Bagger 288, not WWII, though.
And yet somehow, it's still a better design than most of the crap the Nazis drew up on napkins in a frantic effort to win the war.
And how do they stack up against the T34's 85mm gun?
The 85mm I'd imagine had a better HE round than the 17-Pdr, though don't quote me on that. In terms of HE though there is nothing to recommend any of the three over the standard Sherman 75mm which offered a very good HE round.
In terms of armour penetration the 85mm offered some edge over the 76mm. Still inferior to the 17-Pdr though.
If by "slightly less" you mean "twice as long to load"
Admit it dude, the firefly was the inferior tank.
In retrospect, I think you are right about me not really contributing to the discussion(though still more so than the spam posts above ). But i shouldnt have singled you out, or anything so my bad.
Would you say the allied commanders over reacted post Normandy, when they wanted more fire flies? "common wisdom" says the firefly was better, but common wisdom is often wrong. One should never underestimate the effect of bad ergonomics.
I'd suggest the Firefly was employed in the right proportions by Commonwealth forces. They tended to be issued 1 per troop of 5 tanks. Taking a Cromwell troop for example, you'd have the platoon commander in a Cromwell with either a 75mm or 95mm close support weapon, three normal Cromwells with 75mm, and a Firefly to add some extra anti-armour punch without compromising all round effectiveness.
In this regard, the 76mm Sherman does have an edge in that it is superior as an all rounder. Whilst the Firefly could serve in a normal armoured role, it was more of a dedicated tank killing asset and excelled at that. Fielding more than a single Firefly per troop would probably have been inefficient. Meanwhile one might stick as many 76mm Shermans into a Platoon as one wanted, with only a slight decrease in effectiveness compared to 75mm Shermans in return for increased anti-armour capability.
Or essentially as I've said; both the American and Commonwealth approaches were effective and did the job, each having its own strengths and weaknesses. On the whole though it wasn't as important as is sometimes made out as the standard Sherman 75mm was effective against the bulk (70-80%) of German armour at normal engagement ranges and those vehicles which it wasn't effective against could be countered by superior maneuverability, other assets, etc...
I think it is safe to say that the British got a very nasty surprise in Normandy, where their experience of tank fighting in North Africa proved to not only be useless, it was outright faulty in the Bocage.
Not all British armoured formations had previously been engaged.
7th Armoured Division and 4th and 8th Armoured Brigades had served in North Africa. The remaining formations hadn't.
So instead of revising the idea of "tank charges" and tightening Armour/Infantry co-operation, the Brits decided they needed more heavy guns on their tanks. It was a reaction to a very real problem, but it is doubtful if it solved the problem to any real extent.
Actually several formations did highlight the problems of tactics and armour-infantry cooperation.
7th Armoured almost immediately adopted an ad-hoc mixed brigade structure (though this subsequently lapsed), and 11th and Guards also moved onto it. There were also attempts to tie infantry battalions to armoured regiments, the problem was that this was hard to do outside the armoured divisions because armour had to be continually moved around the front to where it was needed.
As far as tactics go, the "tank charge" was by no means universal, it tended to be Guards who were most often guilty of it. You actually see a variety of tactical approaches, some better than others. Some units tended to practice an offhand approach, simply using their tanks as self-propelled artillery and supporting the infantry from a distance. Others worked closely with the infantry. This was a natural result of how the British Army handles doctrine; it tends to be a localized decision on what exactly is to be done, and though overall guidance may exist there is a lot of leeway for your average field officer.
As for the fixation on getting more 17-Pdrs, I wouldn't say it was so misguided given that there was also a call for an improved HE round for the 17-Pdr. If you look at the results of the British tank push late war you will see a pair of very fine vehicles. The first, the Comet, was superb. The second, the Centurion, was a monster. These were in part the result of these influences.