The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

Chapter XXVII: The Noise Before Defeat.​

For all the success on the battlefield the British commanders were suffering from a crippling handicap for the opening weeks of the war, the complete absence of a grand strategy or high level objectives for the war. British operations were almost purely reactive, North Africa was the main theatre because the Italian's had made there main thrust there as opposed to the horn of Africa. While tactical victories had raised morale and given the British the initiative Gort was unsure what to do with it, the obvious military follow up was to continue pushing along the coast and drive the Italians from the theatre. But would that advance the country's war aims or just tie up troops who could, perhaps should, be used elsewhere. In the absence of any direction from the civilian leadership it was impossible for Gort to be certain.

To the relief of Gort and the East Africa theatre commander, Lieutenant General Barker, the politicians were not unaware of the problem. However the government, barely in office and still finding it's feet was far from ready to deal with the domestic situation, let alone articulate foreign policy and grand strategy. The worries of the civil service who had wanted the cabinet reshuffle finished prior to focusing on foreign matters were proved at least partially justified, with the first war cabinet meeting not taking place until two weeks after the war had started. Only with the start of Operation Vulcan, taking priority as it did over domestic issues, allowed Churchill to short-cut the many bureaucratic and political delays so beloved of civil servants and get down to the business of strategy.

The war cabinet was deliberately kept small and limited only to those with a direct influence on the running of the war, the Great War had shown that a small decisive cabinet was infinitely preferable to a larger more inclusive grouping. While the actual attendance varied from meeting to meeting as military commanders and experts came and there were five core members;

• Prime Minister - Winston Churchill
• Foreign Secretary - Sir Austen Chamberlain
• Home Secretary - Sir John Simon
• Minister for Co-ordination of Defence - Leo Amery
• Secretary of State for India - Baron Lloyd

On first look the group could at best be described as eclectic; several ministers that would be 'obvious' choices in a more conventional war cabinet were absent while not all those who were present strictly needed to be. While Churchill and Chamberlain's presence was a forgone conclusion, the same cannot be said of the rest of the core membership. To begin with Sir John Simon while as Home Secretary he did not need to be a member as the leader of the National Liberals his attendance was a political necessity. Leo Amery attended as much for his personal judgement and experience as any ministerial duty, while Churchill had argued for aerial re-armament and Sir Roger Keyes for the fleet, Amery had fought the Army's corner. Aside from speaking out in parliamentary debates and harrying the defence co-ordination sub-committee his main contribution was starting the Army League in the early 1930s to promote the need for a stronger army to the public. Baron Lloyd, the newly appointed Secretary of State for India owed his presence to the large number of Indian troops involved in North Africa, given the large contribution from the sub-continent Delhi had earnt a voice at the table. Although Lloyd was new to the role he had been Governor of Bombay in the 1920s and possessed what Churchill believed to be the most important attribute for Secretary of State for India; Implacable opposition to Indian Home Rule. In this regard Lloyd was in stark contrast to his predecessor, the Marquess of Zetland.


The list of contentious non-members is normally topped by the Chancellor Hore-Belisha followed by the service ministers, the argument being that any war cabinet that did not have financial or military opinions at the highest level was failing to consider the full situation. On the second point the regular, but admittedly not constant, presence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Air Staff clearly show that military advice was taken direct from the services, not filtered through the various ministries. The economic point however is valid, early on Churchill had decided that financial costs could not be allowed to cloud decision making, Lord Beaverbrook's Ministry of Production and Development was to supply the armed forces with whatever they required as soon as possible. In short however much the war costs it was a price that would have to be paid, a decision that would have consequences long after the war was over.

The debate in the war cabinet rapidly evolved from talk of strategy and theatres of operation to war aims and from there to peace aims, an idea of how the world would look post-war. The questions this raised, of grand imperial plans and wide ranging geo-political strategies had once been second nature to Britain in general and the foreign office in particular. This was no longer the case, dis-armament, a distaste for conflict and successive weak governments had left the Foreign Office to led by more Nobel peace laureates than imperial planners. Only Delhi and the Indian Office, immune from the worst ravages of the malaise afflicting the civil service, still retained the spirit of Imperial ambition and naturally attempted to take the lead, as a common Westminster quote of the time put it; "Delhi is not above using the war to extend its power and influence in the same way the Bay of Bengal is not above the peaks of the Himalayas." The strong positions argued by Baron Lloyd forced the pace of the debate, it was soon agreed that to secure Egypt and hence the Suez Canal British holdings in North Africa would have to be expanded. Equally it was realised by all that domestic public opinion would not stand for the continuation of Italian aggression in Abyssinia and so the demand for a cessation of hostilities and a reduction of Italian influence in the Horn of Africa was also agreed.

The breadth of the peace aims were widened during the Imperial War Cabinet meeting of February 23rd when the expected rubber stamping exercise turned into a wide ranging debate, much to the surprise of the British. While the realities of Britain's relations with the Dominions meant that some high level meeting on strategy was required, if only as a courtesy and sop to domestic opinion, with no interests in the region and no forces in theatre it was expected the Dominion representatives would have neither the inclination nor right to influence the peace or war aims. In the event both of those assumptions would be proved incorrect.


Barely had the official formalities been complete than the Australian representative, High Commissioner Stanley Bruce, sprung his surprise; Australia would be committing forces to the conflict. Several light bomber and air-army co-operation squadrons were being assembled and re-equipped at RAAF Darwin for deployment through Singapore and India to North Africa. This shock was followed by the announcement that the South African government's offer of a military mission headed by General Jan Smuts, an offer which Churchill felt compelled to accept if only to avoid a potential diplomatic incident. With his country now committing men to the conflict Bruce laid out Australia's aims for the war; The total security of Suez, the complete destruction of the Italian fleet and ship building limits on post-war Italy. While the importance of the Suez Canal to Australia is obvious, their concern for the Italian fleet is less immediately obvious, having more to do with the Pacific than the Mediterranean. The main long term concern for Australia was Japan, with the Royal Navy Mediterranean fleet almost a month's high speed steaming away any surprise Japanese attack would have to dealt with by the inadequate Royal Australian Navy and the small Royal Navy force in the Pacific. This was obviously not a comfortable state of affairs, made worse by the collapse of the London naval disarmament talks and the un-replaced departure of HMS Eagle from Hong Kong. The Australian government reasoned that with the Regia Marina sunk and not replaced significant forces could be redeployed and they intended that those forces head to the Pacific.

In contrast the South African offer seemed to come without strings; something which meet with a great deal of suspicion amongst all at the meeting. The Hertzog government had delayed it's declaration of war and it seemed out of character for him to sanction anything, no matter how token, that would aid the British, unless it benefited him or his cause more. In the end it was the presence of Smuts as head of the mission that swung opinions in the cabinet; it was inconceivable that Smuts would involve himself in anything that prejudice the war effort. So it was decided that Smuts would head for the Horn of Africa where his leadership would be invaluable to the inexperienced colonial troops holding back the Italians, leaving Hertzog's diabolical machinations to proceed unaided.

The final point agreed was that an unconditional surrender would not be sought, if the Italians offered terms that meet the Cabinets agreed peace aims they would be accepted. Those agreed aims were;

1. Complete control of Italian North Africa, whether directly or through mandates.
2. A cessation of Italian aggression in Abyssinia and a unilateral de-militarisation of the region.
3. Total destruction of the heavy units of the Italian fleet and a post-war moratorium on Italian battleship construction.

These aims were conveyed to the Chiefs of Staff Committee to achieve as best they could, a challenge the ambitious new service chiefs felt they were more than equal to.