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Part XXIV – Prelude to Gallipoli
The sixty-two year old man heading towards the War Office on 7th March 1915 was reckoned to be the most experienced in the British army, having been involved in more wars than any other officer and said to be recklessly brave, a man without fear. His left hand was withered due to a bullet wound sustained in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880/1 and his left leg badly damaged in a previous fall from a horse. A soldier for forty-two years who had seen conflict in Afghanistan, India, Burma, the Sudan, South Africa and Manchuria, General Sir Ian Hamilton was about to take up his next assignment. He arrived at the War Office and was shown to Kitchener’s office, for the Secretary of State for War had requested to see him. Kitchener, writing, looked up and remarked that “we are sending a military force to support the fleet now at the Dardanelles, and you are to have command”. Hamilton was mildly surprised, and Kitchener eventually divulged more details: he was to be the overall commander of a force composed of the Royal Naval Division, the ANZACs and two Greek army corps, totalling approximately 135,000 men. Later that evening, Hamilton, a gentleman and poet, met his staff, said goodbye to his wife and was waved off at the train station by his old colleague Churchill. Within days, Hamilton was journeying through the Mediterranean to take up his new command.
Constantinople was his target. The great city was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the centre of its communications and the hub of the empire’s government. As the centre of Eastern Orthodoxy, it was envied by both the Greeks and the Russians. As the potential key to winning the war, it was envied by the British. The city was guarded by the Dardanelles, which Hamilton hoped to overwhelm. The straits – Troy and Chanak on one side, Gallipoli on the other – divided Asia from Europe, the Orient from the Occident and had seen several great campaigns before. Xerxes, the King of Persia had led an army across the Hellespont on a bridge of boats, trying to get to Athens, and Alexander crossed the same stretch of water on his way to India. Whoever held both sides of the straits was able to control the shipping from – and to – four great rivers of Europe, the Danube, Dniester, Dnieper and Don. From the last three, Russian trade flowed. Yet an attack was expected on the straits – the composition of the forces defending them reflected this. By now, the fortifications were manned and marshalled by a significant number of German officers, sent under the guise of Liman von Sanders’ military mission. To the people of Constantinople, the takeover of the Ottoman Empire by Germany was clear, with both the army and navy dominated by those swearing allegiance to the Kaiser primarily, and the Sultan for show. The more nationalistic officers of the Turkish Army on the straits resented the German presence, and many German officers resented having to be in Turkey. A partnership of expediency alone, both German and Turk realised that, for now, their best interests lie in working together to defend the straits.
They need not have worried for now, as the Allied plan for attacking those straits had not even been formulated. Hamilton only arrived in Alexandria on 13th March, and his staff was not with him. Kitchener chose Hamilton’s staff for him, but Hamilton chose not to protest, assuming that the chief knew best. His staff did arrive – albeit late – and by then Hamilton had already established his headquarters in a disused brothel. When they did arrive, staff officers resolved to hurriedly scour the Middle East for shipping for the invasion force, purchasing tugs, old colliers and trawlers with cash, for the ends of the invasion momentarily outstripped the resources immediately possessed by the Allies. This was true not only with regards to material, but in knowledge too, for the information possessed by Hamilton’s headquarters was sparse in the extreme. They had with them a pre-war handbook on the Turkish Army, a dated report on the Dardanelles fortifications, two tourist guides on western Turkey as well as an inaccurate map. In addition, the location and condition of roads in the region of the straits was not known, and whether suitable wells or fresh water springs existed was anyone’s guess. At a meeting on the island of Imbros on 20th March, Hamilton and his staff made contact for the first time with those of the Greek A and B Corps, which were to be placed under Hamilton’s command. Although the Greeks had better information on the straits than Hamilton, including some useful maps, they were hardly a substantial improvement on the data that Hamilton already had. Nevertheless, Hamilton, Admiral de Robeck – Carden had gone down ill – and the Greeks began to formulate their plan irrespective of how solid their information was.
Hamilton was the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, but he was to be given a surprise when he went to Imbros on 20th March. Not only was he introduced to his two Greek corps commanders – Lieutenant-Generals Kallardis and Dousmanis – but to General Panayotis Danglis, who had been sent by the Greek government as an army commander with authority over the two Greek corps. Danglis was to be Hamilton’s subordinate, but they both held the rank of full general, and it was inevitable that Danglis would provide an alternative source of authority for the two Greek corps commanders, and a source of influence for the Greek government. Venizelos was keen that his significant contribution to the operations – six infantry divisions – should not be used with unlimited scope by Hamilton. The Greek Army had an opportunity to occupy Constantinople, and deal a blow to the hated Turks, and the Prime Minister was keen that a Greek should be seen to be in command of the army performing this heroic feat – not a Scot. The last minute change to the command structure forced by the Greeks expressed itself markedly in the planning of the operations. Hamilton was no longer dealing with two piecemeal army corps, but a solid Greek Army under its own commander that would have to be deployed singularly, and with the good grace of the Greek government. Hamilton put forward his plan: the Greek Aegean Army, the ANZACs and the Royal Naval Division would land at Cape Helles, occupy the heights of Achi Baba, before descending on Kilitbahir at the Narrows. The fortifications could be seized by the army from the rear, thus allowing the fleet – including a number of minesweepers – to move through the straits and onto Constantinople. Danglis and Greek government officials protested: the Greek Army, they announced, should be used to march on Constantinople. “My army is here to capture great cities – not demolish forts” announced the general, and Danglis proposed a landing at Bakla Bay that would cut off the Gallipoli peninsula, before having the Aegean Army march onto Constantinople. Danglis and the Greeks wanted to play the leading role, and they were entitled to, as they were providing the majority of the manpower. Hamilton’s plan, as they saw it, only provided the Aegean Army with a walk-on part, whilst giving the glory to the Royal Navy’s battleships. This could not do, and Danglis implied that he would resign if his army was not landed at Bakla Bay. This was outrageous insubordination, but Hamilton was not a hard man. Just when Hamilton needed to act as the soldier and commander, the gentleman and poet came out. He could see Danglis’ point – how could a fleet ‘take’ Constantinople, anyway? Would it not be best to let the Greek Army land and move rapidly to Constantinople? The plan was altered accordingly: the Aegean Army would land at Bakla Bay, supported by the Greek Fleet led by Kilkis and Lemnos whilst the British elements of the M.E.F. would land at Cape Helles. The Greeks would reach the coast of the Sea of Marmara, and turn eastwards to Constantinople, supported by the British fleet, which would have forced the straits after the disarmament of the Dardanelles forts. The landings were scheduled for 13th April 1915.
However, matters were already turning for the worst. Hamilton’s staff officers told him that the ANZACs and the RN Division would not be ready in time for 13th April due to inadequate shipping, and that the earliest they could be landed on the Gallipoli peninsula was 17th April. Hamilton thought about delaying, but the Greeks wanted to hurry up. Thassos, Samothrace and Mudros Bay were already crowded with ships and Egyptian newspapers were full of stories about the upcoming landings. The element of surprise had been lost and any further delay would not be beneficial. Hamilton agreed – the Aegean Army would land on schedule, and although the ANZACs and RN Division would not arrive until four days afterwards at best, de Robeck was asked to attempt a forcing of the straits anyway. The admiral, although not optimistic, agreed, for he had an impressive armada under his command – his flagship was the Queen Elizabeth and he also had use of the battlecruiser Inflexible, as well as the pre-dreadnoughts Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Triumph, Albion, Prince George, Majestic, Canopus and Cornwallis. In addition, the French had provided three battleships: Bouvet, Gaulois and Suffren. Meanwhile, Constantinople was amidst despair, for an invasion was expected now that a fleet was in the area, and that a Greek army had assembled on the Aegean islands. Cars were set aside, fuel and tires stored, ready to take government officials from Constantinople at an hour’s notice. The German ambassador, von Wagenheim and the Austrian ambassador, Johann Pallavicini feared greatly that the city was about to fall, and had begun to hide their valuables in the American embassy. The U.S. ambassador, Henry Morgenthau was expecting the arrival of the British fleet or a Greek Army, and predicted on 13th April that they would arrive within a fortnight. He was shocked to learn of the C.U.P.’s plans to burn the Hagia Sophia in the event of an Allied invasion, and he met with the fatalistic Grand Vizier, who remarked at how he regretted Turkey’s entry into the war, and of the prospect of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. It was evident that the Turkish government also expected that Constantinople’s fall was forthcoming.
By the time Morgenthau journeyed back to the American embassy, ships carrying Greek troops to Bakla Bay were afloat, and the Allied fleet was journeying between Seddülbahir and Kum Kale. The fifteen-inch guns of the massive Queen Elizabeth were trained on a permanent battery on the heights. When the captain gave the order, there was an almighty roar as shellfire began to plunge down on the Turkish positions. To those on board the Allied ships and the soldiers manning the forts, the fall of Constantinople was imminent.
The sixty-two year old man heading towards the War Office on 7th March 1915 was reckoned to be the most experienced in the British army, having been involved in more wars than any other officer and said to be recklessly brave, a man without fear. His left hand was withered due to a bullet wound sustained in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880/1 and his left leg badly damaged in a previous fall from a horse. A soldier for forty-two years who had seen conflict in Afghanistan, India, Burma, the Sudan, South Africa and Manchuria, General Sir Ian Hamilton was about to take up his next assignment. He arrived at the War Office and was shown to Kitchener’s office, for the Secretary of State for War had requested to see him. Kitchener, writing, looked up and remarked that “we are sending a military force to support the fleet now at the Dardanelles, and you are to have command”. Hamilton was mildly surprised, and Kitchener eventually divulged more details: he was to be the overall commander of a force composed of the Royal Naval Division, the ANZACs and two Greek army corps, totalling approximately 135,000 men. Later that evening, Hamilton, a gentleman and poet, met his staff, said goodbye to his wife and was waved off at the train station by his old colleague Churchill. Within days, Hamilton was journeying through the Mediterranean to take up his new command.
General Sir Ian Hamilton
Constantinople was his target. The great city was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, the centre of its communications and the hub of the empire’s government. As the centre of Eastern Orthodoxy, it was envied by both the Greeks and the Russians. As the potential key to winning the war, it was envied by the British. The city was guarded by the Dardanelles, which Hamilton hoped to overwhelm. The straits – Troy and Chanak on one side, Gallipoli on the other – divided Asia from Europe, the Orient from the Occident and had seen several great campaigns before. Xerxes, the King of Persia had led an army across the Hellespont on a bridge of boats, trying to get to Athens, and Alexander crossed the same stretch of water on his way to India. Whoever held both sides of the straits was able to control the shipping from – and to – four great rivers of Europe, the Danube, Dniester, Dnieper and Don. From the last three, Russian trade flowed. Yet an attack was expected on the straits – the composition of the forces defending them reflected this. By now, the fortifications were manned and marshalled by a significant number of German officers, sent under the guise of Liman von Sanders’ military mission. To the people of Constantinople, the takeover of the Ottoman Empire by Germany was clear, with both the army and navy dominated by those swearing allegiance to the Kaiser primarily, and the Sultan for show. The more nationalistic officers of the Turkish Army on the straits resented the German presence, and many German officers resented having to be in Turkey. A partnership of expediency alone, both German and Turk realised that, for now, their best interests lie in working together to defend the straits.
They need not have worried for now, as the Allied plan for attacking those straits had not even been formulated. Hamilton only arrived in Alexandria on 13th March, and his staff was not with him. Kitchener chose Hamilton’s staff for him, but Hamilton chose not to protest, assuming that the chief knew best. His staff did arrive – albeit late – and by then Hamilton had already established his headquarters in a disused brothel. When they did arrive, staff officers resolved to hurriedly scour the Middle East for shipping for the invasion force, purchasing tugs, old colliers and trawlers with cash, for the ends of the invasion momentarily outstripped the resources immediately possessed by the Allies. This was true not only with regards to material, but in knowledge too, for the information possessed by Hamilton’s headquarters was sparse in the extreme. They had with them a pre-war handbook on the Turkish Army, a dated report on the Dardanelles fortifications, two tourist guides on western Turkey as well as an inaccurate map. In addition, the location and condition of roads in the region of the straits was not known, and whether suitable wells or fresh water springs existed was anyone’s guess. At a meeting on the island of Imbros on 20th March, Hamilton and his staff made contact for the first time with those of the Greek A and B Corps, which were to be placed under Hamilton’s command. Although the Greeks had better information on the straits than Hamilton, including some useful maps, they were hardly a substantial improvement on the data that Hamilton already had. Nevertheless, Hamilton, Admiral de Robeck – Carden had gone down ill – and the Greeks began to formulate their plan irrespective of how solid their information was.
de Robeck took command of the Allied fleet when Carden fell ill
Hamilton was the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, but he was to be given a surprise when he went to Imbros on 20th March. Not only was he introduced to his two Greek corps commanders – Lieutenant-Generals Kallardis and Dousmanis – but to General Panayotis Danglis, who had been sent by the Greek government as an army commander with authority over the two Greek corps. Danglis was to be Hamilton’s subordinate, but they both held the rank of full general, and it was inevitable that Danglis would provide an alternative source of authority for the two Greek corps commanders, and a source of influence for the Greek government. Venizelos was keen that his significant contribution to the operations – six infantry divisions – should not be used with unlimited scope by Hamilton. The Greek Army had an opportunity to occupy Constantinople, and deal a blow to the hated Turks, and the Prime Minister was keen that a Greek should be seen to be in command of the army performing this heroic feat – not a Scot. The last minute change to the command structure forced by the Greeks expressed itself markedly in the planning of the operations. Hamilton was no longer dealing with two piecemeal army corps, but a solid Greek Army under its own commander that would have to be deployed singularly, and with the good grace of the Greek government. Hamilton put forward his plan: the Greek Aegean Army, the ANZACs and the Royal Naval Division would land at Cape Helles, occupy the heights of Achi Baba, before descending on Kilitbahir at the Narrows. The fortifications could be seized by the army from the rear, thus allowing the fleet – including a number of minesweepers – to move through the straits and onto Constantinople. Danglis and Greek government officials protested: the Greek Army, they announced, should be used to march on Constantinople. “My army is here to capture great cities – not demolish forts” announced the general, and Danglis proposed a landing at Bakla Bay that would cut off the Gallipoli peninsula, before having the Aegean Army march onto Constantinople. Danglis and the Greeks wanted to play the leading role, and they were entitled to, as they were providing the majority of the manpower. Hamilton’s plan, as they saw it, only provided the Aegean Army with a walk-on part, whilst giving the glory to the Royal Navy’s battleships. This could not do, and Danglis implied that he would resign if his army was not landed at Bakla Bay. This was outrageous insubordination, but Hamilton was not a hard man. Just when Hamilton needed to act as the soldier and commander, the gentleman and poet came out. He could see Danglis’ point – how could a fleet ‘take’ Constantinople, anyway? Would it not be best to let the Greek Army land and move rapidly to Constantinople? The plan was altered accordingly: the Aegean Army would land at Bakla Bay, supported by the Greek Fleet led by Kilkis and Lemnos whilst the British elements of the M.E.F. would land at Cape Helles. The Greeks would reach the coast of the Sea of Marmara, and turn eastwards to Constantinople, supported by the British fleet, which would have forced the straits after the disarmament of the Dardanelles forts. The landings were scheduled for 13th April 1915.
Danglis was given command of the two Greek corps
However, matters were already turning for the worst. Hamilton’s staff officers told him that the ANZACs and the RN Division would not be ready in time for 13th April due to inadequate shipping, and that the earliest they could be landed on the Gallipoli peninsula was 17th April. Hamilton thought about delaying, but the Greeks wanted to hurry up. Thassos, Samothrace and Mudros Bay were already crowded with ships and Egyptian newspapers were full of stories about the upcoming landings. The element of surprise had been lost and any further delay would not be beneficial. Hamilton agreed – the Aegean Army would land on schedule, and although the ANZACs and RN Division would not arrive until four days afterwards at best, de Robeck was asked to attempt a forcing of the straits anyway. The admiral, although not optimistic, agreed, for he had an impressive armada under his command – his flagship was the Queen Elizabeth and he also had use of the battlecruiser Inflexible, as well as the pre-dreadnoughts Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Triumph, Albion, Prince George, Majestic, Canopus and Cornwallis. In addition, the French had provided three battleships: Bouvet, Gaulois and Suffren. Meanwhile, Constantinople was amidst despair, for an invasion was expected now that a fleet was in the area, and that a Greek army had assembled on the Aegean islands. Cars were set aside, fuel and tires stored, ready to take government officials from Constantinople at an hour’s notice. The German ambassador, von Wagenheim and the Austrian ambassador, Johann Pallavicini feared greatly that the city was about to fall, and had begun to hide their valuables in the American embassy. The U.S. ambassador, Henry Morgenthau was expecting the arrival of the British fleet or a Greek Army, and predicted on 13th April that they would arrive within a fortnight. He was shocked to learn of the C.U.P.’s plans to burn the Hagia Sophia in the event of an Allied invasion, and he met with the fatalistic Grand Vizier, who remarked at how he regretted Turkey’s entry into the war, and of the prospect of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. It was evident that the Turkish government also expected that Constantinople’s fall was forthcoming.
By the time Morgenthau journeyed back to the American embassy, ships carrying Greek troops to Bakla Bay were afloat, and the Allied fleet was journeying between Seddülbahir and Kum Kale. The fifteen-inch guns of the massive Queen Elizabeth were trained on a permanent battery on the heights. When the captain gave the order, there was an almighty roar as shellfire began to plunge down on the Turkish positions. To those on board the Allied ships and the soldiers manning the forts, the fall of Constantinople was imminent.
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Let's hope the Greeks don't mess up your plans! 
I'm surprised they didn't send Haig, with his overtly religious beliefs I'd guess I'd rather enjoy envisioning himself as a 'crusader'
I'm surprised they didn't send Haig, with his overtly religious beliefs I'd guess I'd rather enjoy envisioning himself as a 'crusader'If they succeed dont burn Constatinople to the ground like the crusaders did in the 4th Crusade !!!
Part XXV – De Robeck Attacks the Straits; The Greeks Land
The superdreadnought Queen Elizabeth led the way into the straits on a calm day, with minimal wind on 13th April and dropped anchor with the rest of the fleet. A deliberate and prolonged bombardment of the Turkish fortifications began, and without reply. The Turkish guns were silent because the Allied ships were well out of range, but in frustration, some ships closed in on the fortifications in an attempt to fire more accurately. The secondary armaments of the ships began to open fire once within range, and when some ships went in closer still, the Turkish guns responded with ferocious fire. Irresistible, Vengeance and Ocean were all struck by shellfire, with the decks and hulls of the ships sustaining damage. The Allied fleet continued its cannonade against the forts, but the Turkish guns fired back. It was soon clear that the Turkish batteries would require a direct hit to put them out of action, and that the men manning the guns only had to hide under shelter when a bombardment commenced to stay out of danger. Night came, making it was harder for the ships’ gunners to accurately assess their targets, and an inconclusive day of firing ended, the Allied fleet having fired nearly one hundred and fifty shells at the forts with seemingly little result. De Robeck took his fleet back to Mudros Bay, ready to resume operations the next day.
The Aegean Army was landed at Bakla Bay in unfavourable circumstances. Although the battleships Lemnos and Kilkis provided covering fire, the Turkish defenders held the advantage, having built up the defences around Bulair for a month. When the Greek troops rowed ashore and clambered out onto the beach and began to advance steadily inland, they did so under heavy fire from the Turks in concealed positions. Ahmed Izzet Pasha, commanding the Turkish Armies on the peninsula was aided by the powerful presence of the head of the German military mission, Otto Liman von Sanders, who had the Turkish forces in the region concentrated into groups, able to move quickly and confront any invasion. Bulair was where the peninsula was its shortest, and thus it came as no surprise to Liman von Sanders that the Greek assault should have fallen where it did. Consequently, three of the four divisions on the peninsula were near to Bakla Bay, and when the preliminary bombardment from the Greek pre-dreadnoughts opened up, Izzet and Liman von Sanders were able to rush reinforcements to the Bulair region, expecting an imminent invasion. They were not wrong, and they were aided admirably by the ground that they chose to defend, and the Greeks had erroneously chosen to attack. The Turks had been constructing earthwork fortifications on the high ground between Bulair and Bakla Bay, and in between lay a significant amount of swampland. The Greeks pressed forward as best they could, but sustained heavy casualties as they put in tentative attacks on Turkish defensive positions. The fighting intensified throughout the day, and the Turks eventually gave up their forward positions to fall back behind some of the marshland sitting beneath the high ground. Men of the 2nd (Athinai) Division trudged through much the swamp in an attempt to pursue the Turks as they fell back, and suffered heavily as a result with one brigade commander clambering forward with his swagger stick outstretched towards the Turks, only to be shot dead in the process, with many of the Athenians falling back in disarray. Progress of the 1st (Larissa) Division was not much better – after sustaining tolerable casualties on landing, they were soon to be troubled as they advanced inland. Reaching the Turkish earthworks, they bravely attempted to charge them at the point of the bayonet, but were repulsed on several occasions, taking 846 casualties in the process. By nightfall, the Greek Aegean Army was ashore, but was still nowhere near Bulair, and whilst they dug in and held onto what little ground they had made, the Turks continued to hold the high ground. Greek casualties were mounting, and for now, the beaches of Bakla Bay were the only place for them to find rest.
Next day, on 14th April, the fleet returned to the straits, attempting once again to force them. The sky was clear, there was a light breeze and the sea was calm – perfect weather for de Robeck’s ships. As the sun rose, the huge Allied battleships could be seen approaching quietly on the horizon in columns, with their steam rising inexorably into the air. Their aim was clear to all – the ships would once again try to smash the batteries into submission and allow the minesweepers forward. These merchant ships, hurriedly converted for mine clearing duties, would then work diligently in clearing a path through the Narrows. With this achieved, de Robeck’s ships would move through straits, onto the Hellespont and into the Sea of Marmara beyond. From here, they would be able to strike at will – either supporting the Greek Army by firing over the peninsula, or even sailing onto Constantinople itself. Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Triumph and Inflexible led the first line of ships, creeping forward without dropping anchor, whilst the second line, consisting of Gaulois, Bouvet, Suffren and Prince George followed behind. This line of ships was to combine with the third line of ships, made up of Vengeance, Ocean, Albion and Irresistible, in overtaking the first line and sailing as close to the Narrows as possible, before peppering it with gunfire. A fourth line, composed of Cornwallis, Canopus, Majestic and Swiftsure was to bring up the rear and enter the straits when the gunners of the ships in the second and third lines were too tired to resume their work. By 11am, the Allied fleet was in position, and three lines of ships began to sweep forward blazing away with their heavy guns, striking the forts around Kilitbahir and Chanak repeatedly. Large explosions were seen around Kilitbahir and de Robeck allowed the second and third line of ships to pass his first line, in order to overwhelm the batteries with their secondary armaments. As the second and third lines sailed gracefully towards the Narrows, the Turkish guns opened fire with a tremendous bombardment, and a protracted artillery duel ensued, with forts concealed by rising dust and smoke, whilst vast splashes of water swept the decks of the Allied battleships. The morale of the Turkish gunners was deteriorating, with many reluctant to return to their guns after the heavy bombardment. Some guns were smashed completely, whilst others were perilously short of ammunition. The Turkish guns had done much to damage the ships’ superstructure, but their armour remained largely unbreached, and continued to approach the Narrows. Suddenly, Agamemnon was rocked by an almighty explosion. She began to swing erratically to starboard, listing considerably and straying out of line. Inflexible was also shaken by an explosion – a hole in the bow flooded a compartment and severely impeded her ability to fight. De Robeck was concerned, but insisted on continuing, and the fighting continued for another hour and a half, before there were further explosions from Bouvet and Suffren. The latter French ship beached itself on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, whilst Bouvet limped westwards back towards Mudros Bay. De Robeck, startled, unsure of what was damaging his ships, ordered a withdrawal – Inflexible seemed on the verge of sinking, and the plight of Agamemnon was clear to all. The Allied fleet, having struck an unswept minefield, now began to sail back to base, having unsuccessfully forced the straits. During the evening Suffren was salvaged, and de Robeck convened with his staff and Hamilton on board Queen Elizabeth and decided what course of action to take.
When news of the Greek landing and naval attack reached Constantinople, near panic broke out. The government was sure that the Allies would be in the city within days, and were making preparations for evacuation. They were calmed when they heard that the Greek Army had been stopped in its tracks. The Greek troops near Bulair held onto their positions precariously, overlooked by the Turks, with tentative and sporadic fire fights breaking out between the two across the front during the evening and next day. Meanwhile, the Greeks’ only hospital ship struggled under the weight of the sudden influx of wounded, with many more left on the beaches, receiving little attention, whilst dead bodies littered Bakla Bay and the coast. At the straits, the Turkish guns had less than half of their ammunition left, and the officers manning the guns were sure that the Royal Navy would return in the morning. But they would not – for de Robeck had decided that the straits would not be forced by ships alone, and that he would wait for a few days until the army’s scheduled landings at Cape Helles. Three British divisions had still not been deployed. Potentially, these could hold the balance between defeat and victory.
The superdreadnought Queen Elizabeth led the way into the straits on a calm day, with minimal wind on 13th April and dropped anchor with the rest of the fleet. A deliberate and prolonged bombardment of the Turkish fortifications began, and without reply. The Turkish guns were silent because the Allied ships were well out of range, but in frustration, some ships closed in on the fortifications in an attempt to fire more accurately. The secondary armaments of the ships began to open fire once within range, and when some ships went in closer still, the Turkish guns responded with ferocious fire. Irresistible, Vengeance and Ocean were all struck by shellfire, with the decks and hulls of the ships sustaining damage. The Allied fleet continued its cannonade against the forts, but the Turkish guns fired back. It was soon clear that the Turkish batteries would require a direct hit to put them out of action, and that the men manning the guns only had to hide under shelter when a bombardment commenced to stay out of danger. Night came, making it was harder for the ships’ gunners to accurately assess their targets, and an inconclusive day of firing ended, the Allied fleet having fired nearly one hundred and fifty shells at the forts with seemingly little result. De Robeck took his fleet back to Mudros Bay, ready to resume operations the next day.
The Aegean Army was landed at Bakla Bay in unfavourable circumstances. Although the battleships Lemnos and Kilkis provided covering fire, the Turkish defenders held the advantage, having built up the defences around Bulair for a month. When the Greek troops rowed ashore and clambered out onto the beach and began to advance steadily inland, they did so under heavy fire from the Turks in concealed positions. Ahmed Izzet Pasha, commanding the Turkish Armies on the peninsula was aided by the powerful presence of the head of the German military mission, Otto Liman von Sanders, who had the Turkish forces in the region concentrated into groups, able to move quickly and confront any invasion. Bulair was where the peninsula was its shortest, and thus it came as no surprise to Liman von Sanders that the Greek assault should have fallen where it did. Consequently, three of the four divisions on the peninsula were near to Bakla Bay, and when the preliminary bombardment from the Greek pre-dreadnoughts opened up, Izzet and Liman von Sanders were able to rush reinforcements to the Bulair region, expecting an imminent invasion. They were not wrong, and they were aided admirably by the ground that they chose to defend, and the Greeks had erroneously chosen to attack. The Turks had been constructing earthwork fortifications on the high ground between Bulair and Bakla Bay, and in between lay a significant amount of swampland. The Greeks pressed forward as best they could, but sustained heavy casualties as they put in tentative attacks on Turkish defensive positions. The fighting intensified throughout the day, and the Turks eventually gave up their forward positions to fall back behind some of the marshland sitting beneath the high ground. Men of the 2nd (Athinai) Division trudged through much the swamp in an attempt to pursue the Turks as they fell back, and suffered heavily as a result with one brigade commander clambering forward with his swagger stick outstretched towards the Turks, only to be shot dead in the process, with many of the Athenians falling back in disarray. Progress of the 1st (Larissa) Division was not much better – after sustaining tolerable casualties on landing, they were soon to be troubled as they advanced inland. Reaching the Turkish earthworks, they bravely attempted to charge them at the point of the bayonet, but were repulsed on several occasions, taking 846 casualties in the process. By nightfall, the Greek Aegean Army was ashore, but was still nowhere near Bulair, and whilst they dug in and held onto what little ground they had made, the Turks continued to hold the high ground. Greek casualties were mounting, and for now, the beaches of Bakla Bay were the only place for them to find rest.
Next day, on 14th April, the fleet returned to the straits, attempting once again to force them. The sky was clear, there was a light breeze and the sea was calm – perfect weather for de Robeck’s ships. As the sun rose, the huge Allied battleships could be seen approaching quietly on the horizon in columns, with their steam rising inexorably into the air. Their aim was clear to all – the ships would once again try to smash the batteries into submission and allow the minesweepers forward. These merchant ships, hurriedly converted for mine clearing duties, would then work diligently in clearing a path through the Narrows. With this achieved, de Robeck’s ships would move through straits, onto the Hellespont and into the Sea of Marmara beyond. From here, they would be able to strike at will – either supporting the Greek Army by firing over the peninsula, or even sailing onto Constantinople itself. Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Triumph and Inflexible led the first line of ships, creeping forward without dropping anchor, whilst the second line, consisting of Gaulois, Bouvet, Suffren and Prince George followed behind. This line of ships was to combine with the third line of ships, made up of Vengeance, Ocean, Albion and Irresistible, in overtaking the first line and sailing as close to the Narrows as possible, before peppering it with gunfire. A fourth line, composed of Cornwallis, Canopus, Majestic and Swiftsure was to bring up the rear and enter the straits when the gunners of the ships in the second and third lines were too tired to resume their work. By 11am, the Allied fleet was in position, and three lines of ships began to sweep forward blazing away with their heavy guns, striking the forts around Kilitbahir and Chanak repeatedly. Large explosions were seen around Kilitbahir and de Robeck allowed the second and third line of ships to pass his first line, in order to overwhelm the batteries with their secondary armaments. As the second and third lines sailed gracefully towards the Narrows, the Turkish guns opened fire with a tremendous bombardment, and a protracted artillery duel ensued, with forts concealed by rising dust and smoke, whilst vast splashes of water swept the decks of the Allied battleships. The morale of the Turkish gunners was deteriorating, with many reluctant to return to their guns after the heavy bombardment. Some guns were smashed completely, whilst others were perilously short of ammunition. The Turkish guns had done much to damage the ships’ superstructure, but their armour remained largely unbreached, and continued to approach the Narrows. Suddenly, Agamemnon was rocked by an almighty explosion. She began to swing erratically to starboard, listing considerably and straying out of line. Inflexible was also shaken by an explosion – a hole in the bow flooded a compartment and severely impeded her ability to fight. De Robeck was concerned, but insisted on continuing, and the fighting continued for another hour and a half, before there were further explosions from Bouvet and Suffren. The latter French ship beached itself on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, whilst Bouvet limped westwards back towards Mudros Bay. De Robeck, startled, unsure of what was damaging his ships, ordered a withdrawal – Inflexible seemed on the verge of sinking, and the plight of Agamemnon was clear to all. The Allied fleet, having struck an unswept minefield, now began to sail back to base, having unsuccessfully forced the straits. During the evening Suffren was salvaged, and de Robeck convened with his staff and Hamilton on board Queen Elizabeth and decided what course of action to take.
HMS Queen Elizabeth led the Allied assault
When news of the Greek landing and naval attack reached Constantinople, near panic broke out. The government was sure that the Allies would be in the city within days, and were making preparations for evacuation. They were calmed when they heard that the Greek Army had been stopped in its tracks. The Greek troops near Bulair held onto their positions precariously, overlooked by the Turks, with tentative and sporadic fire fights breaking out between the two across the front during the evening and next day. Meanwhile, the Greeks’ only hospital ship struggled under the weight of the sudden influx of wounded, with many more left on the beaches, receiving little attention, whilst dead bodies littered Bakla Bay and the coast. At the straits, the Turkish guns had less than half of their ammunition left, and the officers manning the guns were sure that the Royal Navy would return in the morning. But they would not – for de Robeck had decided that the straits would not be forced by ships alone, and that he would wait for a few days until the army’s scheduled landings at Cape Helles. Three British divisions had still not been deployed. Potentially, these could hold the balance between defeat and victory.
de Robeck onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth with Hamilton.
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Well, you got the Greeks on your side so that should help sway things...I hope. I'd certainly hate to see a repeat of historical Gallipoli, but I look forward to your next update. Nice writing!
Great stuff as always! I love the way you do the naval battle maps, definitely draws a clearer pictures of the happenings.
Brilliant updates, hope your Baltic campaign works better than the landings have so far.
Docster maybe make a Serbia AAR with the TGW mod.Its a excellent mod wihc captures the real ww1 feel unlike Vic 1914 scenario doesnt.
Part XXVI – Ari Burnu and Helles
Shipping thronged Mudros Bay and Imbros harbour as men of the Royal Naval Division, Australian Division and Australian and New Zealand Division climbed into merchant vessels, colliers and tugs, and prepared to land on the Gallipoli peninsula. It was essentially the worst kept secret in the Eastern Mediterranean, and it was made all the more obvious by the landing of the Greek Army near Bulair on 13th April. This was not lost on Liman von Sanders and Ahmed Izzet Pasha, who had concentrated a division near Maidos, ready to react to a landing from the British Army, which they suspected would come very soon after the Greek landing. They had to wait longer than expected, for the British component of Hamilton’s force was compelled to delay its landing until 17th April due to a shortage of shipping and the disorganisation of the units stationed in the Aegean. The Greek islands were not ideal for the assembly of a great army: they had few facilities to accommodate a force so large, essentially being self-serving and with economies based on fishing. Disembarking and loading supplies onto shipping was both haphazard and difficult, and due to an inadequacy of water, many men found themselves languishing on troopships. Hamilton had considered the possibility of moving his force to Egypt to have it reorganised, but felt that the risk of losing surprise would be too great. It didn’t matter, for surprise was already lost, and by the time the ANZACs and the men of the RN Division went to sea, Turkish troops were already in position on the peninsula, ready to combat an invasion. Liman von Sanders and Izzet hurriedly improvised defences around the peninsula, using up all available barbed wire, creating redoubts centred on machine guns and laying land mines with spare torpedo heads. Two and a half divisions on the peninsula had already been committed to the battle against the Greeks near Bulair, leaving Liman von Sanders and Izzet with one and a half divisions with which to repel a new landing.
Hamilton had changed his plan and unknowingly complied with Liman von Sanders’ and Izzet’s deployments. Originally, all three divisions were to be landed at Cape Helles, but Hamilton then reasoned that a landing further up the peninsula would allow the force to reach the Narrows with greater swiftness. Therefore, Hamilton decided to land in two places – the RN Division would land at Cape Helles at the very tip of the Gallipoli peninsula and advance to Achi Baba, whilst the ANZACs would land south of Ari Burnu and advance on Maidos, therefore cutting off any Turkish forces in the Cape Helles region. This was the plan that was being put into operation as the troop ships sailed towards the Gallipoli peninsula, overcrowded with ANZAC troops who were heading into battle for the first time, and inexperienced men of the Royal Navy. Bands played and the troops sang to keep their spirits up, for within a fortnight, they reasoned, Constantinople’s minarets would soon have the Union Jack flying above them. During the evening of 16th April and early hours of 17th April, men began to lower themselves onto lighters and rowing boats to be towed ashore by motor-launches. Shortly before daybreak, a midshipman on a tow leading the southernmost wave well-meaningfully altered course to the north slightly, causing the others to follow suit, ensuring that the ANZACs were now to go ashore at Ari Burnu itself, not just south of it.
Ari Burnu was the least well reconnoitred of the beaches to be landed on by the British Army. It was crammed in against the sea by sheer-face cliffs and rough terrain, making it wholly inhospitable landscape for battle, especially amphibious assault. It was not the Turks who were to provide the stiffest resistance on the 17th April: for when the ANZACs landed, they alighted from their ships with relative ease, managing to engage the few Turkish defenders with steady fire before sweeping them away at the point of bayonet. The terrain, however, was to provide the attacking force with the most difficulty – groups of Australian troops advanced up into the hills, having been told by Birdwood to not get caught on the beaches for too long. Some groups managed to go so far inland that the Narrows could be seen from the heights. However, the ground upon which they now found themselves was in some places impossible to advance on, with cliffs and steep gullies not seen on the maps provided. Ground was covered in thick scrub, and some hills were exceptionally hard to climb, as many isolated groups would find as they attempted to push inland, attempting to do so in co-ordination, but failing in the process. The accidental shift north had allowed the ANZACs to be landed on a barely defended area, but also succeeded in throwing ANZAC into pandemonium – units were on the wrong beaches, had little idea where they were when they moved inland, and soon found themselves tangled up, with units badly mixed up. Skirmishes were fought between the Turks and Australians throughout the day at Plugge’s Plateau, along White Valley, 400 Plateau and Wire Gully, but these engagements came without direction or support. The first objective was Sari Bair Ridge, but the Turks had swiftly reinforced this region, denying the ANZACs the opportunity of establishing themselves on this vital high ground. The Australians pressed forwards towards Sair Bair, but did so without any co-ordination. Furthermore, lacking artillery support, they found themselves outgunned by the defending Turks and were beaten back accordingly. Turkish counterattacks destabilised the ANZACs, who struggled to maintain what they had won, and in unrelenting struggles, the Turks’ attempts to push the ANZACs back eventually failed. Units intermingled and clusters of men found themselves under temporary commanders, as the ANZACs, their troops carrying light equipment, ammunition and three days worth of rations began to dig in to hold onto what they had won. Attempts to capture Sair Bair or advance on Maidos had failed – the ANZACs were ashore on the Gallipoli peninsula, but their situation was not favourable, with the higher ground held by the Turks, and siege-like conditions ensuing. For now, all they could do was ‘dig, dig, dig, dig and dig’ until they were safe.
For the landing at Cape Helles, three beaches were selected, codenamed ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. The landings here were met with varying degrees of Turkish resistance, and the Royal Naval Division’s fortunes were mixed. At ‘A’ beach, down the coast from Sari Tepe, the 1st Naval Brigade, consisting of the Drake, Nelson and Deal battalions were landed. This was an isolated spot, and they were tasked with advancing across the peninsula and meeting the other landing parties advancing inland. As a sheer cliff, it undoubtedly favoured defenders, but luckily for the 1st Naval Brigade, no Turks were in sight, and the cliff was climbed without opposition. With this done, the brigade commander, seeking to reorganise his force ordered a halt, and his men sat calmly on the cliff-top without advancing, much to the consternation of officers watching on warships covering the landing. The brigade commander asked for further instructions from the RN Division commander, Major-General Archibald Paris, but received no reply as Paris was concentrating on the landings at ‘B’ beach. De Robeck, on board Queen Elizabeth raised the inactivity on ‘A’ beach to Hamilton, and implored him to send his reserves to exploit the lack of Turkish opposition. However, Hamilton dithered and astoundingly remarked that he should not send any reserves without Paris’ approval. When the RN Divison’s commander was finally contacted, Paris agreed that the Hawke battalion should be sent to reinforce the landing, but time was already running out. Some Royal Marines of the Deal battalion had already reached hill of Achi Baba, but without official endorsement had chosen not to secure their position here and made back for ‘A’ beach.
2nd Naval Brigade, consisting of the Howe, Hood and Anson battalions, landed between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles on ‘B’ beach supported by ship-based artillery. Whereas the opposition provided by the Turks at ‘A’ beach was nonexistent, it was ferocious at ‘B’ beach. The Turks had established barbed wire entanglements and machine gun posts, which laid a barrage of fire as the British troops landed. The Hood battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bernard Freyberg, took the brunt of the Turkish defenders’ fire, with the unit taking severe casualties, many being mowed down on the beach as they clambered out of their boats and waded ashore. The machine guns played upon the men of the Hood battalion, with notable casualties, including that of Lieutenant Rupert Brooke, the great poet, who was killed instantly when a stray Turkish bullet passed through his head. Further up the beach, the Turkish defenders were more restrained with regards to their fire, waiting until the men of the Howe battalion had disembarked before opening up, not wishing to reveal their positions to the Royal Navy’s gunners. Again, losses were heavy for the Howe battalion, but they fought tenaciously to establish a beachhead and push the Turks back from their defensive positions. By the evening, 2nd Naval Brigade had been given a savage mauling, but was firmly ashore.
At ‘C’ beach just west of Seddülbahir, 3rd Marine Brigade, consisting of the Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions landed with the aid of a naval bombardment. This did not deter the Turks who returned to their trenches when the bombardment ceased, just in time to meet the invading force. A collier was run aground by the British, and men of the Chatham battalion came out of sallyports cut in the side of the hull of the ship to run along a bridge of boats to shore. As they did so, they were met with Turkish machine guns, which spattered the side of the ship with bullets, inflicting grievous losses on the Chatham battalion in the process. The Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions fared better, with the latter managing to secure Seddülbahir by the evening. The Chatham battalion failed to get ashore, but the success of the Portsmouth battalion in establishing its position on ‘C’ beach ensured that they day was partially successful for 3rd Marine Brigade.
Even though there had been many failings, especially regarding the ignorance and inactivity demonstrated by higher command, ANZAC and the RN Division were ashore on the Gallipoli peninsula. The Turks, in the evening of the 17th April, made fierce counterattacks against the British positions around ‘A’ beach, where the men of the Drake and Nelson battalions had failed to entrench sufficiently. Although it appeared at times as if the men at ‘A’ beach would have to be withdrawn, the Turks were beaten back and the situation was stabilised. Operations thus far had notably been hindered by a lack of landing craft, which ensured that the rate of disembarkation was painfully slow at times. Although the Royal Navy provided covering fire for the landing forces, communications between units on the peninsula and the ships themselves were so poor that many ship commanders felt themselves unable to provide support for fear of hitting British or Australasian troops. Yet if the problems for the Allies were bad, they looked diabolical for the Turks. They had suffered terrible losses during the British landings, and their numerically inferior force was now vulnerably stretched across the Gallipoli peninsula, having to deal with six Greek divisions near Bulair, two Australasian divisions near Ari Burnu and one Royal Naval Division around Cape Helles. Turkish counterattacks had been mounted with great vigour, and the ANZACs in particular had been pushed back in places. Yet this came at a great cost for the Turks, who were facing an increasingly difficult situation.
With finite resources, the ability of Liman von Sanders and Izzet to counterattack the new landings was waning. For the Allies, decisive action on behalf of central command in seeing the partially successful landings exploited and expanded upon would surely deliver victory. The Gallipoli campaign was about to reach its most critical point.
Shipping thronged Mudros Bay and Imbros harbour as men of the Royal Naval Division, Australian Division and Australian and New Zealand Division climbed into merchant vessels, colliers and tugs, and prepared to land on the Gallipoli peninsula. It was essentially the worst kept secret in the Eastern Mediterranean, and it was made all the more obvious by the landing of the Greek Army near Bulair on 13th April. This was not lost on Liman von Sanders and Ahmed Izzet Pasha, who had concentrated a division near Maidos, ready to react to a landing from the British Army, which they suspected would come very soon after the Greek landing. They had to wait longer than expected, for the British component of Hamilton’s force was compelled to delay its landing until 17th April due to a shortage of shipping and the disorganisation of the units stationed in the Aegean. The Greek islands were not ideal for the assembly of a great army: they had few facilities to accommodate a force so large, essentially being self-serving and with economies based on fishing. Disembarking and loading supplies onto shipping was both haphazard and difficult, and due to an inadequacy of water, many men found themselves languishing on troopships. Hamilton had considered the possibility of moving his force to Egypt to have it reorganised, but felt that the risk of losing surprise would be too great. It didn’t matter, for surprise was already lost, and by the time the ANZACs and the men of the RN Division went to sea, Turkish troops were already in position on the peninsula, ready to combat an invasion. Liman von Sanders and Izzet hurriedly improvised defences around the peninsula, using up all available barbed wire, creating redoubts centred on machine guns and laying land mines with spare torpedo heads. Two and a half divisions on the peninsula had already been committed to the battle against the Greeks near Bulair, leaving Liman von Sanders and Izzet with one and a half divisions with which to repel a new landing.
Hamilton had changed his plan and unknowingly complied with Liman von Sanders’ and Izzet’s deployments. Originally, all three divisions were to be landed at Cape Helles, but Hamilton then reasoned that a landing further up the peninsula would allow the force to reach the Narrows with greater swiftness. Therefore, Hamilton decided to land in two places – the RN Division would land at Cape Helles at the very tip of the Gallipoli peninsula and advance to Achi Baba, whilst the ANZACs would land south of Ari Burnu and advance on Maidos, therefore cutting off any Turkish forces in the Cape Helles region. This was the plan that was being put into operation as the troop ships sailed towards the Gallipoli peninsula, overcrowded with ANZAC troops who were heading into battle for the first time, and inexperienced men of the Royal Navy. Bands played and the troops sang to keep their spirits up, for within a fortnight, they reasoned, Constantinople’s minarets would soon have the Union Jack flying above them. During the evening of 16th April and early hours of 17th April, men began to lower themselves onto lighters and rowing boats to be towed ashore by motor-launches. Shortly before daybreak, a midshipman on a tow leading the southernmost wave well-meaningfully altered course to the north slightly, causing the others to follow suit, ensuring that the ANZACs were now to go ashore at Ari Burnu itself, not just south of it.
The ANZACs land near Ari Burnu
Ari Burnu was the least well reconnoitred of the beaches to be landed on by the British Army. It was crammed in against the sea by sheer-face cliffs and rough terrain, making it wholly inhospitable landscape for battle, especially amphibious assault. It was not the Turks who were to provide the stiffest resistance on the 17th April: for when the ANZACs landed, they alighted from their ships with relative ease, managing to engage the few Turkish defenders with steady fire before sweeping them away at the point of bayonet. The terrain, however, was to provide the attacking force with the most difficulty – groups of Australian troops advanced up into the hills, having been told by Birdwood to not get caught on the beaches for too long. Some groups managed to go so far inland that the Narrows could be seen from the heights. However, the ground upon which they now found themselves was in some places impossible to advance on, with cliffs and steep gullies not seen on the maps provided. Ground was covered in thick scrub, and some hills were exceptionally hard to climb, as many isolated groups would find as they attempted to push inland, attempting to do so in co-ordination, but failing in the process. The accidental shift north had allowed the ANZACs to be landed on a barely defended area, but also succeeded in throwing ANZAC into pandemonium – units were on the wrong beaches, had little idea where they were when they moved inland, and soon found themselves tangled up, with units badly mixed up. Skirmishes were fought between the Turks and Australians throughout the day at Plugge’s Plateau, along White Valley, 400 Plateau and Wire Gully, but these engagements came without direction or support. The first objective was Sari Bair Ridge, but the Turks had swiftly reinforced this region, denying the ANZACs the opportunity of establishing themselves on this vital high ground. The Australians pressed forwards towards Sair Bair, but did so without any co-ordination. Furthermore, lacking artillery support, they found themselves outgunned by the defending Turks and were beaten back accordingly. Turkish counterattacks destabilised the ANZACs, who struggled to maintain what they had won, and in unrelenting struggles, the Turks’ attempts to push the ANZACs back eventually failed. Units intermingled and clusters of men found themselves under temporary commanders, as the ANZACs, their troops carrying light equipment, ammunition and three days worth of rations began to dig in to hold onto what they had won. Attempts to capture Sair Bair or advance on Maidos had failed – the ANZACs were ashore on the Gallipoli peninsula, but their situation was not favourable, with the higher ground held by the Turks, and siege-like conditions ensuing. For now, all they could do was ‘dig, dig, dig, dig and dig’ until they were safe.
For the landing at Cape Helles, three beaches were selected, codenamed ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. The landings here were met with varying degrees of Turkish resistance, and the Royal Naval Division’s fortunes were mixed. At ‘A’ beach, down the coast from Sari Tepe, the 1st Naval Brigade, consisting of the Drake, Nelson and Deal battalions were landed. This was an isolated spot, and they were tasked with advancing across the peninsula and meeting the other landing parties advancing inland. As a sheer cliff, it undoubtedly favoured defenders, but luckily for the 1st Naval Brigade, no Turks were in sight, and the cliff was climbed without opposition. With this done, the brigade commander, seeking to reorganise his force ordered a halt, and his men sat calmly on the cliff-top without advancing, much to the consternation of officers watching on warships covering the landing. The brigade commander asked for further instructions from the RN Division commander, Major-General Archibald Paris, but received no reply as Paris was concentrating on the landings at ‘B’ beach. De Robeck, on board Queen Elizabeth raised the inactivity on ‘A’ beach to Hamilton, and implored him to send his reserves to exploit the lack of Turkish opposition. However, Hamilton dithered and astoundingly remarked that he should not send any reserves without Paris’ approval. When the RN Divison’s commander was finally contacted, Paris agreed that the Hawke battalion should be sent to reinforce the landing, but time was already running out. Some Royal Marines of the Deal battalion had already reached hill of Achi Baba, but without official endorsement had chosen not to secure their position here and made back for ‘A’ beach.
Men of the Royal Naval Division land at ‘C’ beach
2nd Naval Brigade, consisting of the Howe, Hood and Anson battalions, landed between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles on ‘B’ beach supported by ship-based artillery. Whereas the opposition provided by the Turks at ‘A’ beach was nonexistent, it was ferocious at ‘B’ beach. The Turks had established barbed wire entanglements and machine gun posts, which laid a barrage of fire as the British troops landed. The Hood battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bernard Freyberg, took the brunt of the Turkish defenders’ fire, with the unit taking severe casualties, many being mowed down on the beach as they clambered out of their boats and waded ashore. The machine guns played upon the men of the Hood battalion, with notable casualties, including that of Lieutenant Rupert Brooke, the great poet, who was killed instantly when a stray Turkish bullet passed through his head. Further up the beach, the Turkish defenders were more restrained with regards to their fire, waiting until the men of the Howe battalion had disembarked before opening up, not wishing to reveal their positions to the Royal Navy’s gunners. Again, losses were heavy for the Howe battalion, but they fought tenaciously to establish a beachhead and push the Turks back from their defensive positions. By the evening, 2nd Naval Brigade had been given a savage mauling, but was firmly ashore.
Cape Helles after the consolidation of the landing beaches
At ‘C’ beach just west of Seddülbahir, 3rd Marine Brigade, consisting of the Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions landed with the aid of a naval bombardment. This did not deter the Turks who returned to their trenches when the bombardment ceased, just in time to meet the invading force. A collier was run aground by the British, and men of the Chatham battalion came out of sallyports cut in the side of the hull of the ship to run along a bridge of boats to shore. As they did so, they were met with Turkish machine guns, which spattered the side of the ship with bullets, inflicting grievous losses on the Chatham battalion in the process. The Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions fared better, with the latter managing to secure Seddülbahir by the evening. The Chatham battalion failed to get ashore, but the success of the Portsmouth battalion in establishing its position on ‘C’ beach ensured that they day was partially successful for 3rd Marine Brigade.
Even though there had been many failings, especially regarding the ignorance and inactivity demonstrated by higher command, ANZAC and the RN Division were ashore on the Gallipoli peninsula. The Turks, in the evening of the 17th April, made fierce counterattacks against the British positions around ‘A’ beach, where the men of the Drake and Nelson battalions had failed to entrench sufficiently. Although it appeared at times as if the men at ‘A’ beach would have to be withdrawn, the Turks were beaten back and the situation was stabilised. Operations thus far had notably been hindered by a lack of landing craft, which ensured that the rate of disembarkation was painfully slow at times. Although the Royal Navy provided covering fire for the landing forces, communications between units on the peninsula and the ships themselves were so poor that many ship commanders felt themselves unable to provide support for fear of hitting British or Australasian troops. Yet if the problems for the Allies were bad, they looked diabolical for the Turks. They had suffered terrible losses during the British landings, and their numerically inferior force was now vulnerably stretched across the Gallipoli peninsula, having to deal with six Greek divisions near Bulair, two Australasian divisions near Ari Burnu and one Royal Naval Division around Cape Helles. Turkish counterattacks had been mounted with great vigour, and the ANZACs in particular had been pushed back in places. Yet this came at a great cost for the Turks, who were facing an increasingly difficult situation.
With finite resources, the ability of Liman von Sanders and Izzet to counterattack the new landings was waning. For the Allies, decisive action on behalf of central command in seeing the partially successful landings exploited and expanded upon would surely deliver victory. The Gallipoli campaign was about to reach its most critical point.
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A 2:1 amphibious invasion against an entrenched opponent with higher organisation than you?Allenby said:
It's my professional opinion that you're doomed. Doooomed.
That's what I'm thinking. 9 versus 4 with lesser org and amphibious...it's Gallipoli alright. Very nice update as always, Allenby. You're really able to bring the war to life and still connect it with the game.
Very nice update as always, Allenby. You're really able to bring the war to life and still connect it with the game.
Well he could have a gigantic force in Athens, waiting to be transported..........
Alternatively, he could have waited until Bulgaria were in the CPs, then invade from Greece into Bulgaria and get a direct land border with Turkey, negating the need for amphibious invasion.
Alternatively, he could have waited until Bulgaria were in the CPs, then invade from Greece into Bulgaria and get a direct land border with Turkey, negating the need for amphibious invasion.
Part XXVII – Climax at Gallipoli
Hamilton had kept the Benbow and Collingwood battalions in reserve, and now committed them to battle. The Benbow battalion was landed south of ‘A’ beach in order to support their precarious position, whilst the Collingwood battalion was landed north of Cape Tekke, to strike the Turks defending ‘B’ beach in the flank. By the afternoon of 18th April, the Benbow battalion was ashore at Gallipoli, having met desultory resistance from the Turks, and began to move swiftly towards its objective, marching southward with a swiftness that was absent from the landings at ‘A’ beach the day previously. Meanwhile, the Collingwood battalion landed and met determined resistance from the Turks, who happened to have a machine gun defending the area. Shellfire from the Royal Navy successfully knocked this gun out, and the odds stacked against the Turks, who pulled back after hand to hand fighting with the Collingwood battalion. Meanwhile, at ‘A’ beach, the newly arrived Hawke battalion attempted to push towards Achi Baba, which was now covered by the Turks having been deserted the day previously. The resistance of the Turks in this sector, however, was too much for the Hawke battalion to deal with, and after a prolonged fire fight, they were forced to fall back to their defensive positions. At ‘C’ beach, the successes of the Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions were exploited, and these units managed to secure Seddülbahir fortress, to the west of Seddülbahir town. Afterwards, the Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions, along with the remnants of the shattered Chatham battalion, pressed on, but were eventually forced to halt after meeting a battalion of unyielding Turks. Around Cape Tekke, the Collingwood battalion’s success was exploited, and the Howe battalion managed to move inland and link up with the men of the Benbow battalion, therefore managing to link all three landing beaches. By the evening of 18th April, the Royal Naval Division was holding a continuous beachhead around Cape Helles, but was thoroughly exhausted and unable to take up immediate offensive operations. Major-General Paris ordered his brigades to go onto the defensive, to allow for reinforcements and supplies to be brought in.
Paris’ orders to his division on 18th April conformed with Hamilton’s orders to the ANZACs to ‘dig’ late on 17th April, and thus set the tone for the fighting at Ari Burnu and Cape Helles. From here, troops on the bridgeheads lived in dugouts hollowed out from the earth, whilst trenches and outposts were cut out of the terrain where suitable. Like on the western front, these were creations of convenience, designed to be temporary only, but with the element of surprise lost, the fighting inevitably took on the character of that in France and Flanders. Having landed, the British were first tasked with bringing off casualties, bringing in supplies, and most importantly, the importation of artillery, the lack of which had manifested most profoundly when the ANZACs tried to push inland. The territory won was consolidated, with building materials brought in to secure defensive positions. Fighting around strong points increased as the Turks attempted to push tentatively at the Allied lines, without launching a full scale offensive, content with raiding and sniping at their opponents. Despite being short of small arms ammunition, the Turks had preponderance in artillery, and used this advantage effectively in shelling the Allied force intermittently. The ANZACs and the RN Division were in difficult terrain, and the deployment of heavy guns was sometimes impossible, which increased their reliance on ship-based guns out at sea. The Australasian forces continued to construct dugouts and pathways, linking their trenches together into a makeshift system, whilst a reservoir was established to partially relieve the problem of chronic water shortages. Although the Turks used the days after the British landings to make attacks themselves, they too were preparing defensive positions to ensure that a British breakout was minimalised. In particular, Turkish positions around Krithia and Sari Bair were strengthened significantly, as well as reinforced by forces garrisoning the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. Conditions for the soldiers around Ari Burnu and Cape Helles worsened as the temperature rose, casualties mounted and supplies became sparse. Yet if conditions were bad around Ari Burnu and Cape Helles, they were lamentable around Bulair, where the Greeks had made no progress against the Turks since landing on 13th April.
The Greeks had had more trouble than the British with regards to the evacuation of casualties, with only one small hospital ship available. The British were barely better prepared for the number of casualties, but inevitably, wounded Greek soldiers found themselves being treated alongside their British allies. More urgently for the Aegean Army, a shortage of shipping ensured that supplies could only be drip fed, leaving the huge force of six divisions crammed onto a small beachhead, increasingly short of ammunition and medical supplies. Like the ANZACs and the RN Division, the Greeks had been unable to land sufficient artillery on their beachhead and were reliant on support from naval vessels, primarily Lemnos and Kilkis. Problematically, these combined could only mount eight twelve-inch, and sixteen eight-inch guns, woefully inadequate for a force of the Aegean Army’s size. Danglis, the commander of the Aegean Army, with his headquarters on Lemnos, asked Hamilton whether the Royal Navy could provide some ships to support the Greek Army. Hamilton was sympathetic to Danglis’ plight but told him that he had no authority over the naval forces, and that he would have to put his request to de Robeck instead. Danglis visited de Robeck on board Queen Elizabeth and asked whether the Royal Navy could spare four battleships to provide covering gunfire for his army. De Robeck was reluctant – he was still reeling from the losses he had sustained in trying to force the straits on 13th April and loathed the thought of losing more ships. Danglis reasoned that his force made up the bulk of the M.E.F. and ought to have the majority of the covering artillery. De Robeck replied by pointing out that his fleet had been sent to force the straits and provide protection for Britain’s land forces, and that the support of the Aegean Army was technically a matter for the Greeks alone. De Robeck did not want to dissipate his force and was having enough difficulty in supporting the three British divisions near the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, without having to cover the Greeks too, yet he realised that Danglis had a point. In order to placate Danglis, de Robeck decided to give him two battleships: Canopus and Cornwallis. These two ships sailed north and were placed under the command of Admiral Koundouriotis, commanding the Greek Navy. By 19th April, the supply situation of the Aegean Army was good enough for a number of field guns to be brought ashore, and with new additions to the Greek naval force, Danglis felt confident enough to launch a renewed offensive.
The commander of B Corps, Lieutenant-General Dousmanis put forward his proposal for an offensive, which he argued could give the Aegean Army a decisive victory. He suggested that the artillery that had been provided should be put under his command and concentrated against the southern most point of the Turkish line. A prolonged bombardment would ensue, with support provided by the Greek Navy, and a hole would be punched in the Turkish line by the attacking infantry. From here, Dousmanis argued, the Turkish line could be rolled up, and the peninsula cut off. Danglis agreed to the proposal, and Hamilton gave his assent, although he was hardly in a position to disagree. On 21st April, with Dousmanis’ artillery in place, the offensive began, with the Greek guns pouring shellfire into the opposing Turkish trenches for two hours, whilst the heavy guns of Lemnos, Kilkis, Canopus and Cornwallis and the smaller guns of supporting cruisers also concentrated their fire on the sector of the Turkish line opposing B Corps. Dousmanis’ force, consisting of 3rd (Patras) Division, 4th (Nafplion) Division and 14th (Kalamata) Division, began to advance steadily when the bombardment finished, and made good early progress, managing to reach the Turkish earthworks with surprisingly little loss. Fierce battles for the Turkish defences ensued, with the men of 14th (Kalamata) Division carrying through their attack at the point of the bayonet, eventually managing to clear the Turkish positions after brutal hand to hand fighting. The exhausted Greeks tried to make good their first day gains when they resumed their offensive on 22nd April, and B Corps advanced in an attempt to capture Bulair town. However, significant Turkish reinforcements had arrived from Constantinople, and in battles that raged for the next three days, continual Greek assaults on the quickly established Turkish defensive positions were repulsed with heavy loss. Realising that no further progress could be made, Danglis called a halt to operations, and ordered his two army corps to go onto the defensive. The Aegean Army’s supply situation had not improved dramatically, and the Greek forces were still suffering terrible hardships, with the last few days of fighting demanding a lot from the average Greek soldier. With casualties growing, ammunition running short, Danglis asked Athens for substantial reinforcements.
Meanwhile, the ANZACs had attempted a breakout by mounting an offensive directed against Sari Bair Ridge. The men of the 1st and 2nd Australian Brigades were used for the attack which was put in on 21st April along a front of 250 yards, against strongly built trenches with roofs providing extra protection. Like the fighting between the Greeks and Turks around Bulair, the fighting between the Australians and the Turks was often hand to hand and very confused. The battles for Sari Bair Ridge lasted for several days, with the Australians winning several Victoria Crosses for acts of gallantry, whilst one battalion sustained eighty percent casualties. Offensive efforts were made on other parts of the ANZAC front, with the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade assaulting Russell’s Top repeatedly with unimaginable bravery, failing each time and taking horrendous casualties in the process. The terrain over which the attacks on Sari Bair continued was difficult in the extreme, exhausting to climb in the best of conditions, let alone with the Turks providing opposition. On 22nd April, the New Zealand Brigade was thrown into the battle, and advanced onto Chunuk Bair, before stopping to entrench. The waters of the Narrows could be seen; if the New Zealanders could hold on, then the Allies would hold the advantage. Unfortunately, lamentable communications ensured that the gains made by the leading companies of the New Zealand Brigade were not reinforced, and the Turks subjected the men of the Wellington battalion to devastating fire from both sides, before rushing to the summit of Chunuk Bair with cries of ‘Allah!’ to sweep the New Zealanders from the hill. Attempts to retake the position failed; the ANZACs were exhausted, and when the battle closed on 27th April, Hamilton considered calling for reinforcements.
Since the end of the first day of operations around Ari Burnu and Cape Helles, Hamilton had given thought to calling for immediate reinforcements, but did not want to alarm Lord Kitchener. Hamilton had been given the chance to command an army in battle, and did not want to be seen to be failing, and having to ask for reinforcements as soon as the landings begun. Thus, Hamilton was not only lacking assertiveness with regards to subordinates and Admiral de Robeck, but to his superior in London as well. For days, Hamilton stalled, half-believing that his force was sufficient to carry out the task given to him. But it wasn’t, and increasingly, it was ill suited numerically in comparison to the Turks, who reinforced their army on the peninsula with four infantry divisions on 22nd April. Before this had happened, however, the War Council in London had met to discuss the Dardanelles, the upcoming Baltic campaign and about making overtures to Italy. It was clear to all that the advance on the peninsula had stalled, and debate commenced over what could be done to kick start the campaign. Churchill weighed in and put forward a case for massively reinforcing the existing force, but Kitchener insisted that success would come about by careful advances by the existing force and reverted to an earlier mantra, that no new divisions could be spared. In a sense, he was correct – the divisions required to reinforce Hamilton were either being prepared for the landings in north Germany or still being completed in Britain. Yet there was one division that could possibly be sent immediately: the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division in Egypt. However, Lieutentant-General Maxwell in Cairo exaggerated the nature of the Turkish threat to the canal to convince London that the movement of the 42nd Division from Egypt was impossible without inviting disaster. Kitchener’s position was strengthened when he pointed out that Hamilton had not asked for reinforcements, but this changed when the request from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force’s commander-in-chief found itself on the War Council’s table. Under pressure, Kitchener did not want to be seen to be letting down Hamilton – and the war effort – and announced that the 52nd (Lowland) Division, a territorial unit in construction, would be sent to the Mediterranean to immediately reinforce the M.E.F. The same arguments were taking place in Athens, and the Greek Army’s high command remained sensitive to the possibility of a Bulgarian intervention. The First Quartermaster-General and the Greek Navy insisted that there were enough problems supplying the existing force, and advised Venizelos that the sending of new divisions would simply turn the beachhead around Bulair into a prison camp, with the chance of losing the entire force to the Turks increasing dangerously. Implicit in this contention was the possibility of withdrawal, and when the Turks went onto the offensive on 1st May, this option began to appear all the more attractive.
Liman von Sanders and Ahmed Izzet Pasha felt confident enough after the halting of the most recent Greek and ANZAC assaults to launch an offensive of their own. They kept light forces around Cape Helles, confident that the defenders there could hold off any offensive mounted by the Royal Naval Division, whilst placing the bulk of their forces opposite the Greeks and the Australasians. On the night of 1st May, the Turks threw in their attacks with a ferocious determination – around Bulair, the Turks emerged from their earthworks and descended upon a numerically larger but demoralised Greek army, inflicting heavy loss on the confused Greeks, who were taken wholly by surprise. By 3rd May, the Turks had reached the Gulf of Saros and split the Aegean Army in two. The Greek Navy frantically provided support, but the Turks could not be deterred, and the spirits of the Greeks could not be lifted. On the ANZAC front, the Turks put in a number of offensives across the line, which met little success. However, they succeeded in inflicting significant casualties on the Australasians, all the while making more pronounced their superiority in artillery. The loss of Quinn’s Post and Courtney’s Post, while not dampening the spirits of the ANZACs, seriously shook the confidence of Hamilton, who now came to realise how vulnerable the M.E.F.’s position was. Hamilton wanted to stay, but his pessimistic reports to London made many on the War Council favour a withdrawal. Churchill was adamant that the M.E.F. should remain, especially as the Baltic landings were about to take place, but the fact that a direct offensive was about to be made in the Baltic made the idea of withdrawal from Gallipoli to some, permissible. Kitchener warned that a withdrawal would harm British prestige in the eyes of the Islamic world, sentiments that were echoed by Kitchener’s adversary, Lord Curzon. It was the former Viceroy who described most vividly of what a withdrawal would look like: ‘half crazy men, the swamping of craft, the nocturnal panic, the agony of the wounded, the hecatombs of the slain.’ Asquith dawdled, but sensed that the War Council favoured withdrawal. Kitchener said that the harm done to Britain’s standing from any withdrawal could be recovered if some effort was made against the Turks somewhere else, and suggested a landing at Alexandretta. This was ruled out by the Royal Navy, but Asquith was keen to withdraw and keep face, and promised the Secretary of State for War that an offensive against the Ottoman Empire would be made, if not at Alexandretta. The Greeks were asked for their opinions, and although reluctant, the government in Athens realised that the Aegean Army could not remain without British support, and given recent reports, it looked as if Dangis’ army could not remain around Bulair for long anyway. With a decision for withdrawal agreed, the order was wired through to Hamilton.
On 7th, 8th and 9th May, the withdrawal of the M.E.F. went in progress. Fortunately for the ANZACs and the Royal Naval Division, Curzon’s prophesy proved to be a false one. Under considerable secrecy, whilst the front line was held by skeletal forces, the bulk of the British forces were withdrawn under the cover of night in operations that were both well planned and excellently executed. The withdrawing forces demonstrated great discipline and the men manning the front line mounted remarkable feats of deception to convince the Turks that everything remained as per usual. By the evening of 8th May, the British force had been extracted from the peninsula, and was being taken back to the Aegean Islands. For the Greeks, Curzon’s prophesy proved to be partially true, as the Turks caught wind of the plan, and began an offensive aiming to drive the Aegean Army into the sea. Fighting on the beaches was intense, and even Lieutenant-General Dousmanis shot a number of Turks with his revolver, whilst Lieutenant-General Kallardis slayed one with his sword. Boats lined the shore, attempting to take Greek troops from the beaches as the battle raged only a few hundred yards away from them. The Greek commanders skilfully brought order to the chaos, and the Turks were held at the perimeter of the two beachheads whilst the evacuation continued. Greek troops held back the Turks for hours whilst the last soldiers were withdrawn, all the time being harassed by Turkish artillery fire. Eventually, the line could not be held, and the Turks burst through to massacre the Greek defenders almost to a man, whilst the remnants of the Aegean Army were ferried away to Greece.
Overall, the ANZACs and the Royal Naval Division had sustained approximately 6,350 casualties since landing on 17th April. The Greeks, in comparison had suffered approximately 15,260 casualties, a significant proportion of which were sustained in the final hours of the withdrawal. Things might have been different for the Allies – if the M.E.F. was landed at the same time, as opposed to being landed piecemeal and on separate days; if the Allied fleet had tried to force the straits on 14th April when the Turks manning the batteries were demoralised and running out of ammunition; if Hamilton had asked for reinforcements much earlier instead of waiting. Had there been a unified command, Hamilton could have exercised greater control over his commanders much better, instead of watching the undignified clash between Danglis and de Robeck. The significant independence of Danglis in the command structure made sure that Hamilton was nothing more than a glorified corps commander, but even if he was the supreme warlord in the Mediterranean, it is doubtful whether Hamilton had the assertiveness to be suitable for such a position. Above all, the operations required better organisation. The shortage of supplies and ammunition were very much in part a reflection of the fact that the landings had been cobbled together in a few weeks and not much thought had been given to how a force so large would be maintained in a land that was generally unknown to those attacking it. Hamilton was on his way home, and into ignominy, for he had proven to be too well-meaning and indecisive for the job, although he was not entirely to blame for the Gallipoli debacle. The Allies had failed to seize Constantinople, and failed to knock Turkey out of the war. The War Council, the Army and the Navy were already switching focus to the Baltic, where the army had landed.
Hamilton had kept the Benbow and Collingwood battalions in reserve, and now committed them to battle. The Benbow battalion was landed south of ‘A’ beach in order to support their precarious position, whilst the Collingwood battalion was landed north of Cape Tekke, to strike the Turks defending ‘B’ beach in the flank. By the afternoon of 18th April, the Benbow battalion was ashore at Gallipoli, having met desultory resistance from the Turks, and began to move swiftly towards its objective, marching southward with a swiftness that was absent from the landings at ‘A’ beach the day previously. Meanwhile, the Collingwood battalion landed and met determined resistance from the Turks, who happened to have a machine gun defending the area. Shellfire from the Royal Navy successfully knocked this gun out, and the odds stacked against the Turks, who pulled back after hand to hand fighting with the Collingwood battalion. Meanwhile, at ‘A’ beach, the newly arrived Hawke battalion attempted to push towards Achi Baba, which was now covered by the Turks having been deserted the day previously. The resistance of the Turks in this sector, however, was too much for the Hawke battalion to deal with, and after a prolonged fire fight, they were forced to fall back to their defensive positions. At ‘C’ beach, the successes of the Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions were exploited, and these units managed to secure Seddülbahir fortress, to the west of Seddülbahir town. Afterwards, the Portsmouth and Plymouth battalions, along with the remnants of the shattered Chatham battalion, pressed on, but were eventually forced to halt after meeting a battalion of unyielding Turks. Around Cape Tekke, the Collingwood battalion’s success was exploited, and the Howe battalion managed to move inland and link up with the men of the Benbow battalion, therefore managing to link all three landing beaches. By the evening of 18th April, the Royal Naval Division was holding a continuous beachhead around Cape Helles, but was thoroughly exhausted and unable to take up immediate offensive operations. Major-General Paris ordered his brigades to go onto the defensive, to allow for reinforcements and supplies to be brought in.
A Turkish camp
Paris’ orders to his division on 18th April conformed with Hamilton’s orders to the ANZACs to ‘dig’ late on 17th April, and thus set the tone for the fighting at Ari Burnu and Cape Helles. From here, troops on the bridgeheads lived in dugouts hollowed out from the earth, whilst trenches and outposts were cut out of the terrain where suitable. Like on the western front, these were creations of convenience, designed to be temporary only, but with the element of surprise lost, the fighting inevitably took on the character of that in France and Flanders. Having landed, the British were first tasked with bringing off casualties, bringing in supplies, and most importantly, the importation of artillery, the lack of which had manifested most profoundly when the ANZACs tried to push inland. The territory won was consolidated, with building materials brought in to secure defensive positions. Fighting around strong points increased as the Turks attempted to push tentatively at the Allied lines, without launching a full scale offensive, content with raiding and sniping at their opponents. Despite being short of small arms ammunition, the Turks had preponderance in artillery, and used this advantage effectively in shelling the Allied force intermittently. The ANZACs and the RN Division were in difficult terrain, and the deployment of heavy guns was sometimes impossible, which increased their reliance on ship-based guns out at sea. The Australasian forces continued to construct dugouts and pathways, linking their trenches together into a makeshift system, whilst a reservoir was established to partially relieve the problem of chronic water shortages. Although the Turks used the days after the British landings to make attacks themselves, they too were preparing defensive positions to ensure that a British breakout was minimalised. In particular, Turkish positions around Krithia and Sari Bair were strengthened significantly, as well as reinforced by forces garrisoning the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. Conditions for the soldiers around Ari Burnu and Cape Helles worsened as the temperature rose, casualties mounted and supplies became sparse. Yet if conditions were bad around Ari Burnu and Cape Helles, they were lamentable around Bulair, where the Greeks had made no progress against the Turks since landing on 13th April.
The hills of the Gallipoli peninsula
The Greeks had had more trouble than the British with regards to the evacuation of casualties, with only one small hospital ship available. The British were barely better prepared for the number of casualties, but inevitably, wounded Greek soldiers found themselves being treated alongside their British allies. More urgently for the Aegean Army, a shortage of shipping ensured that supplies could only be drip fed, leaving the huge force of six divisions crammed onto a small beachhead, increasingly short of ammunition and medical supplies. Like the ANZACs and the RN Division, the Greeks had been unable to land sufficient artillery on their beachhead and were reliant on support from naval vessels, primarily Lemnos and Kilkis. Problematically, these combined could only mount eight twelve-inch, and sixteen eight-inch guns, woefully inadequate for a force of the Aegean Army’s size. Danglis, the commander of the Aegean Army, with his headquarters on Lemnos, asked Hamilton whether the Royal Navy could provide some ships to support the Greek Army. Hamilton was sympathetic to Danglis’ plight but told him that he had no authority over the naval forces, and that he would have to put his request to de Robeck instead. Danglis visited de Robeck on board Queen Elizabeth and asked whether the Royal Navy could spare four battleships to provide covering gunfire for his army. De Robeck was reluctant – he was still reeling from the losses he had sustained in trying to force the straits on 13th April and loathed the thought of losing more ships. Danglis reasoned that his force made up the bulk of the M.E.F. and ought to have the majority of the covering artillery. De Robeck replied by pointing out that his fleet had been sent to force the straits and provide protection for Britain’s land forces, and that the support of the Aegean Army was technically a matter for the Greeks alone. De Robeck did not want to dissipate his force and was having enough difficulty in supporting the three British divisions near the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, without having to cover the Greeks too, yet he realised that Danglis had a point. In order to placate Danglis, de Robeck decided to give him two battleships: Canopus and Cornwallis. These two ships sailed north and were placed under the command of Admiral Koundouriotis, commanding the Greek Navy. By 19th April, the supply situation of the Aegean Army was good enough for a number of field guns to be brought ashore, and with new additions to the Greek naval force, Danglis felt confident enough to launch a renewed offensive.
Dousmanis reasoned that he had the campaign winning solution
The commander of B Corps, Lieutenant-General Dousmanis put forward his proposal for an offensive, which he argued could give the Aegean Army a decisive victory. He suggested that the artillery that had been provided should be put under his command and concentrated against the southern most point of the Turkish line. A prolonged bombardment would ensue, with support provided by the Greek Navy, and a hole would be punched in the Turkish line by the attacking infantry. From here, Dousmanis argued, the Turkish line could be rolled up, and the peninsula cut off. Danglis agreed to the proposal, and Hamilton gave his assent, although he was hardly in a position to disagree. On 21st April, with Dousmanis’ artillery in place, the offensive began, with the Greek guns pouring shellfire into the opposing Turkish trenches for two hours, whilst the heavy guns of Lemnos, Kilkis, Canopus and Cornwallis and the smaller guns of supporting cruisers also concentrated their fire on the sector of the Turkish line opposing B Corps. Dousmanis’ force, consisting of 3rd (Patras) Division, 4th (Nafplion) Division and 14th (Kalamata) Division, began to advance steadily when the bombardment finished, and made good early progress, managing to reach the Turkish earthworks with surprisingly little loss. Fierce battles for the Turkish defences ensued, with the men of 14th (Kalamata) Division carrying through their attack at the point of the bayonet, eventually managing to clear the Turkish positions after brutal hand to hand fighting. The exhausted Greeks tried to make good their first day gains when they resumed their offensive on 22nd April, and B Corps advanced in an attempt to capture Bulair town. However, significant Turkish reinforcements had arrived from Constantinople, and in battles that raged for the next three days, continual Greek assaults on the quickly established Turkish defensive positions were repulsed with heavy loss. Realising that no further progress could be made, Danglis called a halt to operations, and ordered his two army corps to go onto the defensive. The Aegean Army’s supply situation had not improved dramatically, and the Greek forces were still suffering terrible hardships, with the last few days of fighting demanding a lot from the average Greek soldier. With casualties growing, ammunition running short, Danglis asked Athens for substantial reinforcements.
ANZACs attacking Sari Bair Ridge
Meanwhile, the ANZACs had attempted a breakout by mounting an offensive directed against Sari Bair Ridge. The men of the 1st and 2nd Australian Brigades were used for the attack which was put in on 21st April along a front of 250 yards, against strongly built trenches with roofs providing extra protection. Like the fighting between the Greeks and Turks around Bulair, the fighting between the Australians and the Turks was often hand to hand and very confused. The battles for Sari Bair Ridge lasted for several days, with the Australians winning several Victoria Crosses for acts of gallantry, whilst one battalion sustained eighty percent casualties. Offensive efforts were made on other parts of the ANZAC front, with the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade assaulting Russell’s Top repeatedly with unimaginable bravery, failing each time and taking horrendous casualties in the process. The terrain over which the attacks on Sari Bair continued was difficult in the extreme, exhausting to climb in the best of conditions, let alone with the Turks providing opposition. On 22nd April, the New Zealand Brigade was thrown into the battle, and advanced onto Chunuk Bair, before stopping to entrench. The waters of the Narrows could be seen; if the New Zealanders could hold on, then the Allies would hold the advantage. Unfortunately, lamentable communications ensured that the gains made by the leading companies of the New Zealand Brigade were not reinforced, and the Turks subjected the men of the Wellington battalion to devastating fire from both sides, before rushing to the summit of Chunuk Bair with cries of ‘Allah!’ to sweep the New Zealanders from the hill. Attempts to retake the position failed; the ANZACs were exhausted, and when the battle closed on 27th April, Hamilton considered calling for reinforcements.
An Australian soldier carries a wounded comrade
Since the end of the first day of operations around Ari Burnu and Cape Helles, Hamilton had given thought to calling for immediate reinforcements, but did not want to alarm Lord Kitchener. Hamilton had been given the chance to command an army in battle, and did not want to be seen to be failing, and having to ask for reinforcements as soon as the landings begun. Thus, Hamilton was not only lacking assertiveness with regards to subordinates and Admiral de Robeck, but to his superior in London as well. For days, Hamilton stalled, half-believing that his force was sufficient to carry out the task given to him. But it wasn’t, and increasingly, it was ill suited numerically in comparison to the Turks, who reinforced their army on the peninsula with four infantry divisions on 22nd April. Before this had happened, however, the War Council in London had met to discuss the Dardanelles, the upcoming Baltic campaign and about making overtures to Italy. It was clear to all that the advance on the peninsula had stalled, and debate commenced over what could be done to kick start the campaign. Churchill weighed in and put forward a case for massively reinforcing the existing force, but Kitchener insisted that success would come about by careful advances by the existing force and reverted to an earlier mantra, that no new divisions could be spared. In a sense, he was correct – the divisions required to reinforce Hamilton were either being prepared for the landings in north Germany or still being completed in Britain. Yet there was one division that could possibly be sent immediately: the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division in Egypt. However, Lieutentant-General Maxwell in Cairo exaggerated the nature of the Turkish threat to the canal to convince London that the movement of the 42nd Division from Egypt was impossible without inviting disaster. Kitchener’s position was strengthened when he pointed out that Hamilton had not asked for reinforcements, but this changed when the request from the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force’s commander-in-chief found itself on the War Council’s table. Under pressure, Kitchener did not want to be seen to be letting down Hamilton – and the war effort – and announced that the 52nd (Lowland) Division, a territorial unit in construction, would be sent to the Mediterranean to immediately reinforce the M.E.F. The same arguments were taking place in Athens, and the Greek Army’s high command remained sensitive to the possibility of a Bulgarian intervention. The First Quartermaster-General and the Greek Navy insisted that there were enough problems supplying the existing force, and advised Venizelos that the sending of new divisions would simply turn the beachhead around Bulair into a prison camp, with the chance of losing the entire force to the Turks increasing dangerously. Implicit in this contention was the possibility of withdrawal, and when the Turks went onto the offensive on 1st May, this option began to appear all the more attractive.
Liman von Sanders and Ahmed Izzet Pasha felt confident enough after the halting of the most recent Greek and ANZAC assaults to launch an offensive of their own. They kept light forces around Cape Helles, confident that the defenders there could hold off any offensive mounted by the Royal Naval Division, whilst placing the bulk of their forces opposite the Greeks and the Australasians. On the night of 1st May, the Turks threw in their attacks with a ferocious determination – around Bulair, the Turks emerged from their earthworks and descended upon a numerically larger but demoralised Greek army, inflicting heavy loss on the confused Greeks, who were taken wholly by surprise. By 3rd May, the Turks had reached the Gulf of Saros and split the Aegean Army in two. The Greek Navy frantically provided support, but the Turks could not be deterred, and the spirits of the Greeks could not be lifted. On the ANZAC front, the Turks put in a number of offensives across the line, which met little success. However, they succeeded in inflicting significant casualties on the Australasians, all the while making more pronounced their superiority in artillery. The loss of Quinn’s Post and Courtney’s Post, while not dampening the spirits of the ANZACs, seriously shook the confidence of Hamilton, who now came to realise how vulnerable the M.E.F.’s position was. Hamilton wanted to stay, but his pessimistic reports to London made many on the War Council favour a withdrawal. Churchill was adamant that the M.E.F. should remain, especially as the Baltic landings were about to take place, but the fact that a direct offensive was about to be made in the Baltic made the idea of withdrawal from Gallipoli to some, permissible. Kitchener warned that a withdrawal would harm British prestige in the eyes of the Islamic world, sentiments that were echoed by Kitchener’s adversary, Lord Curzon. It was the former Viceroy who described most vividly of what a withdrawal would look like: ‘half crazy men, the swamping of craft, the nocturnal panic, the agony of the wounded, the hecatombs of the slain.’ Asquith dawdled, but sensed that the War Council favoured withdrawal. Kitchener said that the harm done to Britain’s standing from any withdrawal could be recovered if some effort was made against the Turks somewhere else, and suggested a landing at Alexandretta. This was ruled out by the Royal Navy, but Asquith was keen to withdraw and keep face, and promised the Secretary of State for War that an offensive against the Ottoman Empire would be made, if not at Alexandretta. The Greeks were asked for their opinions, and although reluctant, the government in Athens realised that the Aegean Army could not remain without British support, and given recent reports, it looked as if Dangis’ army could not remain around Bulair for long anyway. With a decision for withdrawal agreed, the order was wired through to Hamilton.
On 7th, 8th and 9th May, the withdrawal of the M.E.F. went in progress. Fortunately for the ANZACs and the Royal Naval Division, Curzon’s prophesy proved to be a false one. Under considerable secrecy, whilst the front line was held by skeletal forces, the bulk of the British forces were withdrawn under the cover of night in operations that were both well planned and excellently executed. The withdrawing forces demonstrated great discipline and the men manning the front line mounted remarkable feats of deception to convince the Turks that everything remained as per usual. By the evening of 8th May, the British force had been extracted from the peninsula, and was being taken back to the Aegean Islands. For the Greeks, Curzon’s prophesy proved to be partially true, as the Turks caught wind of the plan, and began an offensive aiming to drive the Aegean Army into the sea. Fighting on the beaches was intense, and even Lieutenant-General Dousmanis shot a number of Turks with his revolver, whilst Lieutenant-General Kallardis slayed one with his sword. Boats lined the shore, attempting to take Greek troops from the beaches as the battle raged only a few hundred yards away from them. The Greek commanders skilfully brought order to the chaos, and the Turks were held at the perimeter of the two beachheads whilst the evacuation continued. Greek troops held back the Turks for hours whilst the last soldiers were withdrawn, all the time being harassed by Turkish artillery fire. Eventually, the line could not be held, and the Turks burst through to massacre the Greek defenders almost to a man, whilst the remnants of the Aegean Army were ferried away to Greece.
Overall, the ANZACs and the Royal Naval Division had sustained approximately 6,350 casualties since landing on 17th April. The Greeks, in comparison had suffered approximately 15,260 casualties, a significant proportion of which were sustained in the final hours of the withdrawal. Things might have been different for the Allies – if the M.E.F. was landed at the same time, as opposed to being landed piecemeal and on separate days; if the Allied fleet had tried to force the straits on 14th April when the Turks manning the batteries were demoralised and running out of ammunition; if Hamilton had asked for reinforcements much earlier instead of waiting. Had there been a unified command, Hamilton could have exercised greater control over his commanders much better, instead of watching the undignified clash between Danglis and de Robeck. The significant independence of Danglis in the command structure made sure that Hamilton was nothing more than a glorified corps commander, but even if he was the supreme warlord in the Mediterranean, it is doubtful whether Hamilton had the assertiveness to be suitable for such a position. Above all, the operations required better organisation. The shortage of supplies and ammunition were very much in part a reflection of the fact that the landings had been cobbled together in a few weeks and not much thought had been given to how a force so large would be maintained in a land that was generally unknown to those attacking it. Hamilton was on his way home, and into ignominy, for he had proven to be too well-meaning and indecisive for the job, although he was not entirely to blame for the Gallipoli debacle. The Allies had failed to seize Constantinople, and failed to knock Turkey out of the war. The War Council, the Army and the Navy were already switching focus to the Baltic, where the army had landed.
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StephenT said:It's my professional opinion that you're doomed. Doooomed.
Hmm. Looks like you were right.
Just to let you know - I reloaded the game again after being forced to withdraw and I won.
Mettermrck said:
Lord G. Q. White said:
Thank you, most kindly!
ptan54 said:
Nothing so organised, I'm afraid. :wacko: