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September-November 1989

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A busy roundabout in Central Kabul, late 1989. Cars were becoming more and more of a rarity every passing month.

Kabul

Kabul saw the formation of yet another government division, this time almost exclusively consisting of ethnic Hazara and Shiite Qizilbash Turkmen from the Afshar district of the capital. With commanding officers transferred from loyalist Hazara militia in Maidan Shahr, or from regular units from around the country, the formation reached the strength of what would be at most considered a brigade almost anywhere else in the world. A usual Afghan division of late 1989, thus. The division was projected to be ready for duty by the end of the year. Interestingly, it drew the attention of a small number of pardoned defectors, while also bringing the government worries about possible infiltration of the unit by the remaining staunch supporters of Sayyed Anwari in the capital. The disappearance of a stockpile of RPGs from the unit’s barracks certainly led to the rise of these fears. A recruitment office of the division was also attacked in November, either by Shia fighters upset over the fact that their fellow coreligionists saw joining the formation as a lucrative possibility, or by hard-core Wahhabists of Sayyaf who continued to wreak havoc in Kabul.

A large delegation of the Soviet Ministries of Foreign Economic Relations, Geology and Metallurgy visited Kabul in late 1989. The Soviets also dispatched a group of sophisticated civilian aircraft for aeromagnetic mineral surveys to the Kabul airport. However, because these aircraft had to fly on a relatively low altitude survey flights were limited to the immediate surroundings of Kabul city, even though the findings were nevertheless impressive and a source of interest in the highest ranks of the Soviet politburo. However, the Soviets were in no position to help, neither financially or technologically, in the exploitation of the newfound mineral wealth. Thus, at least for now, copies of these findings were simply stored in the Afghan Geological Survey library in Kabul, waiting for a better time. Primitive expansion and exploitation of previously known mines and ore sources south of Kabul was initiated by the government, but with the inability to garner Soviet investment these projects could in no way but in socialist propaganda be defined as successes.

The Council of Ministers and the diplomatic corps continued their diplomatic efforts under the leadership of a much more invigorated Sultan Ali Keshtmand. Firstly, Keshtmand contacted the Cubans, whose policy of a ‘medicinal intervention’ had so far been pursued chiefly in Latin America. Cubans sent a number of highly educated doctors, nurses and other experts to the University Hospital of Kabul. Some delegations were also posted to hospitals in the solidly peaceful north. This, along with the arrival of much needed drugs and medical equipment, greatly increased hopes in the core group of government sympathisers, as well as with the military, whose soldiers now had access to somewhat better healthcare. The diplomatic overture didn’t stop here, as Afghan diplomats visited fellow beleaguered left-wing regimes in the Third World, seeing that the Second World was no longer worth spending the effort on, as save for the Soviet Union it was seemingly collapsing. The former role of East Germany as a strong supporter of the Afghan government and its socialist project was to some extent taken over by the Cubans. Afghan ties deepened especially with Nicaragua and Syria. However, attempts to recruit economic planners and other skilled civil servants from the U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia didn’t result in much. A few dozen accepted a contract with the Afghan government, but only after living in the capital for two months, most departed back to their homes. A small number of graduates from the Tashkent and Leninabad universities however began their work advising the Afghan government and the PDPA.

Paghman

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Mujahidin of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, still in high spirits despite of being practically cut-off in the mountains overlooking Paghman.

Following the conclusion of the offensive aimed against the Ittihad positions and entrenchments around Paghman the 18th Division packed up and loaded on trucks that took them back to the north, completing the transfer back to their original garrisons by late October. The responsibility of defending the area was now tasked on the 3rd Division, the formation set up by Kabul in the autumn of last year. Sarandoy units and the newly set-up 81st Division were also posted to the region, as the Afghan General Staff intended to keep pressuring the Ittihad of Sayyaf in the mountains throughout the winter, intending to sway them from attacking positions elsewhere. However, the formations intended to hold the area were relatively green, and took heavy attrition in the fighting with the Wahhabists, with the government forced to deploy mountain troops to map the locations of enemy encampments for aerial and artillery attacks. However, the harsh winter weather and scarcity of supplies took its toll on the mujahidin, as the Shiite militias of Sazman-e Nasr effectively blockaded the mountainous area. Nevertheless, Paghman was continuously targeted with mortars and makeshift rockets, and booby traps utilized in the rugged terrain maimed dozens of elite government soldiers. In November, a limited counterattack by the Wahhabists managed to cut the government supply route between Paghman and Kabul for over a week before retreating to the mountains with a plentiful loot of supplies and weaponry.

Operation Titan

The next government offensive in the East was codenamed Titan, and launched after a set of delays caused by poor logistical situation and the need to gather more weapons for the air force only in late September. Confident in the de facto truce with the Shia factions, the government had transferred the Ismaili 80th Division from Kayan valley in Baghlan to take part in the offensive. Under the command of Gen. Sayed Jafar Naderi this formation of militiamen was renowned for its resilience against the attack of Ali Mazari against their homes in December of 1988, and were considered on par with the mountain battalions in fighting in the rugged terrain, which was plentiful in Nangarhar. In addition, the 8th Division of Gen. Nabi Azimi and the 15th Armored Brigade, as well as the reinforcements intended to join the Jalalabad garrison were thrown into the fray. Nabi Azimi himself only took part in the first battles of Operation Titan, as he was transferred to command the 4th Herati Corps by early October.

With both the Hazara and Massoud in active, thus allowing further reinforcements to head to Nangarhar, the government finally had the upper hand in the battle for Jalalabad. Airstrikes continued to hit rebel positions in amounts never seen before, and Mi-24 gunships were used far more efficiently than before, now that the Afghan Air Force was slowly learning how to use them outside of Stinger range. The 80th and 8th Divisions were leading way in their attack to secure the southern riverbank, as government forces unleashed devastating rocket artillery barrages one after one. Retreating from the Daronta Dam area, HiG and HiK mujahidin blew up the tunnel entrances, thus preventing the use of the easiest supply route to Jalalabad. Attempts were also made to sabotage the dam, but those were prevented by the massive amount of helicopters firing rockets at anyone trying to come near it. Nevertheless, the dam was very badly damaged, and many feared that further fighting might outright cause its collapse, and a massive flood that might drown hundreds if not thousands downstream in Jalalabad. The fact that it was now also the main supply route to Jalalabad and thus regularly targeted didn’t help the slightest. A small contignent of the 80th was meant to advance up the Mindravur plain towards Mehterlam, but this attack had to, yet once again, be cancelled due to its allocated resources being needed for the opening of the Jalalabad roads. And on top of that, Abdul Haqq had managed to set up an extremely solid network of defences in the narrow valley leading to the Laghman province capital.

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Afghan troops of Gen. Nur ul-Haq Ulumi’s 11th Division engaged in battle on the outskirts of Jalalabad airport, shortly before the clearing of the main highway connecting the city with Kabul.

After securing the slightly better supply route to Jalalabad, the government reinforced the 11th Division with a gigantic amount of troops and hardware, clearly expecting the road to become harassed if not entirely blocked again. The new 323rd Brigade of the 11th attacked Samarkhel on November 13, but after two weeks of fighting was forced to call off the attack, as Wardak’s HiG mujahidin threatened to retake the Daronta area in a massive surprise attack. Some advances were made up the Pech river, somewhat securing the perimeter, and to the southwest of Jalalabad, where Sultanpur and Sorkhrud were secured. Government formations were however extremely exhausted, and further attacks planned had to be cancelled due to fear of rebel counterattacks and increase in desertion. The Jalalabad campaign, or at least its most intensive part, was now over. The losses in manpower and equipment had been tremendous for the government, as the mujahidin had managed to slowly bleed the attacking force as it begun the offensive from Surobi. Charred tanks dotted the roadsides, and corpses kept arriving to Kabul in dozens daily. Yet, it was now proven that the government was a true fighting power on its own, having managed to relieve both Khost and now Jalalabad. The mujahidin too had taken losses, but the most importantly loss was the final realization that the war was indeed at a stalemate, and that the Kabul regime wouldn’t be losing its control anytime soon.

Khost

The 12th Division from Gardeyz was ordered to help the 23rd in the burdensome task of patrolling the Gardeyz-Khost highway, while the 4th Armoured Brigade in conjuction with local sarandoy militias and parts of the Khost garrison mounted limited offensives backed by superior firepower to increase the perimeter around the city. Slightly more of the Kurram valley was in government hands by November, but the most important and toughest fighting raged along the highway itself. A detachment of mountain troops was airlifted around to mount surprising raids on rebel encampments, while the HiK under Haqqani retorted back in a similar fashion. The battles fought in the rugged terrain were extremely bloody and exhausting for both parties, but in the end the attrition rate was higher for the government troops, which failed to decisively located and destroy Haqqani’s men and thus fully secure the mountaintops guarding the highway.

With Haqqani somewhat regaining his prestige and fame after a successful campaign of attrition against the government along its supply road to Khost, the HiK started to aggressively consolidate its position in the Paktika and Paktia provinces, assuming increasingly direct control in all MeM held areas. The local MeM groups were already under operational command of the HiK, but now all of their territory, equipment and recruitable tribal manpower were evenly shared with the HiK. The move was to some extent welcomed by the local MeM mujahidin, weakened by the heavy casualties and defection of Wardak. There was heavy discontent towards Pir Gailani, the MeM leader, and the Paktika-Paktia grouping of the group became for all intents and purposes just an arm of Khalis’s organization. There was also a change in strategy from mujahidin part, as Haqqani increasingly targeted the rural areas of the government-held part of the province, while also increasing efforts to infiltrate Khost city proper. Being a city on the frontline, Khost was a relatively easy target for this, and assassinations and acts of sabotage kept the government garrison eternally alert and discontent. How exactly the mujahidin managed to infiltrate into the city on such a scale baffled even the local WAD officers. WAD in general intensified its presence in the city and the province, in an effort to combat the increasing infiltration and ISI attempts at sneaking in weaponry.

Baghdis & Faryab

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General Dostum and a local Tajik tribal elder brought to the government camp by the efforts of the WAD plan the next stage of the Herat highway offensive in Faryab.

Fighting intensified along the Qala-i-Naw-Maymanah highway, as the government forces under Gen. Dostum started the final stage of the offensive to relink Herat with the rest of the country. Formations of the 53rd, 54th and 70th Divisions of Dostum’s 6th Ccorps were involved in the offensive from Maymanah, and the 33rd Brigade of the 17th Division of the 4th Corps from Qala-i-Naw. The offensive was maybe the single most important government effort in the northwest of the country to date, and after weeks of extremely brutal fighting the garrison of Qala-i-Naw managed to meet with the Uzbek militiamen coming from the north. As the road was at least briefly opened, vital military cargo started to arrive in Herat, even though frequent ambushes by JaI took their toll on the government troops. However, Dostum now had hundreds of more kilometres of roads for his troops to patrol, making any further offensive operations by his corps a nigh impossibility, especially when coupled with the loss of many veterans of the Taloqan battle and pieces of much needed equipment. Quite importantly, the offensive proved the worth of the 70th Division of Gen. Abdul Momim. This chiefly Tajik formation had been able to infiltrate local tribal militias, and operated quite much alike the WAD Special Forces, becoming an extremely efficient tool for special operations under Dostum’s command.

Herat

General Mohammad Nabi Azimi, victor of the battles of the ‘Triangle’ and saviour of the Khost garrison landed in Herat on a bleak October day to assume command of the 4th Corps. Gen. Abdul Wahid Baba Jan had fallen in disgrace of the General Staff due to failures to hold back against mujahidin offensives, and was originally intended to assume command of the highly capable 8th Division, but by late November the general still remained far away from the front in Kabul. The staff of Nabi Azimi immediately began the work required to reverse the recent turn of events in the Herat province. The garrison of the city was reprimanded and lectured about their mishaps, and the defences of the airbase were constantly improved, in order to prevent the further loss of crucially scarce transport aircraft. Mohammad Ismail Khan of Jamiat-e Islami continued to focus on ambushing convoys coming south from the Soviet border, destroying a shipment of jet fuel and seizing ammunition and tanks from a few sarandoy checkpoints. The attack against the border troops at the crossing with Iran never came, and instead the mujahidin opted to wait and besiege them, while collecting tolls from passing convoys.

Farah

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Mujahidin of Mahaz-e Milli commander Vali Farah Yousef somewhere in the more rugged parts of the Farah province with a T-55 tank captured from previous battles.

The 21st Division, supervised by Gen. Nabi Azimi, launched a new offensive to restore the highway link between the cities of Shindand and Farah. The experience learned by the general by commanding similar operations clearly aided the government effort, and by November, despite of heavy attacks by the MeM under mujahidin leader Vali Farah Yousef, the road was reopened. The MeM had already foreseen that Farah province would be high on the government’s focus list, and had been building up bases in the more mountainous areas of the province, increasingly shifting to a strategy of occasional guerrilla attacks instead of large-scale takeovers of government territory like with Zaranj, which was however being extensively fortified. The Shindand-Delaram highway was briefly cut in an attack by Harakat-e Inqilab in September, but reopened in October following the arrival of reinforcements from Herat to Shindand airbase. This time the mujahidin of Mojaddedi managed to avoid the most open ground beneficial for the government firepower, and by operating mostly at night dodged the heavy casualties sustained in previous attempts.

Helmand & Kandahar

The area south of Lashkar Gah was considered to be highly important thanks to the irrigation works built there with American funding in the 1960s and 1970s, and thus imperative to capture in order to secure the supply of foodstuffs to the city of Kandahar, and to revitalize the economy of the government-held enclave spanning the two southern provinces. The government formations, chiefly the 15th Division and 7th Armoured brigade backed by sarandoy and Achakzai tribesmen, in Kandahar region continued their offensive down the Helmand river valley, while also keeping the Ittihad and Inghilab positions around Kandahar city and airbase under heavy attacks from air and ground, intending to lift the high pressure put on the Spin Boldak garrison. The JaI fighters under Mullah Naqib managed to find themselves in a significant period of peace that allowed them to rest and refit themselves to become a more relevant formation in the area, as the government shelling barely targeted their fighters. There was also an increase in Inghilab infiltration in Kandahar, more and more using civilian sympathisers.

Ismatullah Muslim, the commander of the pro-government Achakzai tribal militia garrisoning Spin Boldak and surroundings was found assassinated in his Kandahar residence on November 21. The official narrative of the local administration was that he died due to misuse of drugs and alcohol, a known attribute of his. However, the military and WAD disputed the claim, blaming mujahidin for being behind the assassination. The fact that the largely Khalqi local PDPA officials had for long been at odds with Ismatullah was no secret, and the whole affair seemed extremely dubious. The command of the militia at Spin Boldak passed to his nephews, but much of the influence of Ismatullah was lost, and many tribal fighters deserted, some even defecting to Ittihad and Inghilab. Later, the HiG claimed responsibility for the assassination, claiming to have killed a ‘mad dog’ working for the communist regime, and listing the crimes of the ‘unbeliever’ Ismatullah against the Muslim population of Afghanistan; theft, murder and extortion. In the aftermath of the incident, the WAD deployed an increasing presence in Kandahar, securing the airport and starting to investigate the growth of mujahidin cells in the city.

While the government was busy being on the offensive along the Helmand river and around Kandahar, the Inghilab managed to seize the initiative along the Kandahar-Lashkar Gah highway, briefly seizing almost a 10 kilometre stretch of it before retreating under a heavy government counterattack. Nevertheless, the road had been cut for almost a week and extremely underlined the government weakness of having to spend massive amounts of personnel and equipment to garrison huge stretches of roads while mujahidin could still concentrate their forces on relatively minor sections and overpower the government checkpoints. The attack also decreased the pressure on MeM troops in the Helmand valley, allowing them to retake some positions in the fertile region. A similar attack was launched on the Spin Boldak-Kandahar road close to the Pakistani power, but the resistance of local tribesmen forming the core of government troops posted in the area proved out to be a harder nut to crack than the defence of sarandoy checkpoints which had been waiting for pay for the past six months.

Chaghcharan

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An Afghan Air Force Il-28 taking off from Herat Airbase for the evening raid on Chaghcharan on October 13.

Following the clashes that ignited in the capital of Ghowr during the summer, the JaI had retreated to the outskirts of the city. By the autumn, they took a more reconciliatory approach towards HiG, and the groups resumed allowing each other pass through their territory and fighting and clashes ended almost entirely by October. The truce agreed earlier between the local JaI forces and the Chaghcharan shura seemed to be on a rather solid basis until something remarkable happened. On October 13 a formation of antiquated government heavy bombers of the Il-28 took off from Herat, unloading their lethal load on rebel encampments within the city. As each planed could carry up to 3,000 kilograms of high explosives, the damage inflicted upon the city’s rebel fighters, their stockpiles and civilian population were massive. In the aftermath of the air raid, JaI mujahidin advanced to the city in shock and confusion, quickly advancing through it, allegedly having arrived to help in fighting the flames and clearing the debris. In reality the ‘rescue efforts’ effectively disarmed a large part of the HiG garrison before anybody realized what was happening. The remaining members of the shura retreated to the city centre, were fighting raged for weeks before subsidizing. As the Shia Hazara forces managed to rebel attacks on the airfield into late October, the JaI forces withdrew from assaulting it and focused on forcing the HiG and their allies to flee the city, which was accomplished on November 7. However, the mujahidin loyal to Hekmatyar quickly regrouped, and were back at the city’s outskirts on November 18, starting to heavily shell JaI positions as reinforcements arrived from Oruzgan. HiG managed to capture the hills south of the city which had previously been a JaI stronghold, and massive mortar and artillery barrages begun to hit JaI-held districts of the Ghowr province capital. Needless to say, the heavy air force bombing and subsequent fighting and shelling was rendering Chaghcharan into a demolished ghost town.

Kunar

The Islamic Emirate of Kunar became further organized when its Emir declared the formation of the Islamic Army of Kunar, a fighting force incorporating the fighters of the JDQS, local tribesmen, ex-ANLF fighters and increasingly arriving foreign volunteers. The army surprisingly became one of the most organized opposition formations in the entire Afghanistan, totalling almost three thousand men in garrisons around Kunar province. Pious veterans of Arab and Islamic armies were invited to join and serve the Islamic Emirate, and dozens of Egyptians, Pakistanis and Libyans, disillusioned with the current, secular, way of governance in their native countries flocked across the border. With funding and material provided by the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia, Mawlawi Rahman started to set up proper madrassas in Kunar, aching to bring orthodox religious unity to the province, and eradicate last remnants of idolatry and superstition. There were some disputes over the destruction of monuments dedicated to Sufi pirs by foreign radicals, as well as to the removal of images of fallen ANLF fighters from the graveyard of Asadabad, but for the most part this transition towards Salafism was brought forth peacefully.

Other Regions

The north of the country was generally calm save for minor clashes that occurred around Taloqan. Recruitment efforts continued in the north, utilizing the largely loyalist Uzbek ethnicity, which however lead to minor protesting against the allegedly disproportionate and excessive draft. Many of the recruits were also send to the meat grinder at Jalalabad, leading to many deserting and joining the divisions of Dostum instead. JaI forces remained rather inactive, apparently recognizing the might of the forces of Dostum’s corps and instead biding their time, slowly advancing on Feyzabad. The few HiG fighters in the north started to abandon their positions following the growing rift with Jamiat, trekking south to join their brothers in Jalalabad.

Ittihad launched an attack in late September on government positions around the Ghazni highway, managing to make limited gains despite of an intense bombardment, forcing the government forces to shift attention to the area. This was the first major offensive by the mujahidin on the triangle claimed pacified by the government, and somewhat eroded the government taunting of the previous months, as local sarandoy checkpoints were abandoned within the first sight of mortars falling around and within the first sound of shooting and fierce mujahidin.

Following the rout of the JaI forces under Massoud that had briefly broken into northern Shomali plains, the government kept the pressure on the group by keeping the Panjsher valley under a constant barrage of almost daily SCUD or Luna missiles. While failing to cause heavy material or personnel damage, they further eroded the morale of the group and inhibited recruitment efforts that had already taken a turn to the worse.

The Afghan Air Force commander Gen. Abdul Qadir Aqa ordered the air force to again utilize the large fleet of cargo planes for bombing missions. Fitted with largely improvised munitions and cluster bombs, the Afghan Air Force launched heavy aerial attacks against rebel-held towns, opting to shift attention against populated centres instead of tactical air support by attacking known rebel camps. The main goal of the operation was to deny the rebels the possibility of establishing proper governance in cities they had captured over the past few months since Soviet withdrawal, while simultaneously preventing the establishment of logistical hubs for continuous offensives. The cities that sustained the heaviest attacks were Mehterlam, Zaranj and Tarin Kowt.

Events from around the world

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ISI Director Gen. Hamid Gul was sacked by Bhutto after the apparent failures in his handling of the Afghan portfolio.

Pakistan

The apparent failure of the efforts to seize Jalalabad as an interim capital for Hekmatyar and his allies and as a causeway to strike further into Afghanistan landed Hamid Gul, the head of Inter-Services Intelligence, in an embarrassing position. Prime Minister Bhutto was enraged over the failure, and even the military criticized Gul for underestimating the strength of the Afghan military post-Soviet withdrawal. In October reports were leaked to foreign press regarding the involvement of Pakistani regular troops on the Afghan side of the border. By late October, Bhutto managed to gain the approval of the military and the President for sacking Gul, replacing him with Shamsur Rahman Kallu and demanding a return to the classical approach of supporting the mujahidin’s guerilla attrition warfare against the Kabul government. In November the new leaders of the ISI revealed a coup plot in works aimed against Premier Bhutto. A faction had been created within the ISI, headed by Brig. Gen. Imtiaz Ahmed Billa, an associate of the former president Zia-ul-Haq. A VHS tape captured by ISI exposed the conversation of another rogue agent Major Amir Khan, who revealed that General Mirza Aslam Beg, the Chief of Army Staff, with the backing of the conservative President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, had ambitions to topple the Benazir Bhutto's government. The alleged name of the coup plot was Operation Midnight Jackal, and that it included attempts to sway the members of Bhutto’s own party to turn on her. Both military and civilian authorities immediately launched investigations, and the entire country awaited for their result in anxiety.

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The extremely symbolic fall of the Berlin wall in late 1989, along with the more concrete collapse of communist single-party regimes in the GDR, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary marked a clear end to the era of Soviet-dictated socialism in Eastern Europe.

Assorted newsflashes

September 10 – Budapest. The Hungarian government opens the country's western borders to refugees from the German Democratic Republic.
September 23 – Beirut. A cease-fire in the Lebanese Civil War stops the violence that had killed 900 people since March.
October 3 – East Berlin, Prague. The government of German Democratic Republic closes the country's border with Czechoslovakia to prevent further emigration to the West.
October 7 – Budapest. Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party votes to reorganize itself as a socialist party, to be named the Hungarian Socialist Party. Later the same month the Hungarian Republic is declared to replace the Hungarian People’s Republic.
October 18 – East Berlin. Erich Honecker is forced to step down as leader of the country after a series of health problems, and is succeeded by Egon Krenz.
November 9 – East Berlin. GDR government Spokesman Günter Schabowski accidentally states in a live broadcast press conference that new rules for traveling from East Germany to West Germany will be put in effect "immediately". East Germany subsequently opens checkpoints in the Berlin Wall.
 
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Turn 6 – December 1989

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General Secretary of PDPA, President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah (Bonecracker(NL)/Dutchbag)
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sultan Ali Keshtmand (sealy300)
Minister of State Security, Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi (Terraferma)
Minister of Interior, Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (OPEN)


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Chief of Army Staff, Minister of Defense, Shahnawaz Tanai (Julius Maximus)
Commander of Afghan Air Force, Abdul Qadir Aqa (Shynka)
Commander of 6th Mazar-i-Sharifi Corps, Abdul Rashid Dostum (King50000)
Commander of 4th Herati Corps, Mohammad Nabi Azimi (KF25)
Commander of 11th Infantry Division, Nur ul-Haq Ulumi (Harpsichord)
Commander of 70th Hairatani Infantry Division, Abdul Momim (OPEN)
Commander of 80th Baghlani Infantry Division, Sayed Jafar Naderi (OPEN)
Commander of Bagram Garrison, Mohammed Zafar Khan (OPEN)

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Leader of Gulbuddinist faction, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Noco19)
Leader of Khalist faction, Mohammad Yunus Khalis (Kho)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Kabul, Abdul Haq (BlackCrown)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Paktia, Jalaluddin Haqqani (OPEN)
Gulbuddinist Mujahedin commander of the Janjawid Corps, Abdul Rahim Wardak (Dadarian)

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Leader of Jamiat e-Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani (aedan777)
Party Mujahidin Commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud (baboushreturns)
Mujahedin Commander in Herat, Mohammad Ismail Khan (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Northern Afganistan, Atta Muhammad Nur (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Southern Afganistan, Mullah Naqib (OPEN)

Minor Mujahedin Groups

Leader of Harakat e-Inghilab, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Shebedaone)
Leader of Mahaz-e Milli, Sayyid Ahmed Gailani (OPEN)
Commander of Mahaz-e Milli Mujahedin near Shindand, Vali Farah Yousef (Mikkel Glahder)
Leader of Ittihad-e Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Cleeque)

Shiite Mujahedin Groups

Co-leader of Al-Nasr, Abdul Ali Mazari (OPEN)
Leader of Revolutionary Council of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, Sayyid Ali Beheshti (OPEN)
Leader of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Muhammad Asif Mohseni (OPEN)
Commander of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Mujahedin, Sayed Hussein Anwari (tyriet)

Other Resistance Groups

Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Kunar, Jamil al-Rahman (Maxwell500)




Orders will be due next Saturday!


Furthermore, due to inactivity, jeeshadow has been replaced with sealy300 as Sultan Ali Keshtmand.
 
Burhanuddin Rabbani gives a short speech following recent events.

"For many months, local commanders of the Jamiat e-Islami and forces of Hekmatyar in Chaghcharan saw fit to raise tensions against their fellow Mujahideen, spilling unneeded blood over a city already freed of the godless communists. Having seen this strife escalate to new heights in concurrence with a lack of success on other fronts against the communists, I instructed the local commanders of my organization to adopt a reconciliation approach, easing tensions in the region and alleviating the suffering of local peoples. By all accounts this was a most fruitful and beneficial measure, as conflict between local Mujahideen forces had all but ceased by early October, allowing for forces to begin to be transferred to fronts where they could fight directly against the communist pigs.

Alas, events took a most unexpected turn for the worst on October 13. Bombers of the communist air force conducted a terror raid against the city of Chaghcharan, killing untold Mujahideen and local civilians in indiscriminate attacks against the faithful. Local Jamiat e-Islami forces, outside the city and thus spared the worst of the communist onslaught, quickly moved to assist their brethren suffering in the city, hoping to put out fires and attend to the wounded. But instead of a warm welcome for providing much needed relief, they were met by hostility and resistance by Hekmatyar's men. Rather than let local people, innocent children of Allah, suffer due to the stubbornness of a few men, Jamiat forces began to disarm Hekmatyar's forces to prevent further resistance to rescue efforts.

Once the worst damage of the bombing had been brought under control, local Jamiat Mujahideen hoped to negotiate a new status quo with Hekmatyar's men, the local shura, and Shia Mujahideen. But Hekmatyar's forces refused to negotiate, slighted over the assistance of Jamiat e-Islami, and launched bloody attacks on the city, utilizing mortars and artillery pieces to conduct their own indiscriminate attacks against the Chaghcharan. Further attempts to negotiate on the matter have been hampered by Hekmatyar's malicious and fallacious claim that Jamiat forces were working in concert with the communist attack, even stating that we had given intel on his forces to the enemy. This is utterly untrue, Jamiat forces did not provide any information on Hekmatyar's forces to the communist, nor were they in any way forewarned of the terror bombing.

In light of all relevant events, Jamiat e-Islami will not be withdrawing from Chaghcharan, and if Hekmatyar's forces do not cease their attacks against it, operations will be conducted to secure Chaghcharan."
 
To: General Nur ul-Haq Ulumi, Commander of 11th Division.

Comrade General,

Your excellent conduct during the battle for Jalalabad has not gone unnoticed. You are the victor of the most important battle in this war until now, denying the enemy the ability to establish a capital of a government to challenge ours. Thanks to you, these men will remain in Pakistan for a long time to come. A decision has also been made to promote you to the rank of Lieutenant General, and award you the Medal for Excellent Military Service. A ceremony will soon be held in Kabul to present this award to a number of your men recommended for this award as well. You are, of course, invited to attend and I personally hope to see you there.

The aforementioned recognitions of your achievements are not the reason for this letter, however. This is that you are appointed as Governor of Kandahar province, and assigned to take command of the 2nd Army Corps upon your arrival in Kandahar city. During the last couple of months it has become clear that terrorist activity in that region is increasing, and a capable officer such as yourself is to take command of the situation in both government and military affairs. You have freedom of action in combating the insurgency in the 2nd Corps Area, and we will not make you an agent of our policy for the time being after you have sufficiently gotten rid of nefarious elements in the local administration that are cooperating with Hekmatyar and Mohammadi in the region. Accordingly, I advice you bring some of your most trusted men along with you.

May God Almighty grant you success in your endeavours.

-Najib
 
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Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

A letter to the Office of President Najibullah.

Comrade President,

It is absolutely obvious that while the irreconcilable opposition, warmed and encouraged by the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia holds to an extremist policy, military measures will remain an important method of action to “persuade” the enemy of the evidence of the truth: there is no alternative to an intra-Afghan dialogue and peace talks. At the same time, the positive aspect in the military field already achieved opens new domestic and foreign opportunities to step up the political process. I commend your successes with the policy of national reconciliation, and recommend you re-enact the successful “Ramadan amnesty” also during 1990. Furthermore, the Soviet diplomatic corps has been working hard to reach a better consensus with the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and with the People’s Republic of China; these should result in further positive developments within your country.

Retaliatory missile strikes doubtless have great importance in the matter of repelling the barbaric acts of the opposition with respect to cities and the peaceful civilian population and disrupting its attacks. The Soviet Union decided some time ago, as you know, to allocate an additional 500 R-300 (GRAU designation 9K72) missiles for our Afghan friends. In this regard, it is extremely desirable that the R-300 missiles being delivered be used in the most rational manner. I want to stress that we have done this by removing missiles from Soviet military subunits. Deliveries of such effective equipment such as the “Luna-M” and “Smerch” have been restarted. One hundred missiles of the former type will be sent to the Afghan side between the end of November and the new year, 1990.

Mi-35 attack helicopters will be delivered in the first quarter of 1990. Other issues are being examined regarding the deliveries of weapons, which you have raised in your previous messages and correspondence, including ones the deliveries of which were denied by our Ministry of Defence until recently. We can confirm our readiness to deliver, for example, modern MiG-29 fighter aircraft, and to reconsider the previous stance regarding the delivery of Su-24 attack aircraft. Provision of spare parts will also increase, again, rerouted from regular units of the Soviet army. However, even as our military aid continues steadily, and with these promises is set to increase in the next year, I must regrettably inform that the deliveries of food provisions and refined diesel fuel from the Central Asian SSRs must be at least temporarily tuned down due to the recent disturbances in the area. Hopefully you will understand our decision, and we wish that full deliveries on the scale of early 1989 can resume by next summer. We understand that this presents a challenge during the winter months, and thus we recommend your government drafts plans for better rationing over the next months. As I already stated, once the situation normalizes in these SSRs we may again give our undivided attention and aid to your beleaguered position.

With warm, brotherly and socialist greetings,


M. S. Gorbachev

(The text of this letter has been approved at a CC CPSU Politburo meeting, Protocol Nº P175/5).
 
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Col. Sultan Amir Tarar, Special Services Group, Pakistan Army

Remarks of Col. Imam of ISI at a meeting with the commanders of the more radical Islamic factions that participated in the Jalalabad campaign in Peshawar.

"Brothers.

Do not be upset; do not lose your trust in the Almighty and his benevolence, his wisdom. The Muslims of Afghanistan will one day enjoy the just, Islamic rule of the disciples of our Prophet, even though the sour-tasting defeat at Jalalabad leaves us all aching for revenge. Indeed, we believe that the current situation warrants the reassessment of the military strategy pursued by the mujahidin. Firstly, we can conclude that the atheist regime has prioritized the frontline along the Pakistani border, their newest military equipment, their forcibly recruited conscripts and all their efforts in general have been directed to contain the advances of the soldiers of jihad towards the capital. Indeed, the regime is determined to deny us a rightful seat for an interim, Islamic, government.

Secondly, the fact that the shuravi enemy continues to provide the regime with weaponry and munitions that simply cannot be checked with our current approach and the equipment provided to you remains a grave threat to the success of our jihad. Rockets fired from hundreds of kilometers away and bombs dropped from beyond the range of the anti-aircraft missiles graciously provided to your ranks cannot be outmatched. I have been trying to pressure our military-political leadership in Islamabad to retaliate by escalating the amount of heavier weapons sent to you, funded by our Arab friends and brought from China, yet the current developments within our establishment are more than disheartening. Alas, the true friends of jihad and Islam have been casted away following the rise of the new government; many veterans who stood loyal to jihad under the esteemed general and leader Zia ul Haq have been sidelined. But, do not worry, the majority of the military and security services of Pakistan remain in the hands of pious men.

And thirdly, the failure of certain groups to contribute to the battles of liberation in Nangarhar has been noted, and we intend to reprimand them for their failures. Thus I issue a call for further unity on the battlefield, and urge the mujahidin to pursue softer targets, and to open new fronts in the more vulnerable fronts neglected by the atheist regime. I will do my best to guarantee you the logistical necessities, as well as the required political support. More detailed requests and queries can be delivered to me, brothers. In short, we wish to see you reactivate the strategy of a nationwide war of attrition. A capital will fall into the hands of the soldiers of God when the time is ripe, God willing.

May God grant you victory on the path of jihad."
 
GM: Still missing quite a few sets of orders; please send them in ASAP.
 
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A letter to the Office of President Gorbachev

Comrade President,

Let me begin by saying that my cabinet, my party, my army, and myself continue to be grateful beyond words for the brotherly assistance Afghanistan has received and continues to receive from the USSR. Indeed, all Afghans are grateful - even if many of them don't realise it. It is therefore of paramount importance, in my view, that we aim to provide the best possible governance for the country and showcase this in model areas so the progress that our government -and Soviet assistance- can bring will be apparent to all Afghans. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the National Reconciliation that our government promotes, and you so greatly praised. Mirrored against that goal it is indeed unfortunate that supplies of food and fuel are cut, especially during these winter months, but rationing and putting more men to work in the coal mines will hopefully alleviate the worst of the shortages until deliveries can again resume.

It should not be surprising that I favoured the other parts of your letter. We are moving a number of missiles away from Bagram and to [REDACTED], and it would be appreciated if a number of the missiles coming in would be redirected there. Furthermore, we are very interested in acquiring MiG-29s and Su-24s. Perhaps it would be in the interests of the USSR to use Afghanistan as a testing ground, where we only present Soviet planes in Afghan colours, with Soviet pilots. Otherwise, we would like to start a (re)training programme for Afghan pilots in using the Su-24. Other types of weapons that we would be interested in are Air-to-Ground Missile and guided bombs, preferably thermobaric, to use against buildings, static defenses and other such targets. We believe that they will be useful in coming battles.

I would also like to express my gratitude for your diplomatic efforts in engaging China and Iran. Hopefully, such efforts will bring them to feel no more ill will towards Afghanistan, and that this will encourage other nations to engage with us as a legitimate and national government. It would be very much appreciated if your efforts in this regard could be extended to other befriended countries of yours, such as India and Syria.

Further extraordinary assistance of great importance right now is in repairing the Daronta dam and clearing the tunnel, which were heavily damaged during the battles of Nangarhar. If you could dispatch assistance as soon as possible, we would be very grateful. Hundreds, if not thousands of lives are at stake.

You can also rest assured that we will once again enact a general amnesty and unilateral ceasefire during the Holy Month of Ramadan, extended to the 7th of Saur, the Friday after the anniversary of the Saur Revolution. About your point on retaliatory strikes, I see where you are coming from but for now I do not see any compelling reason to launch retaliatory strikes on civilian targets. Not only is that very difficult, as most major cities and towns are held by us, but it would create bad blood. There are a number of towns we see as potential targets for such strikes, however, depending on information from most reliable sources about enemy activity there.

Finally, I would like to explore the possibilities of another official visit to Moscow to raise spirits and to cast away any doubts about the endurance of brotherly relations between the USSR and Afghanistan. It is on that friendship that the future of Afghanistan depends, as without it we will be cast into unending violence, fueled by drug smuggling and the suffering of our people.

With eternal gratitude, and brotherly greetings,

Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai
 
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Before a ceremony honouring soldiers who fought in Jalalabad, President Najibullah delivers a speech in Kabul to mark the victory there. It was broadcast on state radio and television, and an edited version of the speech, delivered in Dari, was translated into Pashto, Uzbek, and Turkmen and printed across the country in the newspaper Parcham.
Honourable soldiers and officers, citizens and sons of Afghanistan,

For one year your blood, your souls, your lives have been spent and shed in Nangarhar province. After our Russian friends had left, the world considered you a motley crew of villagers and labourers, disinterested in what happened beyond your own villages. We were told by America, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia that the army would collapse, and that the victory of Gulbuddin, Khalis, and Rabbani was imminent. We were told that because the soldiers would run, the government should go to Russia along with the Soviet soldiers. We were told that every day we, as Russian puppets, were in power, was a day on borrowed time.

We were told lies.

When they told you, that you were just peasants with no identity beyond your tribe, they looked down on you as a people and called you stupid. When they said that you would go home and not fight Gulbuddin and Massoud, they called you cowards with no sense of duty or honour. When they said that our government was living on borrowed times, they called us foreign lackeys and you traitors for standing with us.

But you have proven them wrong.

You, descendants of the people who stood against and won over the greatest empires in the world, from Alexander the Great to the British Empire just 70 years ago, have proven your capability to follow in their footsteps as the warrior spirit your inherited from them has broken the fingers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the other paymasters of those who call themselves the "freedom fighters". You have shown the world that your are Afghans, and that you are proud to be Afghans, and that you will defend Afghanistan from those who consider us a servile people and country. You have shown that Afghanistan's army is not an extension of the Soviet troops in this country, but a national army that represents every group, every region, and every opinion of Afghanistan as one country fighting foreign aggression.

The Afghan National Army is the premier force to show that our country is coming together. We have Tajiks, Pashtun, Hazara and Uzbeks fighting side by side as Afghan soldiers, with Afghan officers, to defend Afghan ground and all Afghan people from those who seek to defile us all. We oppose groups divided heavily by ethnicity and tribes, armed and financed by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, America, and other foreign terrorists and drug peddlers. They are commanded in battle by Pakistan's intelligence agencies and follow plans made by the Pakistani army to continue their subversive efforts to force Afghanistan to live under Pakistani boots.

It is fine to have different ideas and visions for our country. But the vision for Afghanistan that is propagated Islamabad is one I will not allow for as long as I am alive. And I put my faith in you, brave soldiers, that you will also not allow that to happen. You know that you are all Afghans, and that when you as Afghans come together you have the common power to move mountains and defeat any foe. You have the power to defend your freedom and your country from any foe. And while I am proud to know this, I am also very sad to say that it will be a long time before this storm is weathered. The enemies of Afghanistan are plenty, and around the world their lies dominate how the well-meaning, well-intentioned people of the world view us. They view us as evil men, and the men of Pakistan as a force of good. And if we want to win, we must show that the reality does not fit their narrative.

We must show that we are an army of the people, willing to help all Afghans, to defend them, and to defend their freedom and independence. We must show that we are not a Russian leftover, but a national government dedicated to national reconciliation and healing, to put this horrible war behind us while our enemies continue to throw fuel on the fire. We are willing to give our lives, so that our children and their children will never have to know a day of war. We are willing to work together with all groups to achieve that, we are willing to talk to everyone, to make concessions to everyone deserving. But the painful reality is that we are the only ones who think like that. Our enemies have declared war until the bitter end. They think that bitter end means the end of the war. But that bitter end means the end of Afghanistan.

Gentlemen, we cannot afford to lose. Not for our children, not for our families, not for our people and country. If we do not win, it will be the end of our country. So we must fight. And it is in that war, forced upon us by those who consider us unworthy of having our own country and destiny, that all soldiers must show the bravery that you have shown in Jalalabad. It is your shining example that I can't thank you enough for, but I hope will be raised on a pedestal with these awards.

In Jalalabad and Nangarhar, we won, as in Paghman, Khost, Gardez, Ghazni, Taloqan, and Kunduz. Such great victories are the beginning of a free, and prosperous future for Afghanistan!

Hurrah!

--------


"Sergeant Nasrat Panjshiri, who commanded the defense of the Control Tower of Jalalabad Airport in the heavy battles just before it had been relieved.", spoke the army officer accompanying President Najibullah as he awarded the medals to soldiers and officers in Jalalabad. Nasrat was one of the three recipients of the Order of the Star. The president took the medal from a case, pinned it on Nasrat's uniform, and shook his hand.

"May Allah watch over you, sergeant", Najibullah said.

"Holy crap, the president!", Nasrat thought. But he only said "And over you, sir". It came out without thinking, and he only realised what he had said later. But he didn't regret it. Nasrat wasn't one for politics, but he had a small liking for Najibullah. Despite being a tall and heavy-set man, he had a very gentle demeanor and soft voice - although that was very different from the powerful tone in this speech. He spoke kind words to his enemies about national reconciliation, which sounded very different from some of the things said by rebel leaders. And peace he seemed to have brought, there was no more fighting between the army and the Hazara. But that olive branch and kindness did not take away from the powerful stature and position of the president. Unlike the terrorists, there was a unified command loyal to him in Kabul.

A strong leader, a wise leader, and a kind leader who loved his country. "That's the man our country needs", Nasrat thought. But it was a passing thought after the soldiers were dismissed. It was been a year since he had been in Kabul, and the way to walk home only slowly came back to mind. The old men at the checkpoints, seeing the medal on his uniform and the flower in one of his buttonholes, let him pass.
 
December 1989-February 1990

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Afghan Air Force Mi-24 gunship flying close air support southwest of Kabul, January 1990.

Kabul

To secure the supply of heating during the winter months, in many rural regions of the country local PDPA officials were forced to enter into talks with mujahidin commanders in order to gather enough firewood and coal. A system of rationing was established, and supply to more desolate regions planned and successfully executed, the country overcoming the energy crisis created by reduced natural gas supply and dwindling Soviet diesel shipments, at least this winter. Furthermore the Cuban medical mission expanded its operations during the cold winter months, offering modern healthcare not only in the capital but also in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. After mediation and guarantees from the Islamic Republic of Iran, these medical missions were even allowed to the Hazarajat region, a temporary hospital and aid mission opening up office in Bamian, with plans drafted to further expand government-provided health services in the region. The government also entered into talks with the WHO and MSF in order to provide the rural population of Afghanistan with a vaccination campaign over the next summer. Opposition representatives in Peshawar decried the attempts of the government to ‘use health services as a way of pressuring’. In turn Saudi Arabia and Pakistan promised to provide an alternate healthcare campaign in mujahidin-controlled territories, with many international organizations also promising funding and material to the endeavour – but due to safety concerns international aid chiefly only reached territories held by the MeM and Inghilab.

In another apparent sign of the continuing rivalries within the PDPA, the government announced the creation of yet another internal security formation based in Kabul, the SAD - Sepah-e Amaniyyat-e Dawlati or State Security Troops. Recruits, many of them skilled veterans hardened by both war against crime and mujahedin, were gathered from various army divisions, but some volunteers also arrived from the ranks of the sarandoy and other militias. In the end, the government was able to meet one of its manpower goals for once, and the brigade-sized formation started to take over security posts in the capital. While to an outside observer this might have seemed like an innocent attempt at improving the security situation in a wartime capital, many Khalqis were quite legitimately furious about this latest formation. Firstly, and quite naturally, all of the officer corps were known Parchamis and the unit was placed under the command of the Parchami bastion that was the Ministry of State Security, rather than the Khalqi Ministry of Interior. Secondly, a huge cache of anti-tank weaponry was transferred from army warehouses to the SAD – and the Afghan state’s armoured corps had always been a Khalqi stronghold. The checkpoints were further propped up by employing PDPA members, most of them older bureaucrats unfit for the frontlines, as extra manpower during rush hours.

With the bulk of the Ittehad fighters that used to threaten the capital spending the winter in gruelling conditions in the heights north of Paghman, the government could move on the organization of Sayyaf in other regions. The newly formed 95th Division and troops dispatched from Kabul and Ghazni launched a campaign to contain and reduce the presence of Ittehad along the Ghazni-Kabul highway. This coincided with a hampering to the remaining supply routes of this group of mujahidin from the west, raising anger towards the Hazara faction from Peshawar due to their failure to fight the government and aid the beleaguered mujahidin facing a superior government offensive. The government gains in the region were despite of the heavy firepower utilized quite meagre, but by taking the initiative the vital road had remained free of attacks for almost three months.

Jalalabad & Mehterlam

With the Jalalabad campaign ending in a government victory, the mujahidin slowly abandoned their more vulnerable positions in favour of a traditional guerilla struggle waged from the mountains and caves of the mountainous regions of Nangarhar and Laghman. However, the HiK made no move to abandon their prize of Mehterlam, the only rebel urban gain held after the conclusion of the battles of 1989. Luckily for Abdul Haq, the government forces in the regions were uninterested to continue the futile attacks during the winter especially after the withdrawal of such units as the 80th Division, allowing the HiK to further consolidate in the city, as a civilian administration in the form of a co-ordination shura was established. A few small-scale raids were launched from the town, just enough not to warrant a heavy response. Meanwhile Soviet engineers were spotted arriving at the Daronta Dam, as the government was assessing the damages inflicted on the critical piece of infrastructure and preparing for repairs. Even though the government only scarcely flew ground attack mission over the area, the attack aviation was always escorted by the newly delivered MiG-23 fighter jets, which were increasingly becoming a prime workhorse of the Afghan Air Force.

Khost

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A convoy on its way towards Khost is ambushed.

The 25th Division in Khost received orders to further expand the defensive perimeter in the plains around the city. However, as the government didn’t dispatch any further units or equipment to aid in the effort, the attacks mostly just depleted the strength and morale of the division and the attached 4th Armoured Brigade. The mujahidin didn’t counter these attacks with winter offensives of their own, as instead Haqqani continued a policy of slowly exhausting the government in the Paktia province. This time the mujahidin preyed after the government’s famed mountain troops, and heavy fighting in extreme conditions erupted along the mountains dotting the sides of the highway to Khost. In January a large reinforcement and supply column was ambushed and in fighting lasting for hours decimated after being cut to pieces, the mujahidin carrying off a sizeable loot of weaponry. The WAD was unable to do much, as efforts were limited to tracking and destroying supply caravans from Pakistan. Some anti-aircraft positions and artillery encampments shelling Khost were however successfully eliminated, even though new equipment arrived within days from across the border. The Mahaz-e Milli contingent in the surroundings of Khost was now also under the effective command of the Khalists, as the attention of that organization was increasingly directed to the Nimruz and Farah provinces.

Herat

As more and more equipment continued to reach the 17th Division in Herat from the north of the country, Gen. Nabi Azimi launched a limited offensive to expand the corridor leading to the Soviet border. A permanent garrison in Towraghondi was expanded with regular troops, and each new supply convoy from the Soviet Union was escorted by a convoy of BTRs, increasing the availability of fuel in Herat province tremendously. However, as many of the additional security had been rerouted from Qala-i-Naw, Jamiat fighters managed to ambush a substantial number of convoys in the border region between the command responsibilities of the 6th and 4th Corps, underlining the trouble of military administration along the long road. Much of the hastily captured stockpiles and heavy equipment was ironically enough rushed to the defence of Chaghcharan. Despite of the heavy military presence and construction of fortifications in Herat city proper, mujahidin infiltration and attacks continued in Herat, with now even the HiG operating cells in the city, launching sabotage attacks on the airport.

Chaghcharan

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Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin mujahidin heading towards Ghowr province on an APC captured from DRA stocks.

The Hezb-e Islami continued sending reinforcements to Ghowr province in a bid to reclaim the city of Chaghcharan from Jamiat. Mobilization was launched in Oruzgan, the main base of HiG in central Afghanistan, as hundreds joined the ranks of HiG during the winter, grouping in the provincial capital of Tarin Kowt. One of the convoys leaving for the north, one that happened to include a sizeable portion of the equipment seized from the government garrison of Tarin Kowt, was spotted by the Afghan Air Force and attacked by a formation of Su-22 attack aircraft and MiG-23 fighter jets, resulting in the destruction of a large amount of military equipment and the death of dozens of HiG fighters. The resolve of the men of Gulbuddin didn’t falter, however, and in January a counterattack was launched, yet not in Ghowr. Jamiat positions came under attack everywhere between Herat and Shindand, and HiG quickly routed the weak Jamiat cells from large parts of the area. By February, the hold of HiG was consolidated to such extent that its mujahidin received orders to again march on Chaghcharan. Jamiat had been unable to destroy the artillery emplacements of the HiG overlooking the town, and bombardment was only intensified as reinforcements arrived, with brand new pieces of equipment clearly provided by Pakistan. The Shiite militias struck from the airport, which they managed to hold despite of a number of Jamiet probing attacks, allowing the HiG to infiltrate the region north of Chaghcharan to prevent Jamiat reinforcements from arriving. A sizeable portion of Jamiat fighters were now cut off in Chaghcharan as the HiG prepared to extradite revenge.

Kandahar

Having now assumed command of the garrison and province of Kandahar, General Nur ul-Haq Ulumi immediately launched a new investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of the pro-government tribal militia commander Ismatullah Muslim. While the report was only shown to him, his closest staff and the local WAD, measures were enacted imminently. The Kandahar Mobile Sarandoy Brigade was transferred by a gubernatorial degree to army command, becoming an independent brigade under the 2nd Corps as a mobile reserve. Their duties, quite much, remained the same, and they patrolled the roads leading in and out of Kandahar like before. However, there were some changes in their leadership, and in January a similar reshuffling happened in the ranks of the local PDPA chapter. Gen. Ulumi promoted both young locals and officers from his own staff to fill the vacancies. In February the 2nd Corps Command issued a degree declaring conscription over in its area of jurisdiction for now, instead starting to pay a fixed and quite generous wage to new volunteers and old veterans.

Coupled with the political-administrative efforts of solidifying his grip over Kandahar and pacifying the internal rivalries, Gen. Ulumi also intended to keep the mujahidin far away from the city limits. Patrols were in general intensified, and the offensive of the 15th Division in the Helmand valley continued to make limited gains over the winter. However, in February the mujahedin launched an attack of their own, after Harakat e-Inghilab launched a massive surprise artillery attack with presumably recently acquired equipment on government positions on the Spin Boldak highway, managing to make large gains following the defection of crucial groups of local Achakzai militiamen. To add to the misery of the militia, one of the nephews of Ismatullah Muslim went missing, his apparent kidnapping by an unknown party further driving up desertion. The attack of Harakat e-Inghilab was nevertheless stalled by February upon the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 7th Armored Brigade, but the likelihood of holding on to Spin Boldak for long seemed to dwindle by every passing month.

Other Regions

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Markets in Zaranj got busy due to increased smuggling.

The headquarters of the Mahaz-e Milli were increasingly moved to Zaranj, sufficiently far away from government lines and a slowly recovering and prospering town due to increase of smuggling and regular trade via Iran. MeM made a good profit of this movement of goods and people, which was put to use funding the reconstruction and establishment of a civil shura. The mujahidin of Vali Farah Yousef continued to mount limited small-scale operations around Farah over the winter, and the 21st Division of the Herat Corps responded by launching their own attacks on the rebel positions. Winter and poor weather had its effect on both sides, and nothing of note was accomplished despite of the heavy use of government airpower, as constant guerrilla attacks of Vali Farah Yousef’s command made it impossible to concentrate government forces for a decisive offensive on rebel hideouts.

A number of apparently fresh recruits and reconciled mujahidin fighters from the 11th Division in Jalalabad seized control of a number of trucks in an outlying garrison on the outskirts of the city, fleeing with ammunition and equipment to the lines of the Kunar Islamic Emirate. The equipment was obviously quickly added to the armories of the organization, and the defectors welcomed to the increasingly organized and professional military of the self-declared Salafist state.

The government launched an endeavour of negotiations with tribal elders, low-level commanders and local settlements in the region east of the Kabul-Gardeyz highway. A number of ceasefires were signed, and government administration and brand-new loyalist tribal militia took over a few of the villages in the area. Still, negotiations soon died down with a number of tribesmen, and low-level fighting erupted between government formations and the Inghilab fighters in the area, as elements of HiK under Haqqani arrived to the aid of the villagers. A rapid attack by the HiK on the Gardeyz-Pul Alam road once again showed that the government wasn’t quite as much in control as they claimed.

To better help in patrolling crucial highways in the north of the country, helipads were constructed at Khanabad and Maymanah to provide the forces of the 6th Corps with the most sophisticated and rapid fire support aviation the Soviet industry could provide. With both existing fleet of Mi-24s and newly arriving Soviet Mi-35s arriving to fly patrol missions, the firepower available to Gen. Dostum was vastly increased. SCUD missiles also started to hit the outskirts of Feyzabad and other important mujahidin locations in the Badakhshan area, indicating that a new SCUD battery had been erected somewhere in the north.

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A soldier of the 54th Division watches over a convoy moving through Faryab towards Herat.
To provide the 53rd and 54th Divisions with more manpower, Gen. Dostum started to integrate sarandoy commands in the north under new brigades established for patrolling rear areas. In general, the government recruitment efforts were most aggressive in the north, with the 6th Corps and various critical formations located in Kabul almost competing for the largely loyal manpower base. Furthermore unemployed men were encouraged to start working in the coal mines and other energy industry of the north, and thanks to salaries paid by the government to the 6th Corps and to these various state workers, the northern provinces remained one of the most economically viable regions of the country.

Jamiat fighters under Massoud slowly continued to tighten the siege perimeter on Feyzabad, as government utilized its new aerial firepower to attempt to prop up the defences of the garrison. An airlift by Mi-8s from Khanabad airport was also put to motion in order to help the defenders overcome the harsh winter months. Nevertheless, the mujahidin were making gains no matter how slowly and manpower losses in the besieged town were hard to replace.

In the north-eastern areas of the country controlled by Massoud’s Shura-e Nazar money and relief aid generously provided by Western and Islamic organizations and countries was put to good use, as hospitals and other basic civilian infrastructure were established in the Panjsher and in Badakhshan, significantly lifting the spirits of both the fighters and civilian population. Defections from the government sarandoy in Baghlan and from ex-fighters of the ANLF forced to work for the new rulers of Kunar further boosted the military strength of Massoud, and the organization seemed to finally have recovered from the heavy losses of the botched summer Shomali plains offensive.


Events from around the World


U. S. S. R.

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Soviet troops face off with protestors in Baku.

On 9 January 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR voted to include Nagorno-Karabakh in its budget and allowed its inhabitants to vote in Armenian elections, causing rage throughout Azerbaijan. Protestors took to the streets in Baku, demanding a dismissal of communist officials and independence from the Soviet Union that had failed to protect Azerbaijani interests. On 12 January, the Popular Front opposition movement organised a national defence committee with branches in factories and offices in Baku to mobilise people for battle with Armenians. Situation not only in Baku but in the entirety of Azerbaijan was spiraling out of control, as internal quarreling and sympathizers of the Popular Front within the Interior Ministry forces paralyzed the Azerbaijani authorities. Massive anti-Armenian pogroms erupted, over ninety dying on 13 January alone. On 19 January, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved a decree signed by Gorbachev, introducing state of emergency in Baku.

Late at night on 19 January 1990, after demolition of the central television station and termination of phone and radio lines by Spetsnaz, 26,000 Soviet troops entered Baku, smashing through the barricades in order to crush the Popular Front. The Azerbaijani Interior Ministry officials helped Popular Front activists in stirring disorder by providing them with weapons, technical facilities, and informing them about the movement of army units. Soviet Defence Minister Yazov personally oversaw the operation from a military base on the outskirts of the Azerbaijani capital. The shooting continued for three days. The backlash both internally and internationally was enormous, and effectively showed the whole world that the Soviet Union was indeed in deep disarray. In February riots erupted in Dushanbe following the settlement of Armenian refugees there. Government buildings, shops and other businesses were attacked and looted. Armenians, Russians, and other minorities were targeted. Abuse of Tajik women wearing European clothes in public also took place. The riots were put down by Soviet troops that were called into Dushanbe by Tajik Communist Party First Secretary Ghagar Makhkamov. Similar events also erupted in Turkmenistan. Days later Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party officially blamed ‘counterrevolutionaries influenced and aided by terrorist militias across the state border’.


Pakistan


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Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto greeted by supporters in Karachi.
Investigations were launched following a number of leaks exposing ISI involvement across the Afghan border, providing conclusive proof of a wide scale intervention involving ground troops of several army units. The Chief of Staff and the hardliners in ISI were furious, blaming the Bhutto government for openly colluding with enemies of Islamabad. Premier Bhutto refuted these claims and cited the strong commitment and support of her government to bringing forth a political transition in Kabul. Rivalries between the intelligence and security establishment and the government only increase after Bhutto’s wishes to reorientate support more broadly to groups in the entirety of the country are blocked by President Khan and Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, even though the draft plan had the support of both the Americans and the ISI Director-General Gen. Shamsur Rahman Kallu. The hardliners were in turn dealt a blow just a few weeks later, as attempts by the ISI and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to bring forth an unification of the Islamic conservative rebel groups, many of which were close to Pakistan and the ISI, failed utterly. The collapse of the meeting and the deep rifts within the Afghan mujahidin factions further played up the tensions in Islamabad, Bhutto blaming poor planning of futile battles of the last 12 months on the ISI and the conservative military establishment in turn blaming Bhutto and her government for a lack of enthusiasm in the mujahidin. Opposition press linked to the Islamic Democratic Alliance of Nawaz Sharif attacked the Prime Minister fiercely, blaming Bhutto for betraying the ‘Muslim world’. By February, allegations of corruption started to spread in the press, and soaring unemployment led to mass strikes across the country.

December 2 – Manila. A military coup attempt begins in the Philippines against the government of President Corazon C. Aquino. The putsch is contained with the help of United States intervention ending after days of clashes.
December 6 – East Berlin. Egon Krenz resigns as Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, replaced by Manfred Gerlach, a liberal democrat.
December 20 – Panama City. The United States invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, is launched in an attempt to overthrow Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega.
December 25 – Bucharest. Following massive riots and open rebellion, Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife Elena are executed by military troops after being found guilty of crimes against humanity.
January 1 – Warsaw. Poland becomes the first country in Eastern Europe to begin abolishing its state socialist economy, launching a fast transition with the Balcerowicz Plan. Poland also withdraws from the Warsaw Pact.
February 11 – Cape Town. Nelson Mandela is released from Victor Verster Prison, near Cape Town, South Africa, after 27 years behind bars.
February 13 – Ottawa/Bonn/East Berlin. An agreement is reached for a two-stage plan to reunite Germany.

February 26 – Managua. The Sandinistas are defeated in the Nicaraguan elections, with Violeta Chamorro elected as the new president of Nicaragua, replacing Daniel Ortega.
 
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Turn 7 – March 1990

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General Secretary of PDPA, President of Afghanistan, Mohammad Najibullah (Bonecracker(NL)/Dutchbag)
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sultan Ali Keshtmand (sealy300)
Minister of State Security, Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi (Terraferma)
Minister of Interior, Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (OPEN)


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Chief of Army Staff, Minister of Defense, Shahnawaz Tanai (OPEN)
Commander of Afghan Air Force, Abdul Qadir Aqa (Shynka)
Commander of 6th Mazar-i-Sharifi Corps, Abdul Rashid Dostum (King50000)
Commander of 4th Herati Corps, Mohammad Nabi Azimi (KF25)
Commander of 11th Infantry Division, Nur ul-Haq Ulumi (Harpsichord)
Commander of 70th Hairatani Infantry Division, Abdul Momim (OPEN)
Commander of 80th Baghlani Infantry Division, Sayed Jafar Naderi (OPEN)
Commander of Bagram Garrison, Mohammed Zafar Khan (OPEN)

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Leader of Gulbuddinist faction, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Noco19)
Leader of Khalist faction, Mohammad Yunus Khalis (Kho)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Kabul, Abdul Haq (BlackCrown)
Khalist Mujahedin commander in Paktia, Jalaluddin Haqqani (OPEN)
Gulbuddinist Mujahedin commander of the Janjawid Corps, Abdul Rahim Wardak (Dadarian)

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Leader of Jamiat e-Islami, Burhanuddin Rabbani (aedan777)
Party Mujahidin Commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud (baboushreturns)
Mujahedin Commander in Herat, Mohammad Ismail Khan (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Northern Afganistan, Atta Muhammad Nur (OPEN)
Mujahedin Commander in Southern Afganistan, Mullah Naqib (OPEN)

Minor Mujahedin Groups

Leader of Harakat e-Inghilab, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi (Shebedaone)
Leader of Mahaz-e Milli, Sayyid Ahmed Gailani (OPEN)
Commander of Mahaz-e Milli Mujahedin near Shindand, Vali Farah Yousef (Mikkel Glahder)
Leader of Ittihad-e Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (Cleeque)

Shiite Mujahedin Groups

Co-leader of Al-Nasr, Abdul Ali Mazari (OPEN)
Leader of Revolutionary Council of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan, Sayyid Ali Beheshti (OPEN)
Leader of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, Muhammad Asif Mohseni (OPEN)
Commander of Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Mujahedin, Sayed Hussein Anwari (OPEN)

Other Resistance Groups

Emir of the Islamic Emirate of Kunar, Jamil al-Rahman (Maxwell500)




Orders will be due next Monday!


Hopefully I will get more orders next turn. I must say I was slightly disappointed when I failed to receive all the orders despite of giving quite much more time to get them in. Briefings and statistics will be sent tomorrow.
 
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Mujahideen Special Operations Forces: Ten-Man Raiders
Abul-Firdaws al-Dandawpatani hefted his AK-74 and hugged the ground. Half-buried in snow as he was, he was almost impossible to detect, and his short shallow breaths ensured that very little of his breath escaped to be seen by the creeping WAD mountain troopers below. He watched them for a few seconds more before slowly and carefully moving back from his position and signalling the others. All was quiet on the frozen heights of Paktia, and the cold seemed to cast even time under its frozen scourge. They were trying to track down a shipment of weapons coming from Pakistan - their sources had notified them that they would be passing along this obscure and difficult mountain terrain. It seemed to them wild and dangerous enough, perilous enough, to be seemingly unpredictable. No sane man would take this pass to deliver weapons. And it had been for that very reason that they believed it - it was something the mujahideen and their Pakistani allies would do.

Abul-Firdaws emerged silently further down from his initial position, putting the WAD troopers' backs to him. Across from him, on another white crest, two more men appeared. One was armed with a PK Machine Gun, and Abul-Firdaws immediately recognised him as Abul-Futuhat Ja'far, the man beside him his son, 'Abd al-Ghafur. More heads emerged, armed with their assortment of weapons - 3 with AK-74s, 3 with M16A2s, and one more with a PKM. Ten men.

All was quiet on Paktia's frozen heights, the white snow was unstained. Only the pitter-patter of death's shots broke the serene silence, and only the blood of the kuffar reddened the white dress of the mountains. It was good and seemly that Afghanistan's faithful mounts should from time to time be bathed once more in the blood of one kafir invader or another - that the undying warrior's spirit of this earth and her people may never know the taste of forgetfulness or know the chains of weakness.

When the government's men were dead, Abul-Firdaws allowed himself to scan for his brothers once again. Across from him the crest was red, and Abul-Futuhat had his hand upon his son's lifeless back. 'Abd al-Ghafur's brain lay blown out and bare to Paktia's mountain air. 'We are for God,' Abul-Firdaws whispered, 'and it is to Him that we return.' He watched the area as three of his brothers descended down to search the corpses of the enemy's dead. They lined them all up and hastily covered them in snow - a quick burial, but the dead were to be honoured. Corpses held no faith or beliefs, they were enemies to none. Just old abandoned clothes.

Across from him, Abul-Futuhat was pulling the corpse of his son away, and one by one the nine surviving members of the HiK's Ten-Man Raider squad disappeared into the white mountains of Paktia. All was quiet on the frozen heights of Paktia, and the cold seemed to cast even time under its frozen scourge - but not death.
 
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GM: I must voice my slight disappointment regarding the number of orders and IC this turn. I will be gone for the weekend so there is still time to fix this before I post the update.
 
GM: I must voice my slight disappointment regarding the number of orders and IC this turn. I will be gone for the weekend so there is still time to fix this before I post the update.

(Blood for the blood god!)