The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

Chapter LVII: Fallout and Aftershocks Part VIII - India and the Far East​

Given the foreign machinations of the India Office in the period, causing some to revive the old charge of Dehli trying to build an Empire inside the Empire, it is tempting to believe the situation in the Raj was stable, after all if things were not then surely the India Office would have been focused on their main area of responsibility. In the strictest terms that was correct, the failure of the Government of India Act to pass had very little immediate impact; the majority of the country remained quiet, save for the always rumbling North West Frontier, while the Act had been returned to the Committee stage and vanished into the bowels of the Palace of Westminster. Thus there was no practical imperative to act while affairs in Arabia demanded immediate action if the India Office was to extend it's reach. While such reasoning was correct it missed the obvious fact that, for all the failings of the Act, there was a clear need for some form of constitutional reform in India. Moreover there was a need for Britain to regain control of the situation; the previous decades had seen a string of Government of India Acts, none of which had provided more than a few years of stability before renewed calls for reform.

Perhaps it was this very lack of progress that prompted the mandarins to prioritise Arabian adventures over their titular responsibilities, preferring the glamour and prestige of expanding their influence over the grind of constitutional negotiations. It is also worth noting the attitude of the Secretary of State, Baron Lloyd, picked as a true die hard by Churchill he had little appetite for anything that even resembled progress towards Indian Home Rule, a view that would be reflected in his departments actions, or lack therof. Thus it was that the Act remained in the limbo of committee, enabling the government to say it was working on the matter while actually doing very little. The situation was not helped by the summer recess of Parliament, halting what little work had been done until well into the Autumn by which point events in India would have rendered much of the deliberations academic.

Finally in this tour of the world we come to Japan, a nation that had a fairly quiet summer in international terms. However the surface tranquillity masked a deep and divisive row at the very heart of the government and the armed forces, a battle to determine the path of the nation. The disagreement was not so much over the aim, all agreed Japan had to be recognised as a Great Power, expand her Empire and aquire secure sources of raw material, but how to achieve those aims and who the greatest threat to Japan was. Broadly speaking the conflict can be seen as part of the ongoing Army-Navy war for control of Japan, although as always it was not quite as clear cut, sub-factions on both sides supported conflicting views for political or ideological reasons. It is worth noting first that both sides, on the whole, agreed with the step-by-step approach to China, provoking small conflicts and establishing loyal puppet states rather than full-scale war. Rather than outright conquest and occupation, which even the most optimistic and prejudiced military officers admitted would be difficult, Japanese policy was for a loyal and supportive Chinese government(s) that would take directions from Tokyo, provide raw materials and act as a vast market for Japanese exports. The disagreements was instead over North or South, the Soviet Far East or South East Asia, the two factions having applied their own priorities to reach the most beneficial conclusions.


The Navy led Strike South doctrine started from the simple fact that South East Asia was one of the richest resource areas in the region. Containing vast amounts of oil, rubber, exotic materials and metallic ores control of the region would secure a large part of Japan's raw material supply. The European powers already occupying the region were considered a secondary threat compared to the expected US reaction, even if the Americans were prepared to see the Dutch and British expelled from the region and replaced by Japan (considered unlikely in naval circles) the Philippines would become a Pacific Malta, able to dominate the region and hold a knife to Japan's supply lines by its mere presence. Therefore the Strike South group had the United States as the expected primary enemy and demanded a large scale investment in the Fleet to ensure naval supremacy while minimising the role of the army. To further this aim a great deal of effort had been extended in the 1920s and early 30s by the Navy Japan's South Pacific Mandate was heavily developed with much effort expended into converting key islands into 'unsinkable aircraft carriers'. There was also a concerted effort by the Colonial Ministry ad the larger business conglomerates to expand the economy of the entire region, attempting to increase raw material production and promote the 'Japanisation' of both the Mandate and the surrounding islands, efforts not unnoticed by the other powers in the region.

Conversely the North Strike doctrine started by assuming the primary enemy, the Soviet Union, and working from there. While the Strike South group had, as described above, held sway for much of the post war period the army had retained its focus on Russia, if only because it was a threat to justify increased spending on their service. The early 1930s however had seen the Soviets re-emerge as a genuine threat, the various border incidents with China over the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) had demonstrated the effectiveness of the re-organised Soviet Far Eastern forces (including the classically Soviet Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army). Moreover the Soviet Five Year Plans had expanded the industrial facilities and extractive operations throughout the region, prompting the Japanese Army to present the Soviet Far East as a treasure trove of resources to match the vaunted Dutch and British colonies, a wild exaggeration but not without a grain of truth. However it was not until the mid-1930s that the Army began to build a strong case as the Japanese began to expand towards the borders of the Soviet Union and Moscow flexed it's muscles to assert her influence.

The turning point was probably the establishment of the puppet regime of Manchukuo, quite aside from giving Japan an effective border with the Soviet Union it started a tense stand off with the Soviets over their control of the CER. Having fought off Chinese attempts to seize it in 1929 Moscow was in no mood to surrender control to Japan and negotiations were tense, a string of fatal 'incidents' in the disputed region testified to the stakes. While the matter was eventually resolved by Japan buying out the Soviet interest (technically the Manchukuo government, but the funds came from Tokyo) the episode rocketed the Soviets up the list of priorities for all services, particularly after the Politburo re-established the Soviet Pacific Fleet as a standing force. Given the epic effort involved, whole flotillas were disassembled and transported on the Trans-Siberian Railway, together with the supporting coastal artillery and naval aviation deployed it was a strong statement of Soviet commitment to the Far East. This was only reinforced by the deployment by the Soviets Air Force of the vast four engined Tupolev TB-3 bomber to Vladivostok, an aircraft theoretically capable of just bombing Tokyo from the eastern most Soviet air strips. The previously comfortable Japanese assumption that any action would be contained to mainland Asia was under-mined at a stroke, the complete lack of any other meaningful target meant the bombers could only be used against Japan prompting a serious re-appraisal of the Soviet threat by all the services, not just the Army. This review had just been completed prior to the Abyssinian War.


1936 had begun with the Strike South group in the ascendency, the revelation that the US had not built to her Naval Treaty limits, indeed had pressed for far lower tonnage limits at the aborted London Naval Conference, was a most pleasant surprise. When the Abyssinian War broke out and the Royal Navy stripped the Far East of ships there was even a drive amongst the more belligerent members of the naval staff to push ahead with the invasion using the preliminary plans. Naturally wiser and cooler heads prevailed, the enemy may have been distracted but Japan was nowhere near ready, however the Navy's plans were definitely in the ascendency, much to the Army's annoyance. This position lasted until the Royal Navy efficiently and rapidly devastated the Regia Marina, while the IJN shared the general low regard for the Italians, the Naval Staff was forced to admit they may have under-estimated the quality of opposition the Royal Navy would provided. With the Royal Navy rated as more than just a speed bump and, after the Treaty of Valletta, much of the fleet returning in force to Singapore, the option on an immediate Strike South lost supporters who saw it as too risky in the short term. This was supported by the changing opinion of America where, it was believed, the continuing economic crisis would force the country to continue selling oil, steel and anything else Japan required as the US could not afford an embargo. Certainly it was thought that time was on Japan's side, as the naval programmes churned out newer and larger ships the US Navy's fleet stayed rotting at anchor with nothing even on the drawing board. With the raw material sources believed to be secure, as long as the US stayed in a depression, there was no desperate need to conqueror South East Asia save for the territory itself. Thus the Strike South groups main advantage, immediate resources, became less relevant and it came down to a simple question, who would be easier to defeat and bring to the table; the Soviets or the British and Dutch. It was believed by many high up in government the answer to that question would determine which way Japan's foreign policy faced for the coming years, thus making the fact it would be low ranking junior officers and a string of unexpected events that decided the policy all the more ironic.