1914-1924 'British interests; British honour; British obligations'

[Lord E]

Nice update Allenby, it is about time that French is relived of his command soon I think
Now I guess we will see a great attack from all the Allies at once towards the Central Powers in 1916? But that will probably end in confusion as well, so what about sending Allenby down to the Middle East to show the Ottoman Empire who is the boss

 

[unmerged(28406)]

Please bea the hell outta those Turks,they are the weakest and should be defeated first ! I bet they stacked their capital with lots of divisions witch could mean that the conquest of Mesopotamia is as easy as hitting an pigeon lying on the ground !

 

[unmerged(17780)]

Yes, bring some Lawrence of Arabia-feel to this AAR! Give the Turks hell!

 

[unmerged(28406)]

Indeed I am waiting for an new Middle East update since.....forever !!!

 

[unmerged(4277)]

Alright! Updates since the last time I was here.

 

[Sir Humphrey]

Get to Bashra and advance up the road to Baghdad! Good show!

 

[unmerged(28406)]

So Allenby no update today ?

 

[Mettermrck]

Get to Bashra and advance up the road to Baghdad! Good show!

Just watch it when you get near Kut-el-Amara!

 

[Sir Humphrey]

lol, last thing anybody needs to Kut.

 

[Allenby]

The Canadian Corps under Alderson? Surely not, give the command to Arthur Currie!

Currie's a Major-General in 1915. It wouldn't be the best of moves to give such an important to command to someone who is unqualified.

Now I guess we will see a great attack from all the Allies at once towards the Central Powers in 1916? But that will probably end in confusion as well, so what about sending Allenby down to the Middle East to show the Ottoman Empire who is the boss

I hold out greater optimism for 1916 than you do. For the Allies will be able to pressurise the Central Powers on all fronts, including the front against Turkey. Nevertheless, the western front will remain Britain's main theatre of battle, without doubt!

Please bea the hell outta those Turks,they are the weakest and should be defeated first ! I bet they stacked their capital with lots of divisions witch could mean that the conquest of Mesopotamia is as easy as hitting an pigeon lying on the ground !

Be patient. Defeating the Turks is not a simple matter of sending a token force on an unrelenting advance towards Baghdad...

Yes, bring some Lawrence of Arabia-feel to this AAR! Give the Turks hell!

Lawrence who? Some officer drawing maps in Cairo, I gather...

Alright! Updates since the last time I was here.

Okay o

Get to Bashra and advance up the road to Baghdad! Good show!

Unfortunately, the 'road' to Baghdad is little more than a mud track.

Just watch it when you get near Kut-el-Amara!

Why? It's the perfect place to situate an understrength and exhausted division for several months.

 

[Allenby]

Part XLIII – A Change in Command

Lieutenant-General Sir William Robertson, the BEF’s Chief of Staff, visited London after the battle of Hulluch in October 1915 to meet the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Archibald Murray, supposedly to discuss strategy. In reality Robertson was in London to raise the issue of replacing French, and even went to the King to discuss the matter. Robertson returned and met Haig, who noted that

“I have been more than loyal to French and did my best to stop all criticism of him or his methods. Now, at last, in view of what happened in the recent battle [of Hulluch] over the reserves, I had come to the conclusion that it was not fair to the Empire to retain French in command. Moreover, none of my officers commanding corps had a high opinion of Sir John’s military ability or military views; in fact, they had no confidence in him. Robertson quite agreed, and left me saying ‘he knew how to act, and would report to Stamfordham’”

Lord Stamfordham, private secretary to King George V, received the news of the discontent within the BEF and passed it on to the King. Concerned that the BEF’s fabric was fraying at the seams, he decided to visit France himself to assess opinion. At dinner with Haig, the First Army commander told the King that French was ‘a great source of weakness’ to the British Army and that no one had any confidence in him. Lieutenant-Generals Haking and Fergusson visited the King too, and repeated Haig’s sentiment. French did not endear himself to the King by making it rather inconspicuous that he found his presence in France something of a nuisance. When told that French wanted him to leave for England as soon as possible, the King was unequivocal: “Tell Sir John to go to hell.” The furore over the Hulluch Despatch and French’s blundering at Bullecourt was the final straw for most: the cabinet, divided before was now increasingly hostile to French continuing in his capacity as BEF Commander-in-Chief.

Field Marshal French salutes the 19th Hussars at Boulogne before leaving France​

Asquith met with the King and Kitchener in late November, and it was agreed that French was no longer up to the task of commanding the British armies in France. Lord Esher was sent to France to tell French that the government considered him unsuitable for command, news which the Field Marshal accepted with dignity. French’s subsequent manoeuvrings were less than magnanimous: he met the Prime Minister and was told that he was to be made Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces. French insisted that this appointment would be tricky if Kitchener remained as Secretary of State for War, and impressed upon Asquith his opinion that a civilian be appointed instead. Trying to make Kitchener’s removal a precondition to his own resignation was never likely to work, and Asquith did not prevaricate. On 3rd December, the Conservative politician, Walter Long was given the task of telephoning French and informing him that he had no alternative but to resign – if he did not, Asquith would sack him. French realised this would be damaging, and wrote his letter of resignation, which reached Asquith’s desk on 5th December 1915. He recommended Robertson as his successor, but it was clear that the only viable alternative to French was First Army commander, General Sir Douglas Haig. French met his army and corps commanders individually to bid them farewell: his meeting with Haig was embarrassingly formal, and Foch had cried upon seeing the Field Marshal. Grateful troops cheered as French was escorted by the 19th Hussars to Boulogne. Here, he boarded a vessel to England amidst tumultuous applause – a kind, courageous and generous commander, French was nevertheless not equal to the task that had been given to him in 1914. The government and army felt that, his successor, General Sir Douglas Haig, was.

General Sir Douglas Haig, the new Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force​

One reason why Sir William Robertson was not considered for the role of succeeding French was because he was already being marked down to take over from Murray as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. If French’s credibility in government was shot, then Kitchener’s was waning also. Pressure was being heaped on Asquith by David Lloyd George, Lord Curzon and Arthur Balfour to relieve Kitchener from his position as Secretary of State for War. The Prime Minister appeased them by moving the Ordnance Department from the auspices of the War Office to the Munitions Ministry, and thus to Lloyd George. Stung, Kitchener offered to resign, but Asquith refused and insisted to the Secretary of State for War that it was his duty to King and country to remain at his post. Asquith knew that Kitchener was a symbol of the British war effort, and that to lose him might damage the government’s credibility in the eyes of the public. The people of Britain may have seen Kitchener as indispensable, but the army was less sure. Some commanders in France were losing confidence in Kitchener, whilst a sizeable body of opinion in the British Army did not even see Kitchener as one of their own. Indeed, Kitchener was regarded by many as being a ‘colonial soldier’, an officer who had a lack of experience in the British Army and the country, generally. Field Marshal Wolseley’s comment in 1899 that Lord Roberts, upon taking command in South Africa did “not know a thing about my army – the British Army” was to a degree replicated in 1915. It was felt that Kitchener knew more about the empire than he did Britain itself – he had been Commander-in-Chief of both the Egyptian and Indian armies and had spent much of his life away from Britain. Feeling that a man with experience in the British Army should guide strategy gained currency in the army’s upper echelons – and Asquith was not ignorant of this fact. At Lloyd George’s suggestion, Asquith constructed a streamlined War Committee of the cabinet to replace the War Council, and used the opportunity to enhance the powers of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a position that had lain dormant during Kitchener’s time at the War Office. The CIGS was ostensibly responsible for advising the government and forming the link between the Secretary of State for War and the field commanders, but Kitchener’s status ensured that he and not the CIGS took up this role. Seeking to reinvigorate the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Asquith sought to replace the current occupant, General Murray with someone with greater dynamism. Haig suggested Sir William Robertson, and he was brought from France to be offered the position.

The Western Front in December 1915​

‘Wully’ Robertson was a professional in every sense of the word. Joining the army in 1877 as a seventeen year old private in the 16th Lancers, he impressed those around him, and most importantly, those above him. Not from a military family, but from humble origins, Robertson could have expected to find promotion hard in the Victorian and Edwardian British Army, but his commitment to hard work ensured that he was taken notice of. By 1885 he was a troop sergeant-major in the 3rd Dragoon Guards, and served with them in India, later as an Intelligence Officer. He took part in the Chitral Expedition of 1895, as well as serving with the Malakand Field Force in 1897 and attended the Staff College within that time. An Intelligence Officer on Roberts’ staff in South Africa, he then widened his experience by touring the empire and the United States. Robertson continued his ascent: Commandant of the Staff College, Director of Military Training at the War Office, Quartermaster General to the BEF at the outbreak of war. Performing capably during the BEF’s retreat and subsequent supply shortages, he was rewarded by being appointed Chief of Staff to the BEF. His origins were no bar to his progress – in fact, the intelligent and industrious Robertson was held in high regard precisely because he had risen up the ranks so sharply. Now Robertson found himself in London, pondering over whether he should take up the appointment of CIGS – the professional pinnacle of the British Army. He was determined in one aspect – he was not going to work in Kitchener’s shadow, and he made this clear to Asquith.

Kitchener (left) with Robertson (right)​

Kitchener, upon hearing that strategic decision making would be taken away from him and given to the CIGS, again insisted to Asquith that he be allowed to resign, but again Asquith refused. Kitchener was being undermined, and was only gradually coming to terms with the fact that he would not have a final say on the direction of Britain’s war effort. He met Robertson and asked him to accept the post of CIGS, but spoke bluntly at how the lack of executive work in any new arrangement would make his continuation in office difficult. Robertson pleaded with Kitchener to stay, which the Secretary of State for War did with a little reluctance, and the two subsequently began to negotiate the definition of their respective roles. Kitchener accepted the loss of strategy making to Robertson, reasoning that he might still be able to influence Robertson as he had done with his predecessors. Thus, the Secretary of State for War and the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff began a cordial relationship which was to form the cornerstone of their working partnership.

 

[Mettermrck]

Interesting contrast between French and Kitchener there. It seemed both suffered similar problems of a "loss of confidence" by subordinates in the Army, but Kitchener possessed an advantage by being more of a public symbol than French. Btw, did that incident with the King really happen? "Tell him to go to hell"? Pretty outspoken for George.

 

[Mr.G 24]

Brilliant AAR worthy of more fanfare. You made me download the latest version of TGW. Now all I got to do now is catch up to the current.

 

[Sir Humphrey]

Top notch stuff. Very good!

 

[unmerged(28406)]

Yes I dont care if Kitchener will lose his job,as I heard Robertson's life I think he much more capable of bringing an new look to the army:everybody can join the Army,wether they poor or rich !!

 

[unmerged(28944)]

I'm interested in reading what kind of impact (if any) Robertson's appointment to CIGS will have on the war and it's planning. Can't wait.

 

[Allenby]

Interesting contrast between French and Kitchener there. It seemed both suffered similar problems of a "loss of confidence" by subordinates in the Army, but Kitchener possessed an advantage by being more of a public symbol than French.

I think that's a pretty good point - although French was not without public standing, he was not viewed with nearly the same amount affection as Kitchener was. Had Kitchener been the C-in-C of the BEF instead of French, and committed the same errors, then I suspect that the British government would have had a much harder time in getting rid of him.

Btw, did that incident with the King really happen? "Tell him to go to hell"? Pretty outspoken for George.

It would appear so! ...and very uncharacteristic of George, who normally resorted to quite uncolourful language. The comment is quoted in p. 308 of Richard Holmes' The Little Field Marshal: A Life of Sir John French.

You made me download the latest version of TGW.

It would seem that the next version is not very far away from completion now!

Top notch stuff. Very good!

A pleasure.

Yes I dont care if Kitchener will lose his job,as I heard Robertson's life I think he much more capable of bringing an new look to the army:everybody can join the Army,wether they poor or rich !!

Kitchener has not and probably will not lose his job - he has merely had the right of strategy making taken from him and given to Robertson. It would certainly seem that Robertson had the trust of the army - and government - more than Kitchener did, anyway.

I'm interested in reading what kind of impact (if any) Robertson's appointment to CIGS will have on the war and it's planning. Can't wait.

Headstrong and quite sure that the western front is the place to settle the war.

 

[Allenby]

Part XLIV – Advance and Retreat in Mesopotamia

The Turkish Army’s attempt to drive out Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ from its lodgement around Umm Qasr faltered by 30th January 1915. With the repulse of the Turks, the likelihood of Lieutenant-General Barrett’s force being withdrawn to Bahrein was remote. The Indian force was established on Mesopotamian soil and the Turks fell back to Basra to regroup. There were three Indian divisions in the area: Indian Expeditionary Force ‘D’ consisted of 6th (Poona) Division and 4th (Quetta) Division whilst the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division was on Abadan Island protection the Anglo-Persial Oil Company’s refineries. With four Turkish divisions in the area seemingly content with protecting Basra, Barrett decided to expand modestly on his initial gains. The 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division pushed northward to protect the city of Mohammerah and the west bank of the Kerun River from Turkish incursions, thereby securing the oil pipeline from Maidan-i-Naftun. Meanwhile, Force ‘D’ occupied the town of Sahil, and in so doing, secured both sides of the Shatt Al-Arab.

The British presence in Mesopotamia had been confirmed, but the India Office’s initial objectives were far from being met. General Sir Edmund Barrow, the Military Secretary to the India Office, wrote thus of the value of advancing further into Mesopotamia:

“1. It would checkmate Turkish intrigues and demonstrate our ability to strike;
2. It would encourage the Arabs to rally to us;
3. It would safeguard Egypt by pre-empting the Arab support necessary for a Turkish invasion there; and
4. It would protect the oil installation at Abadan.”

With Basra still unoccupied, no one felt that Britain’s initial objectives in Mesopotamia had been met. Firstly, although the oil pipeline and refinery were protected to a certain degree, it was not certain that a determined thrust against them by the Turks would not result in their damage or loss. Secondly, the local Arab populations were never likely to be impressed by the spectacle of an Indian Army precariously hanging onto a small area of southern Mesopotamia. Practical reasons also made the capture of Basra seem all the more pressing – by early February 1915, supplying the three Indian divisions was proving to be remarkably difficult given the poor quality of the local docking facilities. Umm Qasr was a small port and was soon clogged with shipping, whilst larger vessel were unable to go far up the Shatt Al-Arab, ensuring that the delivery of their stock depended on transfer to smaller craft. The poverty of the area meant that there was only just enough accommodation for the men, stores and animals making up Barrett’s force. The flat and swampy land south of Basra was prone to occasional flooding, thereby denying Force ‘D’ of much of the dry land it needed. It was obvious that an attempt to capture Basra had to be made immediately.

The Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge was an advocate of a forward policy​

Unfortunately, the means of capturing Basra were not readily available. The Indian force in the area was outnumbered by the Turks dug in around the city, whilst the quality of the three Indian divisions was open to question. They were equipped for internal policing and warfare on the northwest frontier of India, not in the flat and desolate territory of southern Mesopotamia. Furthermore, they were lacking in artillery, and most of the best officers available – and those with specialist Indian knowledge – had been sent to France, leaving second rate officers to take commission in peripheral theatres. Nevertheless, Barrett was not deterred, and on 21st February began an offensive against Basra. He opted for a direct, frontal assault on the city, a plan that was never likely to succeed. Unfortunately for him, it did not – he was relieved of command when Force ‘D’ was forced back the day afterwards, and General Sir John Nixon was brought to Mesopotamia to replace him. The Turks were not content with passive defence. They realised that Force ‘D’s rebuff could be turned into rout and put in their own offensive beginning on 25th February 1915. The demoralised Indian divisions struggled to hold onto their ground, and were given invaluable support by Royal Navy gunboats on the Shatt Al-Arab. The Indian government reacted quickly to what seemed like an impending crisis, and sanctioned the sending of two more Indian formations, the 5th (Mhow) Division and the 9th (Secunderabad) Division. The timely arrival of these divisions on 4th March helped stabilise a situation that was looking perilous at times – the Turks, on the verge of compelling Force ‘D’ across the Shatt Al-Arab and into Southern Arabistan, were sent back to Basra. This spirited display convinced the Turks of the worthiness of taking the campaign in Mesopotamia seriously, and two divisions were soon sent to the region via Baghdad.

Whilst Nixon restyled his force as the ‘Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force’, focus switched to Persia, which had become a playground of great power intrigue and conflict. Turkish and Russian detachments had openly fought on Persian soil since the Ottoman Empire entered the war in December 1914. In addition, German and Turkish agents were active across the country, sabotaging the Anglo-Persian Oil Company pipeline at various intervals and disseminating anti-British propaganda among local tribes. In the summer of 1915, the activity of a German foreign office official, Wilhelm Wassmuss in purchasing the help of the Bakhtiari tribe caught the attention of the British. When Wassmuss assembled four hundred tribesmen outside of the port of Bushire, the British reacted by sending a battalion of Indian troops to the port on 13th July 1915 to secure it against capture. To counteract Turco-German sponsored tribal attacks against the pipeline, some British troops were sent to Ahwaz. The British were nevertheless cautious – an aggressive policy in Persia might push it towards the Central Powers, which would be a calamity, especially with Basra still under Turkish control. The capture of this city was given high priority by the British and Indian governments, and on 16th July, two new divisions were disembarked at the crowded port of Umm Qasr: 10th (Indian) Division and 13th (Western) Division.

General Sir John Nixon​

The renewed determination to capture Basra came amidst the establishment of the coalition government in London, with Lord Curzon’s appointment as Secretary of State for India on 20th June 1915. Nearly a decade after resigning from the Viceroyalty of India, Curzon was now the constitutional head of the Indian government in London, responsible to the Cabinet and Parliament. Curzon’s relationship with the Secretary of State for India in his days as Viceroy were often strained – it was ironic that Curzon now found himself on the opposite side of the fence, and even more ironic that the Viceroy he was overseeing was Lord Hardinge, a man who had both criticised and undone some of Curzon’s earlier work in India. Relations between the two were less than cordial, but they were compelled to work together in the circumstances of war. Additionally, the De Bunsen Committee published its findings on 30th June 1915, stating what Britain’s aims in the Middle East should be. Kitchener’s personal representative, thirty-six year old Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, a Conservative MP and an expert on the Middle East, dominated proceedings. Assuming that Russia and France would be Britain’s future rivals in the region, the committee decided to maintain the Ottoman Empire, but in a deeply devolved state. The need to safeguard the Persian Gulf, and the approaches to it, were paramount. Accordingly, the report pledged to divide the Ottoman Empire into five provinces - “Syria”, “Armenia”, “Anatolia”, “Palestine” and “Jazirah-Iraq”, the latter two being dominated by the British. Sykes ensured that a Mediterranean port, Haifa, would connect to the southern portion of Mesopotamia, to allow Britain to swiftly deploy troops in the event of a Russian invasion. Yet the De Bunsen Committee’s findings also had short term consequences with regards to the campaign in Mesopotamia – it emphasised the need to secure Basra and to make the Persian Gulf as safe as possible. This evidently had not been achieved. Furthermore, the government was encouraged by the Admiralty – First Sea Lord, Sir Arthur Wilson commented that “one essential in view of the Admiralty…was that Lower Mesopotamia, including the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, should be occupied and held.” Furthermore, Vice Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, the Admiralty appointed director on the board of APOC argued in committee that “the subject must be looked at specifically from the point of view of safeguarding the interests of the Anglo-Persian concession.” Perhaps most pressing of all, the withdrawal of the Anglo-Greek force from Gallipoli in May, made the capture of Basra seem most urgent for the sake of British prestige

The De Bunsen Committee’s Ottoman Devolutionary Plan​

The capture of Basra​

Nixon now had seven divisions – nearly 80,000 men – concentrated south of Basra, and on 7th August 1915, began another advance on the city. This time, the Turks were outnumbered and had a particularly tough time in holding their ground against the British and Indian infantry. The newly arrived 10th (Indian) Division and 13th (Western) Division were particularly impressive in battle, outfighting the Turks and dislodging them from their defences, despite their numerical superiority in artillery. North of the Shatt Al-Arab, the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division advanced towards northwest of Basra, but were unable to cut off the River Tigris. It was this fear of encirclement and destruction that prompted the Turks to withdraw from their positions – first from Shaiba, and then from Basra itself. By 17th August, Nixon had secured Basra, as well as a number of villages along the River Tigris at a cost of 4,500 casualties, whilst the Turks withdrew upriver.

Basra in 1915​

With Basra secured, it naturally followed that the next target would be Baghdad. But it was here that differences arose over the pace at which Britain should seek to expand its area of occupation in Mesopotamia. Viceroy Hardinge was keen that the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force should follow up on its success at Basra, and pursue the Turks as quickly as possible. The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, writing from Simla, agreed: “the Turks appear to have been given a thorough thrashing; she is to all intents and purposes a beaten enemy”. Sir Edward Grey commented on the betterment of Britain’s standing in the eyes of the Arabs in the event of Baghdad’s capture. Curzon was no less emphatic, writing that “the effect of taking it [Baghdad] would be prodigious throughout Asia and it would be a valuable piece when the game of chess begins.” The subsequent capture of Qurna, site of the Garden of Eden, only helped to intensify the debate. Hardinge and Duff wanted Nixon to continue his advance; Curzon was an advocate of caution. He wanted the advance on Baghdad only to go ahead after the force had been restructured and resupplied. Reports had filtered through to the India Office of the parlous state of some of the divisions: officers serving with the 5th (Mhow) Division, 9th (Secunderabad) Division, 4th (Quetta) Division and 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division said that certain units in these formations were among the worst in the Indian Army, and that the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force’s fortunes would suffer as a result. Curzon felt that better Indian divisions should be constructed, or that units should be brought from Britain or the Dominions. Curzon would have had his way had it not been for the conduct of Hardinge and Duff who encouraged Nixon to make the capture of Nasiriya seem urgent. They argued that the Turks were using Nasariya as a hostile supply base, the capture of which would make the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force’s position impregnable. A local Arab leader, Sheikh Ajaimi of the Muntafik was based around Nasiriya, and was rumoured to be open to British offers – Nixon argued that the capture of the city would encourage this hitherto hostile chief to change sides. Curzon was an expert on Middle Eastern affairs, and knew local conditions better than anyone in Britain, but confronted with information presented by the man on the spot, he gave way and reluctantly sanctioned an advance along the Euphrates.

Indian troops stop during the advance on Nasiriya​

6th (Poona) Division and 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division were transported over the shallow Hammar Lake after Nixon gave the order for the advance to begin on 29th August. The lake was less than three feet deep in places, and some boats had to be trawled through mud to carry on their journey. At Kubaish, Turkish and Arab units provided the Indian infantry with such resistance that Nixon was compelled to call off their advance and withdraw them back to Qurna. Nixon blamed the lack of troop-carrying vessels and the scarcity of Royal Naval support on the failure, thereby renewing his mandate to advance on Nasiriya by asking Curzon to arrange for more river gunboats to be sent. A whole two months passed before Nixon tried again – this time, he involved the bulk of his force in a slow and cumbersome advance along the Old Channel of the Euphrates. 13th (Western) Division, 11th (Indian) Division and 10th (Indian) Division spearheaded the operation, being transported over the Hammar Lake and landed at the maze of channels separating the lake from the Euphrates running through Suq ash Shuyukh. Whilst Kubaish fell to the 6th (Poona) Division advancing out of Qurna, the 13th (Western) Divisions battered its way into Suq ash Shuyukh under a wall of fire provided by small Royal Naval vessels. Strong Turkish defensive positions were overrun, and Nixon ordered the 10th and 11th (Indian) Divisions to quicken their advance on Nasiriya. Yet he had not expected the city to be garrisoned by as large a Turkish garrison as there was, and when the two Indian divisions made their assault, they were easily repulsed. Stretched at the very end of their supply lines, harassed by marsh Arabs, they fell back to Suq ash Shuyukh on 26th October 1915 and dug in – Nasiriya remained in Turkish hands.

Battle of Nasiriya​

From here Curzon took a firm grasp of policy. He knew that Nixon had been less than frank with him regarding the ability of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force to capture Nasiriya. He also knew that the force was in a parlous state. The infrastructure of the region was not suitable for such a large and unwieldy force, being without railways and metalled roads – the MEF was being supplied wholly by river. Basra still lacked quays, a proper wharf and sufficient numbers of warehouses. The recession of floods in the south of Mesopotamia had left only brackish water unfit for human consumption, and the prevalence of cholera, malaria, dysentery and typhus was having a horrifying effect on the strength of units. Also, a lack of medical officers and surgeons meant that wounds went untreated. Curzon feared that the MEF was about to implode and sacked Nixon, replacing him with General Sir Charles Monro, recently commanding VII Corps in Schleswig-Holstein. Curzon made provisions for the improvement of conditions and infrastructure in Mesopotamia, and finally secured the restructuring of the force that he had been pining for: most of 5th (Mhow) Division, 9th (Secunderabad) Division, 4th (Quetta) Division and 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division were returned to India for the purpose of internal security. By 12th December 1915, 42nd (East Lancashire) Division and 68th Division had been brought to Mesopotamia alongside two infantry divisions of the now disbanded Indian Corps from the western front: 3rd (Lahore) Division and 7th (Meerut) Division. Curzon had managed to prevent the potential disaster of the MEF advancing recklessly on Baghdad without concern for its logistics or material strength. With the force resupplied and under a new commander, Curzon was confident that Baghdad would be captured in 1916.

 

[Mettermrck]

Another excellent detailed update. Crack the Turks' underbelly. When does Allenby move on Gaza?

 

[unmerged(28944)]

Nice explanation of the British thoughts on Mesopotamia, but the question is will they be able to turn those council room plans into a reality in Mesopotamia?