Perhaps shocking to me only, but probably not.
I thought I will post it here. My source is very detailed and has very positive reviews.
Majewski is a respected younger historian specialising in CZE military and foreing policy, he is in charge of the Museum of the 2nd WW which will be built in Gdańsk to 2012-15.
The data compares 1939 POL with 1938 CZE
POL Infantry division
16 500 men, 27 AT, 4 AA, 132 HvMG, 20 mortars, 81 granade launchers, 92 AT rifles, 48 cannons and howitzers,
CZE Infantry division
13 500 men, 18 AT, 0 AA, 54 HvMG, 18 mortars, 0 granade launchers, 0 AT rifles, 30 cannons and howitzers,
Some divisions on both sides were supported by addititonal forces, but those numbers are for the avarage, active infantry divisions.
General
--------------
--------------
POL - c. 1,3 million men including a small number of Germans - others remained loyal,
CZE - c. 1,1 million men including hostile German and Hungarian conscripts (for example numerous drivers) - others remained loyal,
POL - 60 divisions and brigades, including 30 active infantry divisions, 11 cavalry and 2 mechanized brigades
CZE - 41 divisions and brigades, including 21 active infantry divisions, 4 fast/mobile divisions,
artillery
---------
CZE - 780 AT in infantry + c. 230 in fortifications
POL - 1300+ AT guns
CZE - 216 AA - 60 modern (56 80mm and 4 75mm) + 49 AA machine guns companies,
POL - 370 AA - 250 modern + 95 AA machine guns companies,
CZE - 2900 cannons and howitzers,
POL - 3300 cannons and howitzers,
tanks
------
CZE - 350 + 50 in reserve (tankettes) and more in production,
POL - 800+ older, mostly recon tankettes + some reserves and in production,
Overall CZE are better armed here with better tanks (armoured cars are not included),
motorization
------------
CZE - 4 fast divisions
motorized-horse/cyclist hybrid divisions with some tanks - each division was different, there was no unified doctrine how to use them, pnly the 4th can be counted as light armored with almost 100 tanks at their disposal,
+ one more than partially motorized infantry division (14th) which however was de-motorized during the mobilization in 1938 sending many vehicles to support AT companies for infantry,
15 % of artillery is motorized, all infantry divisions can be considered partially motorized (process however disrupted by a shortage of drivers - many of them Sudetenland Germans),
POL - 2 fully mechanized brigades, 11 cavalry brigades
a small part of artillery is motorized (all AA cannons, some AT, a small number of army artillery units), all divisionary and army engineer units are motorized,
Aircrafts
---------
POL - 400 first line, 890 with reserves, c.1800-2000 overall including trainers and civilian
CZE - 568 first line, 801 with reserves, 1514 overall including trainers and civilian
Poles had more modern bombers, 30% of CZE pilots were not available, their airforce was more decentralised (no general reserve force such as POL pursuit and bomber brigades), CZE had more of more modern fighters,
Sources:
mainly from -
Piotr Majewski "Nierozegrana kampania, Możliwości obronne Czechosłowacji jesienią 1938 roku", TRIO , Warszawa 2004, ISBN 83-88542-83-4.
based on documents from Prague Military Archieve and these Czech works:
Karlický V. "Československé dělostřelecké zbraně. Naše vojsko", Praha 1975.
oraz
Ráboň M., Svoboda T. "Československá zeď", Brno 1993
The comparison is simply stunning - I never expected something like this, I mean I knew about relative weakness of CZE air defence, but this...
Of course CZE was almost two times smaller and could call for even more larger reserves in equipment, but there would be a problem with manpower, plus those numbers are for equipment avaiable to the military - anything more would have to be delivered first which takes time.
I am not sure how CZE communication equipment was like - how many radiostations they were using, but that is unlikely to change much.
One important factor in CZE favour are the fortifications on their border territories, the problem is there were large areas where the protective belt wasn't built or was full of numerous holes and its details were well known to the German side.
Considering small size of Czechoslovakia, its weak air defences and large numbers of hostile minorities the conclusion is CZE couldn't dream of stopping GER attack without serious support. It was doomed to fail very quickly.
I thought I will post it here. My source is very detailed and has very positive reviews.
Majewski is a respected younger historian specialising in CZE military and foreing policy, he is in charge of the Museum of the 2nd WW which will be built in Gdańsk to 2012-15.
The data compares 1939 POL with 1938 CZE
POL Infantry division
16 500 men, 27 AT, 4 AA, 132 HvMG, 20 mortars, 81 granade launchers, 92 AT rifles, 48 cannons and howitzers,
CZE Infantry division
13 500 men, 18 AT, 0 AA, 54 HvMG, 18 mortars, 0 granade launchers, 0 AT rifles, 30 cannons and howitzers,
Some divisions on both sides were supported by addititonal forces, but those numbers are for the avarage, active infantry divisions.
General
--------------
--------------
POL - c. 1,3 million men including a small number of Germans - others remained loyal,
CZE - c. 1,1 million men including hostile German and Hungarian conscripts (for example numerous drivers) - others remained loyal,
POL - 60 divisions and brigades, including 30 active infantry divisions, 11 cavalry and 2 mechanized brigades
CZE - 41 divisions and brigades, including 21 active infantry divisions, 4 fast/mobile divisions,
artillery
---------
CZE - 780 AT in infantry + c. 230 in fortifications
POL - 1300+ AT guns
CZE - 216 AA - 60 modern (56 80mm and 4 75mm) + 49 AA machine guns companies,
POL - 370 AA - 250 modern + 95 AA machine guns companies,
CZE - 2900 cannons and howitzers,
POL - 3300 cannons and howitzers,
tanks
------
CZE - 350 + 50 in reserve (tankettes) and more in production,
POL - 800+ older, mostly recon tankettes + some reserves and in production,
Overall CZE are better armed here with better tanks (armoured cars are not included),
motorization
------------
CZE - 4 fast divisions
motorized-horse/cyclist hybrid divisions with some tanks - each division was different, there was no unified doctrine how to use them, pnly the 4th can be counted as light armored with almost 100 tanks at their disposal,
+ one more than partially motorized infantry division (14th) which however was de-motorized during the mobilization in 1938 sending many vehicles to support AT companies for infantry,
15 % of artillery is motorized, all infantry divisions can be considered partially motorized (process however disrupted by a shortage of drivers - many of them Sudetenland Germans),
POL - 2 fully mechanized brigades, 11 cavalry brigades
a small part of artillery is motorized (all AA cannons, some AT, a small number of army artillery units), all divisionary and army engineer units are motorized,
Aircrafts
---------
POL - 400 first line, 890 with reserves, c.1800-2000 overall including trainers and civilian
CZE - 568 first line, 801 with reserves, 1514 overall including trainers and civilian
Poles had more modern bombers, 30% of CZE pilots were not available, their airforce was more decentralised (no general reserve force such as POL pursuit and bomber brigades), CZE had more of more modern fighters,
Sources:
mainly from -
Piotr Majewski "Nierozegrana kampania, Możliwości obronne Czechosłowacji jesienią 1938 roku", TRIO , Warszawa 2004, ISBN 83-88542-83-4.
based on documents from Prague Military Archieve and these Czech works:
Karlický V. "Československé dělostřelecké zbraně. Naše vojsko", Praha 1975.
oraz
Ráboň M., Svoboda T. "Československá zeď", Brno 1993
The comparison is simply stunning - I never expected something like this, I mean I knew about relative weakness of CZE air defence, but this...
Of course CZE was almost two times smaller and could call for even more larger reserves in equipment, but there would be a problem with manpower, plus those numbers are for equipment avaiable to the military - anything more would have to be delivered first which takes time.
I am not sure how CZE communication equipment was like - how many radiostations they were using, but that is unlikely to change much.
One important factor in CZE favour are the fortifications on their border territories, the problem is there were large areas where the protective belt wasn't built or was full of numerous holes and its details were well known to the German side.
Considering small size of Czechoslovakia, its weak air defences and large numbers of hostile minorities the conclusion is CZE couldn't dream of stopping GER attack without serious support. It was doomed to fail very quickly.
)
