Barons Behaving Badly: Rebellion, Murder, Incest, and Adultery in Crusader Kings III

  • We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.

Torngasuk

Colonel
86 Badges
Feb 29, 2012
977
1.534
  • Crusader Kings II
  • Europa Universalis IV: Mare Nostrum
  • Europa Universalis IV: Cossacks
  • Victoria 2: A House Divided
  • Semper Fi
  • Victoria: Revolutions
  • Europa Universalis IV: Res Publica
  • Heir to the Throne
  • Hearts of Iron III
  • For the Motherland
  • Europa Universalis IV: Call to arms event
  • Europa Universalis IV: Wealth of Nations
  • Europa Universalis IV: Conquest of Paradise
  • Europa Universalis IV: Art of War
  • Crusader Kings II: The Old Gods
  • Cities in Motion
  • Crusader Kings II: Charlemagne
  • Crusader Kings II: Legacy of Rome
  • Crusader Kings II: Rajas of India
  • Crusader Kings II: The Republic
  • Crusader Kings II: Sons of Abraham
  • Divine Wind
  • Europa Universalis III Complete
  • Crusader Kings II: Sword of Islam
  • Europa Universalis III
  • Europa Universalis III: Chronicles
  • Crusader Kings II: Sunset Invasion
  • Stellaris: Leviathans Story Pack
  • Europa Universalis IV: Mandate of Heaven
  • Hearts of Iron IV: Cadet
  • Crusader Kings II: Reapers Due
  • Europa Universalis IV: Rights of Man
  • Tyranny: Archon Edition
  • Stellaris: Digital Anniversary Edition
  • Cities: Skylines - Natural Disasters
  • Hearts of Iron IV: Together for Victory
  • Cities: Skylines - Mass Transit
  • Crusader Kings II: Monks and Mystics
  • Europa Universalis IV
  • Crusader Kings II: Conclave
  • Crusader Kings II: Horse Lords
  • Europa Universalis IV: Common Sense
  • Pillars of Eternity
  • Crusader Kings II: Way of Life
  • Mount & Blade: Warband
  • Europa Universalis IV: El Dorado
  • Crusader Kings III: Royal Edition
  • 500k Club
  • Victoria 2
  • Europa Universalis III Complete
And so we reach the third chapter of our exploration of potential gameplay improvements and verisimilitudinous additions in Crusader Kings III. Previously, we’ve looked at the arguments in favor of implementing plural homage and additional options for familial-marital interactions. Today we‘re going to look at something rather more sanguine in nature: feudal misbehavior and its consequences.

And, of course, because they go hand in hand, some of the differences between strong and weak royal authority, and the challenges of governing a realm full of hard-headed, bloody-minded warlords and their kin. The questions of the day: in just what ways did the magnates seek to subvert royal authority and assert their own dominance, how were they punished for their transgressions by their feudal superiors, and how can we follow in their footsteps to offer players more interesting opportunities to indulge in the traditional feudal pastimes of rapine, pillage, and plunder?

Something Wicked This Way Comes
As soon as he began to rule, Peter threw aside every trace of the forbearance befitting a monarch's majesty, and in consort with Germans and Latins raged with Teutonic fury, treating the nobles of the kingdom with contempt and devouring the wealth of the land "with a proud eye and an insatiable heart." Fortifications, castles, and every office in the kingdom was taken away from the Hungarians and given to Germans or Latins. In addition, Peter was extremely debauched, and his hangers-on behaved with shameful and unbridled lust, violently assaulting the wives and daughters of the Hungarians wherever the king travelled. No one at the time could feel sure of the chastity of his wife or daughter in the face of the importunity of Peter's courtiers.
The first sign of a change in royal policy towards rebellion came during the reign of Charles IV. Since 1314 the Parlement of Paris and the king's officers in Toulouse, Saintonge and Perigord had been trying to bring an end to the depredations of Jourdain de l'lsle-Jourdain, lord of Casaubon, Very noble in lineage but ignoble in deed'. In spite of a pardon that he had received at the request of Pope John XXII, whose niece he had married, Jourdain did not desist from his criminal ways, 'that is to say, robberies, homicides, rapes of married women and virgins, being a rebel to the king'. His scorn of royal authority was exemplified by his murder of a royal sergeant, 'who was bearing his mace decorated with the fleur de lis, which are the arms of France'. Although the details are probably embellishment, we are told that Jourdain 'avoit boute la masse . . . parmi le fondement [du sergent], et puis l'eust occis'.
Every generation has its own cast of characters, its iconic heroes and villains, and in this the medieval period is no different from any other. For every Richard the Lionheart history has given us, there’s a Gilles de Rais or Peter the Cruel lurking somewhere in the shadows. Those whose names have come down to us through the ages renowned and reviled for their wicked and terrible ways (the potential political motivations of such accusations, we’ll refrain from addressing), however, are relatively few in number, especially when compared against a moral census of your average Crusader Kings campaign.

You might characterize the bulk of the medieval nobility as, at worst, a silent majority, at least as far as detailed references to their personal reputations are concerned. Which is not to suggest by any means that your average feudal magnate was a milquetoast: simply that whatever vices he practiced were those practiced by his neighbors, and that if he can be said to be in possession of a certain hard-heartedness toward the suffering of others, then even so it remains unlikely that he is in the habit of flaying his prisoners as a form of entertainment. In fact, if we are to take nicknames into consideration, then you might find the scale weighted in favor of more positive monikers.

Consider, for example, the Babenberg dukes of Austria. In sequence: Leopold the Illustrious, Henry the Strong, Adalbert the Victorious, Ernest the Brave, Leopold the Fair, Leopold the Good, Adalbert the Devout, Leopold the Generous, Henry Jasomirgott (don’t ask), Leopold the Virtuous, Frederick the Catholic, Leopold the Glorious, and Frederick the Quarrelsome. Now, I’ll be the first to admit, some (if not most) of these nicknames were benevolently-but-retroactively bestowed by a motivated and presumably well-compensated 15th century historian-genealogist, Ladislaus Sunthaym, but we may consider it at least worthy of note that a man writing in much closer temporal proximity to his subjects than any of us apparently did not encounter anything in their personal histories to dim or tarnish the glittering sobriquets he assigned them. In fact, the impetus for Sunthaym’s genealogy of the family was the 1485 canonization of Leopold the Good as patron saint of Austria.
Duke Francesco’s successor, Galeazzo Maria Sforza, was now firmly established in Milan, a competent ruler with an increasingly sinister reputation for acts of appalling viciousness and cruelty. His enemies said that he had raped the wives and daughters of numerous Milanese nobles; that he took sadistic pleasure in devising tortures for men who had offended him; that he supervised these tortures himself and pulled limbs apart with his own hands; that he delighted in the moans of dying men and in the sight of corpses.
Rare indeed were those who sought to rule over their vassals in the image of a decadent eastern potentate, keeping harems of concubines, beheading their close advisors, building a mountain out of the skulls of their enemies, and reigning despotically over the cowered masses. Those who sought to rule as tyrants, or more often, just too autocratically for their barons’ liking, often came to a bad end. Pedro the Cruel, King of Castile. Edward II and Richard II in England. James I of Scotland. Joanna I of Naples. Charles the Bad, King of Navarre.

I could go on all day, but I you have the general idea by now: the creeping expansion of royal authority at the expense of the traditional privileges of the nobility was a process that took place over centuries, not without setbacks and reversals, and any attempt to rapidly accelerate that process was often violently rejected by those who stood to lose the most by it.
The most prominent figure in this part of Italy at this time was Ezzelino da Romano, lord of Padua. In 1250 he was fifty-six years of age, and had reigned for twenty-five years. He had married the daughter of Frederick II. The world has probably never seen so barbarous a monster. He had no regular system of government or administration, but attempted to found an empire by wholesale murder. One of the first acts of the new Pope, Alexander IV., in 1255, was to proclaim a crusade against him, and to call upon all good Christians to hunt him down like a wild beast. The cause was indeed a worthy one.

After the death of Frederick, Ezzelino had thrown aside what shreds of decency that hitherto veiled his actions. Padua had become a charnel house. When his victims had died in his prisons, Ezzelino sent their corpses to their native towns to be beheaded in the market place. Nobles were slain by his satellites in crowds, their bodies cut in pieces and burnt. The whole town resounded with the groans of the tortured and the dying. Every kind of excellence fell a victim to his fury. Birth, wealth, learning, piety, beauty and promise were held to be a sufficient cause to justify a disgraceful death.
Above all else, we must remember the teachings of Machiavelli: “Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.”
The kingdom was in a flame, and in the war which ensued (in which Pedro's only allies were the English rulers of Gascony, Edward III. and his sons) the tide of victory set now for and now against the rightful king. The incidents of his reign were terrible; friends or foes, one after another, men fell victims to his caprice, his cruelty, or his revenge, and their figures start up before us with the rapidity of a horrible melodrama. Inez de Castro was abandoned on the day of her espousals to the fierce king; Dona Maria of Portugal, the queen-mother, died by poison; Samuel Levi, the grand treasurer, was tortured to death; Fadrique, Juan, and Pedro, three of the six sons of Eleanor Guzman, slain before their royal brother's eyes; Pedro Martinez roasted in a cauldron, and Pedro Sanchez de Banuelos baked before a slow fire, all by order of a monarch whom history has well surnamed the Cruel.
As fond as I am of the existing trait system, and as much as it sets Crusader Kings II apart from all other games in its genre, this is one area in which I feel it often falls somewhat short: it has great difficulty in representing the manifold shades of personality in anything other than stark, absolute black and white. So, how best to distinguish the flagrantly cruel from the merely ruthless? To separate the ruler who should be feared from one who should be feared and hated?

The necessary tools we already have at our disposal, and require little modification: I just want to make some modifications to how we use them. As things stand now in Crusader Kings II, every character has an education trait, which works on a scale from one to four, one being the worst, and four being the best at that particular skill set. You can be scarred, grievously scarred, or horrifically scarred. Viking gives way to Ravager, and Ravager to Sea King. You might have guessed by now where I’m going with this: I propose to apply this same system of progression to personality traits, as well.

A character would no longer merely be Lustful or Chaste, instead being Lustful_1, Lustful_2, or Lustful_3, Chaste_1, Chaste_2, or Chaste_3, etc. It’s a form of trait evolution that already exists to a degree in Crusader Kings II, and was memorably one of the best parts of the old school Total War games, which assigned characters traits with names like “Grotesquely Perverse,” “Ruled by Fear,” “Stunningly Incompetent,” and “Drooling Inbred Idiot.” And now that I’ve mentioned it, it comes to mind that this would also much better represent inbreeding as a progressive phenomenon, instead of going full Habsburg right off the bat.

The sort of repetitive events that come up from time to time that would have given us a trait, that instead do little because we already have it, that we tend to click through on autopilot after seeing them a few hundred times, might instead serve to graduate that trait to the next tier, stay its progress, or reverse course, increasing the player’s level of engagement with what was previously essentially a maintenance task. Furthermore, by this method we can distinguish those merely in possession of a short fuse from those likely to shoot the proverbial messenger in a fit of rage. The somewhat unstable from the stark raving mad lunatics. The lustful from indiscriminate womanizers from those to whom the nearest goat is sufficient.
As for John V. count of Armagnac, his life had been a continued train of crimes. He deceived his own sister, and marrying her by virtue of a counterfeit dispensation, had several children by her. After being banished the realm under the preceding reign, for incest, murder, and treason, he obtained a pardon from Lewis XI. but as he still acted with his former treachery, he was again obliged to leave the kingdom; and returned only in consequence of the duke of Guyenne's protection. After the death of that prince, he found a means to surprise the city of Leitoure, by the reason of Montignac, who commanded it for the king, and made a prisoner of Peter Bourbon, sire de Beaujeu, to whom the king had committed the government of Guyenne.
There would be more nuanced and organic decision-making on the part of the AI, and freedom to design events for more extreme character traits without making them too applicable for the bulk of the game’s characters. A ruler of great cynicism, lust, and pride, with no respect for the laws of Man or God, might even take his own sister for a bride or lover, as the aforementioned John V, count of Armagnac, did. A very pious ruler might abandon this sinful world for retreat to a monastery and later achieve sainthood, and a retroactive examination of his traits would make clear his inclinations.

Furthermore, a trait may present with certain benefits when practiced in moderation, but turn out to have hidden pitfalls when taken to extremes: a ruler too kind and soft-hearted may create more trouble for himself in the future by offering leniency with ruthlessness would be called for, and an overly ambitious ruler driven to reach beyond his means if his skills are not equal to his desire. Having a lustful wife may serve to fill your court with children, but the greater her lust, the greater the chance that they may not be yours. Ruler nicknames could be more logically distributed under such a system, as well, with a ruler not being named "the Kind" until his kindness is truly exceptional, and the same to be said for “the Cruel” or “the Good.”

How to Inherit the Earth: A Handbook for Feudal Lords
Margaret II was no better a ruler than Jeanne. This was mostly the result of the problems caused by her marriages. She married her first husband, Bouchard of Avesnes, in 1212 and had three children by him. Eventually, though, her sister Jeanne turned against the match and imprisoned Bouchard for two years, only releasing him on the condition that he and Margaret separate, with the marriage dissolved by papal degree. Margaret then married William de Dampierre in 1223 with whom she also had three children. The question of succession in the two counties remained unresolved, however, and in 1244 war broke out between Margaret's children by Bouchard of Avesnes and those fathered by William de Dampierre.
It is the time of Raymond I des Baux (1095-1150) that marks the family's great struggle for power in Provence. Raymond married Etiennette, daughter of Gilbert, count of Provence. Gilbert's elder daughter, Douce, had married Raymond Berenger IV, count of Barcelona. Gilbert died without a male heir in 1109, and Douce inherited eastern Provence, assigning control in 1113 to her husband, who already ruled the western part of Provence. Raymond des Baux would come to resent the possessions ad power of the house of Barcelona.

For a time, however, he helped Raymond Berenger to defend the region against the advance of the Spanish Moors. But when Raymond Berenger's son Berenger Raymond came to power in Provence, Raymond des Baux rebelled, starting a Provencal civil war that raged for fourteen years. Already a powerful man in the region - tradition has it that from the time of his marriage he owned seventy-nine towns, villages, castles, and estates (called the terres baussenques) in the region and owned the formidable castle of Trinquetaille, next to Arles - Raymond des Baux wished to redress the daughters' unequal inheritance and claimed Etiennette's right to Provence. Sixty-three barons and knights took Douce's side, sixty-four Etiennette's. The Genoese supported Berenger Raymond, only to betray and kill him in 1144.
When Henry II, count of Champagne, died in 1197, the title passed to his brother, Theobald III. Four years later, he too was dead, and his widow, Blanche of Navarre, was pregnant with his heir, Theobald IV. Ruling Champagne as regent-countess, Blanche proved enormously adept in securing her son's future title. In 1215, however, Erard of Brienne married the daughter of Henry II, Philippa of Champagne, and convinced her to press a claim for her father's lands.

The result was the War of the Champagne Succession, in which many local barons rallied behind Erard against Blanche and her son. Despite the French king, Philip II Augustus, ruling for Blanche, in 1217 open rebellion was underway and the duke of Lorraine, Thibaut I, had joined Erard and Philippa. Blanche was not to be out-maneuvered, though. Leveraging foreign leaders and papal powers, Blanche isolated her enemies and then attacked them: in May 1218 she led an army that burned Nancy, the capital of Lorraine, and forced Thibaut I into a humiliating surrender that marked the effective end of the war.
And now we come upon the meat and bones of feudal misbehavior: the inheritance dispute! Forget your fabricated claims, revocation plots, border disputes, and de jure claim wars: this was the primary means of legitimate or at least semi-legitimate medieval dynastic aggrandizement. If it wasn't a crusade, chances are it was one of these: even the Hundred Years' War, which started out essentially as a title revocation war, was transformed after Edward III took things one step further and claimed the throne of France in addition to his vast continental holdings.

My chief proposition here is not to fundamentally change the existing mechanics pertaining to permanent territorial expansion, but rather to shift their focus toward claim wars based on blood relations and away from unjust wars of aggression, particularly those based on fabricated claims. From a historical standpoint, a piece of paper claiming that you are the legitimate inheritor of a particular title is an excuse that would have been considered less than even paper thin, considering that everyone involved would be quite capable of figuring out the bloodlines involved. If you wish to seize something by force that is not yours by right, then let it be done, and upon your head be the consequences. If the title history says that it has been seized by a claimant, then let that be a reasonable assurance that the claim was legitimate, even if the means by which it was pressed were violent.

From a gameplay perspective, fabricating claims is rarely the most effective use of a chancellor, unless you happen to get lucky with a claim for an entire duchy. Fabrications against the player are simply a means to pad out your kill list by order the assassinations of those annoyances, and having someone suddenly be deemed as a legitimate claimant to one of your titles who in truth is nothing of the sort is an unwelcome intrusion indeed. Much better that naked aggression is recognized for what it is, and let claim wars be rooted in legitimate inheritance disputes. This serves to somewhat moderate rapid expansion and dramatically escalates the importance of marital decision-making: the inclination to carefully check the stats of your wife, as the loading screen so often advises us, potentially being outweighed by her potential inheritance.
Domestic abuse, torture-induced suicide, death by poison, murder in the cathedral, and excommunication: the Antiochene war of succession features many of the ingredients popularly associated with the Middle Ages, as well as some of the staples of warfare, such as sieges, campaigns of devastation, and even a few minor battles. Fought between 1201 and 1219 to determine the succession to the throne of the principality of Antioch, the northernmost Syrian crusader state, after the death of its ruler, Prince Bohemond III, this conflict pitched Antioch’s northern neighbor, King Leo of Cilician Armenia, against Antioch’s southern neighbor,

Count Bohemond IV of Tripoli. For the first decade of the war, Leo represented the rights of a minor, his great-nephew Raymond-Roupen, who was also the late prince’s grandson from the marriage of his oldest, but also deceased son Raymond to Leo’s niece Alice, thereby stressing the Antiochene custom of primogeniture and an existing agreement between Leo and Bohemond III. Meanwhile, emphasizing the latter’s final wishes and the alleged will of the people, Bohemond of Tripoli, Bohemond III’s younger son, sought the succession for himself. The war lasted until 1219, the year Bohemond of Tripoli managed to seize Antioch permanently for himself, Leo died, and Raymond-Roupen lost the support of both Antiochenes and Armenians.
I would also like to discuss a potential change to the way that claim wars are fought and won now, particularly for the throne of an independent kingdom (subnational claim wars would remain as they are, for the most part). In such cases where the incumbent is defeated, then it should either be in battle or siege and followed by his imprisonment, or if the odds simply prove to be too much, then by flight into exile, from which he (or his heirs) can plot and scheme and raise support for an invasion to retake his throne, as the sons of Harold Godwinson did, or when Peter the Cruel and Henry of Trastamara traded the throne of Castile back and forth. I should note, in relation to my earlier arguments in favor of plural homage, if implemented, a deposed king and his heirs would, of course, retain any titles held outside the realm proper, being outside the power of the victor to appropriate.

An imprisoned and deposed monarch should remain so, to be relieved of any remaining titles that are within the new king’s power to revoke, with a high likelihood of an untimely demise to follow. What we wish to avoid is any sort of scenario in which the defeated and deposed monarch of an independent kingdom is released again to serve as a vassal of his conqueror. Perpetual imprisonment, execution, banishment and exile, mostly the former two, any of these are more reasonable outcomes than that. Of course, if the player is an independent monarch, then this makes claim wars against them much more significant, being potentially dynasty-ending experiences, but that would also be as it should be. If someone is gunning for your throne, that's a matter of life or death. You don't take threats like that lightly.

It is a period of civil war. Rebel barons, striking from a hidden base...
There followed an extraordinary spectacle as Edward hounded, imprisoned and executed his enemies, seizing their estates and sharing the considerable spoils of war with the Despensers. Hugh Despenser the younger was now established as the richest magnate in England, with an income of approximately £7,000 a year. Meanwhile, the Statute of York of 1322 finally annulled the Ordinances and restored Edward to the plenitude of power. With his military, political and financial supremacy thus restored, the king was largely free to do as he wished. In the mid-1320s England was apparently moving towards a despotism.

In the end, however, the regime of Edward II and the Despensers was bound to be destroyed by aristocratic opposition. In 1325 Queen Isabella was sent to France as escort to the young Prince Edward. It was probably in France that Isabella began her affair with Roger Mortimer of Wigmore, one of the Marcher rebels who had narrowly escaped death in the aftermath of Boroughbridge. They were joined by a number of lords and bishops, previously loyal to Edward II, but by now alienated from the increasingly threatening Despenser regime. Among these was the king’s own half-brother, Edmund, earl of Kent.

Encouraged by the support of the king of France and the count of Hainault, Isabella and Mortimer began plotting an invasion of England. When they landed at Orwell in Suffolk in September 1326 they found little or no effective opposition: the rapid defection of figures such as the king’s other half-brother, the earl of Norfolk, and Edward’s own flight into South Wales, enabled the queen to take over the governance of the realm with hardly a fight. The punishments that followed drew comparisons with Edward’s own policies after Boroughbridge. The Despensers and their ally the earl of Arundel were hunted down and killed, and the king himself was imprisoned first at Kenilworth and then at Berkeley Castle, where he died in mysterious circumstances in September 1327.
Ernst, duke of Alamannia, stepson of Emperor Conrad, only lately exalted by him with benefices and gifts, deserted him and, at the instigation of the Devil, promoted a rebellion again. By the advice of certain of his vassals, he devastated the province of Alsace and laid desolate castles of Count Hugo, who was a relative of the emperor. After that, he assembled a great army of young men, invaded Burgundy, and began to fortify a certain island above castle Solothurn with breastworks and ramparts.
Despite the repeated successes of the monarchy in containing violence, the forcible attempt of a dispossessed southern baron, Raymond Trencavel, to recover the viscounty of Béziers in 1240, though unsuccessful, showed that the spectre of rebellion had not been laid to rest. A more serious manifestation of baronial discontent occurred soon after on the occasion in 1241 of the investiture of the king’s brother Alphonse with the appanage of Poitou in accordance with the instructions of Louis VIII. The investiture required the swearing of fealty to Alphonse by Poitevin barons including Hugues de Lusignan.

Prodded by his wife, Hugues defied Louis and Alphonse. At first, his defiance succeeded. Not expecting hostility, the king had come to Poitou without the kind of military force that could overawe potential opponents. But when the defiance of Hugues infected other barons, like Count Raymond VII of Toulouse, and stimulated the English to intervene in 1242, Louis put together an army ‘that covered the earth like locusts’. Raymond, to protect his patrimony, backed out of the rebellion. Hugues and his remaining allies were soundly beaten in July 1242.
At Burgos in September 1272 the disaffected fijosdalgos presented their demands, the principal of which was the complaint presented everywhere else in the thirteenth-century west, namely that the king had been infringing their liberties – in this case that the fueros the king had granted to certain adjacent ‘villas’ had impinged on them and theirs.108 As elsewhere, of course, this appeal to their liberties was a pretence, or device. What the fijosdalgos meant when they spoke of their liberties (fueros) was the liberties they and their ancestors had acquired for themselves over the generations at the expense of others.

And at one stage of the negotiations after 1272 Nuño González de Lara admitted as much. Alfonso X had an eye for recent fuerza dressed up as ancient fuero. The only fuero that the ricosomes were interested in was the freedom they enjoyed to keep their kings restrained (‘apremiados’), he informed his son and heir Don Fernando in 1273. In July 1274, however, he bowed to pressure and desisted from his attempt to unify Castilian jurisdiction (Ordenamiento of Zamora). In July 1274 imperial considerations were paramount.
The monopolization of the king’s favor was a surprisingly common cause for rebellion and murder, the driving impetus being to rid the king of his “evil councilors” or “bad advisors,” and to replace them with members of the offended party, who would then in turn monopolize the king’s favor (and the realm’s government) for their ambitions. Every ruler has his favorites, but must remember to be liberal with his generosity, and not restrict himself to a few close advisors, especially if they are not members of the upper echelons of the feudal nobility. In some cases, the realm even ends up being divided between factions, such as between the Armagnacs and the Burgundians in France, Lancaster and York in England, or the Beaumonts and Grammonts in Navarre.
Equally resented might be the way that kings gave patronage to their friends and punished their enemies. They had much to give: land, money, wardships and marriages. But if they bestowed these on too narrow a group and raised too many men from the dust, they were bound to antagonise old-established families. Punishment took the form not of execution but of money fines (exorbitant under Richard) and confiscation of land.

Magna Carta was concerned with those who had been dispossessed ‘without lawful judgement of their peers’ by Henry II and Richard I. Not surprisingly, as soon as John came to the throne he was faced by groups of barons demanding the restoration of their ‘rights’. The rebellion of 1215, according to Ralph of Coggeshall, was thus to secure the abolition of the evil customs ‘which both the father and brother of the king had raised up to the detriment of the Church and kingdom, together with the abuses which [King John] had added’.
Of course, in order to properly model this in Crusader Kings III, it would first require the implementation of court favorites as a measurable phenomenon: this is a subject I would like to discuss in much greater detail, but to do so here would to be to distract from a topic already growing to size significant even by my usual standards, and for the time being I think I shall reserve myself to the statement that rebellion should be a viable and common response to monopolization of the realm’s governments by a privileged few. A war waged to banish or execute the king's favorites and to install new councilors in their place. The means by which that privileged few obtained and maintained the king's favor will be a topic for another time.
In Normandy, however, events were moving quickly towards a crisis. The dauphin Charles, royal lieutenant in Normandy since March 1355, had been persuaded by Charles the Bad and Robert Le Coq, bishop of Laon, that Jean II hated him. A treasonous plot was hatched, but the details are obscure. It appears that Navarre was to lead a general uprising in Normandy at the same time that the dauphin, together with the emperor and imperial troops, would attack from the east.

Ultimately they were to seize and kill the king. Among the conspirators, apart from Navarre and Le Coq, were the counts of Foix and Harcourt; Robert de Lorris; Jean Malet, lord of Graville; Pierre de Sacquenville; Guillaume de Mainemares; Jean, baron of Cleres; Navarre's chancellor Thomas de Ladit and several others. It was probably in November 1355 that the conspirators were discovered, for it seems likely that when Jean II invested the dauphin with the duchy of Normandy in appanage in December, he did so in order to convince him of his paternal affection. The others were pardoned in January.
Another common case which often goes hand-in-hand with the above is when the nobility might feel that their king has grown too autocratic in temperament, and is seeking to curb their traditional privileges, in which case they may rebel to enforce their will upon him or even to replace with a son or younger as a figurehead. The English barons of the Magna Carta and the League of the Public Weal would fall into this category. Similarly, a ruler’s son or sons may take it upon themselves to rebel against their father, either out of a desire to accelerate their inheritance, or because they’ve been poisoned against their fathers by the whispering of their own share of the evil councilors.
Frederick, James’s younger brother, became the voice of Sicilian opposition; in 1296 he rebelled against his brother James II of Aragon, and was acclaimed by the Sicilian parliament of barons and townsmen as the independent king of Sicily, as the true heir to his Hohenstaufen namesake; and his court rapidly became the focus for anti-Angevin agitation in Italy, attracting also the Ghibelline exiles of northern Italy
A land under occupation may see a rising of native lords, seeking to throw off the yoke of foreign domination, such as took place among the Welsh, Irish, and Scottish at various points throughout the medieval period. In such cases, rather than the randomly generated leaders of cultural revolts that take place now, I would place a princeling of the people in question, a culturally native ruler with a claim on a kingdom in need of reclaiming or restoration, or otherwise the legitimate heir of a conquered monarch's line, or else just a capable and bold leader chosen from among the available population. The exact method of calculation in this scenario, I'm not particularly concerned with, so long as liberation revolts select their anointed liberators from among the game's existing non-player characters instead of weaving them into existence from nothingness.
The count of Eu had bravely defended Caen against the English in 1346. Captured by Edward III, he was put to ransom four years later. On his return to France, King John - believing rumours that Eu had struck a deal with the English - had him executed (on 19 November 1350) without trial or judicial procedure of any kind. If Eu had indeed been guilty of treason - and the facts of the case are obscure - the king needed to make plain the reasons for his decision, but John II, described by contemporaries as 'an all-too hasty man', was either too wilful or wooden-headed to see the need for good public relations. The killing of the count had the disastrous effect of alienating many members of the French aristocracy; the situation was about to degenerate even further.
A king who failed to reach consent with the most of his leading men had no means of enforcing their rendering the support they owed him. On the other hand the royal court was a kind of social nucleus of the kingdom, the place where fiefs and honours were won and where prestige and dignity were assessed and demonstrated in the ranking of peers. For the king as well as for the nobility it was a constant balancing of mutual dependencies.

If nobles fell into enmity with each other the king’s endeavour to appease let him appear only too easily as partisan of one side in the eyes of the man who felt himself discriminated against. If a king diverged from what his nobles considered to be established custom and therefore their right he had to reckon with their resistance. Controversial feudal heritages in which the king favoured the claim of one side by exercising his right to invest might only too easily bring him the enmity of the other as well as that of its kin and sworn friends. This was even more likely if a king tried to push his own claims against that of one or several powerful men. In that case he could easily face a rebellion of the nobility of a whole region intent on fighting him as a tyrant.
Another potential incentive to rebellion is a king who unjustly exploits his vassals for his own gain. For example, one who tries to press his own claims (or those of his close relatives) to his vassals’ titles, that he believes himself to have a better right to, and seeks to strip them of their patrimony to satisfy his own ambitions. Or, in another instance, a ruler who seduces the wives, sisters, and daughters of his vassals would be committing a grave crime indeed in the eyes of their husbands, fathers, and brothers (regardless of its veracity, this was one of the popular accusations made against King John, that he preyed upon the female relations of his barons). Vengeance, for a wife stolen, for a father hanged, for a brother dispossessed, is a powerful motivator, and a feudal lord may raise his banners in revolt to obtain satisfaction for his grievances.

Murder, Like Duct Tape, is the Answer to Everything
Seven of the Christian princes of Spain at this period fell in battle warring against their own near relations, or were murdered by their hands in cold blood. Garcia of Castile was slain by the sword of the Velas. Bermudo III. of Leon and Garcia Sanchez of Navarre died fighting against their brother, Ferdinand of Castile. Sancho II. of Castile was assassinated by order of his sister Urraca, besieged by him in her city of Zamora.

Among the Christian kings of the century immediately before him, Garcia of Gallicia was strangled in prison by the hands of his brothers, Sancho and Alfonso; Sancho Garcia of Navarre was assassinated by his brother Ramon, at Penalva; Ramon Berenguer II. of Barcelona died by the dagger of his brother Berenguer Ramon; Sancho the Fat, in 967, was poisoned at a friendly repast by Gonzalo Sanchez; Ruy Velasquez of Castile, in 986, murdered his seven nephews, the unfortunate Infantes de Lara; Sancho of Castile, in 1010, poisoned his mother, who had endeavoured to poison him.

At the wedding festivities at Leon, in 1026, Garcia Count of Castile, was assassinated at the church door, and the murderers were promptly burned alive by his friends; Garcia of Navarre, in 1030, as an incident in a family dispute about a horse, accused his mother of adultery. Such was the standard of the eleventh century in the north of the Peninsula.
As he traveled through Bearn, Froissart tells us, he persistently sought information about the mysterious death of young Gaston. His traveling companion, Espang de Lyon, refused to tell him anything about it, but Froissart finally got the story from "ung escuier ancient et homme moult notable" (Chroniques, 12:79) [an old and important squire (Jolliffe translation, 284)] whose name he does not give. Gaston Phoebus's legitimate heir bled to death in 1380 when his hunter father, perhaps inadvertently, slit his jugular vein after imprisoning the young man under suspicion of wanting to poison him. Gaston Phoebus also had an illegitimate son, Yvain, who was burned to death when his disguise as a "savage" (part of a wedding prank) caught fire.
Murder plots: one of the core aspects of the Crusader Kings player’s experience. The world would be a less interesting place without them. We’ve participated in them, initiated them, and had them wielded against us. Bowmen on grassy knolls, poison, bombs. The serpent in the cradle. We’ve seen it all. The logic of them, though, has often left something to be desired. If you don’t check off the little box to automatically stop any discovered plots, then your realm will very shortly be awash with them and the funeral invitations endless. Have you ever observed an assassination plot in progress, and found yourself wondering: just what does she have against him, anyways?
Other Scottish political malcontents arranged the assassination of the king in February 1437. In response to this new upheaval, the next month the Scottish parliament appointed Archibald, fifth earl of Douglas, as lieutenant-general of the realm during the royal minority of the new king, James II. In October of that year the earl of Angus died and was succeeded by his 11-year-old son, James, third earl of Angus. With the Dunbars eliminated, and both the new king and earl of Angus not yet of age, the fifth earl of Douglas was now the ascendant power—not just in the borders, but in the realm as a whole.

Earl Archibald’s new dominance was brief, for he died in June 1439. He was succeeded by his underage son, but the equally short career of the young earl was dominated by his great uncle, James, nicknamed “the Gross.” Tensions at the royal court culminated in November 1440 when James the Gross conspired with others to have the Douglas heir killed in Edinburgh. As a result, James the Gross himself succeeded as the seventh earl and head of the Black Douglas family.
In truth, almost all confirmed or widely suspected medieval murders were likely committed or arranged by someone who served to immediately gain from them: to inherit a title, to remove a rival, to eliminate a hated tyrant, etc. And those who participated or initiated these plots did so with true enmity: you’d be exceedingly unlikely to find anyone plotting to murder their king because their feelings toward him were merely lukewarm. Any conspiracy of murder should consist exclusively of those with tremendous, overwhelming grievances against the target, legitimate or perceived, or with some immediate form of gain on the line that would satisfy their deep, personal ambitions.
There is a fine line between abduction and assassination. Just before joining the battle at Steppes (1213), Henry I ordered five of his knights to approach Louis (II), count of Looz, by stealth and to kill him. John II was probably involved in the murder of Floris V, count of Holland, in 1296. Zantflient attributes the death of Edward, duke of Guelders, to a Brabancon archer's arrow fired with the personal assent of Wenceslas (1371).
In 1386, at the dawn of the second war of Guelders, Renaud (II), lord of Schoonvorst, a sympathiser of William I, had John (II), lord of Gronsveld, one of the most powerful counsellors to Joan, assassinated.
As for the gameplay consequences of this, I would suggest that the prospects of a particular murder plot (and the AI’s inclination to initiate one) should depend not only on those you recruit to it and your own abilities, but also much more than they do now on your proximity to the intended victim. Far easier to arrange someone’s demise when you’re in their very court, underneath their nose, rather than halfway across Europe. For additional flavor, I would also tie this into the mechanics of feasting, tournaments, and hunting, among others.

Need someone dead? Invite them hunting, and see your scheme seize the opportunity to arrange a “hunting accident.” Have them attend your feast, and watch them choke to death on a surfeit of lamprey eels (or just have them killed outright for great infamy – a Black Dinner indeed). Maybe someone’s lance rides a little bit too high in the joust, and someone ends up dead with a splinter in their eye. It happened to Henry II of France, after all. The mêlée is a confusing place: who knows who crushed that lad's skull? Another aspect of this that I would like to see implemented would make it so that not all murders are necessarily flagged as deaths by suspicious circumstances. Leave the player wondering: was it really a hunting accident, or was it a “hunting accident”? Include uncommon, but entirely mundane counterparts for some of these deaths, so that there's some mystery to the world.

Stealing from the Collection Plate
This song illustrates the aristocratic habit of plundering monastic houses, and the way that the king of France made use of one such incident to take control of the county of Auvergne. The chronicler Bernard Itier reports: 'This year, Count Guy of Auvergne razed the monastery of Mozac to the ground and took away the body of Saint Austremoine to one of his towns. Because of this, he has endured the prosecution of the king of the Franks. Saint Pierre-de-Mozac was a Cluniac abbey in the diocese of Clermont, but it was also a fortress of the counts of Auvergne. As the abbey was under royal protection, King Philip II Augustus of France sent a punitive expedition in the autumn of 1212 led by Guy of Dampierre, seigneur of the neighbouring Bourbonnais. In 1216, Guy of Dampierre was awarded most of the county of Auvergne, and it eventually reverted to the French in 1238.
Louis VII., who succeeded his father, had frequent occasion to wage similar wars for the sake of peace. Thus he razed the castle of Monceaux, belonging to the Count of Montmorency, and the entreaty of the abbots of the province marched an army against the Count of Claremont, in Auvergne, and his nephew, William, Count of Puy, and against the Viscount de Polignac, who by the instinct of the devil were accustomed to pass their lives in plundering the churches, capturing travellers and pilgrims, oppressing the poor, and depopulating the country. These men he captured, and kept in prison until they swore to renounce their habits.

Sometimes after, William, Count of Challon, following their diabolic footsteps, with the aid of the bands vulgarly called the Brabantins, ravaged the country, and mercilessly slew the monks of Cluny with a number of the people who came out processionally to meet them without weapons, but only armed with their sacred vestments, and crosses, and reliquaries. At the fame of this barbarity, the king marched against him, and took possession of his castle, and divided his lands between the Duke of Burgundy and the Count of Nevers.
The Church has always been known for its wealth: this was no secret to the feudal nobility, and in times of great chaos and strife, the most rapacious of them would laugh in the face of eternal damnation and sack, plunder, and raze churches and monasteries for their riches as readily as any axe-wielding viking raider ever did. Prince-bishops with substantial holdings were eyed jealously by their secular neighbors. In this particularly sacrilegious form of pillaging, I see the potential for a new avenue to riches in Crusader Kings III.
A complaint written in the form of a letter by the Abbot of St Ghislain, Vidric, addressed to Emperor Henry III, should be added to this set. He complained about the Count of Hainaut, Baudouin I of Mons (1051-70), who, at least according to Vidric, for three years had been savagely destroying and plundering monastery properties. On the list of this "bandit" and "tyrant's" faults were predae, rapina and violentiae.

The count was so bold that when the monks went to visit him with relics of their patron saint to induce him to stop his vile actions, he ordered his servants to chase them all the way back to the church, which additionally ended up tainted with the blood of those of them who were wounded. After this event, Baudouin became so ruthless that his crimes got even worse, and he started abducting monastery servants and plundering their properties. He even stole goods belonging to the abbot from his private property.
When the authority of the crown is low, perhaps a child-king sits on the throne, held in the thrall of ambitious and self-serving regents, and the land is wracked by famine, bandits, and internecine warfare among the magnates, then perhaps a new casus belli will be available for those to whom Christ and his saints are asleep: the opportunity to raid temple holdings either in your own provinces or in those directly neighboring yours.

The potential gains would be substantial, and many a feudal lord earned a dark reputation for his predations against prelates: Henry, count of Luxembourg and Namur warred with Albero, archbishop of Trier, which devastated the region for seven years, with the king of the Romans, Conrad, unwillin g or unable to intervene in favor of either side, a war which was ultimately resolved with a negotiated peace. The risk, of course, is excommunication, the enmity of the realm’s bishops, a significant loss of piety, and potentially a legitimate excuse for your liege to make war against you, but if the king’s power is weak or if he is otherwise occupied with rebellion and foreign wars, then it may be a path to swift and easy riches.

The Ants Go Marching One By One
Under the Norman kings, feudal tenants followed the king across the sea, and foreign service was not refused until the loss of Normandy in John's reign. From this time, frequent fines "ne transfretent" appear in the Pipe Rolls to escape service abroad, and in 1297 the earls refused to go to Flanders, because, as they very clearly told the king, there was no precedent for it - "videtur toti communitati quod ibi non debent aliquod srevitium facere; quia nec ipsi nec predecessores sui seu progenitores unquam fecerunt servitium in terra illa." In the charter of the same year, Edward I. pardons all knights who had not obeyed his summons to Flanders; he is careful, however, to mention "rancorem nostrum et malam voluntatem" from which they have thus incurred (c. 5). From Richard I.'s time, tenants sometimes paid fines to send substitutes to the army instead of obeying the summons in person.

The recognised term of service for a knight was forty days in the year, and, if the duration of service would exceed this time, the king's summmons was expressed in the language of a request rather than a demand. Edward I., in his writs for continued service in the Welsh war in 1277, uses the words "affectuose rogamus," and he has to satisfy the cautiousness of the barons by promising that the lengthened term of service shall not be a precedent. In 1157, Henry II. directed that every three knights should equip one of their number for three times the term of service, and this was also done by Richard I. and John, the latter ordering nine knights to provide a tenth with 2s. a day.
Whether King Louis VII of France knew of the bull is not clear, but he too would have had news from the East, and at Christmas 1145 he summoned his barons and told them of his desire to go to the aid of the Christians in the East. But he made no reference to the pope nor to a crusade with its various inducements, including the remission of sins; instead Louis was saying nothing more than had been said sixteen years earlier, when the first Grand Master of the Templars, Hugh of Payns, came to France to raise fighting men for the attack on Damascus. In the event Louis' barons were indifferent to his call, and Abbot Suger of St Denis, the senior statesman in Louis' court, opposed the venture outright, arguing that the king's business was at home.
In 1528 the Porte concluded an alliance with Zapolya, recognizing him as King of Hungary in return for vassalage and tribute. As Ferdinand would not relinquish his claims, there now began a protracted conflict between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans for control of Hungary. Ferdinand was not strong enough to fulfill his Hungarian ambitions without military assistance from the German Imperial Estates. But the German rulers were unwilling to help him, as they had no interest in supporting Habsburg dynastic and territorial ambitions in Hungary. They recognized no obligation to fight against the Turk unless the latter should become a threat to the security of the Holy Roman Empire itself.
This Catalan attempt at restricting their ruler to the narrow road of feudal custom was taken even further in Aragon and Valencia where from the 1260s disgruntled barons refused to fund or serve in Jaume's military campaigns until he attended to their complaints.
Medieval wars were not, generally speaking, total wars. The sheer logistics involved precluded kings marching off to war with the entire kingdom's chivalry: in practice, they normally only ever deployed a portion of their forces at any given time, because the realm would quickly find itself bankrupt otherwise. Inevitably, not all men summoned even necessarily showed up, and in some cases, recalcitrant magnates refused to serve at all, if they felt it outside the bounds of their feudal contract. For example, when Edward Longshanks summoned the might of his realm to crush the Scots in 1297, he cast his net for approximately 27,000 Englishmen and 12,000 or so Welshmen, a formidable number.

His final roster for the campaign was likely in the realm of just shy of 15,000 Englishmen and slightly over 10,000 Welshmen. The Welsh, as you can see, were clearly much more enthusiastic about the prospect of invading Scotland than the English were. As it so happens, the Welsh were significant contributors to most of Edward's campaigns. This is a significant factor in the explanation of how smaller realms managed to survive beside a much larger, stronger, and potentially more aggressive neighbor - limited force projection, to borrow a more modern term.
Nevertheless, for much of the time the Capetian kings were heavily reliant for military aid on the goodwill of their greater vassals. Even when they did serve in the royal host, the great counts and dukes regarded themselves more as allies than subjects, and their feudal obligations for military service might be very limited. Thus Count Robert II of Flanders (r. 1093-1111) provided only twenty knights for royal service, though he had sufficient resources to contract with Henry I of England to supply one thousand Flemish stipendiary knights in 1101. The service of the counts of Anjou, Blois, and Flanders fluctuated with prevailing political circumstances, while the dukes of Normandy—beginning in the l050s—were among the principal enemies of the Capetians. Duke William's conquest of England, moreover, posed a potentially grave threat to Capetian power by enriching an already powerful dynasty with the military and fiscal resources of a wealthy and administratively sophisticated king-dom. Almost as soon as England was pacified, the Conqueror was employing Anglo-Saxon troops in his continental campaigns.
As such, I propose a change. Under certain laws, your council could have its say in declarations of war, incurring tyranny for the ruler who defied their will. I intend to capture a portion of this spirit, but in a far more organic form. As things stand now, the levies contributed by your vassals fluctuate depending on their personal opinion of you: this would remain so, and be half of the equation.

For the other half, I suggest that wars themselves have an opinion score for each side, which is to say, the duke's contributions to your cause, and his availability for service as a commander, would also fluctuate depending on his opinion of the war and your part in it. You may perfectly well declare a war that your vassals disapprove of - just don't expect them to bend over backwards to help you. This would, of course, also be mitigated by things like crown authority and centralization, with a more powerful monarch obviously being able to exert more pressure on his vassals to supply him with a greater percentage of their troops.
Frederick's far-spread domains were not easy to control, and he spent much of his reign seeking to consolidate his authority with ever insufficient resources. Because the German princes begrudged him troops, he could never raise a large army, nor did his southern kingdom provide him with adequate supplies. He never had more than 15,000 men at his disposal at one time, and few of them were trained soldiers, so even small city militias of northern Italy, protected by their defensive walls, could resist his army for months.
For example, holy wars and crusades would be very popular among zealous vassals, especially defensive wars against pagan and infidel invaders. Wars to press a claim would rank highly with the claimant, their relatives by blood and marriage, and their allies. Unjust wars against your own vassals would be poorly received, and as was historically the case would see the deployment of only a small portion of the forces normally available to you. Very distant wars would also be unpopular: the feudal nobility having no particular enthusiasm for campaigning far from home, potentially for years, with likely little gain for themselves. Civil wars where a vassal has a strong distaste for both you and your side of the war may see that vassal elect to switch sides: going down with a sinking ship was not a value the medieval nobility identified with.

This would also make mercenaries much, much more important than they are now, and give them a more meaningful role in the player's military strategy. Instead of simply augmenting your armies into an even more unstoppable doomstack than it already is, mercenaries would be the king's tool of choice to wage unpopular wars, or to persecute his own vassals, as the English King John did quite routinely. Rather than a luxury item for the medieval super-wealthy, mercenaries in this way become a necessity for unpopular monarchs fighting unpopular conflicts. Alliances take on a new level of significance, as well: if you can get a foreign ruler onboard with your plans, perhaps by planting a favored claimant on the throne, or by his being your loving brother-in-law, then he might provide you enough forces to make all the difference.
Henry the Lion was the mightiest vassal of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. When Frederick was warring in Italy, he found himself almost without troops and urged Henry to help him.
Now, obviously, there’s a catch here. How do we resolve these calculations when a realm is involved in multiple wars? It becomes a somewhat more complicated scenario, but the least frustrating resolution for the player, I think, would be to have the barons’ levies calculated per their opinion of the most popular war currently being waged. So, maybe you’re trying to revoke a county and nobody really wants to help with that, but then you’re invaded by a horde of expansionist Welshmen and their emperor, and now they’re ready to contribute with everything they’ve got.

Logistically, you would then raise the remainder of the levies made available to you, and unite them with your forces already in the field. Declaring additional offensive wars without first resolving your existing conflicts would also incur additional opinion penalties, I think, to prevent someone initiating a second, theoretically more popular war to gain additional troops to fight their first unpopular war, and encouraging both the player and the AI to make peace with their rebellious vassals when more important considerations are at hand: not a few turbulent magnates escaped justice when their evil turned out to be the lesser one.

I'm quite aware that this is likely to be one of my more controversial recommendations, given how it would fundamentally alter the way war is waged from its form in Crusader Kings II, but I feel that it would bring with it substantial benefits and enrich the overall gameplay experience. It would slow the relentless, inexorable expansion of vast empires with seemingly endless legions at their disposal, add meaningful challenges to the later centuries of the game when troop numbers and income are both inflated, help shield and prolong the existence of smaller realms living in the shadow of a leviathan, protect vassals from their liege's depredations, encourage the use of mercenaries in a more strategic way, add another meaningful reason to increase crown authority and centralization, and incentivize rulers to work harder to appease their most powerful vassals.

Until Death Do Us Part
Learn then from me what befalls men who love women and believe what they say. For women love men furiously; then they try to get rid of them; and give them magic potions to drink, with ten thousand wicked tricks; and they wheedle them, and finally for a mere word they kill them. And they do as the she-bear does: when she is on heat, she fondles her mate, the male animal; and when he has covered her and she is off heat, then she kills him.

But the love of a man goes very deep; for his love for the woman waxes little by little until a perfect love is brought to the perfect end, or his hate waxes little by little until he leaves her completely. But the ladder of a woman's love has but one step: if she loves you, she practices a thousand wicked wiles to make you love her, and right in the midst of them she kills you. And if she hates you, she tries to get rid of you, and nothing will stop her. (Machairas 1932: §576)
Now we leave the story of that dog the sultan and let us pass to another, that of the queen, whose name was Eleanora, the wife of the aforesaid king Peter. Even as you know that the demon of fornication assails the whole world, so he beguiled the king, and the good king fell into sin with a noble lady, whose name was Joanna l'Aleman, the wife of sir John de Montolif, the lord of Khoulou: and the king had left her eight months with child.

And when the king went for the second time to France, the queen sent and brought her to the court. And when she came before her she insulted her with shameful words and said to her: "Wicked harlot, (it is you who) separate me from my husband." And the lady was silent. (Machairas 1932: §234)
the queen gave orders to her women, and they threw her [Joanna] on the ground, and by her orders they brought a great marble mortar and set it upon her womb, and they pounded a measure of salt in it, to make her miscarry of the child ... and they brought a handmill and stretched her out on the ground and put it on her womb, and they held her firmly and ground two measures of flour upon her womb; and still she did not miscarry.

And the queen maltreated her in many ways, with fumigations, with nettles, with evil-smelling drugs and other torments; and the child in her womb grew all the stronger ... .she [the queen] told all the midwives, that if they do not take the child away from her as soon as she is delivered, and bring it to the queen and she hears of it, she will cut off her head. And thus it was done, and we do not know what happened to the child, the pure innocent. (Machairas 1932: §234)
I cannot help but adore the Lusignan kings of Cyprus: they’re just so delightfully medieval in everything that they do. They lived and died like most people play this game. Now, adultery. Specifically, today, as it pertains to wives (husbands and their mistresses will receive their own treatment in due time). Seeing as a thread simply titled Cuckolding made it to eight pages alone, I could hardly pass this one by. Did it happen? Yes. How common was it?

That's almost impossible to say: we can only ever know of those cases where those involved either chose or were forced to make the affairs public. A thousand such incidents could pass by without our ever knowing it. However, I’d place a fair wager on the odds that it was not anywhere near as common as in Crusader Kings II when you have the Seduction focus enabled for everyone. You’d need to fast-forward to the reigns of Louis XIV and XV in the 17th and 18th centuries to find lurid sexual intrigue on such a scale. So, how best to balance adultery so that it happens when it should happen, but not so frequently or absurdly that the player can never be certain whether their children are their own?

Two words: location and personality. Step one is making it so that a character’s location has a meaningful effect on their ability to interact with others. Conception, for example, ought to be impossible when the husband is imprisoned or away on campaign, there being certain logistical difficulties when it comes to impregnating your wife in Anjou from the Holy Land. This would also require the implementation of a sort of travel timer, similar to that employed when recalling a councilor, to prevent someone from commuting on crusade to fulfill his conjugal duties, so to speak.

As a beneficial side effect, this would likely also reduce overall birth rates and court overpopulation somewhat, given the sheer amount of time often spent on campaign. If a woman becomes pregnant while her husband is away on Crusade, then unless he is a pious simpleton and she can somehow convince him that the conception was immaculate in nature, odds are, he’s going to have certain reasonable suspicions when he returns. In that same vein, a woman is unlikely to be seduced by a man thousands of miles away, especially if he is in the company of her husband while on campaign!
Again let us return to what happened on account of the queen's wrongdoing. The beginner of all trouble, the demon of fornication, entered into the heart of messire John de Morphou the Count of Roukha, and very great love came upon him for the queen: and he used many shifts, and gave so much to the go-betweens, that he carried the affair through from the beginning to the end, and they came together. And the affair was made known to all the town, namely that so lawless a deed had been done, and all the people were speaking of nothing else, so much that even the street boys were talking about it. (Machairas 1932: § 239)
If a woman is going to take a lover, then traditionally it’s most likely to be someone within her immediate vicinity. Now, under what circumstances should or would she do so? This is where personality comes into play, and there are a number of fascinating options here that illustrate the potential depth of interaction in Crusader Kings III. A woman of insatiable lust, whose husband has been long away on campaign or in prison, may take a lover. A widow, for similar, more permanent reasons, obviously. A proud woman, insulted by a husband who flaunts his mistress and bastards at court, may take a lover in retaliation. A noblewoman with a childless marriage and an impotent husband may seek her satisfaction elsewhere.

If a woman is to take a lover, then there are certain considerations that must be taken into account. He is, for example, unlikely to be a one-eyed, octogenarian Jewish court physician, or a hunchbacked, clubfooted Quasimodo. Much more likely, he will be a courtier, a man of noble lineage, in possession of considerable personal charm or ability, if not both. If you discover that your wife has taken a lover, your first thought upon uncovering his identity should not be: is she insane?

Since this isn’t exactly the sort of phenomenon measurable by statistics, rather than continuing to speak in abstracts, let’s review a few historical examples. To start with a particularly famous one, the three daughters-in-law of Philip IV of France were accused of adultery, their lovers (knights, brothers, sons of a Norman baron) condemned, brutally tortured, and executed, and the ladies Blanche and Margaret were sentenced to life imprisonment. Joana of Portugal, queen of Castile, was said to have given birth to a daughter fathered not by her husband, called Enrique the Impotent for obvious reasons, but by the courtier Beltrán de la Cueva, and later had two further illegitimate children by another lover. The potential succession of Joana's daughter, called la Beltraneja, led to civil war, and Enrique was forced to name his sister, Isabel, as his heir.

Agnese Visconti, wife of the lord of Mantua, was executed alongside her supposed lover for adultery committed with a knight. Maria of Brabant, duchess of Bavaria, was beheaded. Beatrice di Tenda, duchess of Milan, was executed for adultery with a troubadour, although in this case (as with possibly quite a few others) the accusation was simply an expedient means of getting rid of her. Peter I, king of Cyprus, returned from his long travels abroad to discover his wife Eleanor’s infidelity, but was himself murdered soon after and succeeded by their son. Given what we’ve seen of Eleanor of Aragon’s character, one suspects these two facts are not unrelated. Louis VIII was also said to have been poisoned by his queen and her lover, the count of Champagne. Isabeau of Bavaria, queen to Charles the Mad of France, accurately described as widow to a living husband, was said to be the lover of her husband’s younger brother, Louis I, duke of Orleans.

Sibylle de Porcien (daughter of the count of Porcien), wife of Godfrey, count of Namur, was said to have left her husband for the much-older Enguerrand de Coucy, for Godfrey could not keep up with her “boundless sexual needs,” an act which started a long-lasting violent feud between the two men, but Sibylle later started an affair with another man much younger than her new husband, who Enguerrand betrothed to his daughter, perhaps to minimize the scandal. In a twist well worthy of any Crusader Kings player, the formidable lady Sibylle is also said to have conspired with her second husband in the murder of Gerard de Quierzy, another one of her lovers. Elisabeth, countess of Vermandois in her own right, wife of Philip, count of Flanders, who accused his wife of adultery with a knight named Walter de Fontaines, who he had beaten to death, and then seized control of his wife’s lands until her death with the king’s permission. Interestingly, the annals tell us that Walter’s sons rose up in revolt against Philip and laid waste to his lands, and “compelled him to give them satisfaction for the death of the said Walter of Fontaines.”
Since Joanna and Andrew were known to be quarreling - to use the pope's term - not surprisingly, the chroniclers began reporting around this time certain rumors regarding Joanna's sexual behavior. (Like any euphemism, "quarreling" does not do justice to the young couple's relationship; apparently he was threatening her and she was taunting him.) Domenico da Gravina accused Catherine of arranging for her second son, Louis of Taranto, to slip into Joanna's bed, while Boccaccio suggested that in fact the queen's lover was Robert of Cabannis, whom Joanna had just promoted to a position of power.
Similar in nature to the royal favorites mentioned earlier, a widowed regent or ruler in her own right might very well shower favors and titles upon her lovers. Leonor Teles, queen and later regent of Portugal, is said to have taken Juan Fernández de Andeiro as her lover, and her husband was rumored to have killed her child believed to be his. Like Peter of Cyprus, this Leonor’s husband also died soon afterwards, and Leonor raised Andeiro to the title of count of Ourem. Urraca, queen of Castile, Leon, and Galicia, took Pedro de Lara and Pedro de Gomez as lovers, and apparently quite openly had two illegitimate children by the former during her reign.

Margaret of Anjou, queen to another mad king, Henry VI of England, was rumored to be the lover of Edmund Beaufort, duke of Somerset (and, similar to other cases mentioned, rumors spread at one point that she planned to poison her husband to marry her lover), who in turn was also said to have once been the lover of Catherine of Valois, Henry VI’s mother. Somerset’s son and heir, Henry, later boasted of having been the lover of Mary of Guelders, queen-regent of Scotland: it’s further said that she tried to have her lover, Patrick Hepburn (Lord Hailes) kill him for speaking thusly of her. After the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, duke of Milan, the widowed duchess Caterina was said to have taken another regent, Francesco Barbavara, as a lover, and made him count of Valsesia and of Pietre Gemelle. Joanna II, queen of Naples, showered titles and favor upon Sergianni Caracciolo, who she made grand seneschal of the kingdom, the point where he became ruler in all but name.

Having taken all this into account, I think there are a few significant conclusions that we can draw. Noblewomen seem most inclined to take lovers in cases where the husband is dead, incapable, absent, despised, or is otherwise unavailable to his wife. The likelihood would also appear to increase in cases where the lady rules in her own right, or as a regent. Most would seem to be women of strong character and formidable will, to put to mildly. When adultery is discovered or suspected, the husbands of dangerous women seem to meet a suspiciously convenient ends not long after.

Similarly, a husband’s own mistress and illegitimate children may not be safe in the presence of viperous virago. Most importantly, the likelihood of a wife’s adultery should depend quite heavily on her personal traits and circumstances, giving the player a much greater incentive to attend to their wife, her character traits, and her opinion of them. Perhaps it would be best not to embark on a lengthy campaign abroad this year, given the way your young, lustful wife has been eyeing that ambitious duke...

Crime and Punishment, Medieval Style
Juan was excellent at maintaining an angry grudge against traitors without effective punishment, but this did not help to discourage further treason or rebellion against his rule. In the years after the Infante Enrique was released, Castile continued to stumble from one political crisis to the next. Indeed, the later years of Juan's reign were marked by constant miniature civil wars and efforts to replace one privado with the next, a pattern which continued into the reign of his son, Enrique IV.

Juan's weak policy toward treason was a fundamentally ineffective means of dealing with threats to his power. In contrast to the early Trastamaras, who had used harsh punishment to such spectacular effect, Juan's weakness helped to encourage political intrigues, the formation of leagues of nobles, and a general division in the realm. Ultimately, instability was the price of Juan's tepid policies on treason.
At Edward’s command the men were all executed: Neil Bruce and Christopher Seton, brother and brother-in-law respectively of Robert Bruce, along with the men captured with them, were dragged through the streets to the place of execution where they were hanged and beheaded. Furthermore, the earl of Athol was thought to be the first earl to be executed in England in over two hundred and thirty years.

The earl, who was not only a nobleman, but also a kinsman of Edward, should have been able to plead a quicker death, but Edward responded by ordering that “he should be hanged from a higher gallows than anyone else, and then decapitated and burned”. Edward’s treatment of the ladies, all of them of the highest rank, while quite severe, at least ensured that their lives were spared. Three of them were to be kept in cages and the others in various safe prisons around England.
We’ve examined a number of forms of feudal misbehavior, but now we come to one of the most important questions: how should we punish them? Execution and title revocation are, of course, the classics, but were often used more sparingly than one might expect, and it was not unusual for medieval monarchs to practice clemency before vengeance. The Mad War against Charles VIII, for example, saw the leaders of the rebellion essentially continue as they were, despite a victory for the royalist forces, and Jaume the Conqueror, king of Aragon, was well-known in this time for his leniency with his turbulent vassals, despite frequently finding himself in conflict with them. Henry II of England relieved several prominent vassals of some of their lands and castles after they joined his sons in a revolt against him, but refrained from executing them or stripping them of their titles outright.

Enrique the Impotent, king of Castile, failed to punish his magnates’ defiance and rebellion, nor could he gain their loyalty and obedience, thus proving his sobriquet true on multiple levels. Theobald, count of Champagne and Blois, refused to provide military service to Louis VII of France, and later fought against him, but came out of the conflict relatively unscathed after a peace was brokered: one of the advantages of having the king of England as a brother. Roger II of Sicily faced several significant revolts from among his own comital nobility: the first one, at the dawn of his reign, was met with negotiation and leniency, the second and third with blinding, imprisonment, forfeiture, and hanging, thus demonstrating that the royal instruments of justice may vary heavily depending on the king’s position.

In addition, I would argue that there are compelling gameplay considerations that favor a more lenient approach. First, and perhaps most importantly, simply being identified as the leader of plot should be immediately treated as just and unobjectionable cause for imprisonment, especially if a vassal’s plot isn’t even directed against their liege or any of their immediate relatives. Furthermore, unless they’re a member of your immediate court, issuing an order for someone’s arrest is generally followed by them raising their banners in rebellion or otherwise fleeing into exile, more likely the former than the latter. As a player, I’m often informed that I have just cause for imprisonment because someone has acted dishonorably toward me, and I have no earthly idea why. This, I would like to see change. If I’m going to imprison someone, or aim to dispossess them, I should know exactly why I’m doing it.

As far as title revocation is concerned, most instances in which prominent magnates and personalities were deprived of their holdings involved first open rebellion (the Revolt of the Earls in England, for example), capture and imprisonment, and only then did the asset forfeiture proceedings usually begin. From a gameplay perspective, I don’t think anyone truly benefits from dynasties being dispossessed too easily or too frequently: far more interesting to exchange moves with a worthy nemesis or dynasty over the years, than to simply catch them out on a minor scheme and toss them into the oubliette. This would also add an interesting new dimension to scheming: it’s one thing to know that someone is plotting against you, another entirely to try and determine if you’re secure enough on your throne that you can call him out on it and throw down the proverbial gauntlet.

So, other than the means already discussed, by what methods can we punish these turbulent vassals for their crimes against the crown? The razing of castles is one of particular interest to me: not those held by your vassals who assisted you, to be certain, but if you happen to hold a few baronies as secondary or tertiary titles, then having one or two of those razed to the ground by your liege after a rebellion, now that we can have empty provinces, would be a great (and expensive) punishment. Indeed, this is the means by which Cardinal Richelieu broke the back of the remnants of the feudal nobility in the 17th century: he demolished their castles.

Imprisonment is another option, both in the long and short term. The contumacious Jean V, count of Armagnac, the same who took his own sister to wife, was besieged and killed by Louis XI’s forces, at which point his brother Charles was permitted to inherit the county, but was immediately imprisoned and not released until after Louis’ death ten years later (and was ultimately succeeded in the title by his grand-nephew, the duke of Alencon, whose own father was several times imprisoned and eventually died in prison). Apparently we did not, in fact, invent the strategy of imprisoning our enemies until their line dies off and their titles pass into our orbit.

The annals have it that King John stripped John de Courcy, earl of Ulster, of his title and sentenced him to perpetual imprisonment in the Tower of London, until he obtained his freedom by taking up the cause of crusade. James II, count of Urgell, was besieged and captured by the forces of Ferdinand I of Aragon (Urgell was a counter-claimant to the throne of Aragon, and one of his supporters had murdered an archbishop, of all things), stripped of his titles and imprisoned for twenty years until his death.

A particularly zealous ruler, in the vein of the pious Saint Louis IX, may insist that misbehaving vassals embark on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, raise a new church or monastery, or take up the cross on a crusade, if one is pending - or pledge to go on the next one, if one is not - (the first and last of those three being activities that are themselves often not without hazard, and the second a substantial expense) to earn forgiveness for their sins and a potential return to the royal graces. To touch upon the opposite side of the coin for a moment, a ruler renowned for his piety, now imprisoned, may find the realm's bishops or even the pope interceding on his behalf.
John's selection of good hostages rested on their relationship to the grantor and on quantity. Although there were some barons who only pledged their vassals as hostages to the king, most handed over their kins-men. Kinship was an important aspect of hostageship. The surest pledges were sons and daughters. Matthew Paris reflects this understanding in both Chronica Majora and the Flores Historiarum. If in the Chronica, he has Matilda de Briouze refuse to hand over her children (pueros) as hostages to the king, then in the abridged Flores, many nobles are reluctant to give their sons and dear ones (lilies et taros nostros) to the king. Matthew drives the point home when he writes that `some handed over their sons, others their nephews and close relatives to the king's envoys.'

Many of the individuals who are mentioned in the royal records to have handed over hostages gave their closest kin to the king. Sons, daughters, nephews: they are the best hostages John expects because their fathers and uncles would not dare act against him knowing their family was at his mercy. Savary de Mauleon should be remembered in this connection. He was not different from many other barons. Captured at Mirebeau in 1202 when he rebelled against the king, he managed to obtain the king's forgiveness and even secured, as already noted, the seneschalship of Poitou in 1205. However, in that same year, he pledged a remarkable list of twenty-five hostages, in exchange for John's good will. First on that list were his mother and his wife. Nevertheless, he was not the only one to have surrendered his own mother for faithful service under King John. Robert de Vaux offered his mother as hostage in 1213.

When sons were selected as sureties on behalf of their fathers, the eldest son was of higher value because he was the heir to the family patrimony. The History of William Marshal has a lot to say about the grief fathers must have felt when the king demanded their sons. In 1205, the Marshal was suspected of insufficient loyalty to the king. To prove his allegiance and love for John, William 'readily' surrendered his eldest son, 'who was most dear to him.' As if that was not enough, the king demanded his second son, Richard, `because he wanted to be sure of the Marshal's loyalty.' Lucianus d'Arques gave his two sons and his nephew in 1213." Similarly, Robert de Ros gave his son and nephew.n The threat that John promoted in his abusive policy was not only personal, but patrimonial. Hostages were, as Kosto noted, more than individuals. They represented patrimonial and territorial interests. By seizing his barons' sons, the king introduced an element of uncertainty in the lives of entire baronial families. John also tended to take more than one hostage from each donor. John of Curcy pledged eight hostages. Walter de Lacy gave six hostages in 1204. Savary de Mauleon's distinguished list of twenty-five hostages must have made quite an impression.
The medieval hostage is a creature distinct from a simple prisoner or prisoner of war, most importantly from our perspective, in that they cannot be redeemed for a ransom. Prisoners of war exist to be ransomed for their captors’ profit. Prisoners have been imprisoned as a form of punishment, or while awaiting judgment to be passed. The hostage is surety, a guarantor for good behavior, with the possibility of becoming a prisoner (or suffering a more dire fate) should the agreement be broken. They are a welcome guest in their "host's" court, until they aren't.

Malcolm Canmore, king of Scotland, did homage to William the Conqueror as his vassal, and gave him his son Duncan (the future Duncan II) as a hostage. The Deeds of Louis the Fat mention several occasions upon which the king’s (relative) trust was earned (back) by the offering of hostages. Many of King John’s barons offered him their sons, nephews, and even mothers as guarantors for their loyalty. A rebellious vassal may be pardoned for his crimes, but forced to surrender his children or brothers as proof against further treachery: would you rebel against your monarch a second time, knowing that your son may be imprisoned or executed for your crimes?

As we’ve touched upon crown authority a few times throughout this work, I’d like to make reference to it again one last time in terms of punishment and the retributive options available to the medieval monarch. A weak king may find himself forced to negotiate with his own vassals even after defeating them in the field, and accepting fines and hostages in lieu of more permanent punishments, lest he alienate his remaining magnates and trigger a second, more successful revolt. A stronger king may be able to make an example of some, to strip a few vassals of their titles or execute them, but perhaps must choose between the two options. Only a king of formidable ability and reputation with the utmost confidence in his royal authority, or a great and terrible tyrant, can likely get away with depriving the entire host of his enemies of their titles and beheading them in the process.

Yes, It's Finally Over

So, here we are. If you've managed to make it this far, then you have both my most sincere thanks and admiration. I hadn't intended anything quite approaching this volume when I started, but these things tend to take on a sort of life of their own once you get the ball rolling. Much of what's been discussed here today has been mechanical in nature, and would radically alter both the established balance of power and the conventional strategies for personal and dynastic success in Crusader Kings. The ideal is always to make the game more interesting to play, but today we've also discussed ways in which to make it more challenging, as well, especially as far as the late game is concerned.

Inevitability is something I wish to avoid, without arguing for total victory or total collapse. An empire, once established, need not either thrive or collapse and fragment like that of Alexander, for gradual decay and eventual revitalization are also options. Ways in which wars can be fought without resorting to a zero sum scenario in which one side must be annihilated for the other to be triumphant. The guiding principle of today's work, if I had to boil it down, would be enriching the means by which kingdoms and empires are maintained, as opposed to expanded. Making it so that internal politics matter just as much, if not more, than external politics, so that a modest kingdom by itself can offer the player an experience as rich as ruling over any great empire. Yes, for now, I think, that will do nicely.
 
We’ve examined a number of forms of feudal misbehavior, but now we come to one of the most important questions: how should we punish them? Execution and title revocation are, of course, the classics, but were often used more sparingly than one might expect, and it was not unusual for medieval monarchs to practice clemency before vengeance. The Mad War against Charles VIII, for example, saw the leaders of the rebellion essentially continue as they were, despite a victory for the royalist forces, and Jaume the Conqueror, king of Aragon, was well-known in this time for his leniency with his turbulent vassals, despite frequently finding himself in conflict with them. Henry II of England relieved several prominent vassals of some of their lands and castles after they joined his sons in a revolt against him, but refrained from executing them or stripping them of their titles outright.

Enrique the Impotent, king of Castile, failed to punish his magnates’ defiance and rebellion, nor could he gain their loyalty and obedience, thus proving his sobriquet true on multiple levels. Theobald, count of Champagne and Blois, refused to provide military service to Louis VII of France, and later fought against him, but came out of the conflict relatively unscathed after a peace was brokered: one of the advantages of having the king of England as a brother. Roger II of Sicily faced several significant revolts from among his own comital nobility: the first one, at the dawn of his reign, was met with negotiation and leniency, the second and third with blinding, imprisonment, forfeiture, and hanging, thus demonstrating that the royal instruments of justice may vary heavily depending on the king’s position.

In addition, I would argue that there are compelling gameplay considerations that favor a more lenient approach. First, and perhaps most importantly, simply being identified as the leader of plot should be immediately treated as just and unobjectionable cause for imprisonment, especially if a vassal’s plot isn’t even directed against their liege or any of their immediate relatives. Furthermore, unless they’re a member of your immediate court, issuing an order for someone’s arrest is generally followed by them raising their banners in rebellion or otherwise fleeing into exile, more likely the former than the latter. As a player, I’m often informed that I have just cause for imprisonment because someone has acted dishonorably toward me, and I have no earthly idea why. This, I would like to see change. If I’m going to imprison someone, or aim to dispossess them, I should know exactly why I’m doing it.

As far as title revocation is concerned, most instances in which prominent magnates and personalities were deprived of their holdings involved first open rebellion (the Revolt of the Earls in England, for example), capture and imprisonment, and only then did the asset forfeiture proceedings usually begin. From a gameplay perspective, I don’t think anyone truly benefits from dynasties being dispossessed too easily or too frequently: far more interesting to exchange moves with a worthy nemesis or dynasty over the years, than to simply catch them out on a minor scheme and toss them into the oubliette. This would also add an interesting new dimension to scheming: it’s one thing to know that someone is plotting against you, another entirely to try and determine if you’re secure enough on your throne that you can call him out on it and throw down the proverbial gauntlet.

So, other than the means already discussed, by what methods can we punish these turbulent vassals for their crimes against the crown? The razing of castles is one of particular interest to me: not those held by your vassals who assisted you, to be certain, but if you happen to hold a few baronies as secondary or tertiary titles, then having one or two of those razed to the ground by your liege after a rebellion, now that we can have empty provinces, would be a great (and expensive) punishment. Indeed, this is the means by which Cardinal Richelieu broke the back of the remnants of the feudal nobility in the 17th century: he demolished their castles.

Imprisonment is another option, both in the long and short term. The contumacious Jean V, count of Armagnac, the same who took his own sister to wife, was besieged and killed by Louis XI’s forces, at which point his brother Charles was permitted to inherit the county, but was immediately imprisoned and not released until after Louis’ death ten years later (and was ultimately succeeded in the title by his grand-nephew, the duke of Alencon, whose own father was several times imprisoned and eventually died in prison). Apparently we did not, in fact, invent the strategy of imprisoning our enemies until their line dies off and their titles pass into our orbit.

The annals have it that King John stripped John de Courcy, earl of Ulster, of his title and sentenced him to perpetual imprisonment in the Tower of London, until he obtained his freedom by taking up the cause of crusade. James II, count of Urgell, was besieged and captured by the forces of Ferdinand I of Aragon (Urgell was a counter-claimant to the throne of Aragon, and one of his supporters had murdered an archbishop, of all things), stripped of his titles and imprisoned for twenty years until his death.

A particularly zealous ruler, in the vein of the pious Saint Louis IX, may insist that misbehaving vassals embark on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, raise a new church or monastery, or take up the cross on a crusade, if one is pending - or pledge to go on the next one, if one is not - (the first and last of those three being activities that are themselves often not without hazard, and the second a substantial expense) to earn forgiveness for their sins and a potential return to the royal graces. To touch upon the opposite side of the coin for a moment, a ruler renowned for his piety, now imprisoned, may find the realm's bishops or even the pope interceding on his behalf.

I would like your thoughts on something I came across in a play through some time ago. An AI-Run Emperor had all five of his sons murdered by an AI-Run Count, who immediately declared a War of Succession once the last boy was murdered.

This Count had been caught red-handed in each murder, so he had been caught, and identified as a Known Murderer each and every time. The Emperor never tried to imprison and/or revoke the Count. I think the Tyranny Malus was holding him back. But in the *REAL* Middle Ages, that Count would have been arrested, revoked, and executed-with extreme prejudice-by the first murder.

What are your thoughts on this, and how CK3 should best handle this specific type of situation?
 
I would like your thoughts on something I came across in a play through some time ago. An AI-Run Emperor had all five of his sons murdered by an AI-Run Count, who immediately declared a War of Succession once the last boy was murdered.

This Count had been caught red-handed in each murder, so he had been caught, and identified as a Known Murderer each and every time. The Emperor never tried to imprison and/or revoke the Count. I think the Tyranny Malus was holding him back. But in the *REAL* Middle Ages, that Count would have been arrested, revoked, and executed-with extreme prejudice-by the first murder.

What are your thoughts on this, and how CK3 should best handle this specific type of situation?
Well, for one thing, I'm going to have to give that count serious credit: he pulled off murder on a scale usually only carried out by the player. Well done.

Kudos aside, you're entirely correct, however. This is an extreme, but unfortunately common, example of the sort of unreasonable behavior I'm hoping to see modified. For one thing, I would ask whether the count had a legitimate claim to the throne to begin with, and if he was trying to murder his way through the line of succession: I'll assume for the time being that he was some sort of relation. I'll even be generous and presume that he was a rival with the emperor and his sons, some sort of blood feud. Otherwise, in CK3 he should never have even contemplated the act in the first place, unless he was in possession of some combination of the highest levels of traits pertaining to ambition, deceitfulness, cynicism, and others.

Let's open with a historical example, one actually fairly close to the situation you describe. Philip of Swabia, king of the Romans, son of Frederick Barbarossa: he was murdered by Otto VIII, a Bavarian count, who escaped after committing the dark deed. The response was immediate, and as you would expect. He was declared an outlaw, his titles forfeited and granted to another, his castle razed to the ground, and he was hunted down and killed a year later. A similar fate befell Frederick, count of Isenberg, who ambushed and killed the archbishop of Cologne, with the added flavor of also being excommunicated, for the crime was committed against a cleric. The murderers of James I of Scotland failed to kill his queen in their attempted coup, and were later rounded up, stripped of their titles, and executed.

This is a large part of why I say that murder plots should normally be initiated by the AI only for immediate, material gain: because the consequences of being found out or failing are usually quite terminal. If you're going to murder your liege, and you succeed but are found out, then the murder should have elevated you to a position where you can withstand the blowback. The count should have been imprisoned, stripped of his titles, and executed after being discovered the first time, or else forced to flee into exile, deprived of his lands. The flagrant murder of the monarch or one of the monarch's close relatives should absolutely be one of those cases where the offense is legitimately punishable by death - tyranny should never have been an issue. The alternative, wiser course of action in his case would have been either to simply initiate the claim war if he could have from the start, or to assassinate the emperor and then trigger the claim war immediately after, if discovered, since he would by then be past the point of no return - that is to say, the new emperor would have been out for his blood anyways, so the time for subterfuge would be long past.

Here's a good example of what I'm talking about: Louis I, duke of Orleans, was the brother of Charles VI, king of France. He was assassinated by the order of his chief rival, John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, who afterwards made no attempt to disguise his responsibility, and in fact publicly admitted that it was his work. He got away with it, for a time, because it made him master of Paris and, mechanically, in our terms, gave him control of the realm as regent (see: my thoughts last time on regents essentially ruling as the king would). Of course, the rest of the nobility then formed a league against him, starting a civil war (this would be one of the kinds I suggest - one to depose a royal favorite, regent, or powerful courtier), and he was himself later assassinated by agents of the crown prince, the future Charles VII. John the Fearless was also one of the most powerful feudal magnates in France, a prince of the blood royal (the Burgundians being a cadet branch descended from King John II), which ties into my feelings on the criminal's relative power needing to be taken into account. Your count would obviously have a much lower likelihood of making it out with his skin intact after the first murder than a mighty superduke or vassal king might.
 
Ok, can someone boil this down to a TL;DR for me? 'cause it's definitely an interesting subject, but I don't exactly have the time to read non-college essays

EDIT: As for what was said after the main wall of text: I'd definitely be in favour of a deeper system to deal with the consequences for plot discovery, vile acts and dirty politicking, which should connect with the relative influence and power base of the involved characters, and general awareness of said deeds.

The Hook system seems adequate to deal with such elements so long as they remain relatively unknown, but nothing has been said of potential changes to imprisonment/tyranny/opinion changes once secrets of a certain degree come out: the ck2 system does a decent job of simulating it considering the constraints, but was rather harsh on tyranny penalties in quite a few places, and general vileness often lead to nothing due to the rather passive factions: A ruler whose satanism is practically a public secret, had children with close family members, murdered some vassals and is a general immense prick should have problems with vassals who aren't intimidated by all that, and might even have to contend with other realms collectively invading to depose him under Papal blessing.

The fact that they have a system in place where terror would make characters in your realm afraid to act against you, while outside realms would merely disapprove, is definitely a step in the right direction. But when it comes to other realms/the Church/vassals that aren't intimidated acting against you, CK2 was certainly lacking in places, and CK3 could, and seems to be, improving on that.
 
Last edited:
As ever, a brilliant and thoughtful post! I love the use of quotations either from or about the era to support the points :)
A ruler of great cynicism, lust, and pride, with no respect for the laws of Man or God, might even take his own sister for a bride or lover, as the aforementioned John V, count of Armagnac, did.
Ahem! Jean V d'Armagnac was lawfully wed to his particularly close spouse, thank you very much :p
What we wish to avoid is any sort of scenario in which the defeated and deposed monarch of an independent kingdom is released again to serve as a vassal of his conqueror.
Very much so! I could see an exception, perhaps, for a particularly clement usurper allowing his defeated foe to retain titles - William the Conqueror (not a particularly kind man, even!) allowed Edgar Ætheling to hold lands in England, after all, admittedly after Edgar paid homage to William. That being said, it should definitely be the exception rather than the rule, as it's absurd to see, for example, Harold Godwinson as Earl of Wessex under a victorious William the Conqueror.
When the authority of the crown is low, perhaps a child-king sits on the throne, held in the thrall of ambitious and self-serving regents, and the land is wracked by famine, bandits, and internecine warfare among the magnates, then perhaps a new casus belli will be available for those to whom Christ and his saints are asleep: the opportunity to raid temple holdings either in your own provinces or in those directly neighboring yours.
I don't think it need even be only during such chaotic and turbulent times that the casus belli is available! After all, Robert the Old, Duke of Burgundy, was infamous for raiding the lands of the church - and not only during the minority rule of his nephew, but during the adult rule of his brother, Henry I. I'd love to see the casus belli added, but perhaps more related to traits (greed, lack of zeal, etc.) than to circumstances of the land.
Have you ever observed an assassination plot in progress, and found yourself wondering: just what does she have against him, anyways?
Yes. Too often. Definitely support limiting the assassination plot to make more sense. From what I've heard, it gets chosen often by AI due to a lack of other plots available to them, something I hope CK3 addresses, ideally by not having characters always plotting.
Declaring additional offensive wars without first resolving your existing conflicts would also incur additional opinion penalties, I think, to prevent someone initiating a second, theoretically more popular war to gain additional troops to fight their first unpopular war, and encouraging both the player and the AI to make peace with their rebellious vassals when more important considerations are at hand: not a few turbulent magnates escaped justice when their evil turned out to be the lesser one.
Yes, I'd love to see this. Wars too often are fought to the bitter end. Hopefully the AI can be taught to make concessions, to focus upon more dire wars and wave away minor wars with less concern.
I'm quite aware that this is likely to be one of my more controversial recommendations, given how it would fundamentally alter the way war is waged from its form in Crusader Kings II, but I feel that it would bring with it substantial benefits and enrich the overall gameplay experience. It would slow the relentless, inexorable expansion of vast empires with seemingly endless legions at their disposal, add meaningful challenges to the later centuries of the game when troop numbers and income are both inflated, help shield and prolong the existence of smaller realms living in the shadow of a leviathan, protect vassals from their liege's depredations, encourage the use of mercenaries in a more strategic way, add another meaningful reason to increase crown authority and centralization, and incentivize rulers to work harder to appease their most powerful vassals.
It might be a controversial recommendation to take such a drastic change to warfare in Crusader Kings, but it's honestly one of my favorite proposals you've made. It addresses both the absurdity of massive empires marshaling all their forces for a county-level claim... and it also gives greater autonomy to vassals, emphasizing the lack of centralized power, a key characteristic of the age. It allows for more character interplay to shine through, forcing rulers to gain good relations with their vassals - or at least to have some leverage or bargain with them - before their forces can be called to arms. Honestly, even a return to just a CK1 style of raising vassal forces (wherein the vassal could refuse) would be an improvement over CK2's automatic acceptance.
If a woman is to take a lover, then there are certain considerations that must be taken into account. He is, for example, unlikely to be a one-eyed, octogenarian Jewish court physician, or a hunchbacked, clubfooted Quasimodo. Much more likely, he will be a courtier, a man of noble lineage, in possession of considerable personal charm or ability, if not both. If you discover that your wife has taken a lover, your first thought upon uncovering his identity should not be: is she insane?

The guiding principle of today's work, if I had to boil it down, would be enriching the means by which kingdoms and empires are maintained, as opposed to expanded. Making it so that internal politics matter just as much, if not more, than external politics, so that a modest kingdom by itself can offer the player an experience as rich as ruling over any great empire.