Wilhelm VI said:
I'm undecided as to whether I'll update or not at the moment. I shall think about it.
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I'm undecided as to whether I'll update or not at the moment. I shall think about it.
Jolly good AAR so far.
Let's see if we are to experience some action soon or only Admirals debating back and forth.
Let's see if we are to experience some action soon or only Admirals debating back and forth.
Wilhelm VI said:
Because I expect to be busy with TGW modding. However, if there is a great demand for an update, then I am obliged to give one, at some point
Aldo said:
A bit of both, I suspect.
Do you want to write an update for my AAR instead, and I'll do the next one for yours?Allenby said:
StephenT said:Do you want to write an update for my AAR instead, and I'll do the next one for yours?
A gracious offer if I may say so, however, I fear that you may not be able to execute the utterly flawless plans of Churchill and Fisher, and that you may bring embarassment to the Empire with stunning reversals in the Dardanelles and the Baltic.
Besides, would you really want your European Reich to be destroyed single handedly by Admiral Beatty, with sword in hand, coming to liberate the world onboard the Lion?
Why not just update,Allenby.Dont just abandon this good AAR.Me and I think most others are hooked on this AAR !
Oh alright then But don't expect it as often, as I shall be busier in the coming weeks.
But don't expect it as often, as I shall be busier in the coming weeks.
Part XXII – Jellicoe Protests
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s task was the preservation of the Grand Fleet, the weapon upon which the British Empire’s defence was based. He had achieved this and more at the battle of the Waddenzee in August 1914 when he had sunk five German dreadnoughts. Jellicoe was content with this victory, and took pride in the fact that the German fleet had not ventured out into the North Sea for six months. Lord Fisher, however, lusted for battle. He recognised the need to maintain the Grand Fleet above all, but felt that it should now be used in a potentially war winning stroke, in complementing the Baltic campaign. Fisher planned to have the Grand Fleet sail into the Heligoland Bight in order to engage the German Fleet when it ventured out in reaction to a British landing. On 3rd February 1915, in a meeting at the Admiralty, Fisher disclosed the plan of the Baltic campaign to Jellicoe, who had come down by train from Scotland. Upon seeing it, Jellicoe was aghast. To send the first line of Britain’s defence into German home waters in order to do battle seemed like madness. It would be the moment that the German Fleet had been waiting for: the Grand Fleet sailing majestically to within close range of Germany, to be ravaged by submarines, mines and torpedo attacks, in a concentration that would not be possible further out in the North Sea. Britain’s maritime supremacy, expanding with the launching of every warship would be risked for the benefit of one great gambling enterprise in the Baltic. The perception of risk was raised substantially when Jellicoe heard that four dreadnoughts would be detached from his command and incorporated into a Baltic Fleet, that would sail in active support of the invasion forces. To the defensive-minded Jellicoe, a protest had to be made.
Jellicoe raised his concerns in the meeting, in which Fisher, Churchill and Wilson were present. However, Jellicoe’s and Fisher’s differences over the Grand Fleet’s role in the Baltic campaign were not just based upon operational matters, but their differing perspectives regarding the fleet’s very purpose in the war. Now that a significant part of the German Fleet had been crippled, Fisher and Churchill argued, the Grand Fleet could afford to take risks, and thus, could afford to sail to the Heligoland Bight to seek battle. The Grand Fleet, they argued, could be more offensive minded, and could now do something to win the war; not just prevent a British defeat. But Jellicoe was concerned for the safety of his fleet, and especially concerned from the submarine threat. The sinking of the cruisers Pathfinder and Patrol in August 1914 demonstrated the vulnerability of ships to attack by submarine, a belief which was reinforced when the dreadnought Collingwood was nearly a victim to a similar attack not far from Scapa Flow. No ships could now sail the seas without a destroyer escort and not potentially be on the receiving end of an attack by submarines. What made matters worse for Jellicoe was the destroyer’s limited endurance, which would mean that should the Grand Fleet’s dreadnoughts venture into the Heligoland Bight, would eventually be without protection of destroyers, who would be compelled to go home at some point. Whilst placing much faith in the destroyer for providing the Grand Fleet with protection, Jellicoe recognised the not inconsiderable threat they posed, especially in enemy waters. He was fully aware of the potential dangers of being ambushed in the Heligoland Bight by a mass of German destroyers, moving silently and behind a smoke screen, or in low visibility. Furthermore, being such a short distance from Germany, they would find it relatively easy to return to Germany to re-arm before retuning to sea to make further attacks. Jellicoe explained his thoughts at the meeting and painted a verbal picture of the Grand Fleet’s vital dreadnoughts being sunk, one-by-one by a deadly mixture of mines, continual destroyer and of submarines swarming around the Heligoland Bight, whittling away Britain’s control of the sea – all this while the Grand Fleet tried to do battle with the German Fleet.
Jellicoe then pleaded with Churchill and Fisher not to take four of his dreadnoughts. Churchill originally had in mind the sending of four pre-dreadnoughts of the King Edward VII-class, but the War Office pressed for the sending of something more potent in order to protect the army’s passage around the Jutland Peninsula. Churchill caved in and agreed with Fisher for the detachment of four dreadnoughts to form the core of the new Baltic Fleet. The normally sedate Jellicoe showed some rare anger upon hearing this, looking at Churchill and surprised them with the piercing question “who runs the Admiralty? The navy or the army?” Jellicoe thought about resigning, considering how the Admiralty was now interfering with the Grand Fleet’s Battle Orders, which they had only approved last year. Jellicoe loathed the thought of having to execute a plan that he was not in agreement with, especially with a reduced force, but held back and decided to try and win the argument with Churchill and Fisher. Likewise, the latter two feared that Jellicoe would resign, and they realised that they could not risk losing the services of the Royal Navy’s most senior serving officer, and arguably the most important man in the Entente’s war effort. Quite sure that Jellicoe would resign if the Grand Fleet was ordered to sail into German waters, Churchill offered a compromise.
Churchill said that the four dreadnoughts would have to be relinquished, but that Warspite would be delivered in compensation. Warspite was a brand new ship of the Queen Elizabeth-class, monstrous in both size and armament, and would go some way to making up the Grand Fleet’s loss. Despite being given this mighty vessel, Jellicoe, with good reason, still felt short changed. It was then agreed that the number of submarines patrolling the area around Denmark should be increased, and that two submarine flotillas would concentrate in the Heligoland Bight and observe when the German Fleet ventures out. Churchill then agreed that the Grand Fleet should not immediately sail into the Heligoland Bight, although it should still initially escort the landing force’s passage through the North Sea. It was then agreed that for the duration of the Baltic campaign, the Grand Fleet would be based in the Humber, closer to Germany, and potentially allowing it to react more quickly to the German Fleet’s reaction to the landings. Any engagement fought, it was reckoned, would be a safe distance from Germany, thus satiating Jellicoe’s demands for maximum safety. The decision to accede to Jellicoe’s wish was the correct one, for the Grand Fleet commander had exposed an inherent contradiction in the naval component of the Baltic strategy. The victory at the Waddenzee allowed Churchill and Fisher to argue for the sending of the Grand Fleet into the Heligoland Bight, but their insistence on having dreadnoughts sent into the Baltic immediately slashed the overwhelming numerical preponderance enjoyed by the Grand Fleet after that battle which motivated Churchill and Fisher to argue for sending the Grand Fleet to the Bight. Effectively, the Grand Fleet’s superiority in numbers in any potential battle in the Heligoland Bight would only have been maintained by the presence of any vessels built after the battle of the Waddenzee.
Jellicoe’s hand was strengthened with the subsequent delivery of the last of the German Navy’s captured codebooks on February 4th, which ensured that the Admiralty would be alerted to when the German Fleet would come out to battle. The books were given to Sir Alfred Ewing, who ran ‘Room 40’, tasked with breaking the German Navy’s codes. The flamboyantly dressed Ewing had been struggling until recently, having gathered scholars and university dons for the task, but with three codebooks having been captured the undertaking was made much easier. The first book – HVB, dealing with maritime trade and communications between the German Navy and merchant shipping was captured off the coast of Melbourne in Australia in August 1914 from a German steamship. The second book – SKM, the German Navy’s principal codebook, was seized by the Russians when a German ship was wrecked in the Baltic. Even with the possession of these two books, breaking the code comprehensively was hard work until early February when the chest of the sunken dreadnought Ostfriesland was hauled up in a catch by a British fishing trawler – inside was a copy of the third book, VB which allowed Ewing and the staff at Room 40 to complete the puzzle. Intercepted signals could now be deciphered and the details sent to Churchill, Fisher and the fleet admirals. Thus, even with Jellicoe’s protest, the need to send the Grand Fleet to the Heligoland Bight was now made redundant, as the approximate location of the German Fleet would be known, irrespective of the Grand Fleet’s location.
Nevertheless, the plan to move the Grand Fleet to the Humber was kept in place, as it was reckoned that the German Fleet would move north and that it would be best for the Grand Fleet to position itself between them and Germany, and cut off their retreat. This could be done out of the Humber, but much less easily out of Scapa Flow. Jellicoe had won the day: he had influenced the Baltic campaign in order to ensure that the Grand Fleet would be as safe as possible and had also stamped his authority on the fleet. He was not being cowardly or shying away from a potential fight with the Germans. In essence, Jellicoe was determined that he should fight the Germans on his own terms, which he felt was being taken away from him by Churchill and Fisher. Now that the plan had been approved by the Grand Fleet commander, Churchill and Fisher began to put their plan together. Meanwhile, opposite St. James’ Park at the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey received an unexpected visitor – the Greek ambassador was shown into Grey’s office by a civil servant.
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s task was the preservation of the Grand Fleet, the weapon upon which the British Empire’s defence was based. He had achieved this and more at the battle of the Waddenzee in August 1914 when he had sunk five German dreadnoughts. Jellicoe was content with this victory, and took pride in the fact that the German fleet had not ventured out into the North Sea for six months. Lord Fisher, however, lusted for battle. He recognised the need to maintain the Grand Fleet above all, but felt that it should now be used in a potentially war winning stroke, in complementing the Baltic campaign. Fisher planned to have the Grand Fleet sail into the Heligoland Bight in order to engage the German Fleet when it ventured out in reaction to a British landing. On 3rd February 1915, in a meeting at the Admiralty, Fisher disclosed the plan of the Baltic campaign to Jellicoe, who had come down by train from Scotland. Upon seeing it, Jellicoe was aghast. To send the first line of Britain’s defence into German home waters in order to do battle seemed like madness. It would be the moment that the German Fleet had been waiting for: the Grand Fleet sailing majestically to within close range of Germany, to be ravaged by submarines, mines and torpedo attacks, in a concentration that would not be possible further out in the North Sea. Britain’s maritime supremacy, expanding with the launching of every warship would be risked for the benefit of one great gambling enterprise in the Baltic. The perception of risk was raised substantially when Jellicoe heard that four dreadnoughts would be detached from his command and incorporated into a Baltic Fleet, that would sail in active support of the invasion forces. To the defensive-minded Jellicoe, a protest had to be made.
Jellicoe was opposed to the Grand Fleet seeking battle in the Heligoland Bight
Jellicoe raised his concerns in the meeting, in which Fisher, Churchill and Wilson were present. However, Jellicoe’s and Fisher’s differences over the Grand Fleet’s role in the Baltic campaign were not just based upon operational matters, but their differing perspectives regarding the fleet’s very purpose in the war. Now that a significant part of the German Fleet had been crippled, Fisher and Churchill argued, the Grand Fleet could afford to take risks, and thus, could afford to sail to the Heligoland Bight to seek battle. The Grand Fleet, they argued, could be more offensive minded, and could now do something to win the war; not just prevent a British defeat. But Jellicoe was concerned for the safety of his fleet, and especially concerned from the submarine threat. The sinking of the cruisers Pathfinder and Patrol in August 1914 demonstrated the vulnerability of ships to attack by submarine, a belief which was reinforced when the dreadnought Collingwood was nearly a victim to a similar attack not far from Scapa Flow. No ships could now sail the seas without a destroyer escort and not potentially be on the receiving end of an attack by submarines. What made matters worse for Jellicoe was the destroyer’s limited endurance, which would mean that should the Grand Fleet’s dreadnoughts venture into the Heligoland Bight, would eventually be without protection of destroyers, who would be compelled to go home at some point. Whilst placing much faith in the destroyer for providing the Grand Fleet with protection, Jellicoe recognised the not inconsiderable threat they posed, especially in enemy waters. He was fully aware of the potential dangers of being ambushed in the Heligoland Bight by a mass of German destroyers, moving silently and behind a smoke screen, or in low visibility. Furthermore, being such a short distance from Germany, they would find it relatively easy to return to Germany to re-arm before retuning to sea to make further attacks. Jellicoe explained his thoughts at the meeting and painted a verbal picture of the Grand Fleet’s vital dreadnoughts being sunk, one-by-one by a deadly mixture of mines, continual destroyer and of submarines swarming around the Heligoland Bight, whittling away Britain’s control of the sea – all this while the Grand Fleet tried to do battle with the German Fleet.
Jellicoe then pleaded with Churchill and Fisher not to take four of his dreadnoughts. Churchill originally had in mind the sending of four pre-dreadnoughts of the King Edward VII-class, but the War Office pressed for the sending of something more potent in order to protect the army’s passage around the Jutland Peninsula. Churchill caved in and agreed with Fisher for the detachment of four dreadnoughts to form the core of the new Baltic Fleet. The normally sedate Jellicoe showed some rare anger upon hearing this, looking at Churchill and surprised them with the piercing question “who runs the Admiralty? The navy or the army?” Jellicoe thought about resigning, considering how the Admiralty was now interfering with the Grand Fleet’s Battle Orders, which they had only approved last year. Jellicoe loathed the thought of having to execute a plan that he was not in agreement with, especially with a reduced force, but held back and decided to try and win the argument with Churchill and Fisher. Likewise, the latter two feared that Jellicoe would resign, and they realised that they could not risk losing the services of the Royal Navy’s most senior serving officer, and arguably the most important man in the Entente’s war effort. Quite sure that Jellicoe would resign if the Grand Fleet was ordered to sail into German waters, Churchill offered a compromise.
HMS Warspite was commissioned and sent to the Grand Fleet
Churchill said that the four dreadnoughts would have to be relinquished, but that Warspite would be delivered in compensation. Warspite was a brand new ship of the Queen Elizabeth-class, monstrous in both size and armament, and would go some way to making up the Grand Fleet’s loss. Despite being given this mighty vessel, Jellicoe, with good reason, still felt short changed. It was then agreed that the number of submarines patrolling the area around Denmark should be increased, and that two submarine flotillas would concentrate in the Heligoland Bight and observe when the German Fleet ventures out. Churchill then agreed that the Grand Fleet should not immediately sail into the Heligoland Bight, although it should still initially escort the landing force’s passage through the North Sea. It was then agreed that for the duration of the Baltic campaign, the Grand Fleet would be based in the Humber, closer to Germany, and potentially allowing it to react more quickly to the German Fleet’s reaction to the landings. Any engagement fought, it was reckoned, would be a safe distance from Germany, thus satiating Jellicoe’s demands for maximum safety. The decision to accede to Jellicoe’s wish was the correct one, for the Grand Fleet commander had exposed an inherent contradiction in the naval component of the Baltic strategy. The victory at the Waddenzee allowed Churchill and Fisher to argue for the sending of the Grand Fleet into the Heligoland Bight, but their insistence on having dreadnoughts sent into the Baltic immediately slashed the overwhelming numerical preponderance enjoyed by the Grand Fleet after that battle which motivated Churchill and Fisher to argue for sending the Grand Fleet to the Bight. Effectively, the Grand Fleet’s superiority in numbers in any potential battle in the Heligoland Bight would only have been maintained by the presence of any vessels built after the battle of the Waddenzee.
The efforts of Room 40, headed by Sir Alfred Ewing, confirmed the folly of pushing the Grand Fleet too close to Germany
Jellicoe’s hand was strengthened with the subsequent delivery of the last of the German Navy’s captured codebooks on February 4th, which ensured that the Admiralty would be alerted to when the German Fleet would come out to battle. The books were given to Sir Alfred Ewing, who ran ‘Room 40’, tasked with breaking the German Navy’s codes. The flamboyantly dressed Ewing had been struggling until recently, having gathered scholars and university dons for the task, but with three codebooks having been captured the undertaking was made much easier. The first book – HVB, dealing with maritime trade and communications between the German Navy and merchant shipping was captured off the coast of Melbourne in Australia in August 1914 from a German steamship. The second book – SKM, the German Navy’s principal codebook, was seized by the Russians when a German ship was wrecked in the Baltic. Even with the possession of these two books, breaking the code comprehensively was hard work until early February when the chest of the sunken dreadnought Ostfriesland was hauled up in a catch by a British fishing trawler – inside was a copy of the third book, VB which allowed Ewing and the staff at Room 40 to complete the puzzle. Intercepted signals could now be deciphered and the details sent to Churchill, Fisher and the fleet admirals. Thus, even with Jellicoe’s protest, the need to send the Grand Fleet to the Heligoland Bight was now made redundant, as the approximate location of the German Fleet would be known, irrespective of the Grand Fleet’s location.
Nevertheless, the plan to move the Grand Fleet to the Humber was kept in place, as it was reckoned that the German Fleet would move north and that it would be best for the Grand Fleet to position itself between them and Germany, and cut off their retreat. This could be done out of the Humber, but much less easily out of Scapa Flow. Jellicoe had won the day: he had influenced the Baltic campaign in order to ensure that the Grand Fleet would be as safe as possible and had also stamped his authority on the fleet. He was not being cowardly or shying away from a potential fight with the Germans. In essence, Jellicoe was determined that he should fight the Germans on his own terms, which he felt was being taken away from him by Churchill and Fisher. Now that the plan had been approved by the Grand Fleet commander, Churchill and Fisher began to put their plan together. Meanwhile, opposite St. James’ Park at the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey received an unexpected visitor – the Greek ambassador was shown into Grey’s office by a civil servant.
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Part XXIII – Venizelos Intervenes
Before 1915, Greece and Turkey had a long running animosity – the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the domination of Greece by the Ottomans, the Greek War of Independence, the Thirty Days War of 1897 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 were episodes in a rocky relationship which was about to get worse. Turkey was a state in decline and Greece in the ascendancy, driven by Hellenic nationalism, a desire to unite the Greek people under a single government. Most recently, Crete was a focal point of Greco-Turkish contention – in 1908, after the withdrawal of troops by the European powers, Eleftherios Venizelos established a provisional government on the island and proclaimed a union with Greece. However, the powers intervened in reaction to this forward step and after Turkey’s threat of war, marines were sent to haul down the Greek flag. With Turkey claiming sovereignty and Venizelos’ provisional government in charge, the future of Crete was in limbo. In 1909, in reaction to the Greek government’s weakness in the face of international intervention, the Military League led a revolt demanding a more assertive foreign policy and reform of the armed forces. They called on Venizelos to come to Greece from Crete to deal with the crisis. Venizelos persuaded the king to call a National Assembly to revise the Constitution whilst getting the Military League to disband itself. With the election of the National Assembly in 1910, Venizelos became the Prime Minister of Greece, but soon resigned when the Assembly announced that it intended to write a new constitution, not revise the current one. The king dissolved the assembly, and Venizelos was re-elected with a large popular mandate before leading the way in revising the constitution in 1911, as well as introducing a number of reforms such as the creation of a non-political civil service. In 1912, a Chamber of Deputies replaced the National Assembly, but Venizelos refused to allow the Cretan members to take their seats, recognising that such a move would precipitate a crisis with Turkey. Deciding that the time was not yet right for a showdown with the Turks, Venizelos resolved to build a Balkan alliance to demonstrate solidarity before the Ottomans.
By March 1912, alliances between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece were in place and a Turko-Montenegrin conflict spilled over to engulf the Balkans. Venizelos used the war to declare a union between Greece and Crete, and the military went on to score considerable successes against their Turkish foes, seizing Salonika, Epirus, Yannina, Samos, nine Aegean Islands and Mount Athos. A settlement was reached which virtually expelled Turkey from Europe, but squabbling between the Balkan allies over the spoils led to a second conflict, in which Rumania and Turkey combined with Serbia and Greece to overwhelm Bulgaria. The subsequent Treaty of Bucharest confirmed Greek control over Southern Macedonia and the port of Kavalla, but most importantly, of Greece’s occupation of Chios and Mitylene, two Aegean Islands claimed by Turkey. In November 1913, a boycott of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire was instigated by the Turkish government, whilst 30,000 Greeks were deported and driven from their homes in Thrace and Anatolia. In 1914, an arms race between the Turks and Greeks intensified when the former placed orders for two dreadnoughts with the British, whilst Greece also ordered the building of a dreadnought from Germany, whilst purchasing two American pre-dreadnoughts and renaming them Lemnos and Kilkis. In June, Venizelos announced that Greece would not rule out the use of force to protect Greek subjects in Ottoman territory; the two nations appeared to be on the brink of war, when mediation between the two led to the arrangement of a meeting between Venizelos and the Turkish Grand Vizier. The war broke out before the meeting could take place, and while both declared neutrality, relations remained tense.
The pro-British and pro-French Venizelos had wanted to lend Greek support to Serbia – and the Entente as a whole in August 1914 when war broke out. But King Constantine, who succeeded the assassinated King George in 1913 was pro-German, due to his marriage to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s sister and his Prussian upbringing, and urged neutrality. Although more united Venizelos and Constantine than divided them, their differences were enough to make Greece’s status in the Great War a point of considerable contention. Turkey joined the war in December 1914, and to Venizelos, this was an opportunity to show solidarity with Britain and France and negotiate a way into the war, and he initiated a pro-Entente press campaign to this effect. However, Constantine was still determined to maintain Greece’s neutrality. Venizelos and Constantine were in agreement that siding with Germany, as the king might have wished, would expose Greece’s long coast line to harassment from the Royal Navy, but the issue of Greece’s neutrality continued to divide them as 1915 began. Britain, seeking to strike at Turkey in some respect, and build a Balkan League for warring against the Turks and the Austro-Hungarians made overtures to Athens. If Greece could be won over, it was theorised, then Bulgaria may also be won over, Serbia propped up, leaving Rumania with no choice but to side with the Entente. The Ottoman Empire would be overwhelmed, and with the cards stacked against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the war would be won.
The confirmation of Churchill’s Dardanelles scheme helped clarify and hasten Britain’s efforts to bring Greece into the war. This was partly because of the limits that had been put on the Royal Navy’s prospective operations in the Dardanelles by the War Council. With Fisher, Wilson and Limpus announcing that the Dardanelles would only be forced by a joint military and naval operation, the need to find an ally to supply the troops became more intense, whilst the desire to give the navy unlimited scope at the Dardanelles waned. If an army could not be supplied – and Kitchener certainly could not in time for March – then there would be little point in having the navy batter away at the Dardanelles forts if no discernable progress could be made. Thus, for Britain, getting Greece into the war was of prime importance: now it was their army that could be a projectile to be fired by Britain’s navy. Otherwise, the Royal Navy would have the difficult task of trying to single-handedly topple the Ottoman Empire – a feat which the navy’s top admirals had judged to be nearly impracticable. At first, Bulgaria proved to be a major stumbling block. Both Venizelos and Constantine were wary of Bulgaria’s intentions, fearing that if Greece were to join the Entente and move to attack the Turks or support the Serbs, that Bulgaria would themselves launch an attack on Greece, striking her when she was undefended. Much of the wrangling to take place revolved around how Bulgaria might react to Greece’s entry: Constantine declared that he would only support an attack on Turkey if an alliance with Bulgaria was signed, thus securing Greece’s northern flank. On 5th February, the Greek ambassador to Britain visited Sir Edward Grey, and asked whether Britain could put some pressure on Bulgaria to join the war against Turkey, or at least to promise not to attack Greece. Grey was not confident, and both his and Greece’s approaches to Bulgaria proved unsuccessful, with the Bulgarian government unwilling to reveal its hand. Venizelos was therefore compelled to promise to Constantine that if Greece went to war with Turkey, that the bulk of the army would remain on the border with Bulgaria. He reinforced this sentiment by ordering that the defences on border regions with Bulgaria be stiffened.
With the prospect of a Greek entry seemingly waning in the eyes of Grey and Churchill, Venizelos’ bargaining position was strengthened, and he implied that Greece would join if promised territorial concessions. Grey made renewed efforts to bring Greece into the war, and instructed the ambassador in Athens to make another approach to Venizelos. Grey dangled parts of Asia Minor in front of the Greeks in an attempt to entice them into an alliance agreement. For Venizelos, a staunch Hellenist, this was too much to resist, and he disclosed the British promise to Constantine. The king was also impressed by Grey’s pledge to transfer Anatolian territory to Greek control in the event of victory, but was still unenthused at the prospect of having to go to war with his relative, the Kaiser. Furthermore, General Joannis Metaxas, the acting Chief of the General Staff, a pro-German officer, announced his opinion that it Greece would not be able to properly administer her newly won territory in Anatolia in the event of victory, and that she should remain neutral instead. Venizelos, determined that the military should remain firmly under civilian control, and that the military had no place in deciding the direction of Greek diplomacy, sacked Metaxas on 17th February. Venizelos was fully aware that in the event of war with Turkey, that part of the Greek Army would be sent by the British in an invasion of the Dardanelles, and used his sacking of Metaxas as a message of intent. To Grey it seemed that Greece was about to join the Entente, but Venizelos raised the bar again, demanding that Britain contribute with its own troops alongside those of the Greek Army in the Dardanelles operation. Grey asked Kitchener whether any troops could be spared and Churchill pleaded with the Field Marshal to divert some troops for operations in the Dardanelles, to make certain Greece’s entry. Kitchener, realising the potential of the Dardanelles scheme if it was a military-naval operation, promised to release the Royal Naval Division for operations against Turkey and then went further, by informing the War Council that the ANZACs, still training in Egypt, would join them.
On 1st March, Russia announced that they were opposed to Greek participation in the Dardanelles operation. The government in Petrograd had her eyes on Constantinople, and the prospect of a Greek – not Russian – Army reaching the city, acting as the heirs of Byzantium appalled them. Even a pledge by the Greek government that she had no territorial designs on Constantinople, and even that her army would not stay in the city for long was not enough to satiate the Russians, who demanded that the task be undertaken by the British alone. Grey lost patience with the Russian government and bluntly informed the Russian ambassador that the attack on the straits was being done for Russia’s benefit, and that if she did not accept Greece’s participation, then the operation would not go ahead at all. Russian threats of a negotiated settlement with Germany were rightly seen as a sham by Grey, who discarded them, and told the ambassador that the operation would be run however the British government sought fit. For Venizelos, the path seemed open for Greek involvement in the war, but the king remained in opposition. Venizelos, armed with a British pledge of troops and territory after the war and supported by a public that was increasingly sympathetic for his position, confronted the king. Either the king could allow Greece to join the Entente, or Venizelos would resign. The Prime Minister hinted that if the king were to act in an obstructionist way, the people of Greece would be outraged and that his position as king would remain untenable.
The king realised the weakness of his position in comparison to that of Venizelos, and the constitutional unsoundness of overruling his elected Prime Minister. Choosing not to be the king that took his country to war, Constantine abdicated, and Alexander came to the throne. Venizelos had won – having reformed the constitution in 1911, he went a step further in 1915 by confirming his right, as head of government, to make alliances and war as he chose. On 6th March, Greece signed an alliance agreement with Britain, and declared war on Turkey.
Before 1915, Greece and Turkey had a long running animosity – the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the domination of Greece by the Ottomans, the Greek War of Independence, the Thirty Days War of 1897 and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 were episodes in a rocky relationship which was about to get worse. Turkey was a state in decline and Greece in the ascendancy, driven by Hellenic nationalism, a desire to unite the Greek people under a single government. Most recently, Crete was a focal point of Greco-Turkish contention – in 1908, after the withdrawal of troops by the European powers, Eleftherios Venizelos established a provisional government on the island and proclaimed a union with Greece. However, the powers intervened in reaction to this forward step and after Turkey’s threat of war, marines were sent to haul down the Greek flag. With Turkey claiming sovereignty and Venizelos’ provisional government in charge, the future of Crete was in limbo. In 1909, in reaction to the Greek government’s weakness in the face of international intervention, the Military League led a revolt demanding a more assertive foreign policy and reform of the armed forces. They called on Venizelos to come to Greece from Crete to deal with the crisis. Venizelos persuaded the king to call a National Assembly to revise the Constitution whilst getting the Military League to disband itself. With the election of the National Assembly in 1910, Venizelos became the Prime Minister of Greece, but soon resigned when the Assembly announced that it intended to write a new constitution, not revise the current one. The king dissolved the assembly, and Venizelos was re-elected with a large popular mandate before leading the way in revising the constitution in 1911, as well as introducing a number of reforms such as the creation of a non-political civil service. In 1912, a Chamber of Deputies replaced the National Assembly, but Venizelos refused to allow the Cretan members to take their seats, recognising that such a move would precipitate a crisis with Turkey. Deciding that the time was not yet right for a showdown with the Turks, Venizelos resolved to build a Balkan alliance to demonstrate solidarity before the Ottomans.
Salonika was surrendered by the Turks to the Greeks in 1912
By March 1912, alliances between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece were in place and a Turko-Montenegrin conflict spilled over to engulf the Balkans. Venizelos used the war to declare a union between Greece and Crete, and the military went on to score considerable successes against their Turkish foes, seizing Salonika, Epirus, Yannina, Samos, nine Aegean Islands and Mount Athos. A settlement was reached which virtually expelled Turkey from Europe, but squabbling between the Balkan allies over the spoils led to a second conflict, in which Rumania and Turkey combined with Serbia and Greece to overwhelm Bulgaria. The subsequent Treaty of Bucharest confirmed Greek control over Southern Macedonia and the port of Kavalla, but most importantly, of Greece’s occupation of Chios and Mitylene, two Aegean Islands claimed by Turkey. In November 1913, a boycott of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire was instigated by the Turkish government, whilst 30,000 Greeks were deported and driven from their homes in Thrace and Anatolia. In 1914, an arms race between the Turks and Greeks intensified when the former placed orders for two dreadnoughts with the British, whilst Greece also ordered the building of a dreadnought from Germany, whilst purchasing two American pre-dreadnoughts and renaming them Lemnos and Kilkis. In June, Venizelos announced that Greece would not rule out the use of force to protect Greek subjects in Ottoman territory; the two nations appeared to be on the brink of war, when mediation between the two led to the arrangement of a meeting between Venizelos and the Turkish Grand Vizier. The war broke out before the meeting could take place, and while both declared neutrality, relations remained tense.
Venizelos: the driving force of Hellenism, and Greece’s pro-Entente policy
The pro-British and pro-French Venizelos had wanted to lend Greek support to Serbia – and the Entente as a whole in August 1914 when war broke out. But King Constantine, who succeeded the assassinated King George in 1913 was pro-German, due to his marriage to Kaiser Wilhelm II’s sister and his Prussian upbringing, and urged neutrality. Although more united Venizelos and Constantine than divided them, their differences were enough to make Greece’s status in the Great War a point of considerable contention. Turkey joined the war in December 1914, and to Venizelos, this was an opportunity to show solidarity with Britain and France and negotiate a way into the war, and he initiated a pro-Entente press campaign to this effect. However, Constantine was still determined to maintain Greece’s neutrality. Venizelos and Constantine were in agreement that siding with Germany, as the king might have wished, would expose Greece’s long coast line to harassment from the Royal Navy, but the issue of Greece’s neutrality continued to divide them as 1915 began. Britain, seeking to strike at Turkey in some respect, and build a Balkan League for warring against the Turks and the Austro-Hungarians made overtures to Athens. If Greece could be won over, it was theorised, then Bulgaria may also be won over, Serbia propped up, leaving Rumania with no choice but to side with the Entente. The Ottoman Empire would be overwhelmed, and with the cards stacked against Germany and Austria-Hungary, the war would be won.
The confirmation of Churchill’s Dardanelles scheme helped clarify and hasten Britain’s efforts to bring Greece into the war. This was partly because of the limits that had been put on the Royal Navy’s prospective operations in the Dardanelles by the War Council. With Fisher, Wilson and Limpus announcing that the Dardanelles would only be forced by a joint military and naval operation, the need to find an ally to supply the troops became more intense, whilst the desire to give the navy unlimited scope at the Dardanelles waned. If an army could not be supplied – and Kitchener certainly could not in time for March – then there would be little point in having the navy batter away at the Dardanelles forts if no discernable progress could be made. Thus, for Britain, getting Greece into the war was of prime importance: now it was their army that could be a projectile to be fired by Britain’s navy. Otherwise, the Royal Navy would have the difficult task of trying to single-handedly topple the Ottoman Empire – a feat which the navy’s top admirals had judged to be nearly impracticable. At first, Bulgaria proved to be a major stumbling block. Both Venizelos and Constantine were wary of Bulgaria’s intentions, fearing that if Greece were to join the Entente and move to attack the Turks or support the Serbs, that Bulgaria would themselves launch an attack on Greece, striking her when she was undefended. Much of the wrangling to take place revolved around how Bulgaria might react to Greece’s entry: Constantine declared that he would only support an attack on Turkey if an alliance with Bulgaria was signed, thus securing Greece’s northern flank. On 5th February, the Greek ambassador to Britain visited Sir Edward Grey, and asked whether Britain could put some pressure on Bulgaria to join the war against Turkey, or at least to promise not to attack Greece. Grey was not confident, and both his and Greece’s approaches to Bulgaria proved unsuccessful, with the Bulgarian government unwilling to reveal its hand. Venizelos was therefore compelled to promise to Constantine that if Greece went to war with Turkey, that the bulk of the army would remain on the border with Bulgaria. He reinforced this sentiment by ordering that the defences on border regions with Bulgaria be stiffened.
King Constantine’s pro-German attitude made neutrality his favoured option
With the prospect of a Greek entry seemingly waning in the eyes of Grey and Churchill, Venizelos’ bargaining position was strengthened, and he implied that Greece would join if promised territorial concessions. Grey made renewed efforts to bring Greece into the war, and instructed the ambassador in Athens to make another approach to Venizelos. Grey dangled parts of Asia Minor in front of the Greeks in an attempt to entice them into an alliance agreement. For Venizelos, a staunch Hellenist, this was too much to resist, and he disclosed the British promise to Constantine. The king was also impressed by Grey’s pledge to transfer Anatolian territory to Greek control in the event of victory, but was still unenthused at the prospect of having to go to war with his relative, the Kaiser. Furthermore, General Joannis Metaxas, the acting Chief of the General Staff, a pro-German officer, announced his opinion that it Greece would not be able to properly administer her newly won territory in Anatolia in the event of victory, and that she should remain neutral instead. Venizelos, determined that the military should remain firmly under civilian control, and that the military had no place in deciding the direction of Greek diplomacy, sacked Metaxas on 17th February. Venizelos was fully aware that in the event of war with Turkey, that part of the Greek Army would be sent by the British in an invasion of the Dardanelles, and used his sacking of Metaxas as a message of intent. To Grey it seemed that Greece was about to join the Entente, but Venizelos raised the bar again, demanding that Britain contribute with its own troops alongside those of the Greek Army in the Dardanelles operation. Grey asked Kitchener whether any troops could be spared and Churchill pleaded with the Field Marshal to divert some troops for operations in the Dardanelles, to make certain Greece’s entry. Kitchener, realising the potential of the Dardanelles scheme if it was a military-naval operation, promised to release the Royal Naval Division for operations against Turkey and then went further, by informing the War Council that the ANZACs, still training in Egypt, would join them.
Grey worked assiduously to get Greece to join the Entente
On 1st March, Russia announced that they were opposed to Greek participation in the Dardanelles operation. The government in Petrograd had her eyes on Constantinople, and the prospect of a Greek – not Russian – Army reaching the city, acting as the heirs of Byzantium appalled them. Even a pledge by the Greek government that she had no territorial designs on Constantinople, and even that her army would not stay in the city for long was not enough to satiate the Russians, who demanded that the task be undertaken by the British alone. Grey lost patience with the Russian government and bluntly informed the Russian ambassador that the attack on the straits was being done for Russia’s benefit, and that if she did not accept Greece’s participation, then the operation would not go ahead at all. Russian threats of a negotiated settlement with Germany were rightly seen as a sham by Grey, who discarded them, and told the ambassador that the operation would be run however the British government sought fit. For Venizelos, the path seemed open for Greek involvement in the war, but the king remained in opposition. Venizelos, armed with a British pledge of troops and territory after the war and supported by a public that was increasingly sympathetic for his position, confronted the king. Either the king could allow Greece to join the Entente, or Venizelos would resign. The Prime Minister hinted that if the king were to act in an obstructionist way, the people of Greece would be outraged and that his position as king would remain untenable.
The king realised the weakness of his position in comparison to that of Venizelos, and the constitutional unsoundness of overruling his elected Prime Minister. Choosing not to be the king that took his country to war, Constantine abdicated, and Alexander came to the throne. Venizelos had won – having reformed the constitution in 1911, he went a step further in 1915 by confirming his right, as head of government, to make alliances and war as he chose. On 6th March, Greece signed an alliance agreement with Britain, and declared war on Turkey.
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Yay another excellent update Sir Allenby. You put some much excellent work into your AAR. I bow to you.
I don't believe the Greeks for a second, there's no way in hell they could keep their (rightful, or at least much more rightful then Russia) hands on Constantinople. But I'm sure they'll prove a great ally, I like the set up for the Dardenelles though, Greeks and Aussies possibly the most mis-matched group of people to ever fight along side each other
Semi-Lobster said:Greeks and Aussies possibly the most mis-matched group of people to ever fight along side each other
Greeks, Australians, New Zealanders and Reserve Royal Navy Infantry.
Great set of updates there Allenby
Seems like your admirals don’t manage to agree on much things any more, still I think you are doing a great work in writing about the tension who I guess normally affect military leaders at war.
Now with Greece in the war it is time for the Dardanelles raid, so I hope we will see both the raid on the Dardanelles and the Baltic soon
Seems like your admirals don’t manage to agree on much things any more, still I think you are doing a great work in writing about the tension who I guess normally affect military leaders at war.
Now with Greece in the war it is time for the Dardanelles raid, so I hope we will see both the raid on the Dardanelles and the Baltic soon