattention to intelligence gathering and objective analysis. The military’s command structure has remained heavily centralized, with all decisions being referred to the highest levels of authority, contributing to a persistent inability of Egyptian forces to maintain a fast tempo of operations.
Egyptian forces have shown little ability to conduct armor, artillery, air-to-air, or air-to-ground operations. Moreover, their combined-arms operations have regularly been very poor, with the important exception being the first four days of the October War (1973). Categories of military effectiveness related to handling military equipment were also areas of weakness for the Egyptians; their units had little maintenance capability, requiring long periods of times to assimilate new weapons, and rarely were able to take full advantage of the capabilities of their equipment.
The Egyptians also have shown areas of consistently competent performance. The bravery of the individual soldier is beyond question. Similarly unit cohesion has been inconsistent, though tending more towards the positive side of the spectrum. In general, one is struck by the fact that Egyptian forces regularly have fought tenaciously in impossible situations. On many occasions units fought on long after they had been encircled or otherwise defeated until they were physically overcome in hand-to-hand combat. Egyptian logistics and combat engineering were also areas of real strength.
Egyptian strategic leadership fluctuated considerably during this period. On the one hand, there was the dismal performance turned in by Field Marshal ‘Amr and his cronies during the Six Day War (1967). On the other hand there was the highly commendable direction of the War of Attrition (1968-1970) and the October War (1973) by Fawzi, Isma’il ‘Ali, Gamasy, and their colleagues. Additionally, in most of Egypt’s other wars, Cairo’s generals mostly performed quite adequately if not fairly well. Mwawi in Palestine in 1948; ‘Amr and Murtagi in Yemen in the 1960s; and Nasser, ‘Amr, and their staff in the Sinai in 1956 all did a reasonable job. They may never have been able to secure victory through sheer genius, but neither can they be blamed for losing it out of incompetence.
Overall, Egyptian forces fought well in set-pieces offensives and static defense battles but fell down when forced to conduct unplanned, ad hoc operations or fight fluid battles of maneuver. Ultimately, it was these problems that proved most damaging to Egypt’s military fortunes over the years. Because its forces were incapable of anything more than set-piece operations and static defense, against an opponent with any skill, it was simply a matter of time before their adversary was able to take the initiative and force the Egyptians to fight in a manner they could not handle. In the final analysis, every Egyptian campaign ended having achieved less than Cairo had hoped- if not outright disaster- because of the limitations of Egypt’s tactical forces.
Page 264-266:
Iraqi Military Effectiveness 1948-91
Iraqi military effectiveness between 1948 and 1991 closely parallels the Egyptian experience. Both countries enjoyed mixed success at the strategic level but were constantly plagued by extremely poor tactical capabilities. In most cases, Iraqi generals were prevented from obtaining all that they might have with the resources at their disposal because of the limitations of Iraqi field units. In addition, Iraqi and Egyptian forces shared almost identical patterns of strength and weakness among their tactical units, demonstrating a reasonably good ability to perform set-piece offensives and strategic defensive operations but almost entirely incapable of fighting fluid, maneuver battles.
With regard to Iraqi generalship, no clear pattern emerges. In some cases, Iraqi strategic leadership was quite good, such as in the latter half of the Iran-Iraq War. Likewise, during the latter half of the First Kurdish War, the entire Second Kurdish War, and the Gulf War, Iraqi generals performed adequately, if not well. Of greatest importance, in each of these conflicts, Iraq’s generals came up with what was probably the best strategy available to them. At other times, its leadership was miserable. In the October War (1973), the Israeli War of Independence (1948), and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iraqi generalship compounded the tactical failings of the forces under their command.
By contrast, Iraqi tactical performed remained constant. Regardless of the opponent or situation, Baghdad’s junior officers performed very poorly. Iraqi commanders from platoon to brigade (and often division) level repeatedly showed little aggressive initiative, little willingness to innovate or improvise, little ability to adapt to unforeseen circumstances, and little ability to act independently. Iraqi forces were virtually oblivious to tactical maneuver and reacted poorly to enemy maneuvers, often failing to do anything at all in response. Intelligence gather and information flows throughout the chain of command were perverse, and most Iraqi units fought battles in a haze of misinformation. Iraqi forces used their tanks like moveable artillery; their artillery was incapable of anything preplanned, reregistered bombardment missions; and combined arms usually could only be engineered by the direct intervention of the general staff.
The Iraqi Air Force was generally worse than the ground forces, with one exception being the small number of Mirage F-1 pilots who, during the latter half of the Iran-Iraq War, developed a modest air-to-air capability and some real air-to-ground ability. This exception was noteworthy because there were so few Mirage F-1 pilots (the vast majority having been rejected by the French) and, even with advanced equipment and Western training, this cream of Iraqi crop achieved only a marginal improvement in effectiveness over their compatriots.
Iraqi forces consistently had problems because of a dearth of technical skills and a limited exposure to machinery. As a result, Iraqi troops were never able to realize the full capabilities of the sophisticated equipment they fielded. Maintenance and repair was almost non-existent; Iraqi forces took extremely long periods of time to learn to handle new weaponry (even simple Soviet weapons); and, with the exception of a few high-priority projects that received lavish resources and Iraq’s best scientific minds, the Iraqi arms industry was a sham.
Nevertheless, like the Egyptians, there were also areas of real Iraqi strength and other important areas where the results were consistently mixed. Two strong categories for the Iraqis were logistics and combat engineering. Some of Iraq’s logistical accomplishments were impressive by any standards, such as their ability to sustain an armored corps on the Golan Heights in 1973 and their ability to move corps-sized formations the length and breadth of the country in a matter of days by the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Similarly, its soldiers fought bravely in every one of Baghdad’s wars.
That is not to say that there were not instances of cowardly behavior, even of entire units surrendering. But on balance, Iraqi personnel fought hard even in difficult situations. For example, what is noteworthy about the Gulf War is not that 150,000-250,000 men deserted during the forty-two day Coalition air campaign or that another 80,000 surrendered largely without a fight during the Coalition ground campaign, but rather that another 250,000-275,000 did not flee, and some of them fought hard. After six weeks of constant pounding, with their logistical network destroyed, and facing a vastly superior enemy, the Iraqi soldiers (mostly Republican Guards) who fought and died at the battles of the Burqan oilfields, Wadi al-Batin, and Madinah Ridge deserve considerable credit. Similarly, while Iraqi unit cohesion varied throughout the postwar period, on balance it was probably better than worse. Even in their worst defeats at the hands of the Kurds in the 1960s, the Israelis in 1973, the Iranians in 1982, and the American-led coalition in 1991, many Iraqi units hung together in extremely difficult circumstances. Iraqi military performance throughout this period was hardly a model to be emulated, but it was not without its bright spots.
