1914-1924 'British interests; British honour; British obligations'

[Lord E]

Great success Allenby, but I fear that when the German boys get closer to home the fighting will only get harder and harder. And although you have liberated much of Belgium, in the big picture this might only be a small step to Berlin. But at least you managed to move Haig’s drinks cabinet a little more than six inches closer to Berlin

Looking forward to see how all this will turn out and what will happen in Germany now that the army is no longer in full control and losing battle after battle.

 

[Vann the Red]

Advancing on all fronts! I suspect domestic turmoil must be maddening for the Prussian aristocracy at the moment. Some accommodation must be reached before people take to the streets.

Vann

 

[Kurt_Steiner]

Will Germany surrender before the Allies get to the Rhin?

What a disaster for Berlin... poor them...

 

[Allenby]

!!! Brussels and Antwerp have fallen...is this a sign of the end? Will the German Army be...*cough*...'stabbed in the back'? I can't wait until your next update, Allenby.

Well it wasn't stabbed in the back historically, so why should it be on this occasion? Or perhaps it will be?

Or it might even be stabbed elsewhere! ...in the groin or the neck.

Ah...the opening of the 'mobile phase' of combat in the west. Congratulations on cracking into Brussels...one can only hope that Ludendorff can continue to make such mistakes as ordering the troops to defend something 'to the last man' or some such foolishness. You've also made some rumbling about an upcoming French offensive? If so, the Germans may be in for a nasty surprise!

Hoping for the best...Get the boys home by Christmas!

TheExecuter

Yes, these French operations were preliminary to further operations against the German line. As you mentioned, the fighting in the west has taken on characteristics of mobility which can only encourage the Allies.

I have to say, the fall of Brussles and Antwerp, but its still a long way to Berlin, at any distance. A cunning plan indeed on behalf of the German leadership, whether it works or not is another factor.

Perhaps not cunning but desperate. The Germans hope to salvage their army, confront the enemies within and hope for the best with the Allies.

A sterling success, but I suspect that there's quite a way to go yet before peace can finally descend. I wonder if there will be a Kaiserschlacht in this TL?

You might be right - Germany could choose to defend every square inch of territory and force the Allies to fight on. Whether the German Army is in a fit state to launch a colossal counterattack is highly questionable. But if the German war effort lasts for a few more months and the Allies have to pause for rest then anything is possible, I suppose...

Great success Allenby, but I fear that when the German boys get closer to home the fighting will only get harder and harder. And although you have liberated much of Belgium, in the big picture this might only be a small step to Berlin. But at least you managed to move Haig’s drinks cabinet a little more than six inches closer to Berlin

Looking forward to see how all this will turn out and what will happen in Germany now that the army is no longer in full control and losing battle after battle.

If/when the war carries onto German territory the German public will probably rally behind the government to defend the fatherland. Even if the German Army is defeated and its government thrown into turmoil, there is always the possibility of a German version of Gambetta continuing the resistance and protracting the conflict.

Advancing on all fronts! I suspect domestic turmoil must be maddening for the Prussian aristocracy at the moment. Some accommodation must be reached before people take to the streets.

Indeed. The domestic predicament of Germany is one of two major threats to her war effort and the capacity of her people to tolerate the war is inextricably connected to the success of the army.

Will Germany surrender before the Allies get to the Rhin?

What a disaster for Berlin... poor them...

Find out soon!

 

[unmerged(10426)]

How is the French line in A-L doing?

 

[El Pip]

It will be interesting to see how the full French offensive fares. Quite aside from any considerations about Germany France needs a decisive victory on the Western Front to bolster her claims to the share of spoils in the East.

Not that France deserves any share of course, but I doubt the French government or army will see it that way. I do however have every faith that Curzon will show them the error of their ways and keep the region free of the curse of French influence.

 

[unmerged(10426)]

I do however have every faith that Curzon will show them the error of their ways and keep the region free of the curse of French influence.

Curzon for World Dictator!!!!!111

 

[Allenby]

How is the French line in A-L doing?

It has been largely quiet throughout the war. Live and let live.

The French high command has focused single-mindedly on throwing the Germans on French soil before attempting to break into Alsace-Lorraine. Some of the terrain is none too friendly either.

It will be interesting to see how the full French offensive fares. Quite aside from any considerations about Germany France needs a decisive victory on the Western Front to bolster her claims to the share of spoils in the East.

Not that France deserves any share of course, but I doubt the French government or army will see it that way. I do however have every faith that Curzon will show them the error of their ways and keep the region free of the curse of French influence.

France has probably already achieved the 'decisive victory' it requires - having committed more troops to fighting the Germans than the British and US since 1914.

But Clemenceau will prioritise the future security of France above all.

Curzon for World Dictator!!!!!111

A re-run of the 1903 Durbar but with the leaders of the world paying homage instead of the Indian princes.

 

[unmerged(10426)]

A re-run of the 1903 Durbar but with the leaders of the world paying homage instead of the Indian princes.

 

[El Pip]

France has probably already achieved the 'decisive victory' it requires - having committed more troops to fighting the Germans than the British and US since 1914.

Excellent reasoning! Thus France will have all the gains in that area, probably A-L, while Britain will solely benefit in the Near-East where she has committed more troops than anyone else. A fair and just system.

 

[unmerged(11031)]

You've got to wonder though. If the Germans do halt the Allies, British Public opinion would be for peace, after all, they have achieved their War Aims.

 

[unmerged(10426)]

It has been largely quiet throughout the war.

As likely to move as a Frenchman living next to a brothel.

 

[Dr Rare]

As likely to move as a Frenchman living next to a brothel.

:rofl: Classic ,sounds like a Black Adder quote

 

[Sir Humphrey]

I would say Kitchener would assume power at some stage. But since a grave national disaster is unlikely, that is also probably not going to happen.

 

[Allenby]

Excellent reasoning! Thus France will have all the gains in that area, probably A-L, while Britain will solely benefit in the Near-East where she has committed more troops than anyone else. A fair and just system.

It would all be perfect if only the powerful French Colonial lobby could be ignored along with British opponents of French revanchism!

You've got to wonder though. If the Germans do halt the Allies, British Public opinion would be for peace, after all, they have achieved their War Aims.

It would certainly increase dramatically the numbers of those calling for a settlement. This would suit the Germans, who are now inclined to attempt to achieve their essentials through negotiation rather than by force.

Classic ,sounds like a Black Adder quote

It is.

I would say Kitchener would assume power at some stage. But since a grave national disaster is unlikely, that is also probably not going to happen.

It would be a pretty dire crisis for everyone to turn to Kitchener, not to mention an unparalleled loss of confidence in the governing abilities of the politicians. Although it would be quite something for the British people to rally around the moustache in a time of peril for warmth and security.

 

[Allenby]

CXVI – Finis

On 31st March, Easter Sunday, the Allies commenced a general advance along the length of the front in France and Belgium. Encouraged by the progress made throughout the months of February and March, General Lyautey, Field Marshal Haig and General Wood held a conference at the French commander-in-chief’s headquarters at St. Dizier and decided upon this course of action. With the German Army depleted by battle casualties, desertion and capture, perilously short of reserves, racked by despondency among the fighting ranks and holding improvised defences, it was an opportune time for the Allies to seek the comprehensive defeat of the enemy which would cease hostilities.

Within Germany, discord was rife, imitating the anti-authoritarian spirit in Russia which had preceded the tumult of 1917. Kaiser Wilhelm II had become a source of detestation and derision, with many on the left calling for his abdication and even for a republic. Prince Bülow, the Chancellor, now served at the head of a government composed of members from the SPD, the Catholic Centre Party and the National Liberals. Although representative of the Reichstag and detected by outsiders as a profound step towards democracy, the new government was the German leadership’s cynical bid to burden its critics. Events had moved much too quickly for Bülow, who until recently had gambled on playing off the Allied governments against their people to secure a favourable peace. Now a much hastier – and humbler – approach to the Allies was necessary in light of the adverse military circumstances which Ludendorff had assessed as dire. To the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Prince Lichnowsky, who held the opinion that Germany was culpable for the outbreak of war, there was little doubt as to which of the Allied powers the German government should approach. Lichnowsky observed that Clemenceau was a sworn enemy of Germany and that the United States appeared distinctly unfriendly, writing that ‘Mr. Roosevelt’s intemperate language to Congress [in January 1918] appears to promise the complete rout of Germany and her destruction as a great power.’ Consequently, Lichnowsky argued that Germany should approach Britain for an armistice, citing the relatively conciliatory Caxton Hall speech of Lloyd George, in the hope that clear ground existed between Britain, led by a man known for his pro-German sympathies before the war and the United States and France, baying for blood. However, Bülow was resentful that Lichnowsky even held the Foreign Affairs portfolio. He regarded him as an ‘amateur’ and signalled his complete unwillingness to follow any line that the ‘craven Anglomaniac’ recommended. Like Lichnowsky, Bülow sought to divide the Allies but detected different fault lines. Unlike Lichnowsky, the Chancellor believed that behind the tough Rooseveltian rhetoric of the President laid a reasonable negotiator who would not be as vengeful as the British or the French. “The President” Bülow insisted “was playing to the gallery” when he spoke so immoderately to Congress. As the mediator of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Roosevelt was a proven man of peace and it was with him that Bülow intended to parley. The Chancellor pointed out hopefully to the Kaiser that the ‘three points’ were so vague that they could be interpreted favourably to Germany. The best possible scenario, he concluded, was the retention of Alsace-Lorraine, the adoption of a constitutional monarchy in which the power of the government remained strong and the exertion of German influence in Eastern Europe indirectly and unofficially. All of this, Bülow chanced, could be achieved before peace negotiations had even begun, which could be protracted considerably to allow Germany to garner her strength.

Lichnowsky made the case for issuing an armistice plea to Britain​

The German note asking for an armistice was short, transmitted to Washington D.C. on 5th April, pleading for a truce ‘on the basis of the terms outlined by the President to Congress in Washington D.C. on 8th January 1918.’ Germany was now vowing to retreat to her 1914 borders and to adopt a democratic constitution, requirements which were conspicuously lacking in the 13th March note. Roosevelt had previously vowed in 1917 to wage war “until the German cancer is cut clean out of the world body”. Yet he had since progressively narrowed his target to the military and political clique that dominated Germany instead of the country as a whole. Meanwhile, the most bellicose members of Congress and the Yellow Press strongly advocated marching on Berlin to make Allied victory complete and unambiguous, a strategy which Roosevelt would champion within Allied counsels if the German government backtracked “even a single inch” from their plea for an armistice on the basis of the ‘three points’. Replying to the note, the President asked for clarification on the unanimity of support within government circles in Berlin for the armistice plea, the seriousness of efforts to democratise and the time in which the German Army could withdraw from Eastern Europe. The President was determined not to accept prevarication by Berlin, commenting to the Secretary of War, Elihu Root that the Germans “had better get marching, double quick time too”. After Roosevelt had sent his inquisitive reply to Berlin, he consulted London and Paris, where there was surprise that the German government had altered its plea so quickly. The President acknowledged that the ‘three points’ were “light on detail” and that London and Paris would “give them flesh” by securing adequate protection before a peace conference. Roosevelt was untroubled by this, certain that Britain and France would not tolerate the status quo ante bellum before arriving at the peace conference having fought the war since 1914. In response to those who felt that the United States should assert what former President Woodrow Wilson called ‘peace without victory’, Roosevelt was disdainful, retorting that a peace without victory would be a peace without justice.

German prisoners captured in April 1918​

Upon learning that Berlin had sent an appeal for a truce on the basis of Roosevelt’s ‘three points’, Lloyd George rejoiced in a note to his mistress, Frances Stevenson. To ‘my darling Pussy’, the Prime Minister wrote that ‘Germany is badly shaken and has changed her tune…could it be the end?’ Before considering what line to take, Lloyd George consulted the Dominion Prime Ministers to sound out their opinion on the desirability of demanding peace with Germany. Lloyd George himself was favourable, but confided to Bonar Law that the ‘three points’ would form a basis of further negotiation only and would be subject to modification to ensure that Britain had suitable guarantees. Members of the War Cabinet were concerned that the prolongation of the war would only serve to strengthen the hand of the United States and that a favourable settlement should be reached sooner rather than later. Carson summarised this viewpoint: ‘However well disposed towards Britain President Roosevelt might be, it would not be in the interests of our country to fight on if it guaranteed the diminution of our power to the extent that peace with Germany is dictated by America alone.’ Smuts estimated to his colleagues that the British Empire was fighting at its maximum strength and as Roosevelt had not outlined his intentions in any great detail, the War Cabinet was not inclined to take any risks. Encouragement to settle with Germany came from the battlefield, where the Allied armies had continued to achieve success. Advancing along the length of the line, the British had captured Louvain, Charleroi and were approaching the River Meuse, the AEF met little coherent opposition in marching on Charleville-Mézières and Sedan whilst the French had pushed into Alsace-Lorraine. Fighting had become less frequent as the Germans opted to withdraw more often than fight in order to preserve their forces. Having undertaken the bulk of the fighting since February, the casualties incurred by the BEF surpassed those of the French or American armies, causing General Wilson to speculate that the BEF would shrink in size through further casualties and manpower shortages, weakening the position of Britain relative to the United States and France. Customarily, Haig questioned the commitment of his allies and wrote that ‘The British alone might bring the enemy to his knees. But why expend more British lives – and for what?’ He reached the conclusion that continuing the war would strengthen the United States and France and recommended that an armistice should be reached with Germany. Similar conclusions were being reached within the French Army, but without the same harmony of opinion. At St. Dizier, Foch advocated fighting until Germany was utterly defeated but was foiled by the commander-in-chief, Lyautey, who urged the pursuance of an armistice, arguing that to continue hostilities would strengthen Britain and the United States and weaken the voice of France at the peace conference. Detecting German weakness and pessimistic about their abilities to sustain war efforts at optimum strength, Britain and France were eager to settle. By 12th April, the governments in London and Paris had informed Washington D.C. that they were prepared to accept an armistice with Germany using the ‘three point’ declaration as a basis for further negotiation. Clemenceau suggested that the Supreme War Council convene to coordinate Allied demands. Here, the British and French governments intended to give greater detail to the ‘three point’ plan proposed by President Roosevelt.

General Lyautey contended that Britain and the United States would profit from continuing the war​

Bülow’s note of 5th April had intended to facilitate Germany’s orderly exit from the war. Instead, it prompted more discord at home and a further breakdown of spirit and discipline in the German Army. The public nature of the diplomacy did not aid the cause of keeping a peace-hungry population in check. The world witnessed an exchange of notes between Washington D.C. and Berlin which made apparent that the accomplishment of peace was near. While the German government haggled over the projected speed of their withdrawal from the occupied territories, the American government made abundantly clear to Berlin that the British and French governments would possess their own demands that would have to be fixed as part of the ‘three point’ consensus. This hardening Allied line disconcerted the German government, but the deteriorating domestic situation narrowed room for manoeuvre. By accepting Roosevelt’s terms as an acceptable foundation for a peace settlement, the German government had led the way. At this juncture, the German people overtook their government. Now that the prospect of victory had vanished, the German people could tolerate hardship no longer. A spontaneous uprising occurred in Nuremburg on 21st April composed of different elements, ranging from striking workers and those who sought political reform and the abdication of the Kaiser through to socialists and Bolsheviks. Possessing the common aim of peace, they took control of the city without bloodshed, encouraging elements of the police and army to join them. Units of the German Army from Central Europe were sent to restore authority as the first signs of revolution flickered. The Kaiser, having considered the possibility of leaving Berlin to join the army command at Spa, now chose to remain in the German capital, declaring that his proper place in time of crisis was at the head of the nation. He attempted to assuage the sense of shock which had jolted the German government. The alarm the Nuremburg uprising caused in Berlin was matched in Washington D.C., where Roosevelt interpreted the event as a purely Bolshevik venture. This prompted the President to advocate pursuing the armistice negotiations with greater haste, declaring that “I would sooner negotiate with a reasonable statesman than a representative of the revolutionary mob.” The dangers of continuing the war onto German soil were now apparent, with the real possibility of a revolution overthrowing the social order of Central Europe. Roosevelt conceded that he was not keen that his armies should penetrate deep into a country rife with revolutionary spirit but acknowledged that the Allies would have no other choice if Germany did not accede to her demands. Having demonstrated political leadership over the ‘three points’, the press and Congress were less adamant that the Allies march on Berlin. Freed from constraints, the President was able to issue instructions to the Ambassador in Paris, William Graves Sharp, to negotiate Allied armistice terms at the Supreme War Council in Versailles. In his telegram to Paris, the President stipulated that although Germany must not be pushed towards revolution ‘we must ensure that Germany recognises herself to be beaten.’

Admiral Wemyss implored Lloyd George to press for the surrender of the German fleet​

Lloyd George and Clemenceau arrived at Versailles on 25th April convinced that public opinion would not tolerate a resumption of hostilities should a truce be reached. Having reached this assumption, both decided to press for the incorporation of their essential demands of Germany into the armistice terms being drafted at the SWC. Advised by Lyautey and Foch, Clemenceau demanded the right of the French Army to occupy the Rhineland and the bridgeheads on the east bank of the river. The French Prime Minister also insisted that the German Army withdraw from occupied territories by a stringently defined deadline. It was Foch in particular who encouraged Clemenceau to issue this demand, explaining the logic of forcing the German Army to pull out with such rapidity as to necessitate the abandonment of its heavy equipment. Lloyd George raised no objection to these terms, accepting that the Allies could only benefit at the peace conference from the protection afforded by such an occupation and the irreversible weakening of the German Army. Roosevelt accepted the insertion of these terms by the French, reasoning that to insist the Germans withdraw to her 1914 borders in accordance with his first ‘point’ did not preclude the Allies occupying parts of Germany for protection. Just as Clemenceau had consulted Lyautey and Foch before tabling his military terms, Lloyd George had accepted the advice of Admiral Jellicoe and the First Sea Lord, Admiral Wemyss. The admirals suggested that the remainder of the German Navy be surrendered but Lloyd George instinctively felt this to be unnecessary, arguing that it had been suitably reduced in strength in 1917. However, Chamberlain at the Admiralty served as an effective spokesman for the Unionists, who were urging that the fleet be surrendered in its entirety. The Prime Minister acceded to the demands of his coalition partners and raised the subject with the other allies at the conference. Clemenceau was not enthusiastic to accept this, concerned that it would render the terms unpalatable to the Germans. Ambassador Sharp hesitated, knowing that the British naval demand could not be explained in the context of the ‘three points’. He telegraphed Washington D.C. for instructions from Roosevelt, who conceded that if the French could effectively ask for the German Army to be stripped of heavy artillery then the British could legitimately claim the German fleet as an insurance against non-agreement during peace negotiations. The Allied delegates agreed to retain their occupation of the German colonies, recognising their bargaining potential and unwilling to be drawn into debates about their future before the peace conference. On the subject of the Kaiser, Roosevelt had expressed his willingness that Wilhelm II could remain as the head of the German state in a titular capacity. However, this plan was blown out of the water a few days before the Versailles meeting by Lloyd George, who steadfastly declared in a speech at Shoreditch Town Hall that the Kaiser, having unleashed war, could not expect to retain his position after the conclusion of peace. Clemenceau approved, and subsequently, the abdication of Wilhelm II was incorporated into the Allied armistice terms as part of the demand that Germany adopt a democratic constitution. The Austro-Hungarians were not represented at the SWC but were aware that it had convened to discuss armistice terms. In a late plea, Andrássy and Conrad insisted that Austria-Hungary, like France, be afforded some form of territorial protection. Its request to occupy a zone of territory in Germany was rejected, but the SWC did agree to include a demand for a thirty-mile deep demilitarised zone along the Austro-German border. On the insistence of Roosevelt, a final stipulation was added to the lengthening Allied document, designed to prevent German prevarication. The President included a deadline of 8th May before which the German government must have signed. The Allies explicitly stated that unless the armistice terms were accepted, the war would continue and their future terms would become decreasingly generous. When the terms were settled between the Allies, they were transmitted to Berlin on 29th April in the form of a joint note, signed by the attendees of the SWC.

The Western Front at the end of April 1918​

Upon receiving these terms, the German government was aghast that the armistice terms had stiffened. It was observed that the ‘three point’ peace had transformed into the ‘eight point’ humiliation. From the receipt of the armistice terms, events moved rapidly. Ludendorff was disgusted with the Allied terms, declaring that there was no appreciable difference between the objectives of the United States, Britain and France and that it would be impossible to drive a wedge between them. The resolve of the Quartermaster-General to continue the fight strengthened remarkably as the advance of the Allied armies, having reached the River Meuse, ground to a halt. Ludendorff was suddenly gripped by the belief that the German Army could stand and fight on the Meuse. Given the logistical difficulties of the Allies and the exhaustion of many of their units, this was viable in the short-term. Yet winter was six months away, giving the Allies ample time to plan their operations in the summer. This reality rendered Ludendorff’s aspirations complete folly, which was recognised by his enemies. Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, representing the SPD and Matthias Erzberger, leading the Catholic Centre Party, regarded Ludendorff’s status within Germany as anomalous with the doctrines of democratic government. They analysed the deteriorating domestic situation and were willing to accept the terms but insisted to Bülow that Ludendorff’s powers be curtailed significantly, recognising him as the principal enemy of peace. They informed the Chancellor that they were prepared to resign if Ludendorff was not marginalised. Bülow had no intention of accepting the armistice terms, but having previously resented the prospect of working with the SPD and Catholic Centre Party, he now wanted to hold his government together, not wanting his political opponents to evade responsibility. Consequently, the Chancellor asked Ludendorff to confine his reach to affairs of military command alone, hoping that Hindenburg would be of assistance. Yet the old warrior was non-committal and Ludendorff assumed that Bülow had become a prisoner of the socialists and centrists who had joined the government. Ludendorff would not yield and an argument ensued, unnecessary given the similar views held by the Quartermaster-General and the Chancellor on the armistice terms. Bülow insisted that he could not deal with the socialists when exposed to criticism over Ludendorff’s interference in political affairs; Ludendorff considered himself to be the guardian of the country and loathed to be undermined. The Kaiser was appalled at this spat and incensed upon discovering that Hindenburg and Ludendorff had issued operational orders without his consent. On 30th April, Ludendorff was compelled to resign, citing bad health and discreetly departing from OHL in Hindenburg’s staff car.

Ludendorff was forced to resign on 30th April​

At Kiel, the navy planned to salvage the honour of the Reich by confronting the Anglo-American fleet in the North Sea. These plans were wrecked by the outbreak of disobedience on board the vessels of the Hochseeflotte. Unwilling to partake in a death ride and demanding equal rations for officers and men, German sailors refused to board their vessels or stoke the boilers. The Hochseeflotte was paralysed and her sailing orders were rescinded. Seaman seized rifles on 31st April and commandeered the vessels, establishing councils and erecting barricades. The army garrison at Kiel joined the sailors in their defiance of authority, removing the town from the control of the government. The elements which had caused the unrest in Nuremburg appeared in Kiel and ominously, elsewhere. Hamburg, Lübeck and Wilhelmshaven soon experienced the repercussions of the mutiny at Kiel. Anti-establishment spirit was set to spread throughout the Rhineland. In Berlin, Bülow deeply regretted the loss of Ludendorff. Despite his differences with the recently departed Quartermaster-General, Bülow entertained a high regard for his qualities and blamed himself for his departure. The Chancellor feared chastisement across Germany and vented his anger at the SPD and Catholic Centre leaders who had pushed him into confronting Ludendorff. Pressure from Scheidemann and Erzberger to accept the Allied armistice terms had grown since the outbreak of disturbances in Kiel. Maddened, Bülow felt that his peace strategy was being undermined. Sensing that the Allied deadline of 8th May was sheer bluff, he hoped to persist with his negotiations whilst simultaneously sustaining the fight. Bülow regarded the armistice terms as humiliating and declared that Germany had conceded enough to the Allies. He passionately advocated the tightening of discipline, sending every able bodied man to fight the Allies and fighting on the banks of the River Rhine. Above all, the Chancellor refused to accept that the Kaiser should abdicate, especially to conform to the demands of foreign powers. But Bülow was among a dwindling number of die-hards. Lichnowsky, Ludendorff’s replacement General Groener and influential figures such as Prince Max of Baden all urged Wilhelm II to abdicate to save the dynasty and the country. Unlike Bülow, they viewed the deadline indicated in the armistice terms with seriousness and reckoned that the Allies would destroy Germany if they did not come to terms. This meddling drove Bülow’s patience to breaking point – when he discovered that Ebert had visited the Kaiser to recommend his abdication to stem the nascent revolution, Bülow exploded with rage. Bülow despaired to the beleaguered monarch, crying that “they have made my task impossible!” The Chancellor submitted his resignation on 1st May, imploring defiantly to Wilhelm II “do not yield Your Majesty – if you must, die with sword in hand at the steps of the imperial throne!”

The departure of Bülow demolished the final pillar upon which the authority of Wilhelm II as Kaiser stood. There were no credible candidates willing to prolong the war and possessed of the character to confront those in German society who sought to bring it to an end. Count Schulenburg attempted to bolster the resolve of the Kaiser by invoking the memory of Bismarck and talking of the elements of the army which would remain loyal to him. However, Groener made it apparent that the German Army owed its allegiance, not to the Kaiser, but to the Fatherland as a whole. Dreams of joining up with the army to smash the revolution were shattered. The northern docks and the Rhineland were aflame with revolutionary spirit and Wilhelm II had little choice but to ask Ebert to assume the post of Imperial Chancellor, hoping that he could lead socialist opinion away from revolution. By doing so, he effectively concluded his reign as Kaiser. Ebert sought to avoid a Russian-style revolution and salvage Germany at any cost. These aims were further jeopardised by events in Munich, where the Bavarian leader of the USPD, Kurt Eisner, took inspiration from the spontaneous Nuremburg uprising and organised a coup of his own, in cooperation with trade unionists and disaffected soldiers. Eisner and his followers seized weapons from local barracks and commandeered key points throughout the city, declaring a republic and forcing King Ludwig III to take flight. This encouraged Ebert to act immediately. Inevitably, he presented the Kaiser with a bleak choice – abdication and an armistice or revolution and chaos. He warned that he could not keep the republicans under control and that his immediate abdication was imperative to save the Hohenzollern dynasty. Ultimately, the Kaiser opted to sacrifice himself rather than his country. Early on 3rd May, he abdicated the throne and left for Holland, concerned for the safety of himself and his family. After Ebert had insisted that the SPD would not accept him as Kaiser because of his fierce autocratic instincts, Crown Prince Wilhelm renounced the succession. His son, the twelve year old Wilhelm Friedrich Franz Joseph Christian Olaf, bade a tearful farewell to his grandfather and ascended the throne as Wilhelm III. Still commanding in the west, the former Crown Prince, refusing to be separated from his son, boldly remained with his men and intended to return to Germany despite appeals to flee. The second-eldest son of Wilhelm II, Prince Eitel Friedrich, was installed as Regent. Serving in the army as a Major-General, Eitel was summoned immediately to Berlin. As these arrangements were hurriedly made, it was left to Scheidemann to proclaim the Regency to a mass demonstration from the reading room of the Reichstag and to extol its virtues as a victory for democracy. Declaring the new Bavarian regime to be illegitimate, Ebert and he hoped that it was not too late to prevent demands for a republic throughout Germany.

Philip Scheidemann proclaims the establishment of the Regency from the Reichstag​

In expectation of negotiating the armistice with the Allies, Ebert had sent Erzberger westwards to prepare a journey to France at a moment’s notice. As soon as Wilhelm II abdicated, he informed the Allies of Germany’s preparedness to negotiate a settlement and instructed Erzberger to obtain a ceasefire at any price. Erzberger crossed the front line and was escorted to a clearing in the forest of Compiègne. Here, he was received by Lyautey’s Chief of Staff, Foch on 4th May, who theatrically asked him who he was and what he wanted. This forced the confused Erzberger to verbally plead for a ceasefire. Foch then presided over the opening of the negotiations, with Admiral Wemyss representing Britain and Colonel Charles Kilborne, Wood’s Chief of Staff, representing the United States. Having read out the terms, Foch made a number of token concessions when Erzberger begged for modifications, reducing the quantities of weapons to be surrendered by the German Army, lengthening the withdrawal date from Eastern Europe, reducing the Austro-German demilitarised zone to 10 miles and shrinking the zone of French occupation east of the Rhine to 10 kilometres. Foch then departed, asking to be recalled when Erzberger was ready to sign the document. He did not have to wait long. Although the deadline would not pass for another four days, Erzberger was under heavy pressure from Ebert to conclude an armistice with all haste. After discussing the details of the terms with the assembled officers, Erzberger signalled his intention to sign. Foch returned to the melancholy atmosphere of his train carriage to confront the morose Erzberger. At 7:38pm, the German delegates added their signatures to the armistice and Foch dismissed them. The terms would come into effect at 5am the next morning, 5th May 1918.

The armistice was signed on an unusually chilly May evening and came into effect the next day​

 

[Allenby]

Oh, one more thing...

 

[El Pip]

Oh, one more thing...

Wootage indeed!

A most interesting contrast between Roosevelt's "Three Points" the SWC "Eight Points" and that buffoon Wilson's "Fourteen Points". To the surprise of no-one I do of course believe the Eight Points to be the infinitely superior.

It also appears the Hohenzollern dynasty has a good stab of surviving with the Kaiser gone. As I read it the complaints were against the man not the institution, so Kaiser Willy III may last. Assuming Germany holds together of course...

Given the peace negotiations and events to the East I suspect (and hope) the AAR is far from over. *Finger crossed*

 

[Dr Rare]

Given the peace negotiations and events to the East I suspect (and hope) the AAR is far from over. *Finger crossed*

I also hope this is just the latest great installment and not the last ,i think and hope its just Allenby building suspense,prior to some more great stuff in the east that all TGW mod players know is yet to come!!!!

A Great AAR and a fantastic mod to play thanks Allenby!!!

Good luck at the front!!!

Dr

 

[Mettermrck]

I don't believe it, the bloody limeys win somehow....I mean, uh, nice job, Allenby.