Chapter XXVI
Revolts and Scheming
Oh night, be calm.
For what has the midnight oracle declared?
- William Blake, “Ballad of Melissinos,” 1821.
After securing a decisive victory against his main rival in the first triumvirate of the Long Regency, Melissinos set his eyes further east. Like Crassus, the path to the throne lay with conquest against the eastern enemies of the Roman Empire—in particular, the remnants of the Mongol Horde that had stormed through much of Eastern and Central Europe during the Middle Ages. Weakened by war, and the successful revolt of the Duchy of Moscow against their overlords, Melissinos believed that a quick and decisive campaign in the southern plains of Russia would allot him the ability to march on Constantinople—not as a conqueror or liberator, but a savior and hero. After all, it was his only conceivable path back into the walls of the city of Constantine.
While Melissinos was preparing his invasion of the southern steppes, the Georgian people, subjugated by the Romans nearly 100 years earlier, had long wanted their independence. Although fellow Orthodox Christians, the Georgians had a streak of fierce independence, both in ecclesiastical and political matters. In addition, the failures of Gabras and Komnenoi Family in Trebizond to seize power against Sophia and the Imperial Council ruling for the young three year old Constantine XII, many Georgian nobles felt that the eastern holdings of the Roman state was weakened and without serious vigor or leadership. Perhaps they were not aware that Melissinos was now the present military governor of the region, at the least to keep the Komnenoi in check, but with Melissinos free from the strings of the aristocracy, he proved a more forthright commander with little to lose unlike his counterpart Gabras, who had much vested interest in doing the bidding of his aristocratic overseers while simultaneously trying to keep himself in contention for the power struggle.
The Georgian wish for independence broiled over in the spring of 1532. A harsh winter and dry spring only compounded the animosity towards their Roman overlords. When the duke refused to provide his reserve of grain to the starving people, they revolted in a massive uprising all too common throughout the annals of Roman history—especially the history of the Roman Empire in the east. This constituted the 110th major revolt, civil war, or general uprising in the history of the eastern Romans.[1] The Georgians amassed about 14,000 armed peasants and around 1,000 armed nobles who began pillaging the Roman border country, raided into the despotate of Armenia, and even crossed into Persia twice.
For Melissinos, the need to put down a rebellion postponed his planned invasion of the southern steppes. Yet, he also knew of the political prestige a victory against the rebellious Georgians would bring. He felt that, in the span of six months (if possible), victories against the Georgians and the Steppe Hordes would guarantee his return to Constantinople by Christmas. It would only be right and fitting he thought.
The fluctuating nature of the Roman imperial structures in the sixteenth century represented the edge of human evolution, a cauldron of past and present. On one hand, the empire was still an agrarian empire—one based on taxation of agricultural produce. Like most other empires and powers of its day, it was land-based. Only a few of the maritime countries, like Portugal and the Hanseatic Confederacy, had commercial-based economies from trade and colonialism. At the same time, the reforms of John X marked the movement towards something that resembled the centralized nation-states of today, a political revolution that was also manifesting itself in Europe, particularly in the northern grounds of Italy in the struggle for Italian Supremacy between the Valois and Habsburgs.
This transition proved tumultuous in certain areas, and the reactionary counterstrike of the Greco-Roman aristocracy weakened the imperium on the outer edges of the empire. In this weakness, the Georgians arose to seek their independence. They had, ever since the conquests of John VIII, longed for the day they would be free (or perhaps greater autonomy). Their struggle was a curious one since, with all respect to the Georgian natives, they had a great deal of freedom considering the devolved nature of the Roman political structure, particularly in Asia Minor.
The Komnenoi in Trebizond were less than interested in diverting resources from their more immediate holdings to what was perceived to be a wasteland full of degenerate peoples who were not befitting of being called Roman. Despite their Christian piety, the Greek Church held the Georgian Church in contempt. Ever since the Georgian Church’s independence from the Church of Antioch in the fifth century, the Greek Church viewed those who were part of the eastern orbit but without the directive to honor the dictates of the primary bishops of the pentarchy in suspicion. While not held in the same contempt as the Oriental Orthodox Churches, the feuding nature between the two cultures ran deep.
So, from within this midst, the Georgian uprising struck with great speed and thunder. The outer fortresses along the border all fell, with minimal fighting as the men who manned these ancient defenses were underfed, under-armed, and had little invested in the defense of outdated fortresses that had fallen into decay and disrepair. The Georgian forces however, made an early blunder in separated their forces to cover the expense of the eastern holdings of the Duke of Trebizond.
A scene from the Georgian uprisings. Here, the Georgian peasants burn down the villa of a local aristocrat.
As the Georgians clamored violently for independence, Melissinos moved out of Trebizond with an army of about 10,000 men. Like Belisarius nearly a millennium before him, Melissinos charted his path to glory and power. He knew of the separations that had occurred in the Georgian rebels, and he sought to exploit this. He would move on the rebel armies separately, and score decisive victories without having to fight a battle where the Georgians could amass and hold the numerical advantage. It also happened that the Georgian uprising provided good cause for the Roman army to move from Trebizond to the eastern border with the Golden Horde. After defeating the Georgians under the legitimate pretext of preventing a full-scale revolution, he would strike from the south and carve a path through the Russian Steppes and defeat the Steppe Hordes in their wake.
As Belisarius defeated the Vandals then captured Rome, to the point where his popularity matched, or exceeded, that of Justinian, Melissinos figured the same would apply to him. “The Savior of the Empire” he fantasized about. He would have that opportunity.
[1] "110th" is a reflection of my adding in-game revolts to the historical tally.
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