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23.4 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. ŠĀBUHR I’S COURT, FAMILY AND SUCCESSION.
23.4 IRAN UNDER ŠĀBUHR I. ŠĀBUHR I’S COURT, FAMILY AND SUCCESSION.

The essential (and practically only) source about the family and court of Šābuhr I is again the ŠKZ. This document is a long rock inscription which can be divided in the following blocks (some of which have been already covered in this thread as one of the main sources to reconstruct Sasanian political history during the III century):
  • Presentation of Šābuhr I, his ancestry and titles.
  • A long and detailed description of his deeds and military victories against the Roman empire.
  • The announcement that, as he was the one that the gods had chosen to protect, he would establish there, at Naqš-e Rostam several sacred fires (six in total, for himself, his wife and three of his sons) to honor the gods and for the well-being of their souls.
  • Following this announcement, Šābuhr I establishes the deed of settlement, by which these sacred fires will be endowed with 1,000 lambs. And next, the king announces which sacrifices will be compulsory according to this deed of settlement.
  • First, for the soul of Šābuhr I himself.
  • Secondly comes a list of people mixing living and deceased members of Šābuhr I’s family, and then courtiers. Presumably, these were people particularly important to Šābuhr I or of whom he was particularly fond.
  • Thirdly comes a brief list of people who lived “under the rule of Pābag the king”.
  • Fourthly comes a long list of people who lived “under the rule of Ardaxšīr the king of kings”.
  • And a very long list of people who lived “under the rule of under the rule of Šābuhr, king of kings”.
  • The inscription closes itself with yet another invocation to the gods, and the signature of the scribe (“This is my handwriting, Hormazd, the scribe, son of Šērag, the scribe”).
These lists of courtiers and relatives are the main source for historians who want to reconstruct the families and courts of the first two Sasanian kings. And in the case of Šābuhr I, it’s quite interesting that some of the people appear listed three times: in the list of founded fires, in the first list of people for whom sacrifices must be made, and in the final, “general” list of the courtiers of his court.

IMG_0131.jpg

Triumphal rock relief known as "Bishapur III" showing Šābuhr I surrounded by his army and courtiers.

The first thing that can be noticed by comparing these three lists is that Šābuhr I had four male sons who were named kings over different parts of the empire, but that they are not named in the same order in all lists, and some are even omitted in some of them. Let’s see first the first list, that of sacred fires:

And here also, by the inscription we have founded: One Fire, Khusrō-Šābuhr (“fair-famed is Šābuhr”) by name for our soul and to preserve our name; one Fire, Khusrō-Āduranāhīd by name, for the soul of our daughter Ādur-Anāhīd, queen of queens, and to preserve her name; one Fire, Khusrō-Ohrmazdardaxšīr by name, for the soul of our son Hormazd-Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia, and to preserve his name; another one Fire, Khusrō-Šābuhr by name, for the soul of our son Šābuhr, king of Mesān, and to preserve his name; one Fire, Khusrō-Narsē by name, for the soul of our son the Aryan, the Mazdayasnian Narsē, king of India, Sakestān and Turān to the seashore, and to preserve his name.

Scholars consider that in this first list Šābuhr I named his progeny by the order of his affection towards them. First comes his daughter Ādur-Anāhīd, who was obviously not a candidate for succession; it’s interesting nevertheless that she carried the title “queen of queens”; that must imply that Šābuhr I was quite fond of her.

Among his sons, Hormazd-Ardaxšīr comes the first. He enjoys also a very special title, that of Great King of Armenia (wuzurg šāh arminān). No other sub-king in the empire, not even if they were members of the House of Sāsān, enjoyed the title of “Great King”. Scholars suppose that it was created purposefully after the annexation of Armenia in order to remark the exceptional importance that this kingdom had for the Sasanians, and that because of its exceptionality Šābuhr I would have conceived it as the title to be carried by his heir apparent. As we have seen before, Hormazd-Ardaxšīr is also the only one amongst Šābuhr I’s sons whose participation in the campaigns of his father is attested in the sources. He would succeed his father as šāhān šāh as Hormazd I.

The following one among Šābuhr I’s sons named in this first list is Šābuhr king of Mesān (mesān šāh). Little or nothing is known about him, except that according to (very dubious) Manichaean texts, he was converted by Mani to the Manichaean religion.

The last of Šābuhr I’s sons to whom a fire is dedicated is Narsē; he must’ve been something of a special case too because he’s called “the Mazdayasnian Narsē”, which must’ve been a sign that he was seen as especially pious and attached to the Mazdean tradition. He also boasted an impressive array of titles, “king of India, Sakestān and Turān to the seashore” (šāh hind sagestān ud tūrestān). Traditionally, before the conquest of Armenia the title of king of Sakestān (or “king of the Sakas”) had also been viewed as a prerogative of the heir apparent. Eventually, twenty years after his father’s death Narsē would also rise to the throne of the Sasanian empire.

Let’s look now though at the second list, which offer some puzzling revelations based on the order in which its members appear listed (scholars are quite sure that the order of precedence in inscriptions or other official documents was not something random, but that it followed a strict order dictated by social hierarchy or royal favor):

Sāsān the lord; and Pābag the king; and Šābuhr the king, son of Pābag; and Ardaxšīr, king of kings; and Xvarrānzēm, queen of the kingdom; and Ādur-Anāhīd, queen of queens; and Dēnag, the queen; and Bahrām, king of Gēlān; and Šābuhr, king of Mesān; and Hormazd- Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia; and Narsē, king of Sakestān; and Šābuhrduxtag, queen of Sakestān; and Narsēduxt, queen of Sakestān; and Cašmag, the (royal) lady; and Pērōz, the (royal) prince; and Mirrōd, the lady, mother of king of kings Šābuhr; and Narsē, the prince; and Rōdduxt, the princess, daughter of Anōšag; and Varāzduxt, daughter of Xvarrānzēm; and Staxriyād, the queen; and Hormazdag, son of the king of Armenia, Hormazd; and Ōdābaxt, and Vahrām, and Šābuhr, and Pērōz, sons of the king of Mesene; and Šābuhrduxtag, daughter of the king of Mesene; Ohrmazdduxtag, daughter of the king of Sakestān –for their soul (each day) one lamb, one grīv and five handfuls of bread, and four pās of wine.

This list is quite longer, and the first thing to be noted is that first of all Šābuhr I notes down his ancestors in chronological order: Sāsān, Pābag, Šābuhr (eldest brother of Ardaxšīr I) and finally Ardaxšīr I. The order of precedence of the three following names, queens Xvarrānzēm, Ādur-Anāhīd and Dēnag, is unclear. From the previous list we know that Ādur-Anāhīd was his daughter, and from the list of the relatives and courtiers of Ardaxšīr I we know that a certain Dēnag had been the mother of king Pābag (and so she was Šābuhr I’s great-grandmother) and that another Dēnag, who appears also listed in the list of Ardaxšīr I’s courtiers as “queen of queens” (bānbišnān bānbišn) and as “daughter of Pābag, the king”. According to some scholars (like P.Gignoux), she must’ve been Ardaxšīr I’s sister and also his wife (but not the mother of Šābuhr I), in an example of the type of consanguineous marriage favored by the Zoroastrian tradition and priesthood (xwēdōdah), but other scholars (like A.Maricq and J.Harmatta) believe that the title of “queen of queens” reflected social rank rather than family status, and that thus it was no indications that the bearer of the title was the wife of the ruling šāhān šāh.

Thus, Dēnag as sister of Ardaxšīr I bore the title of “queen of queens” under her brother’s (and perhaps husband) rule, but later she lost it, and “dropped” in hierarchy to be listed after her grand-niece Ādur-Anāhīd, who wore the title under Šābuhr I. The same rationale and doubts applied to Dēnag stand also in Ādur-Anāhīd’s case: was she also his father’s wife? Nothing else is known about Xvarrānzēm and about the title she enjoyed (“queen of the kingdom”, šahr bānbišn).

After these three queens, we find a surprise. The first man listed is a certain Bahrām, king of Gēlān. And scholars have been able to identify this Bahrām with none other than Bahrām I, who succeeded Hormazd I as šāhān šāh in 273 CE. He’s followed by the other three kings that we already saw in the previous list: Šābuhr, king of Mesān, Hormazd- Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia; and Narsē, king of Sakestān. Given that these three kings were Šābuhr I’s sons, it seems logical to assume that Bahrām, king of Gēlān was also a son of Šābuhr I. Scholaly consensus about the different order in this list for Šābuhr I’s sons in this second list is that in this one they appear listed by order of birth, while in the first list they were deliberately listed by Šābuhr I according to his preferences. This is further reinforced because Bahrām appears already depicted as a little child in the investiture relief of Ardaxšīr I at Naqš-e Rajab which is dated to shortly after 224 CE. Thus, by order of birth Bahrām was the first-born son, but he was clearly not his father’s favorite, to the point that Šābuhr I did not even include him in the list of people to whom sacred fires would be dedicated. Šābuhr, king of Mesān was the second-born son, Hormazd- Ardaxšīr, great king of Armenia was the third-born son and Narsē, king of Sakestān was the youngest.

Investiture-relief-of-_Ardashir-_I-_Naqsh-e-_Rajab1.jpg

Investiture relief of Ardaxšīr I at Naqš-e Rajab. Šābuhr I stands behind his father to the left of the image, while the future Bahrām, king of Gēlān is the little child in the middle, which is depicted in front of an image of Hercules/Herakles/Verethragna, which is the Iranian warrior god after whom he was named (Avestan Verethragna became Bahrām in Middle Persian).

Clearly, the order in which Šābuhr I’s sons appear listed in the first list is the order of preference which they held on their father’s eyes, and the third son Hormazd-Ardaxšīr was Šābuhr I was his favorite son. Therefore, he named him Great King of Armenia and invested him as his heir apparent, while the eldest son Bahrām was relegated into obscurity and provided only with the rather secondary title of king of Gēlān (a mountainous area in northern Iran in the Alborz mountains), which ranked clearly under the kingdoms held by his three other brothers. This decision of Šābuhr I was potentially problematic, but it seems that he was strong and respected enough as a king that it was enacted after his death, although the short reign of Hormazd-Ardaxšīr caused the problem to reappear just a year after his father’s decease.

After these four kings, the remaining royal relatives are listed in strict hierarchical order: first the wives of te kings (in the same order of precedence as their husbands) and then their sons and daughters, also following the same order of precedence as their fathers (curiously, the kings have precedence over the queens, but sons and daughters are listed together). Immediately before this listing of grandsons and granddaughters of Šābuhr I there are though some characters named that probably include siblings, cousins and other relatives of Šābuhr I which in the hierarchy of the court ranked higher than his grandchildren. Two among these characters are worth mentioning. One is “Pērōz, the (royal) prince”, who could be the same Pērōz who appears in Manichaean sources as a brother of Šābuhr I and one of Mani’s followers and protectors. The other character is “Mirrōd, the lady, mother of king of kings Šābuhr”; this is the same “Lady Myrod” that appears in later Islamic sources as the mother of Šābuhr I. She is quite down in the list’s hierarchy despite being the king’s mother, which has led scholars to believe that she was probably a concubine of Ardaxšīr I and hot a royal spouse.

Let’s look now at the third and final list of courtiers, which is much longer than the two previous lists:

Those who live under the rule of Šābuhr, king of kings: Ardaxšīr, king of Nodšēragān (Adiabene); Ardaxšīr, king of Kirmān; Dēnag, queen of Mesene, protected by Šābuhr; Hamazāsp, king of Viruz (Georgia); Valāš, royal prince, son of Pābag; Sāsān, royal prince, who was maintained by the Kadōg family; Narsē, royal prince, son of Pērōz; Narsē, royal prince, son of Šābuhr; Šābuhr, the bidaxš (N. “viceroy” or” royal lieutenant”); Pābag, the hazāruft (N. “commander of the thousand”, commander of the royal guard and most senior military officer); Pērōz the aspbed (N. “chief of cavalry”, another senior military commander); Ardaxšīr of the family Varāz; Ardaxšīr of the family Sūrēn; Narsē, lord of Andēgān; Ardaxšīr of the family Kārin; Vehnām, the framadār (N. “governor”); Frīg, Satrap of Gundīšābuhr; Srīdō, son of Šāhmust; Ardaxšīr ardašēršnōm (N. “joy of Ardaxšīr”); Pākcihr tahmšābuhr (N. “Šābuhr’s valiant one”); Ardaxšīr, satrap of Gōmān; Cašmag nēvšābuhr (N. “Šābuhr’s brave one”); Vehnām šābuhršnōm (N. “joy of Šābuhr”); Tīrmihr, chief of the fortress of Šahrgird; Zīk, master of ceremonies; Ardavān, of Dumbāvand; Gundfarr avgān razmjōy (N. “who seeks combat”) and Pābag pērōzšābuhr (N. “victorious for Šābuhr”) son of Šambīd; Vārzan, satrap of Gay; Kirdesrō, the bidaxš; Pābag, son of Visfarr; Valāš, son of Seleucus (an interesting case, obviously an Iranized Greek); Yazdbād, counselor of ladies (N. counselor to the queens); Pābag, the safsērdār (N. “swordbearer”); Narsē, satrap of Rind; Tiyānag, satrap of Ahmadān; Gulbed, the peristagbed (N the “chief of services” or majordomo of the royal household); Jōymard son of Rastag; Ardaxšīr son of Vēfarr; Abursām-Šābuhr the darīgān sārdār (N. “chief of personnel of the court”); Narsē son of Barrag; Šābuhr son of Narsē; Narsē, the grastbed (N. “chief steward”); Hormazd the dibīrbed (N. the “chief scribe; Nādūg, the zēndānīg (the “prison governor”); Pābag, the darbed (N. the “master of the gate”); Pāsfal son of Pāsfal; Abdaxš son of Dizbed; Kirdēr, the hērbed (an old acquantaince in this thread); Rastag, satrap of Veh- Ardaxšīr; Ardaxšīr son of (the?) Bidaxš; Mihrxvāst, the treasurer; Šābuhr, the governor; Aštād of the family Mihrān, the fravardag dibīr (N. the “scribe of epistles”), from Ray; Sāsān, the šābestan (N. the “ward of the harem”, an eunuch), son of Sāsān; Virōy, the vāzārbed (N. the “supervisor of markets”, head of the market inspectorate); Ardaxšīr, satrap of Nērēz; Bagdād son of Vardbed; Kirdēr Ardavān; Zurvāndād son of Bandag; Gunnār son of Sāsān; Mānzag the eunuch; Sāsān, the judge; Vardān, son of Nāšpād; Gulag, the varāzbed (N. the “chief of boars”, probably a warden of the royal hunt lands); altogether, one lamb, one grīv and five handfuls of bread, and four pās of wine.

This last list does not include any members of the royal family which had been already named in the second list. It does include though other sub-kings of the empire, some of whom we know were Šābuhr I’s brothers. This is the case of the first two kings listed, Ardaxšīr, king of Nodšēragān and Ardaxšīr, king of Kirmān. Hamazāsp, king of Viruz (ancient Iberia, modern Georgia) was not a member of the House of Sāsān, and so he’s listed in the last place among the kings. The list follows a strict order according to social hierarchy; first the šahrdārān (sub-kings), then the wispuhrān (members of the royal house without a kingly title), then the higher officials of the army and the civilian administration, then the wuzurgān (grandees), then the āzādān (lesser nobility) and then all the rest.

So, after the šahrdārān quoted above, we have the wispuhrān listed: Valāš, Sāsān, Narsē son of Pērōz and Narsē son of Šābuhr. Then the list goes on with the upper members of the political and military apparatus: Šābuhr, the bidaxš, Pābag, the hazāruft (or hazārbed) and Pērōz the aspbed. It’s highly probable that these three gentlemen were also members of the wuzurgān.

The list then continues with the wuzurgān; obviouly it doesn’t include all the wuzurgān of Iran, only those who were in the good graces of Šābuhr I; like under his father, the list includes members of the Sūrēn and Kārin clans. They are listed in this order:
  • Ardaxšīr of the family Varāz.
  • Ardaxšīr of the family Sūrēn.
  • Narsē, lord of Andēgān.
  • Ardaxšīr of the family Kārin.
After them come all the lesser nobility and assorted functionaries of the court, in strict picking order. Towards the bottom we can find Kirdēr the hērbed, who obviously was not an important figure in the court at the time, but it’s worthy of notice that he’s the only priest listed.

An important issue with these lists is that, as you can see, they’re quite exhaustive, but neither the one for the relatives and courtiers of Ardaxšīr I nor the three lists for the relatives and courtiers of Šābuhr I name a kušān šāh. In a previous post I wrote about the conquest of the Kushan empire by Ardaxšīr I and Šābuhr I and the discovery of coins minted in Marv bearing in Bactrian language and script the name of a certain Ardašaro Košano. The problem is that, as you can see, there’s no trace of him in the ŠKZ, or of any descendant. The first certain mention of a kušān šāh in a Sasanian document is in the Paikuli inscription of Narsē, dated to ca. 293 CE. This kušān šāh could be Pērōz 1 (Note: because the imperial Sasanians and the Kushano-Sasanians used the same names, there’s a useful convention of using Roman numbers for the imperial Sasanians and Arabic numbers for Kushano-Sasanian kings), who issued coins during the late III and early IV centuries CE in Balkh, Herat and Gandhāra. It’s still unclear which was the exact family relationship between this minor Sasanian branch and the main branch in Iran.

As for the personality of Šābuhr I, little can be said about it from the surviving evidence. The Šāh-nāmah (which confuses and mixes the historical figures of Šābuhr I and Šābuhr II) gives a glittering report of this mythical Šābuhr as a mirror of human virtues to the point that it sounds quite fanciful; the main Islamic-era account by Tabarī (who at lest does not confuse both kings) offers a similar image. On the other side, most Graeco-Roman, western Syriac and Armenian sources paint him as a bloodthirsty barbarian. Both portraits are obviously little more than a caricature.

He was not exactly a pacifist or a humanitarian about that much we can be sure. His own account of his two in invasions of Roman territory proudly state that his men looted, killed and pillaged everywhere they could, and that was standard behavior for armies in the III century. Some Armenian, Syriac and Greek accounts also paint a ghastly picture of the way the vast columns of Roman captives were driven by Šābuhr I’s soldiers “like cattle” back to Ērānšāhr, which again seems like standard behavior of his times (one just needs to look at the Aurelian column in Rome to see how Roman soldiers behaved in enemy territory). But getting such vast numbers of people back alive (at least enough of them to populate several entire cities and conduct large-scale public works) means that the deportation was at least well organized and that it was not just done for cruelty’s sake.

Hajjiabad.jpg

Rock inscription of Šābuhr I at Hājjiābad in Fārs.

We can also be fairly sure that he was a boastful and prideful individual, judging by the inordinate amount of rock-reliefs and inscriptions he’s left behind. In several of them he’s shown as an accomplished fighter, and probably that’s more than simple propaganda. The Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah victory relief depicting the victory of the Sasanians at Hormozdgan shows bot Ardaxšīr I and Šābuhr I in battle garment and engaged in fight. Although it’s quite improbable that Ardaxšīr I killed the last Arsacid king Ardawān V with his own hands and that his son Šābuhr did the same with the latter’s “chief minister”, it’s quite probable that both men took part personally in battles in leading their men. Islamic sources depict Ardaxšīr I as an accomplished bowman, and as the inventor of the “Sasanian draw” that had not been used in Iran before him, and which favored a quicker delivery of arrows. Šābuhr I was also an accomplished bowman, and the fortuitous finding of an inscription at Hājjiābad in Fārs dated to the last decade of his reign offers us a glimpse that in his old age he was still an active man, capable of feats of archery:

This is my bow shot (of) the Mazda-worshipping lord Šāpūr, king of kings of the Iranians and non-Iranians, whose lineage is from the gods, the son of Mazda-worshipping lord Ardaxšīr, king of kings of the Iranians, whose lineage is from the gods, grandson of the lord, king Pābag. And when we shot this arrow it was before the sovereigns, and the princes of the blood and the grandees and the nobility. And when we placed our foot on this rock, and we shot an arrow beyond that cairn, but that place where the arrow was thrown, there where the arrow fell, it was not that if the cairn was there, it would not be visible from the outside, thus, we ordered that the cairn be set further down, whoever may have a “good hand,” let them place their foot on this rock and let them shoot an arrow towards that cairn, then, whoever throws the arrow toward that cairn, they have a “good hand”.

Obviously, we can’t judge today how far did Šābuhr I shoot that arrow, but clearly he judged the feat important enough that he had the inscription also repeated about a hundred km. northwest of the first, at Tang-e Borāq in an identical archeological context, on the rock of a grotto, and that he made clear that the feat had been achieved “before the sovereigns, and the princes of the blood and the grandees and the nobility”. It’s worth noting that no other Sasanian king has left a similar inscription boasting of an “athletic” achievement (or at least nothing similar has been found up to this date).

Šābuhr I, šāhān šāh ērān ud anērān, died at Bīšāpūr in May 272 CE and was peacefully succeeded by the heir he had designated, the Great King of Armenia Hormazd-Ardaxšīr, who became the new king of kings of Iranians and non-Iranians as Hormazd I.

IMG_0130.jpg

Silver drachm of Hormazd I (r. 272-273 CE).
 
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Fantastic read. I especially enjoyed the chapter on religion, no matter how difficult and convoluted it had to be.

I wonder why, despite being so entrenched, organised and already seasoned in fighting rival faiths, Zoroastrianism collapsed so thoroughly under the pressure of Islam. Quite unlike Christianity which was losing ground much slower and even today is quite vital in the Middle East.
 
Fantastic read. I especially enjoyed the chapter on religion, no matter how difficult and convoluted it had to be.

I wonder why, despite being so entrenched, organised and already seasoned in fighting rival faiths, Zoroastrianism collapsed so thoroughly under the pressure of Islam. Quite unlike Christianity which was losing ground much slower and even today is quite vital in the Middle East.

At the time of the arrival of Islam, Zoroastrianism was already losing ground. And the main reason for it was its archaism and its narrow attachment to a social order that was already in crisis during the late Sasanian era. After the reign of Yazdgird I, the Sasanian dynasty reached a permanent settlement with its Christian subjects, and an autocephalous Church of the East with its own patriarch at Ctesiphon was established, which showed itself staunchy loyalty to the Sasanians. Except for sporadic episodes, from this point on, Christianity became the second “official religion" of the empire, and it quickly spread eastwards into the Iranian plateau and Central Asia. By the early VII century CE there were Christian bishoprics established in all the major cities of the empire, even in Pārs and as far away as Nishapur and Marv. The adoption of Nestorianism by this Church further enhanced its status in the eyes of the Sasanian kings, because it helped to cut any ties with the official church in the Roman empire.

In eastern Iran, Buddhism had also gained many adepts since the times of the Kushans, and the Sasanian control of these lands, intermittent as it was, did not reverse this situation. Afghanistan south of Bactria was full of Buddhist monasteries and shrines (like at Bamiyan), and that was also true for Bactriana, which tradition considered to be one of the cradles of the Mazdean religion. In its capital city Balkh stood the great Nava Vihara monastery, and Buddhism was the majority religion even as far west as Marv, which had been only under brief control of the Kushans during the II century CE.

By its very doctrine, traditional Zoroastrianism was very poorly suited to a society dominated by cities, traders and artisans, because it was tied to an archaic social order that despised these activities. A symptom of this is its disregard for writing at a time when "religions of the book" were gaining momentum and imposing themselves everywhere; it was possibly under pressure of the expanding Church of the East that in the V century CE (at the earliest) the mowbedān developed the Avestan script and wrote the Avesta down; but even so, there was no attempt to translate it (they had the Zand though), and so they kept a "holy scripture" in a language that had been dead for a thousand years.

The Sasanians themselves contributed to these developments with their sustained politics of building new urban centers and developing trade in order to win new income sources for the crown and reinforcing their position in front of the traditional elites (the nobility and the priesthood) who were in fact the main pillars of the social order on which Zoroastrianism depended.

Without a radical change in outlook and attitude towards the rising new social order and a full embrace of the new age of "bookish" faiths, Zoroastrianism had things very difficult in order to retain its primacy in the Iranian plateau. It finally made these changes, but far too late (the Parsis in India were mainly engaged in trade).
 
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I've heard also that Zoroastrianism was an ethnic religion, only Iranians could worship. Although it does not seem that the doctrine itself asserts any special place to the Iranian nation. Why couldn't anybody become Mazdayasnian and recite prayers to help Ahura Mazda battle Ahriman in the world of thought?
 
That’s a good question, but the fact is that still today the Parsis in India and Iran show little enthusiasm about conversions, even though their numbers are slowly shrinking. A reason could be that while in "missionary" faiths like Christianity, Islam, Buddhism or Manicheism the exhortation to spread the faith is intrinsic to their sacred texts and thus to their doctrines, the same can’t be said about Zoroastrianism. Even the very concept of "missionary activity" is absent from the Avesta and the Zand, which means that at no time between the composition of the Gāthās and the fall of the Sasanian empire did the Mazdean priesthood ever conceive of spreading their faith to the non-Mazdean subjects of the empire. And the entrenched conservatism of the Zoroastrian tradition wouldn’t have helped at all to change this outlook.
 
I have read in history of Armenia that the Sasanians actually tried to impose Zoroastrianism there after the country already became Christian. In fact, that was the main reason for the numerous Armenian revolts against Sasanians, including the one which ended with the battle of Avarayr, which gained almost mythical importance in Armenian culture.
 
I have read in history of Armenia that the Sasanians actually tried to impose Zoroastrianism there after the country already became Christian. In fact, that was the main reason for the numerous Armenian revolts against Sasanians, including the one which ended with the battle of Avarayr, which gained almost mythical importance in Armenian culture.

Yes, because Armenia had been a Zoroastrian country before its conversion, and the Sasanians tried to turn it back after Armenia was divided between Rome and Iran at the end of the IV century CE. The events though were not as streamlined as they appear in the "official" Armenian history, which was mainly written by Christian clerics. When king Trdat converted, not all of the Armenian nobility followed along, and that would be a source of internal trouble in Armenia in the last century of its independence. Exactly what portion of the nobility remained loyal to the Mazdean tradition is impossible to say, but this means that the Armenian nobility became divided into two fields: pro-Roman Cnristians and pro-Sasanian Zoroastrians, which weakened the kingdom greatly.

The mowbedān didn’t care much if Christianity grew amongst traders and artisans, or among rhe Aramaic and Arabic speaking local population of Mesopotamia and Khuzestan, because this people had not been Zoroastrians before they converted, but converting the Armenian nobility was another thing altogether. Armenia had been an Iranized country since Achaemenid times, with a social and military system very similar to the Iranian one. Even in the ŠKZ and the KKZ, Armenia is considered as part of ērān. And allowing the militarily powerful and highly valued Armenian nobility to become Christian was seen by the Sasanian dynasty as unacceptable for strategic reasons: they wanted to incorporate it into the Sasanian spah, but they were convinced that if it became a Christian nobility, it would be unreliable in case of war against Rome.

As you can see, Armenia was an exceptional case. And the Sasanian attempt at turning back the clock ended with a mighty rebellion that took many years and huge efforts to put down. After that, the Sasanians abandoned any idea of persecution (the fact that the Armenian Church was autocephalous and separate from the one in the Roman empire probably also helped), but from that moment on, they took care in using Armenian Christian nobles only in campaigns in the East, and never against Romans or other Christian Caucasian states.

EDIT: I's also wish to point out that one thing is not being a missionary religion, and another is trying to defend one's own turf. In essence, that's how most non-Abrahamic faiths have behaved historically. Classical "paganism" (in itself a Christian construction) felt no need to send missionaries to the Arsacid empire of to Germania in order to preach to their inhabitants that they should worship the Graeco-Roman pantheon, but still it could react violently if new faiths tried to establish themselves in its own territory and grow at its expenses, like it happened with Christianity. A similar thing happened for example in China and Japan when Catholic missionaries arrived there in the XVI and XVII centuries.
 
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24.1 THE RISE OF THE ILLYRIAN EMPERORS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ROMAN RECOVERY.
24.1 THE RISE OF THE ILLYRIAN EMPERORS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ROMAN RECOVERY.

Any political system based on the rule of a single leader has a key weakness: the ability of the ruler to adapt themselves to the circumstances and requirements of their time. This was as true for the Sasanian empire as for the Roman empire. After the death of Šābuhr I, we can see a reversal in the roles and circumstances of the two empires.

Ardaxšīr I and Šābuhr I had benefitted from a prolonged period of time in which the Roman empire had been pronged into an ever worsening political, military, demographic and military crisis, which reached its nadir in the 250-270 CE year span. Especially between 260 and 270 CE, the Roman empire was put against the ropes metaphorically speaking, and found itself fighting for its very survival, split into three different “empires”.

The first two energetic Sasanian kings had played themselves an essential part in plunging Rome into this deep crisis, as their constant attacks in the Near East had inflicted considerable stress into the Roman political and military system. If we (arbitrarily, because we could also date its start at an earlier date like the murder of Commodus; I myself prefer this option) make the start of the crisis coincide with the murder of Severus Alexander in 235 CE and its end (less arbitrarily, as this date is accepted by almost everybody) with the accession of Diocletian in 284 CE, it took the Roman political and military elites almost 50 years to get the situation under control, almost risking the collapse of the empire in the meantime.

The deaths of several emperors (and the accompanying usurpations) had been directly caused, or at least strongly influenced by their defeats in the East or by their inability to cope with what the Romans perceived as “Sasanian aggression” in that theater: Severus Alexander, Maximinus Thrax, Gordian III, Trebonianus Gallus, Valerian. And the Roman campaigns and military disasters in the East had also forced an increasingly beleaguered Roman state to shift ever more troops to the East, weakening the long European border of the empire. The collapse of the Rhenish-Raetian border in the 260s CE can be directly linked to the sending of a strong army headed by Valerian to the East at the start of his reign.

The joint reign of Valerian and Gallienus saw finally the fist signs that the Roman elite was starting to think “outside the box” and that it was willing to try some radical reforms. It’s almost sure that this was not part of any kind of plan, but that the crisis had reached such levels that the elite had hit the “panic” button and ad hoc solutions were being implemented on a random basis (it’s not even clear if they were intended as permanent at first). An example of an innovation that did not become a permanent one was the concentration of most of the cavalry in a single central army under Gallienus’ general Aureolus, based at Mediolanum, which together with the central reserve which had been based at Rome until then and selected vexillationes from the border legions was to act as a central reserve directly under the emperor’s command, to give him the upper hand firstly against usurpers and secondly against any “barbarian” raids into Italy and thirdly against the splinter Gallic empire led by Postumus.

But the existence of a proper “central” army directly under the emperor’s command was an innovation (well, partial innovation, a central reserve had already existed before Gallienus, but this ruler turned it into a proper permanent army designed to be deployed as a unified force in campaign) that stuck; this army received the name of comitatus (from Latin comes, “companion”, thus implying “the companions of the emperor”). Another key innovation introduced by Gallienus and which was to have very far-reaching consequences was his promotion to the upper ranks of military command of soldiers of very humble origins, which led within a very short space of time to the complete disappearance of the old senatorial and equestrian elite from the upper command posts. Today scholars agree that the statement by the SHA that Gallienus banished senators from command posts by decree is yet another fabrication, but the fact is that this was a process that happened under Gallienus (but not by imperial decree). There would be still senators commanding armies under his successors, but they became an utter rarity.

Gallienus_01.jpg

Bust of Gallienus as a middle aged man, probably dated to the end of his reign.

These new men were promoted by Gallienus solely on grounds of their military ability, and it’s remarkable that they all came from a very restricted geographical area: Lower Pannonia and Upper Moesia (thus their appellation of “Illyrians”), an area which contained no large cities, with its main center being Sirmium. Probably because the Danubian army was the only large army that remained loyal to Gallienus (the British, Rhenish and Raetian armies had defected to Postumus, and the eastern armies were controlled first by the Macriani and later by Odaenathus). But still, this does not explain why they came from such a specific area; surely these two provinces were important recruitment sources, but so were Thracia or Upper Pannonia.

Sirmium.jpg

Plaster model of Sirmium, modern Sremska Mitrovica in Serbia, on the banks of the Savus river (modern Sava).

These Illyrian officers were all promoted through a new elite unit created by Gallienus, the candidati (from Latin candidus, meaning “white”, because according to ancient sources they wore white garments). This elite cavalry unit was not a ceremonial unit but a real battle unit and also a bodyguard unit that accompanied the emperor at all times. Its members could expect quick promotion out of its ranks into higher command ranks both in the comitatus and the armies that remained at the borders. Scholars believe that these Illyrian officers became a tightly knotted and closed group within the candidati (Ilkka Syvänne even uses the term “Illyrian Mafia” to refer to them, while other scholars like David S. Potter use the somewhat more subdued expression “Illyrian Junta”), which effectively managed to cope all senior positions, to the extent that almost all the emperors for the next century would come from this group (Flavius Constantius, the father of Constantine the Great, also belonged to it).

These men lacked the ideological baggage that respect for former tradition imposed on the older elites, and once they gained access to power, two things happened. First, a dramatic improvement in the fortunes of Roman arms (at last the Romans had managed to put the leadership of the army into the hands of professionals, which was the logical culmination of the reforms of Gaius Marius at the end of the II century BCE) and an acceleration in the rate of reforms, with an ever-diminishing respect towards tradition. Gallienus was to be the penultimate emperor of senatorial descent, and the last emperor who resided during a significant part of his reign in the city of Rome.

Gallienus managed to survive 8 dramatic years between 260 and 268 CE thanks to these emergency measures and the loyalty and skills of these new Illyrian commanders. But in the end, these homini novi adopted also the customs and practices of the old elite and decided to remove Gallienus from power. The mid-260s CE had seen a relative stabilization of the situation in Gallienus’ part of the empire, but this calm was not going to last. In 267 CE, the Goths and Heruli launched again large-scale attacks against the Roman Balkan and Anatolian provinces. While Gallienus was busy in the Balkans fighting against the Goths and Heruli, he managed to repeal the latter at the river Nestus, but in April 268 CE his general Aureolus, his most important and trusted commander who commanded the imperial cavalry army based at Mediolanum, began issuing coins in the name of the Gallic emperor Postumus. In the summer of 268 CE, Gallienus’ army entered northern Italy and marched towards Mediolanum to end with this rebellion; Aureolus blocked the advance of Gallienus’ army at one of the bridges on the river Adda (later called pons Aureoli, modern Pontirolo), but Gallienus won the battle. Aureolus quickly retreated inside the walls of Mediolanum, and Gallienus besieged the city.

While once more the Romans were busy fighting amongst themselves, the Goths and Heruli were left free to plunder at leisure. In Anatolia it had to be Odaenathus and his son Heraclianus who intervened to restore the situation, this meant a further enlargement of the Palmyrene sphere of influence into northern and western Asia Minor. While they were campaigning there, in the winter of 267/268 CE Odaenathus and his son and heir Heraclianus were murdered in what appears to have been an internecine “vendetta” within the Palmyrene royal family; some ancient sources like Petrus Patricius and John of Antioch attribute the responsibility for the murder plot to Gallienus. If this was indeed Gallienus’ doing, he did not reap any benefits from the murder; control in Palmyra (and by extension in the whole Roman East) was assumed by Odaenathus’ widow Septimia Zenobia, in the name of their remaining son Vaballathus, onto whom his mother invested all the titles which had been once held by his father in an action of dubious legal status; except for the titles of Ras and Exarch, and the self-assumed title of rex regum, these titles had been given to Odaenathus by Gallienus, and so his son could only have received them from Gallienus too (offices were not hereditary in the Roman res publica). Instead of bringing the East back under Gallienus’ command, the murder marked a decisive step in the increasingly autonomous and independent tendencies of Palmyra.

In the meanwhile, Gallienus was besieging Aureolus at Mediolanum; before the siege was complete and according to Udo Hartmann’s dates and reconstruction of events, Gallienus was murdered at the end of August 268 CE by a cabal of his Illyrian officers; he was 50 years old. The plotters included generals M.Aurelius Valerius Claudius (Aureolus’ successor as commander of the cavalry), Lucius Aurelius Marcianus (whom Gallienus had left in command of the forces in the Danube, and who was not present at Mediolanum), Lucius Domitius Aurelianus (the future emperor), Aurelius Heraclianus (the Praetorian Prefect) and Cecropius, commander of the Dalmatian cavalry. This included practically all the senior commanders of Gallienus’ army.

Immediately after the murder, the troops of the besieging army acclaimed as augustus one of the members of the conspiracy: Marcus Aurelius Valerius Claudius, which has gone down in Roman history as Claudius II or Claudius Gothicus. His origins are extremely obscure; he came either from Sirmium in Lower Pannonia or Naissus in Upper Moesia (the sources are contradictory about it). Soon hereafter, Aureolus left the besieged city and presented himself in front of the new emperor, presumably to ask for clemency (or because he had taken part in the murder and this was part of the arrangement); according to Zosimus he was conveniently “killed by Claudius’ soldiers”. Claudius also ordered the execution of his fellow conspirator Cecropius and possibly also Heraclianus and forced the Senate (which had hurried to order the execution of Gallienus’ brother, wife and son in Rome) to deify Gallienus in order to distance himself as much possibly from the murder of his predecessor. On the other hand, Aurelian enjoyed a bright career during Claudius’ reign, becoming commander of the cavalry, the post previously occupied by Aureolus and Claudius himself.

Coin_of_Claudius_II_03.jpg

Aureus of Claudius Gothicus. On the reverse, GENIVS EXERCI(TVS), a clear allusion to the way he rose to power.

Claudius’ most urgent task was to go back to the Balkans and finish the task that Gallienus had left unfinished, expelling from there the Goths and their allies. They had launched a new large-scale amphibious attack against the Roman Balkans, gathering forces from the Goths and their allied and subject peoples like the Gepids, Peucini and Heruli. The SHA and Zosimus give enormous (and quite unbelievable) numbers for this second wave of invaders (325,000 men and 2,000-6,000 ships). Still, these numbers can be taken as an inkling that the Gothic force was huge, larger perhaps than anything the Goths had ever before assembled against the Romans.

According to ancient sources (which are quite confusing and contradictory), this force headed to the Bosporus after failing to storm Marcianopolis, where it suffered man casualties due to the strong currents of the Straits and perhaps to Roman naval counterattacks. They attacked and took Byzantium and Chrysopolis, and managed to get into the Aegean, where some detachments plundered as far away as Crete. But the main body attacked the coast of what’s now northern Greece, and besieged Thessalonica and Cassandreia.

But his Gothic campaign had to be delayed, because once again the Alamanni had crossed the Alps and invaded Italy. Claudius intercepted and defeated the invaders at the battle of lake Benacus (lake Garda). The chronology for all these events is unclear. Patricia Southern dates the battle of lake Benacus at the late fall of 268 CE, but many other authors date it to late winter or the spring of 269 CE. Once the Alamannic threat to Italy had been thwarted, Claudius and his army marched to the Balkans. The campaign against the Goths and their allies was to be extremely hard and difficult and would occupy the rest of Claudius II’s reign (a year and eight months).

Claudius left behind in Italy his brother Marcus Aurelius Claudius Quintillus with an army in case that the Gallic Empire tried an attack against the peninsula, while he and Aurelian joined forces with Marcianus in the Balkans, possibly in Upper Moesia.

Upon hearing of the approach of Claudius’ army, the Goths lifted both sieges and marched into the interior, laying waste to northern Macedonia in their wake. Apparently, Claudius had detached the cavalry of his army under Aurelian’s command and sent him forward to shadow and harass the Goths in their northwards march; through skilled attacks and ambushes Aurelian managed to inflict serious losses onto the Gothic force with very few casualties to his own force. Finally, the Gothic army clashed against Claudius’ main army (reinforced by Aurelian’s cavalry) near Naissus in Upper Moesia, in an indecisive encounter that saw many losses on both sides. The battle was not decisive in that it did not cripple the Gothic force, but it severely maimed it and stopped its northbound advance. Unable to retreat across the Danube to their homeland, the Goths were forced to retreat back south across devastated territory, and soon hunger began to take its toll, and worse still a plague broke between their ranks. Once again, they were constantly harassed by Aurelian’s cavalry at short quarters, while Claudius’ main army shadowed them from a distance. The Goths tried to find another way north and out of devastated territory by turning east into Thrace, but there Aurelian and Claudius by skillful maneuvering managed to trap and surround them in the Haemus Mons (the Balkan range). By then it was already winter (269-270 CE) and cold, lack of provisions and the plague were not only tormenting the Goths (who were trapped in the cold mountains, without access to foodstuffs) but also the Roman forces, where discipline began to break down in some unclear its.

Suva_planina_UM.jpg

Suva Planina, in southeastern Serbia. This was probably the place where the battle of Naissus took place. Today is a nature reserve, and it's crossed by the remains of the Roman Via Militaris, which ran between Singidunum (modern Belgrade) and Byzantium.

In this situation, the Goths who were certainly weakened, but whose fighting spirit had been not broken yet) attempted a desperate break out attack against the Roman encirclement. Allegedly, Claudius ignored Aurelian’s advice and tried to block the Gothic sally only with the infantry, and the result was almost a total disaster for Roman arms; only the swift intervention of Aurelian’s cavalry against the Gothic flanks and rear avoided a complete Roman rout. Many Goths managed to break from the encirclement and divided into smaller warbands who began to roam the countryside of Lower Moesia and Thrace looting it for booty and food. By this time, plague was affecting severely the Roman army and even the emperor himself, and Claudius retreated to his regional headquarters at Sirmium to try to recover. The task of cleaning Thrace and Lower Moesia of Gothic war bands fell to Aurelian, who spend most of the spring and summer of 270 CE doing so.

This campaign marked a watershed in the military status between Rome and the Goths, for although it did not break the military power of the Gothic confederation and it did not put an end to the fighting between both foes, it helped to stop for a whole century further large-scale Gothic attacks into Roman territory (of the kind that had begun at the end of Philip the Arab’s reign). Together with the inactivity of the Sasanians in the East, this gave a much-needed balloon of oxygen to the Roman empire, because the two worse enemies of Rome during the III century CE were now (at least temporarily) out of the scene. This would be essential for the Roman recovery, because although many enemies remained, none of them were of the same caliber.

Apparently, after winning all these victories Claudius took the titles of Gothicus Maximus and Germanicus Maximus, although it’s unsure if he managed to go back to Rome to celebrate a triumph, because while Aurelian was wrapping up things in the eastern Balkans, the Vandals and Sarmatians broke across the Roman border in the middle Danube in Upper and Lower Pannonia. In late August or early September 270 CE, Claudius II died at Sirmium of the plague (probably one of the last outbreaks of the Plague of Cyprian), and nominated his brother Quintillus as successor, who was promptly acknowledged as the new augustus by the Roman Senate.

Claudius’ reign would set a trend until the accession of Diocletian: tough, soldierly and short-lived emperors who ruled from the saddle as they displayed superhuman energy running from one border to another fighting assorted invasions and usurpers. These Illyrian emperors managed to stabilize the military situation somewhat but failed at restoring a viable and stable political regime able to guarantee the internal peace needed to allow the recovery of many devastated areas of the empire; only Diocletian would be able to succeed in this regard.

Aureus_Quintillus.jpg

Aureus of Quintillus. On the reverse, the (somewhat premature) legend FIDES EXERCITI (loyalty of the armies)

Quintillus controlled the small army left in Italy to control threats from Gaul, but the largest part of the army was gathered in Pannonia to fight against the Vandals, and it acclaimed the commander of Claudius’ cavalry, Aurelian as augustus. Upon hearing the news and realizing that Aurelian was supported by most of the army, Quintillus killed himself at Aquileia and left the field free for Aurelian. The choice is not surprising, because most of the merit for Claudius’ victories against the Goths in the Balkans belonged in fact to Aurelian’s skillful leadership, and the soldiers of the Illyrian and Danubian armies were well aware of this fact.

The new emperor has gone down in history as one of the greatest Roman generals ever (more than deservedly), although in my opinion even if he was without any doubt a stellar commander, he was not as successful as an emperor, because even if he was able to win an impressive amount of victories, he failed to address properly the political and fiscal crisis that had played a capital role in the downward spiral of the Roman empire.

Aurelian_03.jpg

Aureus of Aurelian. On the reverse, VIRTVS ILLIRICI, in praise of the martial qualities of the Illyrian army.

Aurelian’s reign began with the emperor having to deal with military trouble, and this would be the trend for the four years it lasted, with the energetic Aurelian rushing from one troubled spot to another, playing the role of the “imperial fire fighter“ (like Gallienus and Claudius II before him). His first task was to finish the fight in Pannonia against the Vandals and Sarmatians, a task that kept him busy for the remainder of the year 270 CE. One of the scarce surviving fragments of Dexippus’ Scythica describes how Aurelian resorted to a mix of military action and negotiations to close the campaign in Pannonia. Although it’s unclear if he could achieve a satisfactory result, because in the winter of 270-271 CE the Alamanni and Iuthungi launched yet another major invasion across the upper Danube, crossed the Alpine passes and invaded the northern Italian plain unopposed, moving at great speed and crossing the Po river. Aurelian had to hurry to Italy from Pannonia, but in January 271 CE the Alamanni defeated him near Placentia, and Aurelian was forced to retreat back towards the Julian Alps; it’s probable that the emperor had been surprised by the speedy advance of the invaders and had moved quickly to intercept them with only part of his army (perhaps only the most mobile units), and when he intercepted the Alamanni he found himself badly outnumbered and was forced to retreat and wait for the rest of the army to join him. The Alamanni seized the opportunity and advanced south along the Via Flaminia, with the clear intention of attacking Rome itself. When the news reached the Urbs, panic ensued, but luckily for its inhabitants, Aurelian reacted with energy and speed. He gathered his forces and pursued them; he caught them at Fanum (modern Fano, in Romagna) and there he defeated them in pitched battle, although the Alamanni were not routed and they were able to retreat northwards in good order and crossed again the Po river near Ticinum (modern Pavia). After the fiasco of Placentia and the danger of an attack against Rome, Aurelian’s reputation was at stake, and he pursued the Alamanni and Iuthungi into the northern Italian plain. He cut their path of retreat on an open plain near Pavia, and in the battle that ensued Aurelian routed the completely and recovered all the booty and captives that his foes had plundered during their invasion. Only a small group was able to cross the Alps back into Raetia, but even this small force was pursued and destroyed by Aurelian. After this victory, Aurelian assumed the title Germanicus Maximus.

The city of Rome had suffered its second major invasion scare in a decade, and in a political gesture aimed at inspiring confidence to its inhabitants, Aurelian ordered the building of a new wall around the city, the first one to be built in Rome since the times of the legendary king of Rome Servius Tullius. The wall was a propaganda gesture more than anything, because its disproportionate length, the huge population of Rome and the lack of reliable water springs within the city meant that the city was indefensible against a serious enemy, but it would serve to stop isolated “barbarian” war bands from plundering the city, giving time for relief army to be sent by the emperor.

Aurelian_Walls_01.jpg

Aerial view of the Aurelian Wall in Rome; large tracts of it are still intact.

This decision was probably prompted by the unrest that beset Rome in the aftermath of the invasion scare. In the summer of 271 CE, the workers of the Roman mint revolted, and this soon translated into widespread riots across the city. Some scholars link this revolt to the decision by Aurelian to reform the currency, which had reached its absolute nadir during the early 270s CE. Part of the reform included the decentralization of minting from big mints as the one in Rome into smaller ones closer to the borders (where the soldiers had to receive their pay), like Siscia in Illyricum (modern Sisak, in Croatia). And the guild of minters seems to have taken the news quite badly, the rioting lasted several days and led to thousands of deaths in the fighting. The SHA’s account tells us that Aurelian had the revolt put down by the sword, killing thousands in the process, and killing also a large part of the city’s leadership (i.e. the senators); this is just another example of the SHA’s view of Aurelian as a brutish, bloodthirsty tyrant, which finds an echo in other Latin sources, especially in Ammianus Marcellinus, with his quote that Aurelian “fell upon the rich like a torrent”. From these examples it’s clear that the senatorial tradition was quite hostile towards Aurelian, but Zosimus presents a much milder view of Aurelian, reflecting probably the opinion of (now lost) III century CE Greek sources. In his efforts to pacify the Urbs before departing for the East, apart from ordering the building of the Aurelian Wall, he ordered that from that on the food dole to the Roman populace would also include pork, apart from bread and olive oil (all at the state’s expense).

But Aurelian had no time to rest on his laurels, because alarming news arrived from the Balkans and the East. In the Balkans, the Goths had attacked Dacia and the lower Danube once again, and Aurelian moved quickly against them in early 272 CE, winning his third campaign in less than two years. After this victory, he took the name Gothicus Maximus and took a drastic decision regarding to the defense of the Danubian border: he ordered the abandonment of Dacia and the evacuation of all the military and civilian personnel, as well as any civilians who wanted to remain under Roman rule. This was an extraordinarily risky decision for any Roman emperor to take, because abandoning conquered territory was anathema in Roman political culture, especially a territory that had been Roman for more than a century and a half, but there was already the recent precedent of the Agri Decumates, and from a strategic point of view the decision made sense for a beleaguered empire that had been fighting desperately on the defensive for decades. It shortened drastically the border to defend, abandoning a very exposed territory that anyway was scarcely populated and Romanized and had to be defended with a large garrison of two complete legions and more than 10,000 auxiliaries. Pulled back behind the Danube, these forces would have to defend now a drastically shortened border.

This second Balkan campaign though was just a minor affair for Aurelian, because the major reason for his presence in the Balkans was that he was moving with his army to the East, where the political situation had reached a breaking point between Rome and Palmyra.
 
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Yeah! An update!
 
And so, Rome starts crawling out of its deepest pit. Happy to see you continuing :)
 
Finally :)
 
Very glad to see it's back! Out of curiosity, are there any theories as to why Gallienus was murdered by his own officers? He doesn't seem to have been that unsuccessful, didn't negotiate with barbarians or really do anything that seems to have usually caused Emperors to get murdered earlier in this thread. Sheer opportunism?
 
In other news, a certain group of rabble-rousers is wondering when that other scholar (not you, unfortunately) is going to give us a heads-up on his wonderful AAR on old Uncle Sam?
P.S. Also your writing is pretty eye-catching in my opinion. :D
 
Very glad to see it's back! Out of curiosity, are there any theories as to why Gallienus was murdered by his own officers? He doesn't seem to have been that unsuccessful, didn't negotiate with barbarians or really do anything that seems to have usually caused Emperors to get murdered earlier in this thread. Sheer opportunism?

As far as I know, there are no established theories about the matter, I can only offer here my personal thoughts about the issue.

The image of Gallienus that ancient texts have transmitted us is a heavily biased one. Ancient historical texts about the Roman empire can be broadly divided into three large groups:

  • Historical texts written in Greek. It’s usually forgotten that by far most of the written texts (of all kinds) written in the Roman empire were written in Greek. The East had more cities, literacy was more spread, higher culture was much more widespread and intellectual enterprises always enjoyed a higher level of social prestige than in the Latin west. The very genre of written history as it was understood in the Classical world was invented by the Greeks, more specifically by Herodotus, Thucidides and Xenophon in the V century BCE. All the classical historians would hereafter follow these three models, and in the Greek speaking world Thucidides was usually used as the ideal model, due to the elegance of his style. Despite the fact that historical Greek texts were once much more abundant than Latin ones, their rate of survival has been much lower due to historical reasons. In the West, Latin never ceased to be the language of culture until the Renaissance, but in the East the slow shrinking and final fall of the Eastern Roman Empire meant the replacement of Greek as the language of culture by Arabic, New Persian and Turkish. While some philosophical and scientific Greek works were translated into Arabic and New Persian, I know of no historical texts that enjoyed the same treatment. Also, judging by the surviving fragments of texts by Greek historians who wrote under Roman rule, they seemed to share (except for some cases that I will refer to later) quite a parochial mindset. For example, Dexippus of Athens (perhaps the one from whom more fragments have survived) cared only for the events of Greece and the rest of the Greek-speaking Balkans (hence his interest about the Gothic wars which ravaged Thrace, Macedonia and Greece) or about the “glorious” Greek past (hence his work about Alexander the Great and the diadochi). At most, Greek historians seemed to care about what happened in the eastern part of the empire, and cared very little about the empire as a whole. So, their opinions about emperors were defined exclusively by how well they served what these historians considered to be the interests of the Greek East.
  • The Latin senatorial tradition. By far, this tradition is the most important one, because most of the surviving texts belong to it, with a couple of honorary exceptions. These works were mostly written in Latin, and in the city of Rome, either by senators (in some cases personally, in other by secretaries) or by other people (usually equestrians) who shared the senatorial mindset and worldview. History was perhaps the only literary genre (other than philosophy and epistles) that was considered worthy of an individual of senatorial rank (fiction works, poetry, theater, and the like were considered to be below the dignity of a senator). This tradition flourished within a very exclusive and rarified group of people: before the IV century CE, there were only 600 senators, most of whom resided in Rome or Italy permanently or for prolonged periods of time. A senator needed to know and be fluent in Latin (even if he was of Greek origin), because Latin was the only language used in the army and in the judiciary. This tightly knotted and endogamic set of people tended to view the world in very narrow terms, and even if the Senate had been deprived of much of its power by the new Augustan order, senators still enjoyed immense privileges and political power, and considered themselves, as a group, the true keepers of the Roman traditions. In other words, senators simply saw no difference between “Rome” (as a political idea) and the Senate (as a collectivity of senators), and so judged emperors simply by their actions towards the Senate: if an emperor attacked the Senate or simply displeased or humiliated it, he automatically became a “bad emperor”. And once and emperor got this label, it stuck, because the senators were a group of highly cultivated, literate people who had even more cultivated, literate people working for them and had enormous economic resources at their disposal. That meant that they had the means to write the official history of Rome, and at a time without printing presses, to copy it and make it circulate. The number of senators who wrote identifiable historical texts (some of which have been lost) is long, and it includes heavyweights as Pliny the Elder, Tacitus, Marius Maximus, Cassius Dio (an interesting case, because he wrote in Greek as he was a Bythinian, but his works shows that he had fully absorbed the worldview and attitudes of his Latin-speaking colleagues), Sextus Aurelius Victor, Flavius Eutropius or the elusive SHA. Still in this group we could include the works of authors who were not senators themselves but who wrote in the same lines, probably because they were addressing a senatorial public (quite logical if one was writing in Rome, because books were very expensive items, and so the senators were the best market for them), like Suetonius, Herodian and especially Ammianus Marcellinus.
  • Official histories in Latin and Greek, either written by an emperor himself or commissioned by him. This group includes quite heterogeneous works, and not much of it has survived. Obviously, these texts are heavily propagandistic, but they offer an important counterpoint to the senatorial tradition as well as a valuable insight into the motivations of some emperors. They began to appear already under Augustus, who displayed one of the most impressive (and successful) campaigns of political propaganda in history, and historians were a part of it, for he commissioned Livius’ monumental work about the history of Rome. Another, more utilitary Augustan example are the Res Gestae Divi Augusti. The works of Flavius Josephus can also be included in this group, because one of their primary objectives (other than to justify Josephus’ actions during the Jewish War and allow him to vent and rant against his political enemies of old) was to praise and exalt the Flavian dynasty to which Josephus was heavily indebted. We also know that Hadrian wrote and published an official autobiography which sadly has not survived but which was used by later authors like Marius Maximus and the SHA. Also, some short texts by Julian (“the Apostate”) have survived as quotes in works by Ammianus Marcellinus, Libanius of Antioch and Priscus of Athens, all of whom knew Julian in person.
Once I’ve said this, let’s address the issue of the ancient sources available for Gallienus’ reign. They are painfully lacking. Some very short passages in Ammianus Marcellinus (precisely one of his quotes from Julian), Zosimus, Syncellus and Zonaras, but sadly the only lengthy source surviving is the Historia Augusta, the least trustworthy source of them all. This means that the sources that could be more trustworthy are painfully short, and the oldest of them (Ammianus) was written more than a century after Gallienus’ death, probably using biased sources; while the only one with a substantial amount of material (the HA) is a historical minefield, written 150 years after Gallienus’ death and using also biased sources.

Modern scholars have thus been forced to undertake a very rigorous examination of these sources before taking seriously any of the data they offer about Gallienus. But in a sense, it was probably the case of Gallienus which first called the attention of scholars about the biased nature and unreliability of ancient sources. Because one fact is apparent in the HA and the other sources which also used the same sources as the HA: the senatorial tradition was deeply hostile to Gallienus. According to these sources, Gallienus was little more than a second Nero: an effeminate, lazy and incapable weakling with a penchant for cross-dressing who preferred to stay in Rome in the middle of luxury instead of leading his armies in campaign and defending the empire. Scholars quickly realized that this image is absolutely at odds with historical evidence: these very sources (without any care for contradicting themselves) as well as other short literary fragments, juridical texts preserved in later compilations, epigraphy and numismatics attest to the fact that Gallienus did indeed spend most of his reign in campaign, far away from Rome. And then there’s simple logic: Gallienus was augustus between 253 and 268 CE, the longest reign of the III century CE except for Diocletian’s. And in the convoluted circumstances of that century, it’s just impossible to believe that he would have managed to keep the purple and survive for such a long time if he had been just a Roman drag queen living it up in Rome’s palaces.

The hostility of the senatorial tradition is at the same time surprising and easily understandable. Gallienus was probably (with the possible exception of Gordian III) the most “aristocratic” emperor of the III century CE, because he came from impeccable senatorial Italian ancestry from both sides (especially on his mother’s side, the very prominent senatorial family of the Egnatii). He was also a very cultivated individual, with a love for philosophy and literature (he was the great patron of Plotinus), and he was also (like Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius) a fervent admirer of classical Greece and like the two aforementioned emperors he was initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. He was also a practical and tolerant ruler, who abrogated Valerian’s edict on sacrifices at the first opportunity. The contrast with the rude Illyrian emperors who followed him couldn’t have been greater. Gallienus was the last gentleman senator to rise to the purple.

What did he do then to win him the implacable hostility of the Senate? The SHA clarifies it (as usual, in a twisted and falsified way): he ended the monopoly of senators and their sons in the higher command echelons of the legions, and thus ended the senatorial cursus honorum which had lasted since the beginnings of the Roman Republic. The Senate never recovered from this blow, and the senators never forgave him for it. And as time went by in the IV century CE this hostility only increased, because the Roman Senate became one of the fiercest bastions of traditional paganism against the rapidly expanding Christian religion, and senatorial historians added his decision to repeal Valerian’a anti-Christian legislation to the list of his "sins". We should remember that when the news of Gallienus’ murder reached Rome, the Senate went on a rampage: his son (still a child), his younger half-brother and possibly also his wife were immediately executed by orders of the Senate (apparently on its own initiative), and declared the damnatio memoriae against Gallienus. They were only stopped in this by Claudius Gothicus, who ordered the Senate to deify his predecessor.

But it’s quite improbable that the Illyrian officers of Gallienus’ army shared the same hatred against Gallienus that the Senate developed. In my opinion, it’s probable that Gallienus’ decision to open the ranks of the officer corps (higher than the post of primus pilus) to men of all origins had two reasons behind it. First, to improve the quality of the officer corps at a time when he could not allow himself any more defeats. And second, because he hoped that these homini novi would be more loyal to him than the old senatorial and equestrian elite, which had caused a true nightmare to him with the wave of uprisings and usurpation after Valerian’s capture. This was not an especially original idea; it had been used before regularly by emperors in civilian posts in the court (which included many imperial freedmen and men of lowly social status). A similar approach was adopted later by medieval and modern Islamic states, where the rulers would surround themselves with slaves, eunuchs, freedmen and the like because these men owed everything to their master, which left them without the option of rising in revolt. If we take a look at the names of the conspirators of August 268 CE, we can easily see a pattern: all of them (except for Cecropius, for whom the sources don't offer details about his full name) include the nomen Aurelius/Aurelianus in their names (and the same is true also for later Illyrian emperor like Probus, Carus, Carinus, Numerian, Diocletian and Maximian). This means that their families had received the Roman citizenship with the Edict of Caracalla in 212 CE; before that date they were not been Roman citizens but peregrinii.

But the Illyrian officers’ loyalty to Gallienus was to be short-lived. As we’ve seen, the plot that ended his life included almost all his senior staff; by the end he’d alienated all his senior generals, despite having a personal military record as a commander which was not that bad.

If I had to make a guess, I’d say that Gallienus’ mistake was to become asleep on his laurels ahead of time. Once he managed to stabilize the situation after the initial wave of usurpations and foreign invasions that followed his father’s capture at Edessa, he undertook an attack against Postumus’ Gallic empire that failed when he was injured in a siege and had to retreat back to Italy. But when he recovered, he spent the crucial period between 263 and 267 CE doing “nothing”. In this brief lull in time, Gallienus seems to have resided mostly in Rome, leaving only for traveling to Athens to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. Probably, this sealed his fate. Just compare this with the frantic activity of the two year reign of Claudius or the four year reign of Aurelian, or of the 260-263 CE time period for Gallienus himself.

It's possible that this inactivity infuriated his army officers, and when the Goths and Heruli invaded the Balkans in 267-68 CE (let’s remember that these officers came all of them from the Balkans), Gallienus’ decision to retreat before expelling the invaders in order to deal first with Aureolus’ revolt was the final strain in an already tense relationship between the emperor and his officers. From the emperor’s point of view, the decision made perfect sense. Firstly, usurpations always took preference over foreign invasions, and secondly if Aureolus was left unchecked he could have easily conquered all of Italy in Postumus' name, taking control of Rome and the two Praetorian fleets (and so potentially, also of north Africa and the Mediterranean islands). With only the Balkans and western Anatolia under his direct control, Gallienus would have been left without options. In other words, in my opinion his mistake (in the eyes of his Illyrian officers) was to behave during those years as if he’d lived in the “happier times” of Hadrian instead of waging war non-stop until the empire was “restored”. And again, this was a perfect logical way of thinking for men who were professional soldiers and who probably had no interests or social life outside of the army.
 
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Duplicated post.
 
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I've edited the post with chapter 24.1 to include the revolt of the workers of the mint in Rome; if I want to follow a chronological order it belonged in that chapter.

I've also been reading about Gallienus' murder in Die Zeit der Soldatenkaiser, chapter II.2 Valerianus und Gallienus by Andreas Goltz and Udo Hartmann. They offer some interesting insights about Gallienus' murder which you can compare to my ramblings in my previous post about this very same event.

In my next post about Aurelian and Palmyra I'll be addressing the issue that probably Gallienus was considering a campaign against the Palmyrenes in 267-268 CE. Goltz and Hartmann consider credible the possibility that Gallienus was behind the murder of Odaenathus and his eldest son and successor Heraclianus, and so he'd have become really incensed by Zenobia's seizing of power in the East, which he would have seen as a rebellion plain and simple.

Goltz and Hartmann go along with a certain interpretation of ancient sources (they are not the only historians who adhere to it) that deduce from their very confused accounts that Gallienus had planned to launch in the Spring of 268 CE a great eastern campaign against the Palmyrenes, disguised as a "revenge expedition" against the Sasanians. Taking this premise into account, then Goltz and Hartmann consider that it was probably political and military disagreements between Gallienus and his generals that brought about the plot and murder of the augustus. In 267, the Heruli and Goths had launched two devastating campaigns against the Balkans and Anatolia, and the Illyrian generals would have considered a priority to ensure the security of the Danubian border and the Black Sea, and would have seen Gallienus' eastern expedition as yet another waste of resourecs (like the expeditions of previous III century CE emperors) in a moment when all military forces were needed in the Danube.

They also advance an interesting (if not very important) possibility. Most sources state that the dux dalmatarum (the commander of the Dalmatian cavalry) was the one charged with the physical deed of murdering Gallienus, but only one source gives a name to this character; it's the always unreliable HA, which names him as Cecronius oder Cecropius. Goltz and Hartmann (and other historians) consider this name to be yet another fabrication by the SHA, always prone to such things. Instead, they advance the possibility that the commander of the Dalmatian horse was no other than Aurelian himself, under Claudius' overall commander (as commander of all the cavalry). The fact that Aurelian later became emperor (and a very popular one within the army) would have been a powerful reason to conveniently "forget" his role in the plot, in a similar way as some sources insist that Claudius (the commander of all the cavalry) was not present at the siege, in what most historians consider an attempt by Constantinian era authors to wash this character from the stain of regicide, as Constantine had fabricated a genealogy that made him a descendant of Claudius. This would also explain why Aurelian would prosper so much under Claudius' short reign: the latter literally owed Aurelian the purple.
 
24.2 THE FALL OF PALMYRA.
24.2 THE FALL OF PALMYRA.


My main source for this chapter is the book Das palmyrenische Teilreich, by the German historian Udo Hartmann.

As I wrote in a previous post, Odaenathus of Palmyra and his eldest son Herodian were murdered in the winter of 267/268 CE at Heracleia in Pontus (according to Syncellus’ version, which Hartmann considers to be the most reliable account), in what was apparently a family vendetta. John of Antioch hinted at Gallienus’ being behind the murder, while the SHA (not the most reliable of sources) point at Zenobia (Odaenathus’ second wife) as being the instigator. Most sources though remain silent about the issue. As I wrote in a previous post, Hartmann agrees with John of Antioch in his assessment of Gallienus’ involvement in the assassination .

After the murder though, the transition of power in the East worked in a remarkably smooth way, but totally against Gallienus’ interests. Odaenathus’ widow Iulia Septimia Zenobia (her Aramaic name was Bat-Zabbai) managed to have her 10 year old son Lucius Iulius Aurelius Septimius Vaballathus Athenodorus (usually referred to as Vaballathus, the Latinized form of his Arabic name Wahb Allāt) recognized as Ras of Palmyra and Exarch (which was perfectly legitimate) and as successor in Odaenathus’ titles of corrector totius Orientis and dux Romanorum, which was completely unlawful, as political posts were not inheritable according to Roman law. Obviously, as Vaballathus was just a child, it would be his mother who acted as regent.

Zenobia’s origins are obscure. On one side, scholars are quite sure that he was of Palmyrene aristocratic stock and that she belonged to a family that had received the Roman citizenship decades ago (possibly in the Severan era). Her Greek name Zenobia seems to have been chosen because of it sounded similar to her native Palmyrene Aramaic name, as was usual in Aramaic and Arabic speaking populations in the Roman Middle East. Unfortunately, the source that deals with her life in most detail is the HA, and as usual scholars have very little faith in its account. Apart from the SHA, the two authors who have left accounts about her are the Byzantine late authors Syncellus and Zonaras, and the medieval Islamic scholar al-Tabarī. Al-Tabarī’s account is considered by most authors to be mostly fictional and full of legendary material, but it’s interesting because it gives an account from the Arabic point of view and because it shows how, even after 700 years (al-Tabarī wrote in the X century CE), Zenobia’s memory was still alive among the Arabic tribes of the Syrian and North Arabian desert, and that she’d become a figure of tales and legends. The SHA wrote about two younger children born of the marriage between Odaenathus and Zenobia (Herennianus and Timolaos), but as they’re not attested anywhere else, scholars believe them to be just one more of the fabrications of this unreliable source.

The rise of Zenobia and Vaballathus to power in the East benefitted from the renewed political chaos in the Roman empire that followed Aureolus’ uprising and the murder of Gallienus at Mediolanum in August 268 CE, and the flood of foreign invasions that crashed against the empire’s European borders during the reign of Claudius Gothicus and the first year and a half of Aurelian’s reign.

Zosimus states clearly that Zenobia’s court resided usually at Antioch, the capital of the Roman East, and this implies that most Roman authorities (governors and troop commanders) accepted the succession of Vaballathus’ to the titles once held by his father, although as later events would prove, not all officials were unanimous in their support.

There’s an obscure passage in the HA that has confused historians for a long time, where the SHA write about a Roman expedition sent against Palmyra and commanded by Aurelius Heraclianus (Gallienus’ Praetorian Prefect) which was defeated by Zenobia’s army in Asia Minor. There are several problems with this statement: the unreliability of the source itself, the lack of references in any other sources and the reference to Aurelius Heraclianus, one of the main plotters in Gallienus’ murder. Some historians discard it as yet another fabrication by the SHA, while others think that it could be possible that Claudius Gothicus sent an army against Zenobia of Palmyra early on during his short reign, and that Heraclianus died as a result of the defeat. Hartmann though believes highly improbable that given the very delicate military situation in Europe between 268 and 272 CE that the Romans were in any position to send a large army into the Near East. To him, what the SHA reflected in their text, obscured by the passage of time and the vagaries of textual transmission, was that Gallienus had decided in the Spring of 268 CE (immediately after Odaenathus’ death, when Zenobia and her son were consummating an unlawful transmission of power in the East) to send an army there under the command of his Praetorian Prefect, but this expedition never materialized, due to the Gothic invasion in the Balkans first and Aureolus’ revolt later.

The first two years of Zenobia and Vaballathus’ rule seem to have been mainly busy with the double task of defending the eastern border against Sasanian attacks and containing the Arabic Nabataean tribal confederation of the Tanukhids. Zenobia ordered the building of several new fortress and the fortification of existing towns, villages and cities in the Euphrates to contain further Sasanian invasions; the most important of these projects was the building of the new fortifications of Halabiye (nowadays in Syria), which was renamed as Zenobia in the queen’s honor. Clearly, Zenobia continued the fight against the Sasanians, because in 269 CE Vaballathus assumed the title Persicus Maximus in his coins.

PAB_Halebie_sur_l_Euphrate.jpg

Aerial view of the remains of Zenobia (modern Halabiye, in Syria) taken in the 1930s.

The nature of Palmyra’s conflict with the Tanukhids is unclear, but it was clearly serious business for the Palmyrenes, because they controlled a wide strip of the north Arabian desert from the Jordan valley to the Euphrates valley, and they had the potential to cut the vital caravan routes that ran into Palmyra from the south and east. The situation was made worse by the fact that the Tanukhids were a Roman ally (same as Palmyra), and were allowed the right of crossing into the summer pastures of the Roman province of Arabia in the Hauran region, and even to use the Roman provincial capital of Bosra in Arabia as their seasonal capital as well. The Tanukhids had been led by Jadhima ibn Malik between 233 and 268 CE, and after his death childless, he was succeeded by his sister’s son ‘Amr ibn Adi (268-295 CE), the first member of the Lakhmid clan to rise into prominence (this clan would enjoy a brilliant future in the Middle East until the early VII century CE).

It would be the conflict between Palmyra and the Tanukhids which would ignite the escalation of tensions between Zenobia and Rome that would lead eventually into open war between the two former allies. In the spring of 270 CE a large Palmyrene army led by Zenobia’s chief commander Septimius Zabdas invaded the Roman province of Arabia. Zabdas reached the provincial capital of Bosra where he defeated and killed in battle its legate Trassus (the garrison of Arabia consisted of Legio III Cyrenaica, with its base in Bosra, plus a large number of auxiliaries). After the battle, the Palmyrenes sacked Bosra and then proceeded to invade the southern part of the Roman province of Arabia, as well as the neighboring province of Syria Palaestina. In normal circumstances, this would have been reason enough for the Roman emperor to react and send an army to deal with Zenobia, but if our chronology of the events in Europe is correct, at this precise moment Aurelian had just gained power in a military coup against Claudius II’s brother Quintilius and was dealing with a critical military situation in Italy against the Alamanni and Iuthungi. In addition to this, Zenobia still tried to keep up appearances and acknowledged in her coinage and public inscriptions and edicts the subordination of Palmyra to the “legitimate” emperors recognized by the Senate in Rome (Claudius II and Aurelian).

D5_D577_FE-_A6_E0-458_E-_A477-831_DC43629_A0-9162-00001_AABEDA288_C1.jpg

Theater of Bosra, capital of the Roman province of Arabia (in modern Jordan).

But this did not stop her from pushing things even further down the road of open conflict with Rome. In November 270 CE, the mint of Antioch began issuing coins in which Vaballathus appeared together with Aurelian. In them, Aurelian was depicted wearing the radiate crown and Vaballathus “only” with a laurel wreath (thus implying subtly his junior position vis-à-vis Aurelian), but this was a huge gesture on Zenobia’s part, because minting coins was a privilege reserved strictly to the Roman emperors, and ever since Augustus only the ruling emperor or members of the imperial family had been depicted in coins. The inscription on Vaballathus’ side of the coins read:

VIR CLARISSIMVS REX CONSVL DVX ROMANORVM.


IMG_0508.jpg

Coin issued by the Palmyrene regime in the East. On the obverse, bust of Aurelian with radiate crown (legend IMP C AVRELIANVS AVG). On the reverse, bust of Vaballathus with laurel wreath and legend displaying the title D(ux) R(omanorum).

This was still not an open break with Rome, because Vaballathus’ did not adopt the key Roman imperial title augustus. But that very same year, Zenobia had taken another step that despite her efforts at keeping appearances in place put her on a direct collision course with Aurelian. Either in the summer of 270 CE (according to Zosimus) or in the fall of the same year (according to Syncellus and Zonaras), a large Palmyrene army of 70,000 men, again led by Septimius Zabdas, invaded the strategic Roman province of Egypt, one of the richest provinces of the empire, the breadbasket of the city of Rome and key to the supply of Rome’s armies in the East and the lower Danube.

These campaigns had been probably well calculated and timed by Zenobia, because they coincided with the Gothic invasion of the Balkans. Apparently, once again part of the Gothic invaders had taken the sea route and had managed (yet again) to slip past the Roman defenses in the Bosporus and Hellespont straits and were raiding the Aegean coasts. Emperor Claudius had ordered the Prefect of Egypt Tenagino Probus to clear the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean of “Scythian pirates”, and so the prefect took the Alexandrian fleet and part of the Egyptian garrison (formed by Legio II Traiana and more than 10,000 auxiliaries) and departed Alexandria to the north. So, Egypt was left pretty much defenseless when Zabdas invaded it. Ancient sources claim that the Romans put together a force 50,000 strong to counter him, which must have been formed mostly by untrained militias (even if not weakened by the Prefect’s departure to the north, the regular Egyptian garrison must’ve numbered 20,000 professional soldiers at the most, between legionaries and auxiliaries). Zabdas defeated easily this improvised army and occupied Alexandria, after which he retreated into Syria and left behind a 5,000 men garrison to defend Alexandria and Egypt. According to the SHA (sadly, the source which treats this episode with most detail, but of very dubious credibility), Zabdas left in command in Alexandria a local man, a certain Timogenes.

But in late August 270 CE, after Zabdas’ retreat Tenagino Probus appeared suddenly with his fleet in front of Alexandria and retook the city easily after some street fighting against Timogenes’ forces. This chronology is supported by the coins minted briefly by the Alexandrian in the name of Quintillus and Aurelian (dated to his first regnal year without any mention of Vaballathus). But Zenobia promptly sent Zabdas back to Egypt; Tenagino Probus left Alexandria and met him (and Timogenes) near the fortress of Babylon (just where the Nile fans out into its delta), where he was defeated by the Palmyrenes and committed suicide rather than fall prisoner. This detail of the tale is considered suspicious by most historians, as its only source is the SHA, and it looks suspiciously like the stories of the heroes of Rome’s mythologized past. Thus, in November 270 CE Alexandria was back under Zenobia’s control.

By late 270 CE, the mint of Alexandria was issuing coins under the joint name of Aurelian and Vaballathus, and Zenobia took a measure that further strained her relationship with Aurelian. She appointed the former vice Prefect of Egypt Iulius Marcellinus as Prefect of Egypt without caring about having his appointment formally acknowledged by Aurelian. And the next spring she substituted him by Statilius Ammianus (a seasoned equestrian official who had been governor of Arabia), again without caring about Aurelian’s consent. Also, according to Zosimus, during 271 CE Palmyrene troops made further inroads into Anatolia and secured Palmyrene control over its territories as far west as Ancyra. The proconsular legate of Asia Virius Lupus seems to have hovered in a hesitant position, acknowledging to some degree Palmyrene rule over his province.

These actions were accompanied by other initiatives in the political and symbolical arena that were geared towards raising slowly and gradually the status of Vaballathus in front of Aurelian. Immediately after the Palmyrene conquest of Egypt, Vaballathus assumed the title imperator, and his full titles in coins and public inscriptions were changed to:

VIR CLARISSIMVS REX CONSVL IMPERATOR DVX ROMANORVM

EAFEC036-9_CBF-4_CFD-_BD25-1924867_EF88_D-9162-00001_AAB50_DDCC36.jpg

Coin with Zenobia's bust in the obverse. In the reverse, C PIA REGINA.

While Zenobia appears with the titles clarissima pia regina, which in themselves were not a usurpation, but until then the title pia (pious) had by custom only been used by augustae. Also, coins, milestones and public works, both in Greek and Latin (like in the milestones of the Via Nova Traiana in Arabia) began to be dated according to the regnal years of both Vaballathus and Aurelian. This was bordering on open usurpation, because Vaballathus had begun his reign three years earlier than Aurelian, and thus in a subtle way he was being presented as the senior ruler amongst them.

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Maximum extent of Palmyrene control in the East.

Zenobia surrounded herself with a brilliant court, and encouraged philosophers and writers to join it, like the Syrian-born philosopher and rhetor Longinus, the historian Nicodemus of Trapezus and the sophist Callinicus of Petra. Much like other III century CE Roman and Sasanian rulers, Zenobia showed herself to be interested in the religious developments of her time; she had a close relationship with the bishop of Antioch Paul of Samosata and she also invited Manichaean missionaries into Palmyra. Her generals Septimius Zabdas and Septimius Zabbai were raised to the (Roman) rank of viri egregii. According to Hartmann Zabdas seems to have been in charge of the field army in offensive campaigns while Zabbai seems to have been in command of Palmyra itself.

But Zenobia and her son had gone too far. The expansion of Palmyrene power was only possible because between 260 and 272 CE the Roman “central” government was too busy fighting for its very survival in Europe, but it should be noted that neither Gallienus, Claudius nor Aurelian acknowledged ever formally any of the “illegal” initiatives of Zenobia. We have already seen how there’s an inkling that before things went downhill for him again in 268 CE Gallienus had been probably considering some sort of campaign in the East, taking advantage of the relative lull in attacks in the European border in the mid-260s and the inactivity of the Gallic empire. And it should’ve been clear that emperors as energetic as Claudius and Aurelian would never accept such initiatives by a ruler that was formally a Roman vassal; as soon as the situation became calm in Europe, their full attention would be turned towards the East.

Aurelian spent the winter of 272 CE in Byzantium, and in the spring of 272 CE, after defeating the Goths and evacuating Dacia, the emperor and his army crossed the Straits and entered Anatolia following the great military road (Byzantium, Chalcedon, Ancyra, Tyana, Antioch) towards Syria. At the same time, a large Roman fleet (probably formed by the combined Praetorian fleets of Ravenna and Misenum) carrying an army led by M. Aurelius Probus (the future emperor, yet another Illyrian officer) set sail for Egypt. This move by Aurelian seems to have taken Zenobia by surprise, because the Palmyrenes reacted to this by severing the last tenuous ties of loyalty that they still maintained with Rome: either in March or April 272 CE, Vaballathus and his mother usurped the title of augustus and so raised in open revolt against Aurelian. In an Egyptian papyrus dated to 17 April 272, Vaballathus appears named as Imperator Caesar Lucius Iulius Aurelius Septimius Vaballathus Athenodorus Persicus maximus Arabicus maximus Adiabenicus maximus pius felix invictus Augustus. And the mints of Antioch and Alexandria began minting coins in the name of Imperator Caesar Vaballathus Augustus and Septimia Zenobia Augusta.

Bythinia was occupied by Aurelian without a fight, probably because western Asia Minor had never been under Palmyrene control. But when he entered Galatia, he met with resistance. The city of Ancyra closed its gates to his army but surrendered after a short siege. The army kept advancing towards the southeast but was stopped in its tracks by the stern resistance of the city of Tyana. According to the SHA, the city fell into Aurelian’s hands thanks to the betrayal of one of its citizens, a certain Heraclammon. And the SHA continue their tale with yet another of the fabricated stories so plentiful in their work: Aurelian’s soldiers wanted to plunder the conquered city, but Aurelian would have forbidden it due to a vision he’d had in his slumber of the I century CE legendary sophist and miracle worker Apollonius of Tyana. Scholars consider it most probable that Aurelian’s clemency was a calculated risk; depriving his soldiers from what they saw as their fair loot was a very dangerous (and potentially fatal) decision (it was the cause for the Gallic emperor Postumus’ death). But Aurelian enjoyed enough respect from his troops and had enough charisma within the army to pull this move and survive it. By showing his control over his army and his attachment to discipline at Tyana, he motivated other eastern cities to surrender without a fight, which was crucial if he wanted to conduct his campaign against Zenobia swiftly, because the East had many walled cities. And the trick worked, because all the cities in Cilicia (the next province he crossed in his way to Syria) opened their gates to Aurelian without a fight.

Zenobia seems to have reacted by pulling back her armies from Anatolia and Egypt and concentrating on the defense of Syria, which was the vital area for the defense of Palmyra itself. In May 272, Probus’ fleet reached Egypt and took Alexandria apparently without a fight, and by the third week of June all reference to Zenobia and Vaballathus disappears from Egyptian papyri, meaning that all of Egypt was back under Aurelian’s control. In the meanwhile, by late April and early May Aurelian crossed the Cilician Gates (which surprisingly were not defended by the Palmyrenes) and entered Syria Coele; there he finally clashed with the Palmyrene army led by Zabdas near the village of Immae, 40 km north of Antioch (this great city was the center of Zenobia’s eastern dominion and had to be defended). Ancient Immae lies near the modern Turkish town of Reyhanli, near the Orontes river.

At Immae, Aurelian showed once again his skill as a cavalry general and managed to destroy Zabdas’ heavy cataphract cavalry by the old trick of a feigned retreat of his much lighter cavalry (Eques Mauri et Dalmati, according to the SHA). When Zabdas saw the rout of his heavy cavalry, he realized that the day was lost and rather than risk the loss of the rest of his army against Aurelian’s hardened veterans, he managed to disengage and retreat to Antioch, which he evacuated the following day, accompanied by Zenobia, Vaballathus and all their courtiers. The Palmyrenes retreated south to Emesa, where they were reinforced by more effectives and waited for Aurelian’s arrival (according to the SHA, the Palmyrene army gathered at Emesa amounted to 70,000 men).

Aurelian entered Antioch without meeting resistance immediately after Zenobia’s flight, and there he showed once again political skill. The leadership of the city expected bloody reprisals from Aurelian (who had not a reputation for leniency after his bloody reprisals at Rome), but instead of purging the leading class of Antioch, Aurelian surprised everybody by issuing a general amnesty to any supporters of Zenobia and Vaballathus who wanted to change sides and acknowledge him as the sole legitimate augustus. Hartmann states that one of the members of Zenobia’s administration who hurried to accept Aurelian’s amnesty was Statilius Ammianus, Zenobia’s appointee as Praefectus Aegypti, who was confirmed by Aurelian in his post and remained in it perhaps until May 273 CE.

Immediately after issuing the general amnesty, Aurelian’s army left Antioch and marched south; the cities of Apamea, Arethusa and Larissa opened their gates to Aurelian without offering any resistance. The province of Mesopotamia also switched sides, and Aurelian sent Aurelius Marcellinus there as the new Praefectus Mesopotamiae. Finally, Aurelian’s army met the concentrated Palmyrene army near Emesa in June or July 272 CE. The Palmyrene commander was again Zabdas, who had time to choose carefully the battleground: according to ancient sources, the battle took place in a large plain near the city ideally suited to cavalry movements; Zabdas wanted to take maximum advantage of his quantitative and qualitative superiority in cavalry. Aurelian chose to meet Zabdas’ army in this terrain, and he ran a great risk in doing so. Aurelian tried the same trick he’d used at Immae against Zabdas’ cavalry, but this time it didn’t work: the Palmyrene cavalry caught up with Aurelian’s horsemen before they could gain enough ground in their feigned retreat and defeated them thoroughly. With his cavalry destroyed in a plain battlefield, Aurelian was on the brink of disaster, but he was saved by the indiscipline of the Palmyrene horsemen. Instead of regrouping and surrounding the Roman infantry, Zabdas´ cavalry dispersed in a disorderly pursuit of the routed Roman cavalry. This gave time to Aurelian’s veteran infantry to attack the disorganized Palmyrene horsemen and engage them in close combat, in which the long spears and bows of the Palmyrene cataphracts were of little use; according to the ancient sources, Aurelian had organized a special detachment of soldiers armed with clubs precisely for this purpose (as we’ve seen in previous posts, this was an old and favored tactic of the Romans when dealing with enemy armored cavalry at close quarters). Aurelian won the battle and once again the Palmyrene leadership opted to retreat without defending the walled city that lay behind them; the remaining Palmyrene forces retreated across the Syrian desert all the way to Palmyra while Aurelian entered Emesa without resistance. Zenobia had abandoned the city in such haste that according to ancient authors Aurelian was capable to capture here her entire royal treasury.

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Roman Emesa (modern Homs, in Syria) stood in the middle of a dry plain, at the gates of the Syrian desert, in perfect cavalry country. These old pictures of the 1920s give an idea of what the ancient city looked like within its immediate environment.

Immediately after this victory, Aurelian decided once more to make a bold move and advanced against the city of Palmyra with his army across the Syrian desert. To get an idea of the risks involved in such a move, let’s remember the disastrous result of the sieges of Hatra by Trajan and Septimius Severus; besieging fortified oasis in desert areas was usually a bad idea. But here we clash against another problem with the extant sources. Both the SHA and Zosimus (who followed different sources) state that Palmyra was ready to resist a protracted siege (something that Aurelian probably wanted to avoid at all costs), but archaeology has revealed that at this time Palmyra wasn’t fortified and was thus unable to withstand an assault by Aurelian’s army. If this is the case, then Aurelian wasn’t running any risks whatsoever. As his army approached Palmyra, things unfolded quite quickly and without further bloodshed. Within the city a party opposed to Zenobia’s rule was gaining momentum (led by Septimius Haddudān, a very important citizen who enjoyed senatorial rank and was Symposiarch of the guild of priests of the god Bel), and Aurelian entered in secret negotiations with them. When Zenobia realized that her own subjects were going to betray her to Aurelian, she fled the city furtively and tried to seek refuge in the Sasanian empire, but Aurelian’s soldiers pursued her party and captured them by the Euphrates river. In August 272 CE, Palmyra surrendered to Aurelian without a fight, and the emperor honored the general amnesty he’d announced months before at Antioch. The conquered city was not plundered, and the only people who were arrested and prosecuted for treason charges at Emesa were Zenobia, her son and their councillors and ministers. Of them, the only one put to death was the rhetor Cassius Longinus (why he was the unlucky one, I don’t know). Zenobia and her son were to be brought back to Rome by Aurelian, where he exhibited them at his formal triumph in 274 CE. Her fate after this triumph is disputed, because the ancient sources are in contradiction between them, but the most reliable tradition states that Aurelian settled her (under house arrest) in an imperial villa at Concae, near Hadrian’s Villa at Tibur.

Before returning to Europe though Aurelian reorganized the administration of the eastern provinces and introduced an important innovation that hinted at the future thorough reform of the empire’s administrative structures by Diocletian. He entrusted the governor of Mesopotamia Aurelius Marcellinus with the overall command of all Roman forces in the East and their defense against the Sasanians, like Iulius Priscus and Odaenathus had done in previous times (perhaps he even received the same title, rector Orientis). This was nothing new, but the innovation was that he appointed the (until then) consular governor of Asia Virius Lupus as legate of Syria Coele and general supervisor of the civilian administration of the East, with the title iudex sacrarum cognitionum per Orientem. This was the first time in Roman imperial history in which military and administrative responsibilities were clearly divided and held by separate individuals, something that was unheard of previously (the cursus honorum for senators and equestrians included both military and civilian posts). Another important development of Aurelian’s sojourn in Syria was his association with the god Sol (the Sun), which was venerated at Emesa since immemorial times (in close association to El Gabal). Aurelian’s propaganda proclaimed that the victory at Emesa was due to the divine help of Sol, and hence that Aurelian was under the special protection of this god. During the two remaining years of his reign, Aurelian promoted Sol as his chosen deity and tried to raise it to the most prominent place in the Roman pantheon, even building a gigantic temple to Sol in the campus Agrippae, the last great pagan temple to be built in Rome.

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Today, nothing remains of Aurelian's great temple to Sol Invictus in Rome, but its ruins were still visible during the modern era. These are two drawings of its remains made in 1626 by G.B. Mercati.

After taking these measures, Aurelian began his return to Europe with his army, and according to Hartmann he wintered again in Byzantium. But as soon as Aurelian was far enough, trouble began anew in the East. Ancient sources give a confusing account of these events, but Udo Hartmann offers this reconstruction of events: within Palmyra remained a party loyal to the family of Odaenathus who did not approve of the restored authority of the central government, and its leader was a certain Septimius Apsaeus, the Prostates of the city. Apsaeus approached the governor of Mesopotamia and generalissimo of the eastern armies Aurelius Marcellinus and tried to entice him to revolt and usurp the title of augustus, but Marcellinus stalled and asked Apsaeus for some time to think it over, while in secret he sent messengers to Aurelian to inform him about the plot. Apsaeus realized this and trying to anticipate Aurelian’s reaction, in the early spring of 273 CE he organized an armed uprising in Palmyra, in which Aurelian’s garrison was massacred, alongside with its commander Sandario. Immediately after this, Apsaeus’ party proclaimed the elderly Antiochus (probably Zenobia’s father) as augustus (it’s unclear up to which point Antiochus followed willingly with Apsaeus’ plans). The SHA give wrongly Antiochus’ name as Achilleus and identify him as Zenobia’s father. But the revolt seems to have been strictly restricted to Palmyra and some villages and towns that had formed part of its closest area of influence; most of Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Egypt remained firmly loyal to Aurelian.

Aurelian received the news from Marcellinus when his army had left Byzantium and was already in the Balkans fighting some incursions by the Carpi, but he reacted with astonishing speed. His return march to the East was so sudden that he appeared by surprise completely unannounced at the chariot races in Antioch, leaving the populace completely openmouthed. From Antioch, he launched another rapid march towards Palmyra and by the early summer of 273 CE, Aurelian entered the city a second time without meeting any resistance. The main culprits were punished, although the early Antiochus surprisingly suffered no reprisals. And now again archaeology reveals yet another disagreement with the SHA and Zosimus. These authors wrote that after this second conquest of the city, Aurelian’s soldiers looted and burned the city, but archaeological digs in Palmyra show no signs of violent destruction dated to this time period; probably this reflects yet another attempt by some sources (followed by the SHA and Zosimus) to present Aurelian as a bloodthirsty, brutal and uncouth soldier/tyrant.

But Aurelian could still not return to Europe, because now some kind of unrest arose in Alexandria. Egyptian papyri show that Aurelian appointed as corrector Aegyptus in 273 CE a certain Claudius Firmus, with the task to restore order in the province, who presumably acted under the overall control of Virius Lupus, who received the title of iudex sacrarum cognitionum per Aegyptum. Epigraphy attests that between 272 and 273 CE Aurelian took the titles Dacicus Maximus, Carpicus Maximus (a reference to his victory against incursions by the Carpi), Arabicus Maximus, Palmyrenicus Maximus and Parthicus Maximus. He also issued coins with the titles ORIENS AVGVSTVS, PACATOR ORIENTIS and RESTITVTOR ORIENTIS.

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Aureus of Aurelian. On the reverse, RESTITVTOR ORIENTIS.

Aurelian could now return to Europe and tackle with the last remnant rebellion, the splinter Gallic empire that lasted unchecked since 260 CE. According to Hartmann, he spent the winter of 273-274 CE in Rome.
 
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