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Allenby, I love how you took my fairly simplistic comment, ignored the lame joke and gave a sophisticated response as if I had posed an intelligent question. Well done sir! And VJ, your appetite for updates is truly insatiable! 
Alright folks, an update should be near.
Well, I knew that there was proper sentiment behind the facade of silliness.
VILenin said:Allenby, I love how you took my fairly simplistic comment, ignored the lame joke and gave a sophisticated response as if I had posed an intelligent question. Well done sir! And VJ, your appetite for updates is truly insatiable!
Well, I knew that there was proper sentiment behind the facade of silliness.
CV – The Gough Controversy
Having been relieved of command by Lloyd George, Sir Hubert Gough was resentful that the government had thought it appropriate to intervene in what the former Fifth Army commander considered a purely military matter. Gough was among a group of senior soldiers who believed that the interference of the government in the military war effort was intolerable. When the Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons that the numerical strength of the BEF was increasing, Gough felt that it was necessary to bring attention to the falsehood. Gough believed that the misfortune of the Fifth Army at St. Quentin was endemic of manpower shortages, and that the army was being forced to rely upon untested American troops who were being seconded with the British to provide them with experience. The government, Gough thought, was intentionally attempting to handicap the BEF by refusing to grant it reinforcements, thereby undermining the morale of the army and endangering the war effort. When Gough returned to Britain, he was determined that this state of affairs be challenged.
General Gough accused Lloyd George of misleading parliament
In Fleet Street, Gough sought an interview with Northcliffe. Relations between Lloyd George and the press baron were often tense, more so after he had refused an offer from the Prime Minister to serve at the head of a government department. Many recognised the malign influence of Northcliffe and Chamberlain was chief among them, writing that ‘I told B.L. [Bonar Law], that the P.M. will never be safe till he has fought Northcliffe & smashed him’. For Gough, Northcliffe was a curious source of counsel as the press baron had harshly criticised the generalship of Gough after St. Quentin and was increasingly ill-disposed to the military leadership of the war in France. Northcliffe had little respect for Gough or for the reasoning he advanced for his calamitous defeat at St. Quentin, but nevertheless saw in his accusations of ministerial impropriety an opportunity to attack the government. Thus, he promised Gough that the Times would give coverage to the matter. Gough received a more enthusiastic welcome from H.A. Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, which was already calling for a change of government. Gwynne was very sympathetic to Gough and recognised in the general’s accusations the potential for ammunition to use against the government. If the Lloyd George ministry could be discredited, Gwynne reasoned, it could lead to the restructuring of the government that he desired. Gough had already written to Haig pleading for advice but the BEF commander-in-chief was unhelpful. Haig responded to Gough by telling him that the government possessed the right to remove and appoint whatever commanders it wished and that making public accusations about the statements of ministers would not assist the war effort. Having effectively received a rebuke from his old chief, Gough was somewhat reluctant to press the matter further, but his ire was rekindled when Robertson was removed from his post as CIGS on 25th August. Gough was highly critical of the government’s handling of Robertson and the War Secretary, Derby, and sought to make contact with the former. On 29th August, Gough met Robertson at the latter’s new Eastern Command headquarters, a backwater in comparison to the bustling office of CIGS. With Lloyd George having sacked both of them, it was unsurprising that they reached a commonality of purpose, and were eager to make life uncomfortable for the government. However, Robertson suggested to Gough that the correct procedures be adhered to and that it would be unwise to go straight to the press. Robertson advised Gough to write to Wilson, the new CIGS, and raise the issue of the statement made by Lloyd George to the House of Commons. He also suggested that he visit Asquith and inform him of the mistruths of the government. Gough’s letter to Wilson, busy upon assuming his new role, received no reply, and Robertson urged Gough not to lose resolve. At no point did Asquith encounter Gough, although he did meet Robertson, where they discussed Gough’s predicament. Asquith strongly recommended to Robertson that Gough not spark controversy by going public with his accusations and that he should raise them directly with the government. However, it was too late, for Gough had already written to the press.
General Robertson told Gough to pursue his grievances through proper channels
Gough’s letter appeared on the morning of 14th September in the Times, Morning Post, Daily News and Daily Chronicle. The Daily Telegraph also received the missive, but refused to print it. The revelation of Gough’s accusations caused a storm. Gough claimed that the strength of the BEF was being eroded and that the government was deliberately restricting the flow of reinforcements. The success of the German counteroffensive at St. Quentin was blamed on the shortage of manpower which inhibited the ability of military leaders to fight the German Army. Furthermore, Gough accused Lloyd George and Bonar Law of misleading parliament in their statements and pushed for an inquiry into the affair. With the Flanders offensive not appearing to be progressing rapidly, the timing of the letter could not have been worse for the government. The implication of the accusation was that Lloyd George was evading responsibility for the reverses of the military by misleading parliament and pinning blame upon the high command in France. Lloyd George and the War Cabinet feared that there was a conspiracy to discredit the government. In particular, the Prime Minister feared that Robertson was orchestrating the campaign against him through the press and in parliament and that he aimed to unseat the government and have it replaced with one more pliable to the demands of the military. However, many senior military officers were scornful of Gough. At Montreuil, Haig wrote that his letter was a ‘grave mistake. No one can be both a soldier and a politician at the same time. We soldiers have to do our duty, and keep silent, trusting to Ministers to protect us.’ In the eastern Mediterranean, General Allenby wrote that the affair ‘really is amazing – there are many mixed up in it who ought to be ashamed of themselves. I have not heard a word of sympathy for Gough.’ Nevertheless, Asquith was under considerable pressure to put forward a motion of censure in the House of Commons, with Gwynne writing to him imploring him to resume the premiership in the event of Lloyd George’s fall. Asquith was annoyed at what he suspected was another manifestation of Lloyd George’s secretive and underhand style of government. Although he was highly reluctant to take up the reigns of power again, his sense of duty drew him towards taking up the matter in the House of Commons on 17th September.
Gough’s letter caused a sensation in the press
Lloyd George, having already bested him in debate on the SWC, assumed that Asquith could not stomach a resumption of power. On the morning of the scheduled debate, Lloyd George was notably relaxed and confident. The fact that Asquith did not wish to push Lloyd George out of office was demonstrated by the timidity of the speech, which soon became overly technical in character. Asquith proposed that a select committee be established to investigate the charges made by Gough and restricted himself to this demand. He deliberately stepped around the question of whether the statements made by Lloyd George and Bonar Law were truthful or not, believing that this was a matter to be left to the select committee. Rendering his speech less effective still, Asquith entreated the House not to consider the motion to be a vote of censure on the government, insisting that he was questioning the manner of the government, not its existence. As Hansard recorded:
Mr. ASQUITH (East Fife): ‘…There was a suggestion of holding a judicial inquiry into the accusations made by General Gough. However, I have sat in Parliament for thirty-one years and I am jealous of its honour. The correctness or otherwise of ministerial statements should not be submitted to any other tribunal other than a Parliamentary enquiry. As I have stated previously, it is far from my desire to cause the Prime Minister to resign from office, but what is the alternative to a select committee?’
Mr. STANTON (Merthyr Tydfil): ‘Get on with the war’ [hon. Members cheered]
C.B. Stanton, a miner, docker and Labour MP, had judged the mood of the House perfectly with his sudden intervention. Even before Asquith had concluded his speech, the House was favourable to Lloyd George and responded enthusiastically to Stanton’s riposte to Asquith. Asquith said that his comment was ‘irrelevant’, hardening the attitude of the House and giving heart to Lloyd George, who eventually rose to give his response. He roused the lower chamber with his fighting oratorical style, denouncing Gough as ‘neurotic’ and arguing that he should have raised the issue privately through the correct channels. He deprecated the actions of Gough as a breach of the King’s Regulations. The Prime Minister spoke of the irresponsibility of those who encouraged Gough to take his final step of writing to the press and deplored the ‘plot’ to remove the government. On the subject of the fighting strength of the BEF, Lloyd George argued that distinctions between the comparative number of British and American troops were irrelevant as they both ultimately contributed to the rifle strength of the Allies on the western front. He based his argument on the figures that he quoted in the House of Commons after the defeat at St. Quentin and those put before the lower chamber a few days later, conveniently disregarding the corrected figures that were provided for the War Cabinet by the War Office which made it apparent that the strength of the BEF actually had declined. Lloyd George skipped over this issue, arriving at the seriousness of the debate itself. He informed the House that the fate of the motion would effectively decide the future of the government:
The PRIME MINISTER: ‘…the right hon. Gentleman disclaims notions of his ambition to form a government. [hon. Members: “Oh!”] However, the right hon. Gentleman has placed before the House a Motion that amounts to a test of strength for the Government…’
[Mr. ASQUITH indicated dissent]
The PRIME MINISTER: ‘Well make no mistake! This is a Vote of Censure upon the Government, and if the Motion were carried, it would not be possible for us to continue in office, and the hon. Gentleman responsible for the Motion, the same hon. Gentleman who relinquished office just ten months ago, would have to be responsible for the Government.’
Lloyd George transformed the debate over the motion into a discussion on the leadership of the war effort, compelling the House of Commons to choose between him and an unenthusiastic Asquith. Finishing his speech, Lloyd George pleaded that the urgency of the war demanded unity and an immediate end to controversies stoked by the press which were distracting the government and paralysing the war effort. To loud cheers, Lloyd George sat down and the debate lingered for another hour. The House divided and government supporters were sent a three-line whip. It was apparent even before Lloyd George finished his response to Asquith that he had carried the day – the motion calling for a select committee to investigate the accusations of General Gough was defeated by 298 votes to 101.
Asquith, portrayed in Vanity Fair
The debate was a significant victory for Lloyd George and served as an expression of confidence in his leadership. The Daily Telegraph commented that ‘Mr. Lloyd George has reaffirmed his credentials as one of the most formidable parliamentarians of our era.’ Yet again, Lloyd George had smashed Asquith in debate and comprehensively seen off his challengers. There was little public sympathy for Gough, who appeared in the eyes of many to be harbouring a grudge against a government that had tired of his incompetence. The actions of Gough were not regarded as patriotic righteousness but the sore actions of a loser. Asquith was damaged by being associated with his cause, however tenuously, and the fact that he had pushed the issue to a division in the House of Commons augured a more profound split in the ranks of the Liberal Party. Haig had little sympathy for either side, writing ‘how terrible [it is] to see the House of Commons so easily taken in by a clap trap speech by Lloyd George. The House is really losing its reputation as an assembly of common sense Britishers.’ However, the consequences of the debate were not wholly beneficial for Lloyd George and the government, for it sparked diplomatic controversy with the United States. President Roosevelt was strongly opposed to any notion of Lloyd George stemming the influx of British divisions to France, suspicious that the Prime Minister was hoping to extricate Britain from the war on the western front and substitute the United States in its place. With American units serving with the British Army to accumulate experience, Roosevelt, Root and Major-General Wood were soon suspicious that the British sought to use American troops as cannon fodder. Haig informed Wood that this idea, from his perspective, was ridiculous, although he could not fathom the intentions of the Prime Minister. President Roosevelt had emerged as the most enthusiastic proponent of a western-orientated strategy and in the midst of the diplomatic embarrassment, Curzon stressed to Lloyd George the importance of proving to the French and Americans the western front credentials of the British government. Consequently, the War Cabinet sanctioned the continuation of the Flanders offensive and reassured Haig that the BEF would not be starved of manpower.
Having been relieved of command by Lloyd George, Sir Hubert Gough was resentful that the government had thought it appropriate to intervene in what the former Fifth Army commander considered a purely military matter. Gough was among a group of senior soldiers who believed that the interference of the government in the military war effort was intolerable. When the Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons that the numerical strength of the BEF was increasing, Gough felt that it was necessary to bring attention to the falsehood. Gough believed that the misfortune of the Fifth Army at St. Quentin was endemic of manpower shortages, and that the army was being forced to rely upon untested American troops who were being seconded with the British to provide them with experience. The government, Gough thought, was intentionally attempting to handicap the BEF by refusing to grant it reinforcements, thereby undermining the morale of the army and endangering the war effort. When Gough returned to Britain, he was determined that this state of affairs be challenged.
General Gough accused Lloyd George of misleading parliament
In Fleet Street, Gough sought an interview with Northcliffe. Relations between Lloyd George and the press baron were often tense, more so after he had refused an offer from the Prime Minister to serve at the head of a government department. Many recognised the malign influence of Northcliffe and Chamberlain was chief among them, writing that ‘I told B.L. [Bonar Law], that the P.M. will never be safe till he has fought Northcliffe & smashed him’. For Gough, Northcliffe was a curious source of counsel as the press baron had harshly criticised the generalship of Gough after St. Quentin and was increasingly ill-disposed to the military leadership of the war in France. Northcliffe had little respect for Gough or for the reasoning he advanced for his calamitous defeat at St. Quentin, but nevertheless saw in his accusations of ministerial impropriety an opportunity to attack the government. Thus, he promised Gough that the Times would give coverage to the matter. Gough received a more enthusiastic welcome from H.A. Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post, which was already calling for a change of government. Gwynne was very sympathetic to Gough and recognised in the general’s accusations the potential for ammunition to use against the government. If the Lloyd George ministry could be discredited, Gwynne reasoned, it could lead to the restructuring of the government that he desired. Gough had already written to Haig pleading for advice but the BEF commander-in-chief was unhelpful. Haig responded to Gough by telling him that the government possessed the right to remove and appoint whatever commanders it wished and that making public accusations about the statements of ministers would not assist the war effort. Having effectively received a rebuke from his old chief, Gough was somewhat reluctant to press the matter further, but his ire was rekindled when Robertson was removed from his post as CIGS on 25th August. Gough was highly critical of the government’s handling of Robertson and the War Secretary, Derby, and sought to make contact with the former. On 29th August, Gough met Robertson at the latter’s new Eastern Command headquarters, a backwater in comparison to the bustling office of CIGS. With Lloyd George having sacked both of them, it was unsurprising that they reached a commonality of purpose, and were eager to make life uncomfortable for the government. However, Robertson suggested to Gough that the correct procedures be adhered to and that it would be unwise to go straight to the press. Robertson advised Gough to write to Wilson, the new CIGS, and raise the issue of the statement made by Lloyd George to the House of Commons. He also suggested that he visit Asquith and inform him of the mistruths of the government. Gough’s letter to Wilson, busy upon assuming his new role, received no reply, and Robertson urged Gough not to lose resolve. At no point did Asquith encounter Gough, although he did meet Robertson, where they discussed Gough’s predicament. Asquith strongly recommended to Robertson that Gough not spark controversy by going public with his accusations and that he should raise them directly with the government. However, it was too late, for Gough had already written to the press.
General Robertson told Gough to pursue his grievances through proper channels
Gough’s letter appeared on the morning of 14th September in the Times, Morning Post, Daily News and Daily Chronicle. The Daily Telegraph also received the missive, but refused to print it. The revelation of Gough’s accusations caused a storm. Gough claimed that the strength of the BEF was being eroded and that the government was deliberately restricting the flow of reinforcements. The success of the German counteroffensive at St. Quentin was blamed on the shortage of manpower which inhibited the ability of military leaders to fight the German Army. Furthermore, Gough accused Lloyd George and Bonar Law of misleading parliament in their statements and pushed for an inquiry into the affair. With the Flanders offensive not appearing to be progressing rapidly, the timing of the letter could not have been worse for the government. The implication of the accusation was that Lloyd George was evading responsibility for the reverses of the military by misleading parliament and pinning blame upon the high command in France. Lloyd George and the War Cabinet feared that there was a conspiracy to discredit the government. In particular, the Prime Minister feared that Robertson was orchestrating the campaign against him through the press and in parliament and that he aimed to unseat the government and have it replaced with one more pliable to the demands of the military. However, many senior military officers were scornful of Gough. At Montreuil, Haig wrote that his letter was a ‘grave mistake. No one can be both a soldier and a politician at the same time. We soldiers have to do our duty, and keep silent, trusting to Ministers to protect us.’ In the eastern Mediterranean, General Allenby wrote that the affair ‘really is amazing – there are many mixed up in it who ought to be ashamed of themselves. I have not heard a word of sympathy for Gough.’ Nevertheless, Asquith was under considerable pressure to put forward a motion of censure in the House of Commons, with Gwynne writing to him imploring him to resume the premiership in the event of Lloyd George’s fall. Asquith was annoyed at what he suspected was another manifestation of Lloyd George’s secretive and underhand style of government. Although he was highly reluctant to take up the reigns of power again, his sense of duty drew him towards taking up the matter in the House of Commons on 17th September.
Gough’s letter caused a sensation in the press
Lloyd George, having already bested him in debate on the SWC, assumed that Asquith could not stomach a resumption of power. On the morning of the scheduled debate, Lloyd George was notably relaxed and confident. The fact that Asquith did not wish to push Lloyd George out of office was demonstrated by the timidity of the speech, which soon became overly technical in character. Asquith proposed that a select committee be established to investigate the charges made by Gough and restricted himself to this demand. He deliberately stepped around the question of whether the statements made by Lloyd George and Bonar Law were truthful or not, believing that this was a matter to be left to the select committee. Rendering his speech less effective still, Asquith entreated the House not to consider the motion to be a vote of censure on the government, insisting that he was questioning the manner of the government, not its existence. As Hansard recorded:
Mr. ASQUITH (East Fife): ‘…There was a suggestion of holding a judicial inquiry into the accusations made by General Gough. However, I have sat in Parliament for thirty-one years and I am jealous of its honour. The correctness or otherwise of ministerial statements should not be submitted to any other tribunal other than a Parliamentary enquiry. As I have stated previously, it is far from my desire to cause the Prime Minister to resign from office, but what is the alternative to a select committee?’
Mr. STANTON (Merthyr Tydfil): ‘Get on with the war’ [hon. Members cheered]
C.B. Stanton, a miner, docker and Labour MP, had judged the mood of the House perfectly with his sudden intervention. Even before Asquith had concluded his speech, the House was favourable to Lloyd George and responded enthusiastically to Stanton’s riposte to Asquith. Asquith said that his comment was ‘irrelevant’, hardening the attitude of the House and giving heart to Lloyd George, who eventually rose to give his response. He roused the lower chamber with his fighting oratorical style, denouncing Gough as ‘neurotic’ and arguing that he should have raised the issue privately through the correct channels. He deprecated the actions of Gough as a breach of the King’s Regulations. The Prime Minister spoke of the irresponsibility of those who encouraged Gough to take his final step of writing to the press and deplored the ‘plot’ to remove the government. On the subject of the fighting strength of the BEF, Lloyd George argued that distinctions between the comparative number of British and American troops were irrelevant as they both ultimately contributed to the rifle strength of the Allies on the western front. He based his argument on the figures that he quoted in the House of Commons after the defeat at St. Quentin and those put before the lower chamber a few days later, conveniently disregarding the corrected figures that were provided for the War Cabinet by the War Office which made it apparent that the strength of the BEF actually had declined. Lloyd George skipped over this issue, arriving at the seriousness of the debate itself. He informed the House that the fate of the motion would effectively decide the future of the government:
The PRIME MINISTER: ‘…the right hon. Gentleman disclaims notions of his ambition to form a government. [hon. Members: “Oh!”] However, the right hon. Gentleman has placed before the House a Motion that amounts to a test of strength for the Government…’
[Mr. ASQUITH indicated dissent]
The PRIME MINISTER: ‘Well make no mistake! This is a Vote of Censure upon the Government, and if the Motion were carried, it would not be possible for us to continue in office, and the hon. Gentleman responsible for the Motion, the same hon. Gentleman who relinquished office just ten months ago, would have to be responsible for the Government.’
Lloyd George transformed the debate over the motion into a discussion on the leadership of the war effort, compelling the House of Commons to choose between him and an unenthusiastic Asquith. Finishing his speech, Lloyd George pleaded that the urgency of the war demanded unity and an immediate end to controversies stoked by the press which were distracting the government and paralysing the war effort. To loud cheers, Lloyd George sat down and the debate lingered for another hour. The House divided and government supporters were sent a three-line whip. It was apparent even before Lloyd George finished his response to Asquith that he had carried the day – the motion calling for a select committee to investigate the accusations of General Gough was defeated by 298 votes to 101.
Asquith, portrayed in Vanity Fair
The debate was a significant victory for Lloyd George and served as an expression of confidence in his leadership. The Daily Telegraph commented that ‘Mr. Lloyd George has reaffirmed his credentials as one of the most formidable parliamentarians of our era.’ Yet again, Lloyd George had smashed Asquith in debate and comprehensively seen off his challengers. There was little public sympathy for Gough, who appeared in the eyes of many to be harbouring a grudge against a government that had tired of his incompetence. The actions of Gough were not regarded as patriotic righteousness but the sore actions of a loser. Asquith was damaged by being associated with his cause, however tenuously, and the fact that he had pushed the issue to a division in the House of Commons augured a more profound split in the ranks of the Liberal Party. Haig had little sympathy for either side, writing ‘how terrible [it is] to see the House of Commons so easily taken in by a clap trap speech by Lloyd George. The House is really losing its reputation as an assembly of common sense Britishers.’ However, the consequences of the debate were not wholly beneficial for Lloyd George and the government, for it sparked diplomatic controversy with the United States. President Roosevelt was strongly opposed to any notion of Lloyd George stemming the influx of British divisions to France, suspicious that the Prime Minister was hoping to extricate Britain from the war on the western front and substitute the United States in its place. With American units serving with the British Army to accumulate experience, Roosevelt, Root and Major-General Wood were soon suspicious that the British sought to use American troops as cannon fodder. Haig informed Wood that this idea, from his perspective, was ridiculous, although he could not fathom the intentions of the Prime Minister. President Roosevelt had emerged as the most enthusiastic proponent of a western-orientated strategy and in the midst of the diplomatic embarrassment, Curzon stressed to Lloyd George the importance of proving to the French and Americans the western front credentials of the British government. Consequently, the War Cabinet sanctioned the continuation of the Flanders offensive and reassured Haig that the BEF would not be starved of manpower.
Fantastic Parliamentary piece there although if Gough ever gets a Command again well...
My hat is off to you, sir, for the ability to write both dramatic scenes of naval warfare and compelling political debates. Well done, Allenby.
Vann
Vann
Allenby said:
Goodness me, what happened to the Daily Sketch? Or the Daily Mail? They should have lapped up that kind of thing!
Allenby said:
Aye, and as swift an end to the fighting in the East as possible, I'll wager. Time to treat with the Turk?
A great update, Mr A.
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Superb update Allenby, I must say you do really great in writing about the Parliament, the debates and the politics. I am very fascinating, and I feel I get to learn a lot about British politics of the time…
Just one question did Gough do this in real history as well? In this timeline he should be force to spend the rest of his life in the Tower for such acts against the Government, as the MP said “Get on with the war’ and that is something Gough should remember the country is at war and as a soldier he should support the war effort not go around sending bad letters to the press!
Just one question did Gough do this in real history as well? In this timeline he should be force to spend the rest of his life in the Tower for such acts against the Government, as the MP said “Get on with the war’ and that is something Gough should remember the country is at war and as a soldier he should support the war effort not go around sending bad letters to the press!
Or, otoh, he might have exactly that duty if he feels that the dishonesty and poor performance of the PM's office are letting the men in the field down. Now, here it sounds more like sour grapes, but his actions could be precisely his duty.
Vann
Vann
Allenby said:
Weren't we talking about the United Kingdom and 1917, I would feel that we were in the Middle Earth ...
By the way... any kind of new about how is doing an officer called Tolkien at the trenches? I think he serves in the Lancashire Fusiliers as a second lieutenant...Thus, poor Gough as made a show again... and again, as successful as it used to be.
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When he returns home with his troops, maybe he ough to releave the HoC of its power.
Gough should just sit down and shut up now. Nobody cares for him.
Sir Monty said:
It ain't happening.
Half-pay and a journalistic career probably awaits...Vann the Red said:
Thank you very much - if you wish to read more invented or fabricated Hansard extracts, then you need only ask.
Vincent Julien said:
The Daily Mail chose to run a story about asylum seekers on its front page instead.
Vincent Julien said:
Diplomatic pressure exerted by France and the US may compel Britain to stay the course on the western front and increase her commitments there. Treat with the Turk or knock 'em out as quick as possible? Next update shall reveal all!
Lord E said:
Historically, Gough kept quiet when he was relieved of command in 1918, as he was advised to not raise a storm by fellow officers. He did, however, become politically active after the war. We became, strangely enough, given his part in the Curragh Mutiny, a Home Ruler.
Vann the Red said:
Quite so!
There is no impropriety in an officer questioning the military policies of a government provided that they raise them in private and detached from the public domain. (unlike General Dannatt c. 2006) However, once they go to the public with their opinions, they breach the terms of their employment and deserve everything they get.
Kurt_Steiner said:
I think Austen was writing metaphorically.
I doubt Lloyd George would get away with physically smashing Northcliffe to pieces and dumping his dismembered body somewhere. Tolkien was apparently in the 11th battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, which means that, in my game, he is part of 25th Division in the Earl of Cavan's IV Corps. Presently, that formation is on the Wyschaete-Passchendaele ridge, preparing for the next phase of the Flanders offensive...
Sir Humphrey said:
Do not expect Haig, a man with an almost invincible contempt for politicians, to return home in order to become one.
However, the same cannot be said of many of his officer colleagues...
I must say that I beg to differ. I think that going public is permissable if, after exhausting official channels, one feels that the policies are sufficiently dangerous. Now, this certainly entails the end of one's military career, but it is not necessarily grounds for criminal prosecution.
Vann
Vann the Red said:
Well they won't be prosecuted but they can be disciplined.
It is permissable for an officer to go public if they resign their post and offer their opinions in the capacity of a private citizen - if officers wish to play politics, they are perfectly entitled to stand for election as politicians, but they should not take command in a non-political post and then stress their opinions publicly.
Vincent Julien said:
Hurrah for crappy newspapers!
Long update is upcoming...
CVI – Peace dealings with the Ottomans; Pledge to the Zionists
In late June 1917, with the conquest of the Arab Middle East complete, an emissary of the Ottoman government met a British embassy official in Bern and quietly raised the possibility of a separate peace deal between the Ottoman and British governments. No terms were mentioned, and the news of the Ottoman offer soon reached the new occupant of the Foreign Office, Lord Curzon. Intrigued by the possibilities that were opening up, Curzon insisted that the Bern embassy press the Ottomans to reveal their hand as to the terms they were willing to countenance and to emphasise that an agreement would have to be reached with all Allied powers, not Britain alone. Talaat Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had tenuously put forth the peace proposal and withheld terms with the objective of salvaging as much as possible of the empire from the British. However, Curzon’s insistence that the Ottomans state their terms contrived to stymie Talaat’s peace initiative before it had left the ground. Eager that something be made of the brief dialogue with the British other than a plea and a stonewall refusal, Talaat instructed that he was willing to negotiate on the basis that Anatolia remain Turkish whilst the Arab Middle East be ceded to Great Britain. The Allies would not have the right to occupy Anatolian territory; indeed, no other powers other than Britain were mentioned. Curzon regarded the terms as a workable basis upon which to negotiate further, although he was perturbed by the continued exclusion of other powers. Whilst Sir Mark Sykes, political secretary of the War Cabinet Secretariat, urged Curzon to provisionally accept the Ottoman proposal on the additional condition that the Armenian population of the empire be protected, Curzon was cautious, given that Britain’s allies were blithely unaware that Talaat had sent out peace feelers. Curzon was attracted to a scheme that acknowledged British supremacy in Arab territory and kept the Ottomans in Anatolia, yet the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the subsequent Cairo Agreement of 1917 severely limited his options, much to his chagrin. The Foreign Secretary believed that the 1915 scheme of regional devolution within the empire, if revived, could successfully prize the Ottomans from the war whilst respecting the interests of the Allies. Curzon swiftly latched onto this concept as a way forward and sought to convince his allies that the devolutionary scheme would be worth implementing in return for an armistice with the Ottomans.
Ottoman officials made contact with the British embassy in Bern
Curzon was concerned that his allied partners would be encouraged to add to their ambitions in the Ottoman Empire by Talaat’s peace offer. Consequently, when he met the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, he did not reveal the fact that Talaat had made contact with the Foreign Office, choosing instead to present his offer in abstract terms. New to his post, Curzon could present the scheme as a personalised initiative of an enthusiast and enquired whether France would accept a devolved but sovereign Ottoman Empire in return for an armistice. Wary, Cambon responded that he could conceive of no reason why the Cairo Agreement should be overhauled so swiftly after its conclusion, and then explained that even if Ottoman integrity were to be respected, France would still have to become the de facto rulers of Syria and Cilicia, in a more overt fashion of pre-1914 British rule in Egypt. As Curzon expected, Cambon had reasserted France’s claim to Syria, which the Foreign Secretary regarded as unacceptable in the light of recent British conquests. When contacted by the Foreign Office, the Italian and Greek governments signalled that they opposed an armistice with the Ottomans without their total surrender and acceptance of Allied troops to occupy strategic locations. Predictably, Italy, Greece, France and Russia had readied troops to occupy their claims and were not prepared to countenance a settlement that saw previous territorial agreements torn up. In particular, the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg, despite the turmoil in Russia, insisted that its claims to the Bosporus be respected and argued, not unjustly, that its occupation of Trabzon and portions of Armenia be rewarded with a slice of Anatolian territory. The Russians showed little interest in the Ottoman devolution scheme, regarding it as an unsatisfactory safeguard of Russian interests. It was soon apparent that Britain’s allies were not going to be deterred from urging that the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Cairo Agreement, which Russia was unaware of, be upheld. Indeed, they were positively encouraged by the manifestation of Ottoman weakness as demonstrated by the British advance in Syria, which indicated that she was on the brink of collapse.
Talaat Pasha
Britain and France had already acted without Russian counsel in reaching an agreement at Cairo, but with the Russians still tying down German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the eastern front, Curzon was mindful that Russia not be provoked into detaching herself from the Allies and reaching a separate arrangement with the Central Powers. Although confidence in Russia’s ability to continue her exertions had faded, Curzon did not wish to give her cause to leave the Allies. The Foreign Secretary recognised that denying his allies of their claims in Anatolia would only encourage them to seek compensation elsewhere. The future friendship of Greece and her participation in the war could not be guaranteed if her rights in Anatolia were not maintained; if Italy were not to receive south-west Anatolia, she would press for Arabian territory at the expense of Britain; if France were not to receive Cilicia, she could never be ejected from Syria without a serious, permanent breach. Curzon was determined to assert British hegemony in the Arab Middle East and already regarded the Cairo Agreement as a millstone around Britain’s neck. Although Curzon keenly sought to keep Turkey intact, he soon recognised that his primary aim of promoting Britain in Arabia required that the energies of his allies be diverted and that the partition of Anatolia was the best method of reaching that goal. The failure of the Allies to reach a common agenda on an armistice with the Ottomans guaranteed a continuation of hostilities. Talaat had no interest in a settlement that did not involve a guarantee of Ottoman primacy in Anatolia. When the prospect of peace arose, no ally was prepared to forego the entitlements achieved by their diplomats. With his ambition to absorb vast tracts of Arabia into the British Empire, this was no the less the case for Curzon than it was for other Allied statesmen. The Foreign Secretary still reserved hope for the maintenance of a friendly Ottoman entity confined to Anatolia, but was now resigned to the fact that Britain could only achieve this by gaining mastery over Turkey itself and pleading the right of conquest in a future settlement. The Allies were now thoroughly committed to dismemberment – Ottoman peace terms were rejected and when they sought out the United States, the State Department was unsympathetic, refusing to respond to their enquiry.
Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London
By earmarking Palestine for British rule, the Cairo Agreement implicitly acknowledged that the cause of Zionism was a British concern whilst Armenian nationalism would flourish under French protection. Not only did Curzon lament the Cairo Agreement for its provision for the dismemberment of Anatolia and the recognition of French rights in Syria, he was ill at ease with the inference drawn from the agreement that in claiming Palestine, Britain was automatically promoting Zionism. Curzon regarded it as fortunate that no definite pledge had been made by the British government to the Zionist lobby led by Chaim Weizmann and retained the hope that none would need to be made in the future. Curzon was eager to defer discussion on the subject and aimed to wait out the nationalist lobbyists by shrouding British intentions in mystery. He pleaded with the Cabinet that, whilst the prospect of peace with the Ottoman Empire remained, no decision on Zionism should be made in case it complicated negotiations. Whilst pursuing the offer made by Talaat, Curzon successfully suppressed moves within the War Cabinet to make British support of Zionism a public, irreversible fact. Meanwhile, Sykes, the architect of the Cairo Agreement and the most ardent advocate of Zionism in government circles, sought to undermine Curzon’s stance by cultivating the support of those sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Lord Robert Cecil, the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was fervent in his support for self-determination and had already envisaged a world of collective security and eternal peace. He concurred with Sykes that Curzon’s evasion of the Zionist issue could not continue and that a commitment would have to be made to Weizmann before the Zionists looked elsewhere for support. Sykes also discussed the issue with Lloyd George, who had recently taken receipt of a report by Leo Amery, also attached to the War Cabinet Secretariat, which predicted that the war against the Central Powers would last until 1919 or 1920. The timing of the presentation of the report proved fortuitous for pro-Zionists such as Sykes, as it reinforced Lloyd George’s tendency to conceive of the war in a long-term perspective. When Sykes restated the case for Zionism to Lloyd George, he emphasised the benefits for Britain in her war of endurance. Lloyd George, an avid reader of the Bible, had long been enamoured with the Zionist cause and required little convincing. Balfour, an admirer of Jewish culture, and Milner, who believed that Judaism could strengthen the British Empire, were also sympathetic to Zionism. When Curzon informed the Cabinet that terms for an armistice with Turkey could not be agreed upon, the pro-Zionists went to work in attempting to force the Foreign Secretary’s hand.
Sykes enthusiastically promoted Zionism when dealing with War Cabinet members
Sykes was permitted to put forward his case for the Zionists to the War Cabinet in July 1917. In his report, he emphasised the potential diplomatic benefits by illustrating the apparent influence of Jews. He argued that the sentiment of European Jewry, particularly in Russia, lay with the Central Powers as a consequence of the anti-Semitism of successive Russian governments. Support for the cause of Zionism and the settlement of Jews in Palestine could bolster Russian Jews to support the Allied cause and sustain Russia in the war. The deterioration of the domestic front in Russia, argued Sykes, made a pro-Zionist declaration more urgent than ever before. Sykes also expounded his belief that a commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine would earn the support of American Jews who could put their wealth at the disposal of the Allies. Although the virtue of self-determination for the Jewish people was an important component of Sykes’ argument, he catered for his War Cabinet readership and sought above all to appeal to British interests. Taken together, the effect of the reports submitted by Amery and Sykes was to transform a national Jewish homeland from a distant aspiration to an urgent necessity for Britain. Curzon was unimpressed, and wrote to the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Edwin Montagu, that ‘I cannot conceive a worse bondage…to which to relegate an advanced and intellectual community than to exile in Palestine.’ Montagu, a Jew, staunchly anti-Zionist, found a powerful ally in his attempt to prevent the British government from sponsoring a Jewish national home when the Foreign Secretary invited him to his Derbyshire estate, Kedleston Hall, where they discussed the matter. Curzon and Montagu directed their critiques of Zionist ambition from different perspectives. Whilst Montagu labelled Zionism as a ‘mischievous political creed’ that would provide anti-Semites with excuses to support the deportation of Jews to Palestine, the Orientally-orientated mind of Curzon operated differently. The Foreign Secretary could not envisage how an influx of Jewish migrants could be facilitated without the forced removal of the local Arab population and did not think that Palestine could accommodate a vast number of newcomers. Having agreed that committing to a Jewish homeland would be an act of folly, Curzon and Montagu pledged to work together.
Kedleston Hall
The arguments against Zionism put forth by Curzon inside the War Cabinet and by Montagu outside it were countered by Lloyd George, Balfour, Milner and Smuts, who formed a formidable quartet in support of declaring publicly that Britain would support a Jewish national home. Indeed, Curzon and Montagu soon found that members of the government were unanimously opposed to their pleas that Zionism be kicked into the long grass. They were encouraged when Curzon conceded that a commitment to the Zionists had some merit. He calculated that it could assist in reconciling American public opinion to the new order that he sought to construct in the Middle East, which he wanted to be overtly imperialistic. Furthermore, he shared Sykes’ belief that the Zionist cause was linked to that of the Armenians because of the sponsorship by France of the latter. Curzon toyed with using the liberationist rhetoric favoured by Sykes for explicitly British ends – championing the Armenians alongside the Zionists could lure France away from Arabia, embroil her with Russia in Anatolia and allow Britain to benefit. Nevertheless, Curzon was still inclined to follow his instinct and regard the Zionist project as a sham. When another meeting of the War Cabinet failed to convince Curzon, Sykes was sent to Kedleston Hall in an attempt to persuade him differently. Together they exchanged stories of their extensive travels in the Middle East and Central Asia, but Sykes was unable to convince Curzon of the virtues of Zionism any more than the War Cabinet had. Sykes was also somewhat deterred by the peculiarities of Curzon’s character – when he asked the Foreign Secretary whether Kedleston Hall’s columns were imitation marble, as they were at his Sledmere estate, Curzon replied self-admiringly, ‘purest alabaster!’ Amused but unsuccessful, Sykes returned to London where he attempted to strengthen the resolve of pro-Zionist ministers. Despite his obduracy during the meeting with Sykes, Curzon had accepted that he could not prevent Lloyd George from issuing a public commitment to the Zionist lobby and resolved to water down the policy of the government.
Curzon – ‘Alabaster’ to Sykes
When the War Cabinet resumed its discussion on 30th July, Curzon reiterated his arguments and produced reports from officials in Palestine that suggested that the attitude of local Arabs to the idea of greater Jewish immigration was unfriendly. The Foreign Secretary insisted that the principal obstacle to any Jewish settlement in Palestine would be from the Arab population, a contention that appeared to be confirmed by the reports put before the War Cabinet. Curzon insisted that the text of the declaration being prepared for Zionist consumption be tempered. The phrase originally suggested by Balfour, which expounded ‘the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people’ was a primary target for Curzon. He now worked to harness Arab nationalism – a force he regarded as transitory and easy to control – in opposition to Zionism. In what Curzon regarded as a crucial victory, he successfully secured the consent of the War Cabinet to define the scope of the proposed Jewish national homeland within Arab-ruled and British protected territory. Together, Curzon, Milner and Balfour formulated the wording of the declaration and published it in the form of a public letter to the most prominent Jew in Britain, the banker Lord Rothschild. Reluctantly, Curzon, in the capacity of Foreign Secretary, agreed to be the official author of the letter.
In winning his concessions, Curzon believed that he had smothered Zionism under a blanket of British controlled Arab nationalism, thereby rendering the declaration insignificant. Yet Britain had pledged itself to a substantial degree, publicly acknowledging that she intended to rule Palestine and to sponsor the aspirations of both the Arabs and the Zionists. Sykes believed that the War Cabinet had given too much ground to Curzon and made British intensions a little too apparent, writing with dissatisfaction to Weizmann that ‘Alabaster has spiked our guns.’ Weizmann concurred and believed that an opportunity had been missed to issue a stronger declaration in support of Zionist aims. Despite this disappointment, the British Zionist Federation was not prepared to pass up the chance of heralding the declaration as a new departure for the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. The Federation organised a celebration at the London Opera House in which numerous speakers praised the ‘Curzon Declaration’ and pleaded for unity among the Jewish, Arab and Armenian peoples in their quest for national self-determination. Sykes and Cecil were honoured guests, and although invited, Curzon politely declined to attend.
General Allenby addressing a Jewish community in Jerusalem
As soon as Syria was conquered by the British Army in mid-June, the government in London commenced planning for operations that would knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. These proceeded apace even as Curzon attempted to make the best of the furtive peace offer from Talaat. The War Cabinet asked General Allenby in Palestine to pass verdict on the viability of continuing the Allied advance into Anatolia. The cautious response was that a campaign in Anatolia would demand a doubling of British manpower in the region and a vast importation of horses and mules to cope with the gargantuan logistical demands of sustaining an army through the Taurus Mountains. This confirmed to Lloyd George his initial conviction that the Ottomans could only be forced from the war by directly threatening the capital, Constantinople. The War Cabinet ordered that divisions of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Syria be transferred to Crete and Thrace. The concerns of General Allenby that insufficient troops would be available for the garrisoning of the Levant were satisfied by the movement of Indian divisions from Mesopotamia to Syria. The Prime Minister had already envisaged the campaign that would compel the Ottomans to sue for peace and make Britain the undisputed master of the Near East. Briand agreed with Lloyd George that an attempt should be made in 1917 to push the Ottomans from the conflict and that a campaign against Constantinople would require Allied cooperation. Furthermore, Venizelos appreciated the attention that his allies were now giving to the Thracian front and promised that Greece would give full assistance to a renewed Allied campaign against the Turkish capital. The Greek Prime Minister even suggested that the commander of his armies in Thrace, General Danglis, be appointed to command Allied forces in Thrace and the Aegean, but this was vetoed by both Lloyd George and Briand, who wanted the position to be filled by generals of their choice. The Greek government, effectively reliant on Britain and France for munitions and supplies, could only protest mildly as Lloyd George and Briand jockeyed for the leadership role in the campaign. Briand suggested that General Louis Franchet d’Esperey fulfil the newly created role of Allied Supreme Commander, Eastern Mediterranean, pointing to his valuable experience on the western front. However, Lloyd George was able to seize the high ground by outbidding the French Prime Minister in terms of manpower commitment. The British soon possessed fourteen divisions based in Crete and Thrace and more in transit, dwarfing the five divisions of France. Unable to remove any more divisions from the western front for the campaign and aware that it would be absurd to protest at the immense British commitment, Briand grudgingly accepted defeat and permitted Lloyd George the right to select the Allied commander. By 17th July, General Allenby had established his headquarters on the island of Lemnos and assumed command of all British, French and Greek forces in the region.
The experience of the aborted Gallipoli campaign in 1915 aroused uneasiness at the prospect of another operation against the Dardanelles Straits in the War Cabinet. Yet this is precisely what Allenby proposed in his operational plan, which encompassed a combined military and naval assault on the Gallipoli peninsula, a probing attack against Smyrna and the main thrust, an eastward advance on Constantinople through Thrace. The Anglo-Greek attack on Gallipoli in 1915 had lasted just three weeks prior to its ultimate repulse and the new Allied Supreme Commander in the region was not alone in believing that this had been insufficient. Then, British manpower was at a premium as a consequence of the demands placed by the campaigns in France and northern Germany. Yet by now, Allenby had nearly twenty-five divisions at his disposal and was promised by Lloyd George any quantity of reinforcements that he required. Curzon, having quickly realised that the prospect of immediate peace with the Ottoman Empire was slim, became the most forceful proponent of a combined assault on the Straits within the War Cabinet. The Foreign Secretary opined that the 1915 operation never probed the defences of the Turkish capital vigorously enough and that a weighty push against her forces in Thrace and in Gallipoli would push the Ottomans out of the war. Control of the Straits, Curzon insisted, would permit Britain to boss peace terms with the Ottoman Empire. This attitude gained ascendancy within a sympathetic War Cabinet and Allenby’s plan was quickly sanctioned by its excited members. Whilst the inevitable agreement of France and Greece was pending, Russia was deliberately kept in the dark about the planned campaign. Any suggestion emanating from Lemnos that Russia could lend a participatory hand in attacking the Bosporus from the Black Sea was decisively quashed by the intervention of Curzon and the Foreign Office. Lloyd George and Curzon were equally desirous that the fantastic prize of Constantinople should fall to the British, not the Russians. The War Cabinet reaffirmed its desire that the campaign against Constantinople should be British-led and mostly British operated when Allenby requested naval reinforcements, particularly for vessels with heavy calibre guns. The victory in the North Sea in early-July further widened the disparity between the Grand Fleet and the Hochseeflotte, negating the justification for maintaining Jellicoe’s fleet at such a size. With the approval of the French and Greeks, Lloyd George offered command of Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean to the Battlecruiser Fleet commander, Admiral Beatty, informing him that he would take three entire battle squadrons from the Grand Fleet with him. Beatty leapt at the opportunity to depart the North Sea theatre, which appeared to have been concluded satisfactorily. Accepting the offer of a new command, he even persuaded Admiral Wemyss at the Admiralty that he should be permitted to take Lion to the Mediterranean as his flagship. Sailing to the Mediterranean, Beatty led an immensely powerful force, consisting of three battlecruisers, Indomitable, Invincible and New Zealand, five dreadnoughts from the Fourth Battle Squadron, Agincourt, Canada, King George V, Audacious and Ajax and five dreadnoughts of the Sixth Battle Squadron, Revenge, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Resolution and Emperor of India. Upon rendezvousing with the French and Greek fleets, Beatty gathered his armada at the Gulf of Volo. Once repaired, the vessels, Centurion, Benbow, Indefatigable and Australia were also sent to Volo to join the Allied fleet.
Admiral Beatty socialising with Greek soldiers at Volo
When the Bulgarians launched an offensive in Macedonia against Serbian-held Allied lines on 17th August, a Turko-Bulgarian attack was also pressed against Allied positions in Thrace, where the Ottomans and Bulgarians sought to recapture Xanthi and Komotini, lost to the Greeks in the spring. This latter offensive was merely a support operation and it was never likely to make much headway against the entrenched Allied lines, now reinforced by an influx of British and French divisions. The attackers were heavily outnumbered and were soon forced into retreat. General Franchet d’Esperey, appointed by Allenby to command Army Group Thrace, took advantage of this unexpected development and commenced his advance on the vital Bulgarian port of Dedeagach a month earlier than planned. The attempt by the Bulgarian Army to break the Allies’ hold over Macedonia had succeeded only in encouraging them to flaunt their newly-acquired strength. Franchet d’Esperey was bold in his advance, and Grossetti’s XVIII French Corps, part of General Sarrail’s First Thracian Army, occupied Dedeagach on 28th August. Along the Turko-Bulgarian front, there was discord as their respective governments issued orders for their forces to retreat along different routes. Whilst the Bulgarian Army fell back northwards in order to defend Bulgarian territory, the Ottoman Army retreated behind the Ergene River, settling on her eastern bank. Throughout September, Franchet d’Esperey continued to probe at the fragile line settled on the Ergene River, but otherwise waited for the delivery of more artillery and reinforcements. The resumption of the offensive occurred on 19th September when the First Thracian Army attacked along the Ergene whilst British troops from XXII Corps sailed in landing craft across the Aegean Sea towards the Gallipoli peninsula.
In late June 1917, with the conquest of the Arab Middle East complete, an emissary of the Ottoman government met a British embassy official in Bern and quietly raised the possibility of a separate peace deal between the Ottoman and British governments. No terms were mentioned, and the news of the Ottoman offer soon reached the new occupant of the Foreign Office, Lord Curzon. Intrigued by the possibilities that were opening up, Curzon insisted that the Bern embassy press the Ottomans to reveal their hand as to the terms they were willing to countenance and to emphasise that an agreement would have to be reached with all Allied powers, not Britain alone. Talaat Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had tenuously put forth the peace proposal and withheld terms with the objective of salvaging as much as possible of the empire from the British. However, Curzon’s insistence that the Ottomans state their terms contrived to stymie Talaat’s peace initiative before it had left the ground. Eager that something be made of the brief dialogue with the British other than a plea and a stonewall refusal, Talaat instructed that he was willing to negotiate on the basis that Anatolia remain Turkish whilst the Arab Middle East be ceded to Great Britain. The Allies would not have the right to occupy Anatolian territory; indeed, no other powers other than Britain were mentioned. Curzon regarded the terms as a workable basis upon which to negotiate further, although he was perturbed by the continued exclusion of other powers. Whilst Sir Mark Sykes, political secretary of the War Cabinet Secretariat, urged Curzon to provisionally accept the Ottoman proposal on the additional condition that the Armenian population of the empire be protected, Curzon was cautious, given that Britain’s allies were blithely unaware that Talaat had sent out peace feelers. Curzon was attracted to a scheme that acknowledged British supremacy in Arab territory and kept the Ottomans in Anatolia, yet the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the subsequent Cairo Agreement of 1917 severely limited his options, much to his chagrin. The Foreign Secretary believed that the 1915 scheme of regional devolution within the empire, if revived, could successfully prize the Ottomans from the war whilst respecting the interests of the Allies. Curzon swiftly latched onto this concept as a way forward and sought to convince his allies that the devolutionary scheme would be worth implementing in return for an armistice with the Ottomans.
Ottoman officials made contact with the British embassy in Bern
Curzon was concerned that his allied partners would be encouraged to add to their ambitions in the Ottoman Empire by Talaat’s peace offer. Consequently, when he met the French ambassador, Paul Cambon, he did not reveal the fact that Talaat had made contact with the Foreign Office, choosing instead to present his offer in abstract terms. New to his post, Curzon could present the scheme as a personalised initiative of an enthusiast and enquired whether France would accept a devolved but sovereign Ottoman Empire in return for an armistice. Wary, Cambon responded that he could conceive of no reason why the Cairo Agreement should be overhauled so swiftly after its conclusion, and then explained that even if Ottoman integrity were to be respected, France would still have to become the de facto rulers of Syria and Cilicia, in a more overt fashion of pre-1914 British rule in Egypt. As Curzon expected, Cambon had reasserted France’s claim to Syria, which the Foreign Secretary regarded as unacceptable in the light of recent British conquests. When contacted by the Foreign Office, the Italian and Greek governments signalled that they opposed an armistice with the Ottomans without their total surrender and acceptance of Allied troops to occupy strategic locations. Predictably, Italy, Greece, France and Russia had readied troops to occupy their claims and were not prepared to countenance a settlement that saw previous territorial agreements torn up. In particular, the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg, despite the turmoil in Russia, insisted that its claims to the Bosporus be respected and argued, not unjustly, that its occupation of Trabzon and portions of Armenia be rewarded with a slice of Anatolian territory. The Russians showed little interest in the Ottoman devolution scheme, regarding it as an unsatisfactory safeguard of Russian interests. It was soon apparent that Britain’s allies were not going to be deterred from urging that the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Cairo Agreement, which Russia was unaware of, be upheld. Indeed, they were positively encouraged by the manifestation of Ottoman weakness as demonstrated by the British advance in Syria, which indicated that she was on the brink of collapse.
Talaat Pasha
Britain and France had already acted without Russian counsel in reaching an agreement at Cairo, but with the Russians still tying down German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the eastern front, Curzon was mindful that Russia not be provoked into detaching herself from the Allies and reaching a separate arrangement with the Central Powers. Although confidence in Russia’s ability to continue her exertions had faded, Curzon did not wish to give her cause to leave the Allies. The Foreign Secretary recognised that denying his allies of their claims in Anatolia would only encourage them to seek compensation elsewhere. The future friendship of Greece and her participation in the war could not be guaranteed if her rights in Anatolia were not maintained; if Italy were not to receive south-west Anatolia, she would press for Arabian territory at the expense of Britain; if France were not to receive Cilicia, she could never be ejected from Syria without a serious, permanent breach. Curzon was determined to assert British hegemony in the Arab Middle East and already regarded the Cairo Agreement as a millstone around Britain’s neck. Although Curzon keenly sought to keep Turkey intact, he soon recognised that his primary aim of promoting Britain in Arabia required that the energies of his allies be diverted and that the partition of Anatolia was the best method of reaching that goal. The failure of the Allies to reach a common agenda on an armistice with the Ottomans guaranteed a continuation of hostilities. Talaat had no interest in a settlement that did not involve a guarantee of Ottoman primacy in Anatolia. When the prospect of peace arose, no ally was prepared to forego the entitlements achieved by their diplomats. With his ambition to absorb vast tracts of Arabia into the British Empire, this was no the less the case for Curzon than it was for other Allied statesmen. The Foreign Secretary still reserved hope for the maintenance of a friendly Ottoman entity confined to Anatolia, but was now resigned to the fact that Britain could only achieve this by gaining mastery over Turkey itself and pleading the right of conquest in a future settlement. The Allies were now thoroughly committed to dismemberment – Ottoman peace terms were rejected and when they sought out the United States, the State Department was unsympathetic, refusing to respond to their enquiry.
Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London
By earmarking Palestine for British rule, the Cairo Agreement implicitly acknowledged that the cause of Zionism was a British concern whilst Armenian nationalism would flourish under French protection. Not only did Curzon lament the Cairo Agreement for its provision for the dismemberment of Anatolia and the recognition of French rights in Syria, he was ill at ease with the inference drawn from the agreement that in claiming Palestine, Britain was automatically promoting Zionism. Curzon regarded it as fortunate that no definite pledge had been made by the British government to the Zionist lobby led by Chaim Weizmann and retained the hope that none would need to be made in the future. Curzon was eager to defer discussion on the subject and aimed to wait out the nationalist lobbyists by shrouding British intentions in mystery. He pleaded with the Cabinet that, whilst the prospect of peace with the Ottoman Empire remained, no decision on Zionism should be made in case it complicated negotiations. Whilst pursuing the offer made by Talaat, Curzon successfully suppressed moves within the War Cabinet to make British support of Zionism a public, irreversible fact. Meanwhile, Sykes, the architect of the Cairo Agreement and the most ardent advocate of Zionism in government circles, sought to undermine Curzon’s stance by cultivating the support of those sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Lord Robert Cecil, the Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, was fervent in his support for self-determination and had already envisaged a world of collective security and eternal peace. He concurred with Sykes that Curzon’s evasion of the Zionist issue could not continue and that a commitment would have to be made to Weizmann before the Zionists looked elsewhere for support. Sykes also discussed the issue with Lloyd George, who had recently taken receipt of a report by Leo Amery, also attached to the War Cabinet Secretariat, which predicted that the war against the Central Powers would last until 1919 or 1920. The timing of the presentation of the report proved fortuitous for pro-Zionists such as Sykes, as it reinforced Lloyd George’s tendency to conceive of the war in a long-term perspective. When Sykes restated the case for Zionism to Lloyd George, he emphasised the benefits for Britain in her war of endurance. Lloyd George, an avid reader of the Bible, had long been enamoured with the Zionist cause and required little convincing. Balfour, an admirer of Jewish culture, and Milner, who believed that Judaism could strengthen the British Empire, were also sympathetic to Zionism. When Curzon informed the Cabinet that terms for an armistice with Turkey could not be agreed upon, the pro-Zionists went to work in attempting to force the Foreign Secretary’s hand.
Sykes enthusiastically promoted Zionism when dealing with War Cabinet members
Sykes was permitted to put forward his case for the Zionists to the War Cabinet in July 1917. In his report, he emphasised the potential diplomatic benefits by illustrating the apparent influence of Jews. He argued that the sentiment of European Jewry, particularly in Russia, lay with the Central Powers as a consequence of the anti-Semitism of successive Russian governments. Support for the cause of Zionism and the settlement of Jews in Palestine could bolster Russian Jews to support the Allied cause and sustain Russia in the war. The deterioration of the domestic front in Russia, argued Sykes, made a pro-Zionist declaration more urgent than ever before. Sykes also expounded his belief that a commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine would earn the support of American Jews who could put their wealth at the disposal of the Allies. Although the virtue of self-determination for the Jewish people was an important component of Sykes’ argument, he catered for his War Cabinet readership and sought above all to appeal to British interests. Taken together, the effect of the reports submitted by Amery and Sykes was to transform a national Jewish homeland from a distant aspiration to an urgent necessity for Britain. Curzon was unimpressed, and wrote to the Chief Secretary of Ireland, Edwin Montagu, that ‘I cannot conceive a worse bondage…to which to relegate an advanced and intellectual community than to exile in Palestine.’ Montagu, a Jew, staunchly anti-Zionist, found a powerful ally in his attempt to prevent the British government from sponsoring a Jewish national home when the Foreign Secretary invited him to his Derbyshire estate, Kedleston Hall, where they discussed the matter. Curzon and Montagu directed their critiques of Zionist ambition from different perspectives. Whilst Montagu labelled Zionism as a ‘mischievous political creed’ that would provide anti-Semites with excuses to support the deportation of Jews to Palestine, the Orientally-orientated mind of Curzon operated differently. The Foreign Secretary could not envisage how an influx of Jewish migrants could be facilitated without the forced removal of the local Arab population and did not think that Palestine could accommodate a vast number of newcomers. Having agreed that committing to a Jewish homeland would be an act of folly, Curzon and Montagu pledged to work together.
Kedleston Hall
The arguments against Zionism put forth by Curzon inside the War Cabinet and by Montagu outside it were countered by Lloyd George, Balfour, Milner and Smuts, who formed a formidable quartet in support of declaring publicly that Britain would support a Jewish national home. Indeed, Curzon and Montagu soon found that members of the government were unanimously opposed to their pleas that Zionism be kicked into the long grass. They were encouraged when Curzon conceded that a commitment to the Zionists had some merit. He calculated that it could assist in reconciling American public opinion to the new order that he sought to construct in the Middle East, which he wanted to be overtly imperialistic. Furthermore, he shared Sykes’ belief that the Zionist cause was linked to that of the Armenians because of the sponsorship by France of the latter. Curzon toyed with using the liberationist rhetoric favoured by Sykes for explicitly British ends – championing the Armenians alongside the Zionists could lure France away from Arabia, embroil her with Russia in Anatolia and allow Britain to benefit. Nevertheless, Curzon was still inclined to follow his instinct and regard the Zionist project as a sham. When another meeting of the War Cabinet failed to convince Curzon, Sykes was sent to Kedleston Hall in an attempt to persuade him differently. Together they exchanged stories of their extensive travels in the Middle East and Central Asia, but Sykes was unable to convince Curzon of the virtues of Zionism any more than the War Cabinet had. Sykes was also somewhat deterred by the peculiarities of Curzon’s character – when he asked the Foreign Secretary whether Kedleston Hall’s columns were imitation marble, as they were at his Sledmere estate, Curzon replied self-admiringly, ‘purest alabaster!’ Amused but unsuccessful, Sykes returned to London where he attempted to strengthen the resolve of pro-Zionist ministers. Despite his obduracy during the meeting with Sykes, Curzon had accepted that he could not prevent Lloyd George from issuing a public commitment to the Zionist lobby and resolved to water down the policy of the government.
Curzon – ‘Alabaster’ to Sykes
When the War Cabinet resumed its discussion on 30th July, Curzon reiterated his arguments and produced reports from officials in Palestine that suggested that the attitude of local Arabs to the idea of greater Jewish immigration was unfriendly. The Foreign Secretary insisted that the principal obstacle to any Jewish settlement in Palestine would be from the Arab population, a contention that appeared to be confirmed by the reports put before the War Cabinet. Curzon insisted that the text of the declaration being prepared for Zionist consumption be tempered. The phrase originally suggested by Balfour, which expounded ‘the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people’ was a primary target for Curzon. He now worked to harness Arab nationalism – a force he regarded as transitory and easy to control – in opposition to Zionism. In what Curzon regarded as a crucial victory, he successfully secured the consent of the War Cabinet to define the scope of the proposed Jewish national homeland within Arab-ruled and British protected territory. Together, Curzon, Milner and Balfour formulated the wording of the declaration and published it in the form of a public letter to the most prominent Jew in Britain, the banker Lord Rothschild. Reluctantly, Curzon, in the capacity of Foreign Secretary, agreed to be the official author of the letter.
In winning his concessions, Curzon believed that he had smothered Zionism under a blanket of British controlled Arab nationalism, thereby rendering the declaration insignificant. Yet Britain had pledged itself to a substantial degree, publicly acknowledging that she intended to rule Palestine and to sponsor the aspirations of both the Arabs and the Zionists. Sykes believed that the War Cabinet had given too much ground to Curzon and made British intensions a little too apparent, writing with dissatisfaction to Weizmann that ‘Alabaster has spiked our guns.’ Weizmann concurred and believed that an opportunity had been missed to issue a stronger declaration in support of Zionist aims. Despite this disappointment, the British Zionist Federation was not prepared to pass up the chance of heralding the declaration as a new departure for the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. The Federation organised a celebration at the London Opera House in which numerous speakers praised the ‘Curzon Declaration’ and pleaded for unity among the Jewish, Arab and Armenian peoples in their quest for national self-determination. Sykes and Cecil were honoured guests, and although invited, Curzon politely declined to attend.
General Allenby addressing a Jewish community in Jerusalem
As soon as Syria was conquered by the British Army in mid-June, the government in London commenced planning for operations that would knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. These proceeded apace even as Curzon attempted to make the best of the furtive peace offer from Talaat. The War Cabinet asked General Allenby in Palestine to pass verdict on the viability of continuing the Allied advance into Anatolia. The cautious response was that a campaign in Anatolia would demand a doubling of British manpower in the region and a vast importation of horses and mules to cope with the gargantuan logistical demands of sustaining an army through the Taurus Mountains. This confirmed to Lloyd George his initial conviction that the Ottomans could only be forced from the war by directly threatening the capital, Constantinople. The War Cabinet ordered that divisions of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Syria be transferred to Crete and Thrace. The concerns of General Allenby that insufficient troops would be available for the garrisoning of the Levant were satisfied by the movement of Indian divisions from Mesopotamia to Syria. The Prime Minister had already envisaged the campaign that would compel the Ottomans to sue for peace and make Britain the undisputed master of the Near East. Briand agreed with Lloyd George that an attempt should be made in 1917 to push the Ottomans from the conflict and that a campaign against Constantinople would require Allied cooperation. Furthermore, Venizelos appreciated the attention that his allies were now giving to the Thracian front and promised that Greece would give full assistance to a renewed Allied campaign against the Turkish capital. The Greek Prime Minister even suggested that the commander of his armies in Thrace, General Danglis, be appointed to command Allied forces in Thrace and the Aegean, but this was vetoed by both Lloyd George and Briand, who wanted the position to be filled by generals of their choice. The Greek government, effectively reliant on Britain and France for munitions and supplies, could only protest mildly as Lloyd George and Briand jockeyed for the leadership role in the campaign. Briand suggested that General Louis Franchet d’Esperey fulfil the newly created role of Allied Supreme Commander, Eastern Mediterranean, pointing to his valuable experience on the western front. However, Lloyd George was able to seize the high ground by outbidding the French Prime Minister in terms of manpower commitment. The British soon possessed fourteen divisions based in Crete and Thrace and more in transit, dwarfing the five divisions of France. Unable to remove any more divisions from the western front for the campaign and aware that it would be absurd to protest at the immense British commitment, Briand grudgingly accepted defeat and permitted Lloyd George the right to select the Allied commander. By 17th July, General Allenby had established his headquarters on the island of Lemnos and assumed command of all British, French and Greek forces in the region.
The experience of the aborted Gallipoli campaign in 1915 aroused uneasiness at the prospect of another operation against the Dardanelles Straits in the War Cabinet. Yet this is precisely what Allenby proposed in his operational plan, which encompassed a combined military and naval assault on the Gallipoli peninsula, a probing attack against Smyrna and the main thrust, an eastward advance on Constantinople through Thrace. The Anglo-Greek attack on Gallipoli in 1915 had lasted just three weeks prior to its ultimate repulse and the new Allied Supreme Commander in the region was not alone in believing that this had been insufficient. Then, British manpower was at a premium as a consequence of the demands placed by the campaigns in France and northern Germany. Yet by now, Allenby had nearly twenty-five divisions at his disposal and was promised by Lloyd George any quantity of reinforcements that he required. Curzon, having quickly realised that the prospect of immediate peace with the Ottoman Empire was slim, became the most forceful proponent of a combined assault on the Straits within the War Cabinet. The Foreign Secretary opined that the 1915 operation never probed the defences of the Turkish capital vigorously enough and that a weighty push against her forces in Thrace and in Gallipoli would push the Ottomans out of the war. Control of the Straits, Curzon insisted, would permit Britain to boss peace terms with the Ottoman Empire. This attitude gained ascendancy within a sympathetic War Cabinet and Allenby’s plan was quickly sanctioned by its excited members. Whilst the inevitable agreement of France and Greece was pending, Russia was deliberately kept in the dark about the planned campaign. Any suggestion emanating from Lemnos that Russia could lend a participatory hand in attacking the Bosporus from the Black Sea was decisively quashed by the intervention of Curzon and the Foreign Office. Lloyd George and Curzon were equally desirous that the fantastic prize of Constantinople should fall to the British, not the Russians. The War Cabinet reaffirmed its desire that the campaign against Constantinople should be British-led and mostly British operated when Allenby requested naval reinforcements, particularly for vessels with heavy calibre guns. The victory in the North Sea in early-July further widened the disparity between the Grand Fleet and the Hochseeflotte, negating the justification for maintaining Jellicoe’s fleet at such a size. With the approval of the French and Greeks, Lloyd George offered command of Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean to the Battlecruiser Fleet commander, Admiral Beatty, informing him that he would take three entire battle squadrons from the Grand Fleet with him. Beatty leapt at the opportunity to depart the North Sea theatre, which appeared to have been concluded satisfactorily. Accepting the offer of a new command, he even persuaded Admiral Wemyss at the Admiralty that he should be permitted to take Lion to the Mediterranean as his flagship. Sailing to the Mediterranean, Beatty led an immensely powerful force, consisting of three battlecruisers, Indomitable, Invincible and New Zealand, five dreadnoughts from the Fourth Battle Squadron, Agincourt, Canada, King George V, Audacious and Ajax and five dreadnoughts of the Sixth Battle Squadron, Revenge, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign, Resolution and Emperor of India. Upon rendezvousing with the French and Greek fleets, Beatty gathered his armada at the Gulf of Volo. Once repaired, the vessels, Centurion, Benbow, Indefatigable and Australia were also sent to Volo to join the Allied fleet.
Admiral Beatty socialising with Greek soldiers at Volo
When the Bulgarians launched an offensive in Macedonia against Serbian-held Allied lines on 17th August, a Turko-Bulgarian attack was also pressed against Allied positions in Thrace, where the Ottomans and Bulgarians sought to recapture Xanthi and Komotini, lost to the Greeks in the spring. This latter offensive was merely a support operation and it was never likely to make much headway against the entrenched Allied lines, now reinforced by an influx of British and French divisions. The attackers were heavily outnumbered and were soon forced into retreat. General Franchet d’Esperey, appointed by Allenby to command Army Group Thrace, took advantage of this unexpected development and commenced his advance on the vital Bulgarian port of Dedeagach a month earlier than planned. The attempt by the Bulgarian Army to break the Allies’ hold over Macedonia had succeeded only in encouraging them to flaunt their newly-acquired strength. Franchet d’Esperey was bold in his advance, and Grossetti’s XVIII French Corps, part of General Sarrail’s First Thracian Army, occupied Dedeagach on 28th August. Along the Turko-Bulgarian front, there was discord as their respective governments issued orders for their forces to retreat along different routes. Whilst the Bulgarian Army fell back northwards in order to defend Bulgarian territory, the Ottoman Army retreated behind the Ergene River, settling on her eastern bank. Throughout September, Franchet d’Esperey continued to probe at the fragile line settled on the Ergene River, but otherwise waited for the delivery of more artillery and reinforcements. The resumption of the offensive occurred on 19th September when the First Thracian Army attacked along the Ergene whilst British troops from XXII Corps sailed in landing craft across the Aegean Sea towards the Gallipoli peninsula.
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Oh, an excellent update if ever there was one. Curzon knocks some sense into the Balfour Decleration, and full steam ahead against the Ottomans! Constantinople, here we come!
I eagerly await Gallipoli Mk II. Hopefully the Ottomans shall be done before Autumn arrives!
Although I wonder how Curzon will try to challenge the breakup of Anatolia in the future, if indeed he does so.
I eagerly await Gallipoli Mk II. Hopefully the Ottomans shall be done before Autumn arrives!
Although I wonder how Curzon will try to challenge the breakup of Anatolia in the future, if indeed he does so.
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Vincent Julien said:
Thank you, sir!
Thank you very much!Curzon has declared his support for Zionism, Arab nationalism and British imperialism in the same sentence! Now all that has to be done is to marry these together as smoothly as possible. The Arabs will wonder to what extent the British will be involved, the Zionists will speculate as to whether they will be able to migrate to Palestine in large numbers and the British will ponder over whether everyone can get along!
Vincent Julien said:
375,000 men all thrown simultaneously at the demoralised, ill-equipped Turkish Army should be a simple matter.
The Curzon plan to prevent the break-up of Anatolia is to convince his allies that the war against Turkey, having been undertaken almost entirely by Britain, should justify the peace agreement being dictated by Britain alone. Failing that, effective occupation of the Ottoman Empire should allow Britain to dictate the peace...
And so begins the in-fighting over the scraps, though the British clearly have the upper hand having been the main effort in the advance.