The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

Chapter XLVI: For King or Country - Part I.​

Had the freshly re-elected French Prime Minister, Albert Sarraut, wished to influence, or even understand, events in Spain he would have been ill-advised to send diplomats to Madrid. Event after Manuel Azaña's ascendancy from Presidente del Gobierno (President of the Government or Prime Minister) to Presidente de Espana (President of Spain, the head of state) he would remain confined to the role of catalyst, the trigger for events that others would attempt to control. If the French government had possessed slightly more knowledge of the situation, Sarraut may have been tempted to send agents to Spanish North Africa, to monitor the meetings of army commanders. While he would find plots and conspirators in abundance, he would also find that the centre of power lay elsewhere. To put our notional French leader out of his misery, to find the eye of the coming storm he would not have to look any further than King Charles Street, Westminster and the palatial buildings that housed the British Foreign Office.


That Britain was in a position to exert such influence over the future of Spain was not the product of cunning intelligence or diabolical intrigue, but the result of a lucky find by an Army Intelligence unit and basic geography. The former came in the aftermath of Operation Templar, searching the over run Italian Army HQs indirectly revealed the coup plot by way of the Regia Aeronautica involvement. The latter can be summed up in one word; Gibraltar. Sitting slap bang between the coup leaders in Morocco and the Spanish mainland any attempt to move from one to the other could be stopped dead by even a modest force operating out of 'The Rock'.

In summary Britain had the means, the opportunity and, due to the vast scale of British interests in Spain, the motivation to get involved. The problem for the cabinet therefore was what not if to get involved, but how to intervene, which of the many possible outcomes were best for Britain and how to bring it about. As previously discussed the two obvious options available; supporting the government or supporting the coup were both considered unattractive (dislike of the communist and far left elements of the government and concern over the violent reputation and Italian links of the plotters respectively). The other option, doing nothing, despite leaving the vast and important interests in the country at considerable risk of being seized or falling under hostile control, had been the front runner, if only due to being 'least bad'. Such an option had been utterly unacceptable to Churchill while Prime Minister, so he had instructed that all efforts be made to delay the coup until a fourth option could be found, one that Britain could whole-heartedly support. After Churchill's rapid fall from power it would be Chamberlain who would inherit that fourth option, a typically bold and ambitious scheme but one that would have the most unexpected side effects.

While the delaying efforts was spectacularly successful, partly because Italy's defeat in the Abyssinian War had curtailed their ability to assist and partly because the coup's main financial backer, the extraordinarily wealthy Juan March Ordinas, was a British agent in Gibraltar and so controllable, the fourth option appeared an impossibility. The polarisation of the country during the election had reduced Spain to two colossal factions on the left and the right, the few remaining centrists were too small a body to be of any account. The key to the British solution was the realisation that they did not need to create a new faction if they could make influence either of the existing ones to more acceptable policies. With this in mind the coup chief planner, General Emilio Mola, naturally came to the fore, having been sent by the Popular Front government to the backwater province of Navarre he had forged links with one of the largest groups in Spain, and one which would be vital to the British plans; the traditionalist pro-monarchy Carlists.

As a group to support, the Carlists were attractive for a variety of reasons; quite aside from their large size and diverse membership they possessed their own milita, the Requetés, who had been equipped and trained by various governments throughout the Second Republic era, They had strong links to the Catholic Church (another important anti-government group) and had a non-military political organisation with a strong presence in the Cortes. Despite these advantages, or perhaps because of them, they punched well below their weight in terms of influence, the coup plotters being reluctant to give concessions to any political party when there was the prospect of forming a military Junta, with one of their own as Caudillo. The political leader, Manuel Fal Conde, while aware of the problem could see no solution, with the army providing the muscle, plans and, indirectly through Juan Ordinas' network, the finance for the coup they were in the driving seat. In summary they were a sleeping giant, potentially very powerful but, through circumstances beyond their control, unable to leverage their advantages into power and influence.


The decisive factor in favour of the Carlists was, perhaps, more emotional than practical, certainly it would not have been as influential to other nations as it was to Britain. Put simply the Carlist aim, a restored Spanish monarchy, appealed to the British sensibility; Britain had bult her empire and thrived under a constitutional monarchy, clearly it was the best of all possible systems and could only be good for Spain. That is not to say there were not practical benefits from a British point of view, supporting the restoration of the King as a constitutional monarch would, by definition, remove the possibility of a military Junta running the country. The restoration would also help put the Carlist political wing, the Comunión Tradicionalista, into power hopefully providing a further bulwark against extremism and, of course, ensuring that the British help was remembered and suitably rewarded by the new government. These carefully assembled plans were shattered with news from the intelligence networks in Spanish North Africa;


As worrying as the initial reports were, the details proved even more disturbing. While the exercises were a genuine government idea, an opportunity the plotters had dismissed as being too soon and forcing them to act before they were ready, it appeared that the former chief of staff, General Fransicso Franco felt differently. After Franco had been sent to the Canaries by the Popular Front government he had, naturally, been approached by both Mola and the coup figure head José Sanjurjo. However at the time he had been decidedly ambivalent about it, to such an extent the plotters had planned to proceed without him. The mystery of why he had so dramatically changed his mind had an alarming answer; Major Pollard reported the presence of a large contingent of Abwehr agents in the Canary Islands.