The Butterfly Effect: A British AAR

Chapter CIII: Caution vs Ambition​

The winter of 1936 had seen the two sides in the Spanish Civil War grappling with an unwelcome truth; foreign aid came with strings. The stream of foreign equipment had been accompanied by engineers, officers and officials from the supplying nations, men who were greeted with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Those bringing technical knowledge or tactical advice were the most warmly welcomed; practical information on how to fix or fight the new tanks, artillery and fighters was eagerly devoured at all levels. It was the senior advisers and 'observers' (as opposed to the genuine observers who did limit themselves to only watching) who were the least welcome, both high commands felt they were more than capable of determining grand strategy and disliked any attempts at outside direction of the war. That said it soon became apparent that the convenience of a foreign scape goat was realised by both sides; success was always ascribed to 'Spanish' ideas while failures had foreign parents, generally those of the foreign power supporting a rival faction.

We begin in the Monarchist half of Spain where the two dominant foreign powers, the British and the Germans, were engaged in trying to convince a sceptical Monarchist high command, the Ejército del Rey (Army of the King), to accept their blueprint for victory. Of the two options the German scheme found most favour with the pre-war Spanish officer class as, contrary to the popular stereotypes, it was far more conservative and cautious than the British alternative. For the German contingent caution was not just a political choice to find favour with the Spanish, though undoubtedly that played a part, but a harsh choice based on a stark reality; their preferred options just weren't possible. The 'traditional' German way of war, as much as any nation has a single definable style, was based on manoeuvre and concentration of force, not especially new or radical ideas but ones the Wehrmacht had put considerable effort into, trying to work out how to implement them in the modern world without ending up in trench warfare. The problem was the complete unsuitability of the Monarchist Army for these ideas; lacking modern tanks, trucks and even horses the bulk of the Monarchist's forces were not especially mobile, while the paranoia of the officer corps about flank security made force concentration tricky, as the previous years campaign had shown any breakthrough soon dissipated it's strength on guarding the 'shoulders' and flanks of the advance. The Germans therefore advised a cautious campaign with limited objectives; a sweep along the southern coast to relieve pressure on the Cordoba pocket and capture the port city of Malaga. Naturally enough this campaign was to be led by the troops loyal to the pro-German Manuel Hedilla who, after the 'accidental' death of General Franco had used German support to cement leadership of the Falangist militias and seize political control of the elite Army of Africa.


As mentioned above the British plan was considered by the Spanish Army to be far more risky, bordering even on the reckless, a charge that was not without a grain of truth. With less of a 'manoeuvrist' tradition, unless one counted the Great War Middle Eastern campaigns of Allenby that Hobart's Royal Armoured Corps were striving to emulate, the limited mobility of the Monarchist Armies was less of a concern to the British contingent than their continental counterparts, quite simply they had an entirely different 'traditional' way of war; the leveraging of sea power. In contrast to the almost entirely Wehrmacht German contingent, the British had officers from all three services in Spain; the Royal Air Force were overseeing the introduction of new aircraft and covertly training pilots, the Army was coaxing the new Light Tank brigades into action and in the background the Royal Navy was shipping or escorting all of the above. This breadth of opinions, combined with the example of the Abyssinian War and the countless historical precedents, made some form of amphibious operation the obvious choice for the British to suggest. The final plan was for the Real Armada Española (RAE, Royal Spanish Navy) to gather the entire fleet, 'remove' the Republican Navy (preferably by sinking it, forcing it to hide in port if necessary) and then make an amphibious assault on Valencia, capturing the Republican government and ending the war at a stroke. Taking an optimistic view the plan had a great deal to commend it; the Spanish had experience of amphibious landings from the Rif War (and there was no shortage of British experts available to 'top up' that experience), the Balearic Islands were solidly Monarchist and were perfectly positioned to act as a base and intelligence reports from 'neutral' traders indicated the Republicans were not defending the coast or ports and were clearly not expecting an attack from the sea.

Despite these advantages, and the still tantalising prospect of a quick end to the war, the British proposal was summarily dismissed, the Real Armada Española refusing to even countenance the plan. Interestingly the opposition was not based on the amphibious part of the operation, certainly the riskiest part of the plan, but the naval portion, quite simply the Monarchist admirals did not believe that they could defeat the Republicans in open battle. While the balance of light forces slightly favoured the Monarchists, the admirals felt that the heavy cruiser Canaris would be no match for the pride of the Spanish fleet, the battleship Cortes (the recently renamed Jamie I). Just to add to the case against the plan was the uncertainty over the status of the battleship España and the still fitting out heavy cruiser Baleares, both of which were in Republican hands. The naval plan therefore perished before the army got a chance to digest it, much to the disgust of the Royal Navy who still believed their plan to be not only possible but desirable.

In contrast the German plan was seized upon by Hedilla and even extended to include a drive on the rich iron mines around Almeria, a decision more political than military; after losing the battle for mineral policy over the winter Hedilla was keen to capture a rich mining territory such as Almeria to use as a show case (or perhaps testing ground) for his corporatist ideas. While the new commander of the Army of Africa, the brutal but mercurial General Juan Yagüe, would have preferred a more aggressive plan, Hedilla convinced him to support the scheme and to lead the main drive along the coast while the Falangist militias held Cordoba and pushed out to join him. The northern commanders, especially the pro-British ones grouped around General Mola, refused to co-operate with the scheme, correctly anticipating they would be given the defensive duties while Yagüe took the glory. Having determined what they wouldn't do, Mola was left with the problem of what to do, his harsher critics have summed up his answer as 'not much', a more generous observer would characterise it as a cautious cleaning up operation. The Carlist militia, the Requetés, were detailed to break the Salamanca pocket and capture or destroy the Republican 4th Division, while the bulk of the Northern Army aimed to relieve the northern pressure on Madrid by relieving the fortress town of Siguenza and then possibly pushing on to Zaragoza.


Perhaps the biggest single difference between 1936 and 1937 was the death of ambition, outside of the schemes of the Royal Navy nobody was thinking in terms of quick knock out blows. Instead the factions were resigned to a long war and so were shifting their emphasis onto solidifying gains and building a strong base for the next campaign. Given the flow of materials into the country had not yet become decisive, a few brigade of light tanks and some biplane squadrons were not a war winning force, it was a reasonable enough plan to wait and gather strength, however it depended upon one crucial assumption; that the Monarchists were getting stronger faster than the Republicans. Had the Ejército del Rey been aware of the Republican's true position in the spring of 1937 they would have been far less comfortable about that particular balance of power.

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Notes:
So cheap nasty British light tanks heading for Zaragoza while cheap and nasty German light tanks head for Almeria, what could possibly go wrong? Apart from, well, everything.

Wilhelm Faupel was the OTL contact with Franco and was quite keen on Hedilla so becomes the main German link man. Interesting chap, was indeed very busy in South America from 1900s through to the 1940s whenever he got sacked/retired from German service he'd race back down there. If this were a narrative AAR he'd be a great character, as it is a brief bio and photo is all you get, at the moment anyway.

Hopefully progress should be faster after a few manic weeks at work, but alas I make no promises.