Chapter CVI: The Air in Spain Part II - An Old Rivalry
Where the Soviets and British were relatively detached from the fighting, their counterparts in the south of Spain took a far more visceral interest in the conflict. For the British, and especially the Soviets, their proxies and allies in Spain were chess pieces in a strategic game, important pieces perhaps but still ultimately pieces that could be played or sacrificed as the situation and strategy dictated. In contrast the fate of Spain dominated the attention of the French political class, concerned as they were about encirclement and the threat from a German dominated Spain. Their interest was made all the sharper as they began to consider the consequences of their open assistance to the Republicans should the Monarchists triumph. The German motives were simpler but no less urgent; after a string of diplomatic mistakes, missteps and misfortunes Hitler needed a success and had pinned what remained of his foreign policy reputation onto success in Spain. Equally important as the political requirement for victory, success in Spain, or at the very least parleying German support into Monarchist trade policy, was becoming an economic imperative. As the world re-armed German import agents began to struggle to source key strategic materials. Colonial suppliers across the world began sending their output back home to Britain and France instead of the hungry furnaces of the Rhineland and German agents used to the easy buyers market of the Depression failed to find new sources. Spanish ores, particularly those of mercury, tungsten and iron, would fill a vital gap, especially if an indebted Spain made them a 'gift', sparring the rapidly emptying German treasury further hard currency expense. With so much, both real and perceived, at stake for both sides it is hardly surprising the air war in the south was more intense with the 'volunteer' pilots and advisers much more to the fore.
The German aerial contribution was given the grand name 'The Condor Legion' by Goebbel's propaganda men in Berlin, though it tells you almost all you need to know about the unit that it acquired the nickname Die Briefträger (The Postmen) from it's own pilots. The bulk of the initial aircraft were indeed ex-civilian mail planes, the sparse mail variants being quicker to convert to bombers than the seat filled passenger types. The iconic Condor Legion aircraft was the Junkers Ju 52, by far the most numerous aircraft supplied by Germany they were a common site in the skies above Spain, used as bomber and reconnaissance aircraft as well as serving in their original transport role. Alongside the Ju 52 was the Heinkel He 70, another ex-mail plane with secret military roots that arrived in considerable numbers as German re-armament accelerated. It had been considered by the Luftwaffe their first Schnellbomber (fast bomber), intended to use raw speed not guns to defend itself from enemy fighters. For the early 1930s it was indeed impressive, it's 225mph top speed making it far faster than any of the biplanes it could reasonably expect to face off against. However the march of technology had left the He 70 painfully vulnerable to the later evolutions of the biplanes, and easy meat for the new generation of 300mph+ monoplane fighters. As such it was being rapidly phased out of the Luftwaffe in favour of the Dornier Do 17, making it an ideal choice to send to Spain.
The Dornier Do 11, one of the less successful German contributions to the Monarchist's cause. Another of the many secret 'dual purpose' designs developed in the early 1930s the Do 11 was technically a freight aircraft, but in reality was intended to serve as a heavy bomber in the then secret Luftwaffe. Despite being slightly smaller than the Ju 52 the Do 11 could carry twice the bombload at similar speeds and bore the burden of great expectations from the level bombing fraternity in the Luftwaffe. Unfortunately the Do 11's relatively good performance with such large bomb loads had come at a price; reliability. Plagued with problems several of the early production models never even made it into service, crashing on or after take off from the factory. Keen to be rid of such a problem child the Luftwaffe tried to temp the Monarchists into accepting it, however desperate as Manuel Hedilla and the pro-German faction were for aircraft, they weren't that desperate and further shipments beyond the initial trial aircraft were firmly refused.
While the bomber and reconnaissance squadrons of the Army of Africa revelled in the luxury of relatively modern monoplanes their fighter brethren were not so lucky. Fighter aircraft were harder to disguise than bombers and, although Goring and the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM, Ministry of Aviation ) had done their best with many 'sports aircraft' and 'high speed couriers', overall fighter deployment lagged that of bombers. With sale of the new Messerschmit Bf 109 and Bf 110 vetoed until all German squadrons had been equipped there was very little Germany could offer bar obsolete biplanes. The sole exception was the attempt to sell the Heinkel He 112 (one of the losing rivals to the Bf 109), but even that faltered for one of the main reasons it had lost out to the Bf 109; it just wasn't ready for volume production. This left biplanes to fill the gap, primarily the Heinkel He 51 (which could just, on a good day and in a dive, touch 200mph) and a small number of marginally faster Arado Ar 68s for a select few 'elite' squadrons. Neither of these were particularly impressive aircraft, both would struggle against a Hawker Fury or Gloster Gauntlet and wouldn't stand a chance against anything more modern. However they were all that was available from Germany and, by the standards of the war in southern Spain, they were acceptable enough for early 1937, if admittedly towards the lower end of the scale.
The Republican government was, on paper, in a far better position. As the legitimate government of Spain it had access to countless markets that refused to even acknowledge the 'rebel' Monarchists, let alone sell arms to them, and it had control of it's own exports, giving it a hard currency income that Hedilla's Army of Africa so dearly lacked. Despite this choice they still ended up with France as the de facto monopoly supplier for much of 1936, the carrot of better terms than almost anyone else would offer and the stick of the stranglehold on the supply lines gave France an irresistible advantage. Given how things would turn out it is interesting to note that the first aircraft to arrive from France were selected purely on the basis of compatibility with the existing Spanish Air Force, a fine idea in principle but one that was soon abandoned once losses began to mount. Thus it was that the aerodromes of Republican Spain were quickly filled with Nieuport-Delage NiD 62 fighters and Breguet XIX bombers, both 1920s designed biplanes being hurriedly phased out of French service. In a particularly nasty shock to the Spanish pilots the technically inferior French NiD 62s (which were a mixed wood-metal construction, as opposed to the otherwise identical all metal NiD 52) had noticeably superior performance, actually being able to reach their claimed top speed and easily out performing their own NiD 52ss. Sadly for all Republican pilots they were no easier to fly, despite being badly outclassed in combat accidents were by far the biggest pilot killer, even in front line fighter units. This was particularly alarming as the air war of 1936 did not go at all well for the Republicans, their very obsolete French biplanes suffering terrible casualties at the hands of the Monarchist's merely obsolete British biplanes. It was this lack of success, as much as President Azaña's policy of diversifying the Republican arms supply, that led the Republicans to scour the international markets and produce the legendarily varied Republican Air Force.
The French designed but Spanish manufactured Nieuport-Delage NiD 52, technically the Hispano-Nieuport-Delage NiD 52 after it's manufacturer immodestly added themselves to the aircraft's formal name. After being selected as Spain's front-line fighter in 1928 the Spanish engineering firm Hispano-Suiza acquired a licence and began producing the design in Spain, production finally ending in 1933 with over 120 aircraft completed. The main problem with the NiD 52 was that it never achieved the performance that Nieuport-Delage claimed it was capable of, however as Spain was the only purchaser and manufacturer of the NiD 52 there is no easy way of knowing if it was manufacturing mistakes by Hispano-Suiza or a fundamental flaw in the design. That said as the more advanced NiD 72 and less advanced NiD 62 both managed to out perform the Hispano built NiD 52s the balance of probability does point to the problems lying in the factories of Spain and not the design studios of France. In any event the best judgement on the NiD 52/62/72 series comes from the fate of her designer; by late 1937 Nieuport-Delage had changed hands twice and had been reduced to little more than a brand used by it's then owner, the seaplane and naval engineering firm Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire.
The French government was aware of the Republican plans and successfully diverted them, ensuring the first trade delegations visited France's New Entente ally Czechoslovakia. In fairness to France it was a not bad move for the Republicans to make; Czechoslovakia had a respectable modern aircraft industry that had advanced beyond licenced assembly into serial production of their own designs, indeed the Czechs laid claims to the oldest aviation design works in Eastern Europe, tracing a lineage back to the factories of the Austria-Hungary. There was but one problem; the Czech government was in no mood to sell those advanced designs and instead wished to follow the French and British path; dumping out dated designs on Spain and keeping the modern production lines going for their own re-armament programme. Thus instead of returning home from the Czech capital with such relatively advanced designs at the 250mph Avia B-534 biplane or the Aero A.304 monoplane bomber, the Republican delegation instead brought back such questionable delights as the the Letov Š-31. The Š-31 was trumpeted as being over a third faster than the NiD 52/62s then in front line service, this being more palatable than admitting it was only capable of 200mph fighter and only mounted two fixed machine guns. The Letov Š-31 is in fact a classic of the problems encountered by the Republicans, it's Czech built engine needed the unique and unusual BiBoLi fuel mixture (50% oil, 30% alcohol and 20% benzol, a mixed designed to minimise the use of precious Czechoslovakian oil reserves) and their machine guns were modified Vickers which used a 7.92mm round (0.312") unlike the standard Vickers 0.303" which the NiD fleet was armed with. It was the maintenance problems of the Republican air fleet in miniature, with the added danger of explosive results if the wrong fuel went to the wrong engine.
However it was not all problems, while the Š-31s were joined by other less than stellar purchases (the equally Czech Aero A.101 biplane bomber that was worse than the A.100 it was meant to replace, the catastrophically slow Potez 25 that could just top 130mph when in a dive and the predictably disastrous efforts at using the Dutch Koolhoven F.K.51 trainers as light bombers) there were successes. The Baltic States continued their efforts to support the Spanish Republic as Lithuanian sold her squadron of Dewoitine D.372s at a knock down price. The 235mph high wing monoplanes were markedly superior to anything Germany had supplied at the time, sadly Lithuanian only had one squadron to sell and the rest of the run was still in front line service in France. The D.372 was not the best purchase however, the truly elite Republican squadrons were equipped with the real prizes; the Dutch Fokker D.XXI and the Polish PZL P.24. Though wildly different, the Fokker was a cheap and rugged low winged monoplane originally designed for service in the Dutch East Indies, while the P.24 was a highly evolved version of the gull winged monoplane layout that characterised Polish design, both were a quantum leap ahead of anything else in the south of the country. While the D.XXI edged it on raw speed (at 285mph it had a good 15mph on the P.24) and manoeuvrability, the twin 20mm Orelikon FF cannons of the P.24 were by far the more potent weapon. It was less good news for the bombers however, while the biplanes were just as poor even the newer monoplanes were a terrible disappointment. The Potez 540 was one of the most modern and capable bombers in the Republican inventory but still acquired the nickname "Ataúd Volante" (Flying Coffin), the names given to the slower and less well armed Breguet XIXs and PZL.23s can well be imagined.
The Grumman FF-1 in original US Navy markings. First developed as a carrier fighter and later serving as scout and advanced trainer, the FF-1 was the most visible American aircraft to end up in Republican service. The bulk of the FF-1s ended up being deployed to the high profile, but rarely in combat, squadrons protecting Valencia and became a favourite of the government's propaganda men. The attention lavished on the FF-1 had everything to do with the continuing campaign to woo America and almost nothing to do with it's fighting ability. While not a bad design it was nothing special either, just another one of the many 200mph, twin machine gunned biplanes in Republican service, but with the added problem of being imperial sized not metric and having the obligatory different size of machine gun ammunition (0.3" for the M1919 Brownings in this case). It does however neatly illustrate the main reason Republicans ended up with such a vast variety of aircraft types instead of just buying the best; money. After the collapse of a deal with the Canadian Car and Foundry Company to produce an export version of the FF-1, the G23 Goblin, Grumman had several squadrons worth of FF-1 parts but no buyers. The Republican agents in the US could therefore pick up the FF-1 on excellent terms; a low price and most of that on credit. The actual up front hard currency cost per delivered unit was less than a 10th of the cost of a new Fokker D.XXI, not to mention the propaganda value of a US aircraft. With many aircraft to buy, and little money available, the Republicans chose quantity over quality, prioritising biplanes from friendly powers and the desperate over expensive new build monoplanes.
As in the north of Spain the air war in the south was an intensely local affair, while the German equipped Monarchists had a relatively homogeneous force the variations in the Republican air force, along with a lack of a solid Command and Control structure on either side, made every engagement a lottery. Across much of the south air superiority changed daily, if the high end Republican fighters were available they could sweep the skies clear, however if a lack of parts, fuel or the right calibre of ammunition kept them grounded, the replacement NiDs from the next aerodrome along would be easy prey. There was one great exception to this; the air battle above the Cadiz Campaign. Where the Army of Africa could only call upon the same aircraft as the rest of the southern Monarchist armies, if in greater numbers and with the better pilots, the Assault Guards and the new Monarchist Armoured Division would have the cream of the Republican Air Force above them. This gave the Republicans air superiority throughout the campaign, allowing almost unhindered reconnaissance to keep their commanders up to date and leaving their Monarchist opponents perpetually short of hard intelligence. With neither side having the right aircraft or the inclination for strategic bombing, and both believing their own rapid advances would make logistical strikes on enemy bridges and railways counter-productive, the only real activity on the bombing side were the attempts at tactical support. For all the efforts of the Republican bombers (the Monarchists soon abandoned their efforts to use 'Schnellbombers' that were 50mph slower than most fighters they were facing) they struggled to achieve more than just harassment, certainly inconveniencing the Army of Africa but not actually doing much in the way of damage. For all the efforts poured into aircraft by both sides, the campaigns of 1937 would be won on the ground by artillery, infantry and above all tanks.
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First off despite all the delays (for which I mumble vague apologies) I'm not entirely happy with this one. I fear it might be too much airframe porn and not enough of anything actually happening, which is a impressive achievement for something 3000 words long. Hopefully with that out of my system the next update may actually contain some plot.
Notes;
Germany is following the RAF route and dumping anything the RLM don't like the look of onto Spain, with Monarchist exports (and hard currency) in the hands of either the British faction or neutrals Germany is struggling to sell anything to Spain so 'loans' and credit sales are the order of the day. Of course if they started offering Bf 109s and Stukas they'd sell as many as they could ship, however post-TTL Rhineland and the slightly earlier Spitfire and Hurricane introduction there is even more of a panic in Germany about how badly equipped the Luftwaffe is.
France is a great deal more agitated than OTL over Spain, not enough to actually directly intervene (they still don't want war and wish to avoid casualties) but almost no-one is suggesting sacrificing Spain. Once you start publicly intervening you worry what happens if the other side wins, hence I think France is much more worried than OTL. A fascist (but non-Axis) Spain is one thing, a Spain run by people who hate you for backing the other side during the Civil War is quite another. As to why France is only supplying dross, they have no other choice. The French aviation industry at the time was only capable of producing 50 aircraft a month, that's in total across all types and all factories! Re-armament is painfully slow and as such most modern biplanes are still needed for front line service. Now without the nationalisation of the aero industry France wont suffer years of disruption and confusion, but equally they wont make any progress towards solving the underlying problems. Tricky.
The Czech BiBoLi is alarmingly actually true, in a desperate attempt to save oil they did use that strange mix. While petrol:benzene mixes weren't that uncommon it's the addition of alcohol that makes BiBoLi so unusual and it's the combination of all three that make it such a temperamental fuel.
No Canadian Goblin TTL, I figure the deal would have been disrupted post the Abyssinian War and then killed off when the Canadian government went for Snow Hurricanes and Arctic Hampdens. However I'm sure the Canadian Car & Foundry Company will find a way to get involved when local production of the Wellington kicks off.
And now, at last, tanks.
