Oh yeap. I opened it in 03 03 of 09. It's less than a month and... wait... 400 posts!
I need now a list of who wanna the OOBs and witch nation. Please post here and I'll send it to you. That will make our progress go fast and furious.
-
We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.
Oh yeap. I opened it in 03 03 of 09. It's less than a month and... wait... 400 posts!
I need now a list of who wanna the OOBs and witch nation. Please post here and I'll send it to you. That will make our progress go fast and furious.
Hey, Hebe, can you do the OOBs? Not just looking out for it? If so, I'll send you all nations you wanna.
Okay, here's a modified province chart, along with the first bit of the information about South Africa's military, this bit focusing on some of the elite and very prominent units.
One thing to note is that they had a very large reserve/para-military force, with actual manpower (as of 1976) being approximately 225,000 military/security/police/reserve personnel, and this number was simply a publicly available figure, regarded as an under-estimate due to the fact that all white males were required to submit to two years of military/security service upon reaching 18 years of age. I believe that the military reality of South Africa would best be represented with a few elite units, a few regular units, and then the police and paramilitary/reserve forces (which are hard to approximate with HOI units) be activated by events (massive invasion/war/etc) and/or as manpower available from the beginning.
Anyway, the updated province info, with consolidated airbases. Two airbases in Namibia, two in South Africa. I think that should suffice.
Province Information
Kimberley: Industry 2. Infrastructure 70. Nuclear Reactor 6. Rocket Facility 4. Anti-Air 1. Manpower 2.
Springbok: Industry 1. Infrastructure 60.
Cape Town: Industry 3. Infrastructure 90. Airbase 6. Anti-air 1. Naval base 5. Manpower 3.
Port Elisabeth: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Manpower 1.
East London: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Manpower 1.
Durban: Industry 2. Infrastructure 80. Anti-air 1. Naval base 5. Land Fort 2. Manpower 2.
Johannesburg: Industry 4. Infrastructure 90. Anti-air 1. Manpower 4.
Pretoria: Industry 4. Infrastructure 90. Airbase 6. Anti-air 3. Land Fort 2. Manpower 4.
Mafeking: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Land Fort 1. Manpower 1.
Luderitz: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Manpower 1.
Windhoek: Industry 1. Infrastructure 80. Airbase 4. Anti-air 1. Manpower 1.
Walvis Bay: Infrastructure 60. Anti-air 1. Naval Base 3. Land Fort 2. Manpower 1.
Odangwa: Infrastructure 50. Airbase 2. Land Fort 2.
Grootfontein. Infrastructure 50. Land Fort 2.
Here's the first bit of unit information. Some of these forces will be difficult to approximate as they are far from division/corps in strength. These units are about 5-20% the strength/size of a typical western division. Remember, the Americans and British are used to using the brigade, division, and corps as the primary operational unit, while the South Africans used the brigade, regiment, and battalion (in some instances company) for their operations.
One thing to remember is that a lot of South African forces were ad hoc battlegroups formed for a specific operation/campaign/etc. Likewise, a number of their forces (such as 32 Battalion) started as under-strengthed battalions with little more than two rifle companies, a weapons platoon, a logistics platoon, and an HQ unit, and then wound up growing into something resembling two and a half or three full strength battalions complete with anti-tank weapons, integral artillery support, etc.
As of 1986-
Reserves/manpower- As of 1986, South Africa has a manpower reserve (available force pool) of at least 200,000 (counting only white males fit for immediate service).
Koevoet 1,200 security/police of the South West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (aka Koevoet)- this is approximately two battalions worth of personnel, although they operated on the platoon level. They were deployed in Namibia. Koevoet was a very effective unit even though they had mostly outdated equipment. They managed a kill ratio of about 25 to 1 during most of the counter insurgency campaign in South West Africa. They should be represented as motorized/mechanized infantry.
44 Parachute Brigade (aka Parabats)- formed in the late 70s from 3 independent parachute battalions with the addition of support units- each battalion comprised of approximately 5 rifle companies, the brigade’s units served mostly in Angola and then later in Namibia, although in 1991 one of their battalions took part in an urban counter-insurgency operation in Natal province. They should be represented by paratrooper/airborne infantry. As of the mid-1980s they should be posted in Namibia along the border with Angola.
32 Battalion (aka Buffalo Battalion) formed in the mid 70s for the purpose of unconventional warfare in Angola. It was originally only several companies in size but later when it was transferred to Namibia it eventually grew to a fairly strong unit with artillery, anti-tank, and anti-air weapons. It should be represented as a special/elite infantry force until the end of 1989 when it shifted mostly to motorized/mechanized infantry force (at this point probably best represented as an over-strength regiment) with an artillery and IFV component (Ratel 90s). The unit was mostly in Angola until it was moved to the Namibia/Angola border, then various counter-insurgency duties within Namibia, and then finally counter-insurgency in the South African townships, before it was disbanded in 1993.
I'm going to finish up the government officials list, the ideologically similar replacements, the several choices of alternative government ideology lists, and then handle the standing regular forces and the rest of the elite units, then move on to the air force, then the navy, then probably pause on South Africa for a few days (I'm going to have to send out a few emails/messages, get some research in, that will take a bit of time to get some answers) and help anybody who has an Arab League or Warsaw Pact issue, then wait for the answers to come in (or the research to pan out) and go back to put the finishing touches on the South African profile and OOB. Then I'll have to do 13 years worth of events to make it interesting.
If you're handling the Iran-Iraq war and have a question/problem, now would be a wonderful time to toss it my way. In regards to that particular war/situation, I have the information/books ready at hand, I already know a fair bit about it, and I'll have the time to field most questions on the war. Remember, this mod starts in 1986 so Iran and Iraq start the game at war with each other.
One thing to note is that they had a very large reserve/para-military force, with actual manpower (as of 1976) being approximately 225,000 military/security/police/reserve personnel, and this number was simply a publicly available figure, regarded as an under-estimate due to the fact that all white males were required to submit to two years of military/security service upon reaching 18 years of age. I believe that the military reality of South Africa would best be represented with a few elite units, a few regular units, and then the police and paramilitary/reserve forces (which are hard to approximate with HOI units) be activated by events (massive invasion/war/etc) and/or as manpower available from the beginning.
Anyway, the updated province info, with consolidated airbases. Two airbases in Namibia, two in South Africa. I think that should suffice.
Province Information
Kimberley: Industry 2. Infrastructure 70. Nuclear Reactor 6. Rocket Facility 4. Anti-Air 1. Manpower 2.
Springbok: Industry 1. Infrastructure 60.
Cape Town: Industry 3. Infrastructure 90. Airbase 6. Anti-air 1. Naval base 5. Manpower 3.
Port Elisabeth: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Manpower 1.
East London: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Manpower 1.
Durban: Industry 2. Infrastructure 80. Anti-air 1. Naval base 5. Land Fort 2. Manpower 2.
Johannesburg: Industry 4. Infrastructure 90. Anti-air 1. Manpower 4.
Pretoria: Industry 4. Infrastructure 90. Airbase 6. Anti-air 3. Land Fort 2. Manpower 4.
Mafeking: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Land Fort 1. Manpower 1.
Luderitz: Industry 1. Infrastructure 70. Manpower 1.
Windhoek: Industry 1. Infrastructure 80. Airbase 4. Anti-air 1. Manpower 1.
Walvis Bay: Infrastructure 60. Anti-air 1. Naval Base 3. Land Fort 2. Manpower 1.
Odangwa: Infrastructure 50. Airbase 2. Land Fort 2.
Grootfontein. Infrastructure 50. Land Fort 2.
Here's the first bit of unit information. Some of these forces will be difficult to approximate as they are far from division/corps in strength. These units are about 5-20% the strength/size of a typical western division. Remember, the Americans and British are used to using the brigade, division, and corps as the primary operational unit, while the South Africans used the brigade, regiment, and battalion (in some instances company) for their operations.
One thing to remember is that a lot of South African forces were ad hoc battlegroups formed for a specific operation/campaign/etc. Likewise, a number of their forces (such as 32 Battalion) started as under-strengthed battalions with little more than two rifle companies, a weapons platoon, a logistics platoon, and an HQ unit, and then wound up growing into something resembling two and a half or three full strength battalions complete with anti-tank weapons, integral artillery support, etc.
As of 1986-
Reserves/manpower- As of 1986, South Africa has a manpower reserve (available force pool) of at least 200,000 (counting only white males fit for immediate service).
Koevoet 1,200 security/police of the South West Africa Police Counter-Insurgency Unit (aka Koevoet)- this is approximately two battalions worth of personnel, although they operated on the platoon level. They were deployed in Namibia. Koevoet was a very effective unit even though they had mostly outdated equipment. They managed a kill ratio of about 25 to 1 during most of the counter insurgency campaign in South West Africa. They should be represented as motorized/mechanized infantry.
44 Parachute Brigade (aka Parabats)- formed in the late 70s from 3 independent parachute battalions with the addition of support units- each battalion comprised of approximately 5 rifle companies, the brigade’s units served mostly in Angola and then later in Namibia, although in 1991 one of their battalions took part in an urban counter-insurgency operation in Natal province. They should be represented by paratrooper/airborne infantry. As of the mid-1980s they should be posted in Namibia along the border with Angola.
32 Battalion (aka Buffalo Battalion) formed in the mid 70s for the purpose of unconventional warfare in Angola. It was originally only several companies in size but later when it was transferred to Namibia it eventually grew to a fairly strong unit with artillery, anti-tank, and anti-air weapons. It should be represented as a special/elite infantry force until the end of 1989 when it shifted mostly to motorized/mechanized infantry force (at this point probably best represented as an over-strength regiment) with an artillery and IFV component (Ratel 90s). The unit was mostly in Angola until it was moved to the Namibia/Angola border, then various counter-insurgency duties within Namibia, and then finally counter-insurgency in the South African townships, before it was disbanded in 1993.
I'm going to finish up the government officials list, the ideologically similar replacements, the several choices of alternative government ideology lists, and then handle the standing regular forces and the rest of the elite units, then move on to the air force, then the navy, then probably pause on South Africa for a few days (I'm going to have to send out a few emails/messages, get some research in, that will take a bit of time to get some answers) and help anybody who has an Arab League or Warsaw Pact issue, then wait for the answers to come in (or the research to pan out) and go back to put the finishing touches on the South African profile and OOB. Then I'll have to do 13 years worth of events to make it interesting.
If you're handling the Iran-Iraq war and have a question/problem, now would be a wonderful time to toss it my way. In regards to that particular war/situation, I have the information/books ready at hand, I already know a fair bit about it, and I'll have the time to field most questions on the war. Remember, this mod starts in 1986 so Iran and Iraq start the game at war with each other.
WTF! You're fast fellow!
You're free to do everything you wanna acording to I-I war...
You're free to do everything you wanna acording to I-I war...
One thing I recommend is that the primary Arab armies all have major organization penalties. After having read Arabs at War it seems that Arab armies, despite often having excellent equipment (some of the best the USSR and/or Western nations had to offer at the time) and access to great training, consistently fail to utilize their equipment to the fullest potential. They also fail to do much aside from very determined, yet mostly ineffective, static defense.
One example is that the Egyptian air force was trained by the Soviets for about two decades, and then by the Americans for about 10-15 years. They were only ever able to graduate about 200-300 pilots through French pilot programs, and that was simply basic handling of a plane, not under combat conditions. Also the Americans found that the Egyptian pilots do not understand what radar is, so they don't use it, even after the Americans tried to explain it (repeatedly). Their fighter pilots only operate on a visual basis. They will wait until they can see a threat before they fire, they don't use radar.
Furthermore the Egyptian military (as with almost all Arab militaries) is highly centralized. During the Six Day War of of 1967 the Egyptian air force was caught largely unprepared on the ground, but at one airbase they still had a half-dozen intact aircraft (Soviet provided aircraft) since the first Israeli attack wave had not completely destroyed the base or the aircraft. Soviet advisors were begging and pleading with the Egyptian pilots at the base to get into their aircraft and fly into southern Egypt, so their aircraft would be safely out of the reach of the Israelis when the second attack wave came. Since the Egyptian pilots had no authorization from Cairo to do such a thing they simply sat back and waited. Within about 20-30 minutes the second wave of Israeli aircraft arrived and completed the destruction of all remaining aircraft present at the base.
One more example, the Egyptians, during their counter-insurgency campaign in Yemen (in the 1960s- the North Yemen Civil War) would wind up with an entire battalion or regiment surrounded by insurgents/rebels, pinned down in some rugged and rural area. There would be another Egyptian battalion just two or three miles down the road, and they would be receiving desperate calls for help from the surrounded unit. What they would do was immediately radio/contact Cairo and ask for permission to go and relieve their comrades who were being slaughtered by insurgents/rebels. About twenty-four to thirty hours later they would finally receive permission, they would move the two or three miles to go help their friends, only to find the entire battalion/regiment had been slaughtered and the rebels were gone.
If that wasn't enough for you... Arab armies typically lack the ability to shift fire missions. During Gulf War 1 when the Americans were working with the Egyptians they found that the Egyptians were unable to shift artillery fire and engage anything other than pre-registered targets. They would have to fire at pre-selected areas (usually marked with oil barrels). Even though the Iraqis abandoned some trenches the Egyptians still fired onto the empty trenches for two reasons. The first was that they did not have permission from Cairo to abandon the pre-planned fire missions, the second was that they had no idea how to shift fire and select new targets. There are actually some accounts of Egyptian lieutenants having to wait for Cairo to approve a request for a MORTAR strike.
I could go on and on with this stuff. Not to disparge Arab armies or Arab peoples, their soldiers are very brave and have often inflicted serious losses on enemies who engage in frontal assaults. They will often fight to the death with attacking forces being required to get into the trenches and kill them in close combat, but the Arab armies (as a whole) lack the ability to engage in maneuver warfare, combined arms operations, and counter-insurgency operations. They have major problems when it comes to anything that requires immediate and fast action on the part of junior officers. The main exception was Jordan in the 1948 war, but their performance slipped once they lost their professional officer corps (many of whom were British or British trained) shortly after. They typically deploy their tanks hull-down and use them as fixed/fortified artillery positions, even then with accuracy issues.
One retired Arab general, I forget who it was, once said, "most of the training you see our soldiers doing, is only for the cameras. They learn how to march and parade but not how to fight." Part of the problem is that their militaries are primarily focused on internal security, policing their populations, rather than on fighting other conventional armies. If you notice when Arab armies fight other Arab armies (Egypt vs Yemen) the wars tend to be very prolonged stalemates with serious losses on both sides.
When Arab armies fight armies that are using Western tactics (mainly Israel) they tend to get clobbered.
The main exception being the first three days of the 1973 October War where the Egyptian senior command had scripted maneuver warfare into the training and forced all Egyptian units to spend about two years rehearsing how they would cross the Suez Canal, how they would maneuver/assault the Israeli positions, etc... The first three days were magnificent for the Egyptians. The Israelis were shocked, they thought that they were fighting an entirely different generation of Egyptians, totally new soldiers and officers, capable of rapid maneuver warfare. The Egyptians were only doing what their senior commanders scripted and made them rehearse for close to two years. They correctly assessed Israeli strength, positions, intentions, etc, and predicted how the opening stages of the conflict would unfold. The Egyptians hadn't actually gained any ability to maneuver, as was evidenced a few days later when the Israelis forced them into situations they had not rehearsed, compelling them to think on their feet and operate in real maneuver warfare. After about three or four days of their kicking Israeli butt and taking out hundreds of IDF tanks, the entire Egyptian force was crushed as the Israelis flanked them, crossed the Suez canal, and rolled up virtually the entire Egyptian line.
The Egyptians had no problems following orders and doing what they had been forced to rehearse for nearly two years, but the Egyptian senior staff was unable to predict how the war would go beyond the first few days. It's like a chess match, it's easy to predict your opponent's next move, and then based on what you know you will do from his doing that, his next move after that, but predicting the game 15-16 moves down the road is fairly difficult.
I think that to reflect this military reality, the following nations should have negative organization modifiers and reduced land speed.
Egypt
Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Libya
Algeria
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
UAE
Qatar
Bahrain
Oman
Yemen
Iraq
Iran (certainly not an Arab country but arguably using virtually the same tactics/strategy and suffering very similar problems- source Iran-Iraq war)
I don't know of many recent combat operations of Tunisia and Morocco (aside from Morocco's conflict with Spain and France in the late 1950s which incidentally Morocco lost), so it's hard to say if those two nations should be lumped in with the rest in regards to organization penalties.
One example is that the Egyptian air force was trained by the Soviets for about two decades, and then by the Americans for about 10-15 years. They were only ever able to graduate about 200-300 pilots through French pilot programs, and that was simply basic handling of a plane, not under combat conditions. Also the Americans found that the Egyptian pilots do not understand what radar is, so they don't use it, even after the Americans tried to explain it (repeatedly). Their fighter pilots only operate on a visual basis. They will wait until they can see a threat before they fire, they don't use radar.
Furthermore the Egyptian military (as with almost all Arab militaries) is highly centralized. During the Six Day War of of 1967 the Egyptian air force was caught largely unprepared on the ground, but at one airbase they still had a half-dozen intact aircraft (Soviet provided aircraft) since the first Israeli attack wave had not completely destroyed the base or the aircraft. Soviet advisors were begging and pleading with the Egyptian pilots at the base to get into their aircraft and fly into southern Egypt, so their aircraft would be safely out of the reach of the Israelis when the second attack wave came. Since the Egyptian pilots had no authorization from Cairo to do such a thing they simply sat back and waited. Within about 20-30 minutes the second wave of Israeli aircraft arrived and completed the destruction of all remaining aircraft present at the base.
One more example, the Egyptians, during their counter-insurgency campaign in Yemen (in the 1960s- the North Yemen Civil War) would wind up with an entire battalion or regiment surrounded by insurgents/rebels, pinned down in some rugged and rural area. There would be another Egyptian battalion just two or three miles down the road, and they would be receiving desperate calls for help from the surrounded unit. What they would do was immediately radio/contact Cairo and ask for permission to go and relieve their comrades who were being slaughtered by insurgents/rebels. About twenty-four to thirty hours later they would finally receive permission, they would move the two or three miles to go help their friends, only to find the entire battalion/regiment had been slaughtered and the rebels were gone.
If that wasn't enough for you... Arab armies typically lack the ability to shift fire missions. During Gulf War 1 when the Americans were working with the Egyptians they found that the Egyptians were unable to shift artillery fire and engage anything other than pre-registered targets. They would have to fire at pre-selected areas (usually marked with oil barrels). Even though the Iraqis abandoned some trenches the Egyptians still fired onto the empty trenches for two reasons. The first was that they did not have permission from Cairo to abandon the pre-planned fire missions, the second was that they had no idea how to shift fire and select new targets. There are actually some accounts of Egyptian lieutenants having to wait for Cairo to approve a request for a MORTAR strike.
I could go on and on with this stuff. Not to disparge Arab armies or Arab peoples, their soldiers are very brave and have often inflicted serious losses on enemies who engage in frontal assaults. They will often fight to the death with attacking forces being required to get into the trenches and kill them in close combat, but the Arab armies (as a whole) lack the ability to engage in maneuver warfare, combined arms operations, and counter-insurgency operations. They have major problems when it comes to anything that requires immediate and fast action on the part of junior officers. The main exception was Jordan in the 1948 war, but their performance slipped once they lost their professional officer corps (many of whom were British or British trained) shortly after. They typically deploy their tanks hull-down and use them as fixed/fortified artillery positions, even then with accuracy issues.
One retired Arab general, I forget who it was, once said, "most of the training you see our soldiers doing, is only for the cameras. They learn how to march and parade but not how to fight." Part of the problem is that their militaries are primarily focused on internal security, policing their populations, rather than on fighting other conventional armies. If you notice when Arab armies fight other Arab armies (Egypt vs Yemen) the wars tend to be very prolonged stalemates with serious losses on both sides.
When Arab armies fight armies that are using Western tactics (mainly Israel) they tend to get clobbered.
The main exception being the first three days of the 1973 October War where the Egyptian senior command had scripted maneuver warfare into the training and forced all Egyptian units to spend about two years rehearsing how they would cross the Suez Canal, how they would maneuver/assault the Israeli positions, etc... The first three days were magnificent for the Egyptians. The Israelis were shocked, they thought that they were fighting an entirely different generation of Egyptians, totally new soldiers and officers, capable of rapid maneuver warfare. The Egyptians were only doing what their senior commanders scripted and made them rehearse for close to two years. They correctly assessed Israeli strength, positions, intentions, etc, and predicted how the opening stages of the conflict would unfold. The Egyptians hadn't actually gained any ability to maneuver, as was evidenced a few days later when the Israelis forced them into situations they had not rehearsed, compelling them to think on their feet and operate in real maneuver warfare. After about three or four days of their kicking Israeli butt and taking out hundreds of IDF tanks, the entire Egyptian force was crushed as the Israelis flanked them, crossed the Suez canal, and rolled up virtually the entire Egyptian line.
The Egyptians had no problems following orders and doing what they had been forced to rehearse for nearly two years, but the Egyptian senior staff was unable to predict how the war would go beyond the first few days. It's like a chess match, it's easy to predict your opponent's next move, and then based on what you know you will do from his doing that, his next move after that, but predicting the game 15-16 moves down the road is fairly difficult.
I think that to reflect this military reality, the following nations should have negative organization modifiers and reduced land speed.
Egypt
Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Libya
Algeria
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
UAE
Qatar
Bahrain
Oman
Yemen
Iraq
Iran (certainly not an Arab country but arguably using virtually the same tactics/strategy and suffering very similar problems- source Iran-Iraq war)
I don't know of many recent combat operations of Tunisia and Morocco (aside from Morocco's conflict with Spain and France in the late 1950s which incidentally Morocco lost), so it's hard to say if those two nations should be lumped in with the rest in regards to organization penalties.
Last edited:
Koevoet dude when i read your posts i think that you can easily create mod by only yourself:wacko::wacko::wacko:
Czechoslovakia OOB, v.0.1
Hi,
What do you think about this:
As I mentioned before, we should decide everything about units, their statistics, years, etc.
Ideas?
Hi,
What do you think about this:
Code:
# ################################
# Czech army
# ################################
# Western Army Group HQ * located at Tabor
landunit =
{ id = { type = 23000 id = 1 }
location = #Tabor
name = "Western Army Group HQ"
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 2 }
name = "Western Army Group HQ"
type = HQ
strength = 75 #Category B is between 50-75% strength with modern equipment requiring a few days to be combat ready.
model = 0
}
}
# 1st Czech Army - Pribram
#Besides below located there were more brigades:
#1st CVA Helicopter Regiment: 20 MI24, 10 MI8, 10 MI2
#311th CVA SSM Brigade: 12 SCUDb
landunit =
{ id = { type = 23000 id = 3 }
location = #Pribram
name = "1st Czech Army"
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 4 }
name = "1st CVA Tank Division"
type = armor
strength = 75 #Category B is between 50-75% strength with modern equipment requiring a few days to be combat ready.
model = 0# with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = sp_rct_artillery # 1st CVA SAM Brigade: 27 SA-4
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 5 }
name = "2nd CVA Mot Rifle Division"
type = infantry #?
strength = 50 #Category B is between 50-75% strength with modern equipment requiring a few days to be combat ready.
model = 0 # with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = artillery # 1st CVA Artillery Brigade: 20 TMM, 12 MTU, 36 PMP, 24 GSP, 28 K61, 12 BTM
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 6 }
name = "19th CVA Mot Rifle Division"
type = infantry #?
strength = 50 #Category B is between 50-75% strength with modern equipment requiring a few days to be combat ready.
model = 0 # with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = engineer # 1st CVA Engineer Brigade: 20 TMM, 12 MTU, 36 PMP, 24 GSP, 28 K61, 12 BTM
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 7 }
name = "20th CVA Mot Rifle Division"
type = infantry #?
strength = 50 #Category B is between 50-75% strength with modern equipment requiring a few days to be combat ready.
model = 0 # with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = anti_tank # 1st CVA AntiTank Regiment: 36 T12, 27 BRDM3
}
}
# 4st Czech Army - Pisek
#Besides below located there were more brigades:
#4th CVA Helicopter Regiment: 20 MI24, 10 MI8, 10 MI2
#331st CVA SSM Brigade: 12 SCUDb
landunit =
{ id = { type = 23000 id = 8 }
location = #Pisek
name = "4st Czech Army"
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 9 }
name = "4th CVA Tank Division"
type = armor
strength = 80
model = 0# with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = sp_rct_artillery # 4th CVA SAM Brigade: 27 SA-4
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 10 }
name = "9th CVA Tank Division"
type = armor
strength = 80
model = 0 # with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = engineer # 4th CVA Engineer Brigade: 20 TMM, 12 MTU, 36 PMP, 24 GSP, 28 K61, 12 BTM, 3 GMZ
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 11 }
name = "3rd CVA Mot Rifle Division"
type = infantry #?
strength = 80
model = 0 # with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = artillery # 4th CVA Artillery Brigade: 36 2S5, 54 D20
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 12 }
name = "15th CVA Mot Rifle Division "
type = infantry #?
strength = 80
model = 0 # with T72, BMP2, OT64, SA8, 2S1, DANA, RM70
extra = anti_tank # 4th CVA AntiTank Regiment: 36 T12, 27 BRDM3
}
}
# Eastern Army * Trencin
#Besides below located there were more brigades:
#22nd CVA Airborne Regiment (Cat A)
#7th CVA Artillery Division
landunit =
{ id = { type = 23000 id = 13 }
location = #Trencin
name = "Eastern Army"
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 14 }
name = "13th CVA Tank Div"
type = armor
strength = 25 #Category C is less than 50% strength with older equipment requiring 2 months mobilization time.
model = 0# with T55, BMP1, OT64, SA 6, D30, DANA, RM70
extra = sp_rct_artillery # CVA SAM Brigade: 27 SA-4
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 15 }
name = "14th CVA Tank Div"
type = armor
strength = 25 #Category C is less than 50% strength with older equipment requiring 2 months mobilization time.
model = 0 # with T55, BMP1, OT64, SA 6, D30, DANA, RM70
extra = rocket_artillery # CVA SSM Brigade: 12 SCUD-b
}
}
# 7th CVA Air Army * Prague
#3 Fighter Regiments: 45 MIG23, 90 MIG21
#2 FighterBomber Regiments: 45 MIG27, 50 SU7
#2 Recon Squadrons: 24 MIG21RF
airunit =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 16 }
name = "7th CVA Air Army"
location = #Prague
base = #Prague
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 226 }
name = "1. stihaci letecky pluk" #?
strength = 100
type = interceptor
model = 0
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 226 }
name = "1. bombardovaci letecky pluk" #?
strength = 100
type = cas #?
model = 0
extra = escort #?
}
}
# 10th CVA Air Army * Pradubice
#3 Fighter Regiments: 45 MIG23, 90 MIG21
#2 FighterBomber Regiments: 45 MIG21, 45 SU25
#2 Recon Squadrons: 15 L39
airunit =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 16 }
name = "7th CVA Air Army"
location = #Pradubice
base = #Pradubice
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 226 }
name = "2. stihaci letecky pluk" #?
strength = 100
type = interceptor
model = 0
}
division =
{ id = { type = 26000 id = 226 }
name = "2. bombardovaci letecky pluk" #?
strength = 100
type = cas #?
model = 0
extra = escort #?
}
}
#CVA Reserves
#Note: Both the 1st and 4th CVA Armies are at full strength and combat ready.
#The 2 tank divisions of the East Army are at Category C.
#Upon mobilization, these two divisions will be fully manned along with 2 Reserve
#Motorized Rifle Divisions, 1 Artillery Division, an Air Assault Brigade, and
#other Army subunits creating a 3rd CVA Army. Mobilization time would take 24 weeks.As I mentioned before, we should decide everything about units, their statistics, years, etc.
Ideas?
Why everybody here read's my mind?:rofl:
You're in fellow. I'll add you as ministerator. It will be nice to have someone to help out with Israel.
Igro, buddy, my account at Filefront is saying the following menssage about adding files:
This function is currently down for maintenance and will be back shortly.
So I guess that will be possible just when it's ended. I guess tomorrow. Maybe.
I'll send it to you as soon as I can.
If you have a msn account I can send it to you there. It's faster.
Sorry for forgetting about that,
Samuel.
EDIT:
The button for selecting scenario. What do you think? This is democratic. Votes for a yes and no are welcome.
Unfortunately, not.
BTW, I've got ICQ and Skype account. (may be by e-mail?)
EDIT:
The button for selecting scenario. What do you think? This is democratic. Votes for a yes and no are welcome.
I think, it's too bright
I guess it can be by e-mail. here is mine: samuelcavalcanti1994@hotmail.com
Oh, and thanks for reporting that. I'll try to make it... darker.
Last edited:
Maybe so, but I'd have major time issues. I spend at least several hours on most days doing training activities, and I often try to read and/or write for several hours per day, but I've been neglecting a lot of that lately.
Koev, you're our seacher and carrier of cookie of knowledge... Don't let ous down. Your job here is important. We all know how private life is important. I've life outta here too.
I guess we all have, don't we?Do you know how to write events, by the way?