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Well that's quite a feat given that I don't see much of pre-modern empires being as militarized as Rome, but given the feudal/tribal nature of Iran I can go with it :p

By “militarized”, I mean that a larger part of its population was trained as soldiers and would be of use in campaign. Bear in mind that after Marius, Rome had a professional army. A 380,000 strong professional army under Trajan in an empire which boasted between 50 and 75 million inhabitants mean that Roman society during the Principate was mostly a civilian one. In comparison, Iranian society had a much larger share of soldiers (not professional ones though), and Germanic societies an even larger one (basically 100% of all free males).
 
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Very nice.

I have a couple of questions on Part 3.6, when you talk about the breakdown. I am not sure you're revealing a sufficiently clear picture of the political situation. In particular, while you recognize the Parthian origins as steppe nomads, yet you seem to discuss the political situation as if they were conventional kings. But that may not be quite the right approach.

You only gave a small selection of coins. Start with Asarces I:

parthiancoins11.jpg


Then turn to Mithradates II:

Drachma_Mithradates_II.jpg


and finally your Sanatruk:

54899952_1_m.jpg


The evolution of the face is pretty obvious. You start with
- (1) a steppe nomad chieftain with his felt cap, then
- (2) a Hellenic king with a diadem a la Seleucids, then
- (3) a complex regal King of Kings crown, a throwback to the Achaemenids.

So the royal face evolves. But notice what doesn't evolve. The obverse. It is remains throughout a decidedly East Iranian steppe archer - cap, trousers, recurve bow. It is pretty much an advertisement of where Parthian power lies.

And it continues that way. While the royal image changes, they never dropped the archer.

So it seems the Parthians remained quite conscious of themselves and their roots. That they were and remained a steppe nomad elite superimposed on a Persian state. Their sculptures say that too, i.e. Mithradates governs on horseback:

mithridatesparthia12.jpg


If so, then you really want to give some thought to how this might change how they governed. You seem to interpret the Parthian state as much more centralized than it probably was. Steppe nomads have their own political structure - i.e. typically a confederation of "inner" tribes & "outer" tribes. It would be weird to abandon that loose structure in an instant to embrace some alien, centralized King of Kings thing. They may have a Persian bureaucracy underneath, but the military elite is still the elite, and they are bound by steppe rules. Thinking in confederation terms explain the powers of the Suren clan & other regional lords better.

Steppe rules also helps explain the breakdown & chaos. The system of succession in steppe nomads was lateral, not linear, i.e. the succession doesn't go to the eldest son, or even a son at all, but can go to brothers, uncles, cousins, etc. It is up to the inner Parthian clans to decide whom among the Arsacid family should succeed. If the clans agree, fine. If they don't agree, we got a problem. A very typical problem in any nomad confederacy - vide Huns, Mongols, etc. - and easily exploitable by an outsider (like Augustus).

So I think you're cutting it a little short by insinuating the Parthians forgot they were steppe nomads once they got hold of Iran, and were all instantly converted into a Persian King of Kings & satraps in some grand collective act of nostalgia. The bureaucracy may have been nostalgic and pushed the regalia. But it is likely the military elite dealt with each other by older steppe rules.

Not to take away from your excellent exposition. It just feels like you're not giving their steppe roots much emphasis in the politics.

A very incisive post. I agree with you that maybe I lacked emphasis in stating to which point the Arsacids and their nobility retained collectively a nomadic mentality, but it’s something that is most times hardly recognized even in scholarly literature. Graeco-Roman authors, which for better or worse are our main (often only) source did hardly understand this at all, and resorted to anachronic concepts like a “Parthian Senate” to refer to the nomadic dynamics of power in the Arsacid empire.

As for coinage, you have an interesting point there, although it’s not so clearly cut as it may seem.

achamenid-coins.jpg


This is an Achaemenid silver coin. Achaemenid coins always showed in the obverse the figure of the king shooting an arrow (and were thus known as “archers” by ancient Greeks). Notice thus that the use of the king with a bow is not something specifically tied to central Asian Iranian nomads, but also to settled Iranians.

coin_0.jpg


This is a coin of Arsaces I. The most distinctive aspect of it is that Arsaces is depicted wearing a headdress typically associated with Scythian nomads. As for the reverse, Arsaces is shown with the bow, but sitting in a typically Greek seat, with the legend also in Greek.

MithridatesIParthiaCoinHistoryofIran.jpg


And this is a coin of Mithridates I. It’s perhaps the most Hellenized of the lot. In the obverse, Mithridates is portrayed as a Greek king, without any ethnic distinctives, and in the reverse, a figure of the Greek god Hercules is surrounded by a Greek legend (although following a typical Arsacid array). There’s nothing in this coin pointing towrds a nomadic origin of Mithridates I.

PacorusIIAnotherParthianCoinHistoryofIran.jpg


This is a coin of Pacorus II (78-105 CE). In the obverse, we see what had become the classical image of an Arsacid king: the king’s head looking to the left, and the king wearing the royal diadem, which was the sign of royalty among the Arsacids. But in the reverse, we see a image that could have been taken from any Roman coin: a femenine figure (a goddess, perhaps Victory/Athenea/Anahid) is handing to the king, who is sitting on a throne of the Graeco-Roman type, what seems like a diadem/laurel wreath/ring of power. The king seems to be wearing Iranian gear and is grasping a sword.

What I mean is that, even if in the long term some tendencies can be discerned, in the short term variations could be huge between the coinage of one king and his successor, or even between coins minted by the same king along his reign. There’s also for example the coinage of Phraates V, showing also his mother Musa, something that would never again happen in Arsacid coinage (curiously, Sasanian coins would sometimes show queens).

Just as a curiosity. The coin of Sanatruk is something of a curiosity, bacause he’s shown bearing a bejewelled and emboidered kolah/kulaf, which was a felt hat typical of the settled inhabitants of the Iranian plateau. But it was not a typical Arsacid headgear, and none amongst his successors are shown wearing it. But it’s striking to see that in the first coins minted by Ardashir I before he became King of Kings (while he was only king of Persis), he also wore the same headgear, and his appearance was altogether very similar to that of Sanatruk:

3020218.jpg
 
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I haven’t posted here but have been following since page one. It’s really interesting but I have no practical use for the information sadly.

Early someone brought up what kinds of nomads there were - simple herders or ‘warlike’ raiders. A lot of this is determined by climate and geography.

In the most marginal areas you get goatherds and shepherds. These animals can subsist on sparse forage and scant water. The presence of a lot of rocky ground and mountains is acceptable because these animals can navigate steep slopes and extraordinarily rough terrain (certainly better than any human can) They can go considerable distances between food and water. However it takes a lot of land area per sheep or goat under such poor conditions, so population densities in these areas are low. Hunting is a sideline - if something shows up - great kill it and eat it but the land is too theifty for there to be much worth the effort of trying to kill. However each and every person has plenty of experience fighting off stuff that likes to eat sheep and goats (which is every predator ever for sheep). Individually they are decent fighters but there aren’t many of them, and they won’t have much of a mounted contingent - they just don’t control much land good enough to keep a large number of horses alive. They don’t have a long of time to spare to fight as organized groups or develop complex political organizations. Even the loss of a few animals from their scanty herds might mean starvation or lack of funds, so every animal is carefully tended to and accounted for. Herds are moved from one place to the next in search of ideal pastures, and literally watched night and day to prevent predation and watch for any sickness.

In areas where rainfall is greater and the heat is less, the grass and other naturally occurring plants grow faster, are available in greater abundance and variety, and access to drinking water is not an issue. This is the area where horse mounted nomads with vast herds of cattle and horses reign. Their population density is much higher than the shepherds because they have access to much greater resources. They also have the greatest military potential of all pre modern people’s on a per capita basis thanks to their ready access to a seemingly endless supply of horses and a need to be able to ride them perfectly basically as soon as they are to heavy to be carried as a backpack on their parents. ‘Every man a lancer archer and ahorseman ’ is a reality. Not only is it a military necessity, but hunting can be a major boost to your family - game is plentiful, and often consists of large bodied tasty critters like deer, wolves and wild boar. From a military perspective it’s perfect. Everyone already knows how to ride, and hunting is often a cooperative venture, so military cavalry techniques are learned by all the adolescents men. I mean seriously - have you ever seen a pack of wolves or a herd of wild boar? Even on horseback with a bow you definitely want a group of cooperative friends with you for that business. In the early spring during calving period it’s all hands on deck to get the babies safely born. In the fall breeding is often important and it may be important to move to winter pastures. Other wise cows pretty much take care of themselves. Adult cattle are formidable opponents for most predators and need only minimal checkups and care to stay out of trouble. Most diseases are either in babies only, or of minimal concern, or untreatable prior to the development of antibiotics. This leaves a lot of time for other things - trade, sports/hunting (often the same thing) war, politics, etc.

Finally in the flattest and best watered areas you have sedentary farmers. Their population densities are the highest, but they aren’t fighters. Everyone is too busy with their farms. Hunting is a sideline if it’s worth considering at all - the land is too settled for much game to be around. Horses are obviously useful for war or for draft and ploughing but they take a lot of food, and food means space a space that could be a wheat field or an olive grove or a vineyard, all of which are a much better return on investment than a horse. Most people won’t have them unless they are rich, or control some land food for horses but not crops. Cattle are common, but mostly for draft animals and milk. Each family owns a few each - not like the nomads where each extended family might have dozens or hundreds of head. If fighting is to be done, people (professional soldiers) will have to be set aside to do it on a permanent basis, because there’s always something to do on the farm, and if it’s not done the crops won’t produce enough and everyone starves to death. Putting full time farmers in the field as a military force can only be done for limited times, or in desperate need for local defense. Anything that’s not caring for the farm needs to be dealt with quickly or delegated to someone else which leads eventually to complex political organizations and specialists for anything that can’t be done on the farm.

Obviously the boundaries between these groups are kinda fuzzy and people are flexible, but these are the subsistentence archetypes the Middle East is built around.
 
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6.1. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE ANCIENT SOURCES.
6.1. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE ANCIENT SOURCES.

We enter now the key period of the events that led to the fall of the House of Aršak and the rise of the House of Sāsān; this means that the thread will change from posts centered on descriptions and analysis to narrative posts.

The main events will involve Romans as well and Iranians, Armenians and other peoples, and for this complex set of events, I think it advisable to explain a bit what ancient sources have been available to scholars to reconstruct them. I’ll divide these sources into Graeco-Roman, Middle Persian, Islamic and Armenian. When pertinent, I will subdivide them into extant and non-extant sources.

EXTANT GRAECO-ROMAN SOURCES:
  • The single most important source available for this period is by far the Roman History, written in Greek by Cl. Cassius Dio Cocceianus (c.155 – 235 CE). He was born in a senatorial family in the Greek city of Nicomedia, in the province of Bythinia in Asia Minor, and enjoyed a long political career. He was twice consul, and belonged to the private council of emperors Septimius Severus, Caracalla and Severus Alexander. He was a very well-educated man, and his Roman History is a very ambitious work: a history of Rome originally in eighty books, beginning with the foundation of Rome and ending the year of his second consulship (229 CE). However, he later changed opinion and wrote and addendum, writing a brief account of events from this year to the death of Severus Alexander. He was a contemporary of most of the events that I will write about later, and more importantly, he witnessed them from a privileged position and had the intellectual capacity to write insightfully and in detail about them. His work has not survived complete to our days. About one third of it has survived intact, while the rest has either been lost or has arrived to us in form of quotations by later authors or through the epitomes written by the historian Zonaras in the V century CE and the Byzantine monk John Xiphilinos in the XII century. Dio’s value as a witness though is debased by some traits of his education and personal biases. He was an ardent conservative in almost everything, and adhered to Thucydides’ style and language rigidly; he also valued rhetoric and generalizations over mere facts, and he let his personal biases color his pages almost everywhere, and most especially in the last part of his work, the one that covers the events he witnessed personally. His point of view is entirely Roman and aristocratic; he despised the plebs, defended aristocratic virtues and identified the values and interests of his own class (the senatorial ordo) with the good of the res publica, without question. Because of this, the last books of his work become increasingly bitter as it becomes clear that under the Severans the Senate was being progressively sidelined in benefit of equestrian officials. He hated Caracalla with a passion, and his portrait of this emperor borders the caricature. In all, an invaluable resource, but one to be managed with care.
  • Another important source, written also in Greek, is the History of the Empire since the death of Marcus, by Herodian (c.170–c.180), in eight books. Very little is known about his life. He was a Greek, probably a Syrian and maybe from Antioch because in his work he clearly writes for an eastern audience, explaining Roman practices and customs to them. He was not a senator, and he lacked the education of Dio: his work is much shorter, less ambitious and less historically sound (he shows no familiarity with the work of previous historians). His Greek is also plain, without any pretensions at archaizing rhetoric, and his narrative is above everything else, plain, simple, lively and honest. He just wanted to offer his readers a good read about the event he’d witnessed, and nothing more. Some scholars believe that he was a lower functionary and that he spent part of his public service career in Rome, because some of the events he describes seem written by an eyewitness. He also lacks Dio’s biases, and his work can be taken at face value without so many precautions as in Dio’s case. His work covers from 180 CE to 238 CE (the death of Maximinus Thrax) and so overlaps with the last books of Dio, but Herodian’s much shorter work has survived intact.
  • A source to be used with the utmost care, and only by scholars specialized in Roman history and Latin language and literature is the Historia Augusta (HA), perhaps one of the most bizarre books written in antiquity. It’s a real shame that we’re forced to rely on such a work for this period of time, but it the only extant surviving historical work that deals in a continuous way with the events that happened since the death of Maximinus Thrax to the accession of Diocletian. There were other works written but none of them have survived; precisely the main worth of the HA is that it has preserved much material from these lost sources within it. The HA is a collection of biographies of emperors, caesars and usurpers from 117 to 284 CE, supposedly written down in Latin by six different historians during the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine I; they are collectively known as the Scriptores Historia Augustae (SHA). These writers are (in the chronological order they supposedly wrote the biographies) “Aelius Spartianus”, “Iulius Capitolinus”, “Vulcacius Gallicanus”, “Aelius Lampridius”, “Trebellius Pollio” and “Flavius Vopiscus Syracusanus”. The problems of the HA as an historical source were exposed in a devastating study published in 1886 by the German scholar Hermann Dessau. He was an expert Latin philologist, and increasingly worried by the many false names found in the work, the use of anachronistic Latin words, and the many obviously invented passages, Dessau ruled that the six SHA were invented characters, and that the anonymous writer of the HA wrote it at the very end of the IV century CE, perhaps as some kind of practical joke or just as an intellectual amusement. The controversy continues up to this day: the British scholar Ronald Syme aligned himself completely with Dessau’s views, while other scholars believe that it would be irresponsible to dismiss the whole work as a fraud. And the fact is that there are verifiable historical facts in it, but while some biographies are entirely accurate, some others are complete fakes. One of the sources used by the SHA for example was Herodian himself, which is a reliable one, and scholars believe that fragments and passages of other important, now lost, works have been preserved in its text. These sources are the autobiography of Hadrian (of no interest to us), the lost work of Marius Maximus a contemporary of Dio and Herodian), the works of Dexippus (not very relevant in our case), the so-called Kaisergeschichte, a book that would have contained a “serious” account of imperial biographies of the III century CE, and an even more elusive work, an historical work written by an “Ignotus”, which would have been a more general work in the style of a chronicle. In general, the lives of the ruling emperors after Caracalla include more and more fraudulent information, so after 217 CE, the validity of the HA as a source is quite questionable. The overall tone of the work is staunchly traditionalist, pro-senatorial and anti-Christian.
  • John Zonaras was a Byzantine clergyman who lived in the XII century, and wrote titled Extracts of History, based on ancient authors, most of whom are now lost. Until the early III century CE, he followed mostly Cassius Dio, but for the rest of the III century he resorted to sources now lost to us, but which have survived in an abbreviated form in his work.
  • Zosimus was an East Roman historian active during the 490s-510s CE. He wrote a work in Greek titled New History in 8 books. He was a hardcore defender of paganism, and his agenda was to show how the abandonment of the old gods had led to the decadence and ruin of the Roman empire. Again, he made use of works now lost to us; for the 238-284 CE period, his main source seems to have been Dexippus.
  • Roman and Greek prosopography. The first one is compiled in the Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, a mammoth undertaking (nowadays accessible online) of all Latin epigraphic inscriptions dated back to Roman times in milliary stones, statues, assorted monuments, aqueducts, tombstones, etc. Thanks to the use of new methods of database processing, its importance is growing day by day as a resource for scholars. Among other things, for example it has allowed scholars to check the existence of characters named in literary sources and to reconstruct their public careers whenever possible. Nevertheless, the epigraphic habit that was so commonplace in the early Roman empire started to decline in the late II century CE, especially in Syria and the East, which means that precisely for the era and time period that interests us, it is of very limited use.
  • Numismatics. Given the scarcity of written sources, numismatics has revealed itself as a most useful tool for reconstructing events in this period of time. Again, its systematic use as a tool for scholars is relatively recent, even if ancient coins have been known for a long time.

LOST GRAECO-ROMAN SOURCES:

  • Marius Maximus (Lucius Marius Maximus Perpetuus Aurelianus, c.160-c.230 CE), was a senator who was a contemporary of Cassius Dio, although he was far more involved in the public affairs of his day than Dio. He was also twice consul, and was very active as a military commander, especially under Septimus Severus and Caracalla, for whom he was amongst their main supporters and generals. He wrote in Latin a collection of 12 imperial biographies as a continuation of Suetonius, and in the same salacious, sensationalist and gossipy vein. His biographies ended with Elagabalus, and due to the nature of the material, he was one of the main sources for the earlier vitae of the HA.
  • Dexippus (Publius Herennius Dexippus, c.210-273 CE) was a member of a leading Athenian family. He wrote several historical works in Greek, all of them lost except from some isolated fragments quoted by later authors and some passages of the HA that could have been reused from his work. The work that would have been of interest to us is his Historical Chronicle, which narrated the 1,000 years that preceded the reign of emperor Claudius II Gothicus. He also wrote a Scythica, an eyewitness account of the III century wars between the Romans and Goths, which will be of secondary interest to us. Recently in 2010 it was announced that a fragment of this lost work had been recovered in a palimpsest at the Austrian National Library in Vienna.
  • Enmansche Kaisergeschichte, is a supposedly lost Latin work whose existence was first postulated by the German scholar Alexander Enmann in 1884. Enmann compared several late Roman historical works and found many coincidences in them that he explained as having been originated in a common source now lost. This would have been a short work, covering from the reign of Augustus until either 337 or 357 CE. It would have been used as a source by many late Roman Latin histories, such as Aurelius Victor, Eutropius, Festus, the HA, Jerome, and the anonymous author of the Epitome de Caesaribus.

EXTANT MIDDLE PERSIAN WORKS.

With the rise of the Sasanians, the court language of their empire ceased to be Parthian and became Middle Persian, the language of their native province of Pars, and a direct descendant of Achaemenid Old Persian. The amount and quality of texts available in Middle Persian with any interest to us is quite scarce, but one of them is crucial.

  • The first and most important of these sources, and of key importance for our narrative is the trilingual inscription (in Middle Persian, Parthian and Greek) of the second Sasanian šahanšah Šābuhr I on the lower outer wall of a building built by the Achaemenids (whose original function is still unknown to archaeologists) at Naqš-e Rustam near Persepolis, just in front of the tombs of the Achaemenid kings carved in the rock of the opposing cliff. Šābuhr I chose this dramatic and symbolic place to leave a trilingual inscription (just as Darius I had done at Bīsitūn in Media many centuries before) as a narrative of the deeds he’d achieved during his reign, especially his victories over Rome. Although the main purpose of this text is blatant political propaganda, it is extremely valuable to us, because it gives us a contemporary Iranian description of events that can be confronted with the much better known in the West Graeco-Roman one. Surprisingly, although the building had always been known and had never been ruined or covered by debris, the inscription was not discovered by western scholars until 1940, and then only because they decided to excavate the lower parts of the outer walls of the building in order to determine its total original height. Western scholars originally christened it as Res Gestae Divi Saporis (The Deeds of the God Šābuhr), making a parallelism with Augustus’ well known own Res Gestae. But today it’s usually referred to by scholars as The Inscription of Šābuhr I at the Ka’ba-ye Zardošt (Ka’ba-ye Zardošt means “the Kaaba of Zoroaster” in New Persian, and is the popular name that the inhabitants of the area have given to the building since the XIV century), usually abbreviated as ŠKZ.
  • The Kār-Nāmag ī Ardaxšir ī Pābagān is a late Middle Persian book written in court circles during the reign of Xusrō I (501-579 CE). It’s an epic tale of the rise of Ardaxšir I, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, full of romance-like adventures, and full of fantastic tales. It was part of the vast propaganda effort deployed under Xusrō I’s reign to strengthen the status of his dynasty and gather support for his policies. Because of this, it has little value as a direct historical source, because rather than telling what really happened in the early III century CE, it tells what Xusrō I and his court in the VI century CE wished their subjects to believe to have happened; although scholars see in it some kernels of truth.

LOST MIDDLE PERSIAN SOURCES.

  • The Xwadāy-Nāmag (The Book of Lords) was a book whose existence is quite secure (unlike with the Kaisergeschichte) because later Islamic authors refer specifically to it, either to its original Middle Persian version or to the version that was translated into Arabic in the VIII century. Both versions are now lost, but its main structure and sequence of kings was integrated wholly into Ferdowsi’s epic Šāh-nāma in the late X – early XI centuries. Its existence is also implied by the extant work of the Eastern Roman historian Agathias. Its existence was first postulated by the German scholar Theodor Nöldeke in the XIX century, who proposed a first redaction under Xusrō I, and a final redaction under the last Sasanian šahanšah Yazdgird III. It would have been a collection of short biographies of every Sasanian monarch starting with Ardaxšir I, but the same problem happens as with the Kār-Nāmag ī Ardaxšir ī Pābagān: it’s a late work, written by propaganda reasons. Still, most of the information given by Islamic authors (and some non-Islamic ones, like Agathias) about Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I must have come from this lost book.

ISLAMIC SOURCES.

  • History of the Prophets and Kings (Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk), written in Arabic by the Persian scholar Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabarī (839-923 CE). A monumental work covering since the Creation (according to the Qu’ran until the year 915 CE). Used sources in Middle Persian now lost. Around 963 CE, Tabarī’s work was translated into New Persian by the Samanid vizier Abu Ali Muhammad Bal’ami (this version is commonly known as Tarikh-e Bal’ami), who added much material that was missing in Tabari’s original text, most of it probably taken from the Arabic translation of the Xwadāy-Nāmag.
  • Tarikh-e Sistān, an anonymous work written in Sistān in New Persian, covering since the mythical foundation of the world until 1062 CE. It includes much material from local Sistani pre-Islamic lore.
  • The Šāh-nāma, written by Abu’l-Qāsem Ferdowsī between 977 and 1010 in New Persian. It’s the national epic of Iran, and the longest poem ever written by a single author. It covers from the mythical foundation of the world, according to pre-Islamic Zoroastrian tradition, to the battle of Qādisiyyah in 636 CE. For the part covering the Sasanian dynasty, it draws heavily from the Arabic translation of the Xwadāy-Nāmag, and also from “Fahlawi” (“Parthian”) local lore that was still being transmitted in Khorasan in Ferdowsi’s time.

ARMENIAN SOURCES

  • Movses Khorenats’i (Moses of Chorene, c.410-490 CE) was an Armenian bishop, who wrote the first History of Armenians in Armenian (Patmutyun Hayots; he is considered the father of Armenian history). His work deals in some detail with the vents that surrounded the fall of the Arsacid dynasty in Iran and the following wars between the Arsacid dynasty if Armenia and the Sasanians.
  • Faustus of Byzantium (P'awstos Buzand's in Armenian); despite his name, he wrote a History of the Armenians in six books, of which the first two are lost. In its surviving state, his work begins with the preaching of Gregory the Illuminator (c.257-331) and the conversion of Armenia to Christianity.

The most important sources will be the Graeco-Roman ones (just because they’re by far the most abundant), with prosopography and numismatics playing a key part in the reconstruction of Roman military movements and the public careers of important Roman emperors and functionaries.
 
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6.2. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE FIRST PARTHIAN WAR OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS AGAINST WALAXŠ V.
6.2. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE FIRST PARTHIAN WAR OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS AGAINST WALAXŠ V.

In 193 CE, the Roman emperor Pertinax (Publius Helvius Pertinax) was murdered by mutinied Praetorians after an ephemeral reign that lasted only three months. This murder originated a power vacuum that was solved by the Praetorian Guard through the dubious expedient of auctioning the purple to the highest bidder. The winner was Didius Julianus (Marcus Didius Severus Iulianus), a rich and experienced senator with a long career in public affairs under Marcus Aurelius and Commodus behind him.

300px-Pertinax_Providentia_Aureus.jpg

Publius Helvius Pertinax.

did008.jpg

Marcus Didius Severus Iulianus.

These actions put in jeopardy the whole Augustan order that, for two centuries, had mostly succeeded in maintaining the internal stability of the res publica by keeping the armies of Rome out of politics. Now the army would be brought back into politics in full force, and this time there would be no Augustus to stop it. The first two Severan emperors actually worsened things to a point of no return in this respect with actions, and set the basis for the growing indiscipline and political meddling of the III century military.

Upon receiving news of what had happened in Rome, the border legions reacted by supporting their own candidates to the purple. Unsurprisingly, the three candidates were the senatorial legates of the three most-heavily garrisoned provinces of the empire, each of them with three full legions and their corresponding auxiliaries:
  • Septimius Severus (Lucius Septimius Severus), legate of Pannonia Superior.
  • Pescennius Niger (Gaius Pescennius Niger), legate of Syria.
  • Clodius Albinus (Decimus Clodius Albinus), legate of Britannia.
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Lucius Septimius Severus.

220px-Aureus_Pescennius_Niger_%28obverse%29.jpg

Gaius Pescennius Niger.

Albinus.jpg

Decimus Clodius Albinus.

Severus’ brother Geta was governor of Moesia Superior, whose two legions swiftly joined Severus’ cause, and the rest of the Danubian legions followed in turn. Furthermore, as Severus’ army was the one located closer to Rome, he reacted quickly and skillfully to neutralize his other three rivals. He took detachments (vexillationes) from the Pannonian legions and marched immediately upon Rome, while other detachments from the Danubian and Dacian legions, under the command of his brother Geta, Marius Maximus and Tiberius Claudius Candidus, moved to the Bosphorus and the Hellespont to block these straits against any advance by Niger’s troops. As for Albinus, he reached an agreement with him by which he was appointed Caesar and Severus’ successor (despite the fact that Severus had two male sons).

Upon receiving news that Severus’ army was approaching Rome, the Praetorians deserted Iulianus, who was put to death by one of Severus’ soldiers, while Severus ordered the disbandment of the entire Pretorian Guard. He reformed it filling its ranks with seasoned (and loyal) veterans from his Pannonian legions, increasing its size to 15,000 men. He also increased the numbers of the four Urban Cohorts in Rome to 1,500 men per cohort, to a total of 6,000 men, and the number of the Vigiles to 7,000 men. Finally he conducted a bloody purge in Rome of supporters of Iulianus.

Afterwards, and with his back secure due to the reprisals in Rome and his agreement with Albinus, he moved east with his army (including the reformed Praetorians) to join the forces that were blocking the straits and besieging Byzantium (the only European city under Niger’s control).

Aware of the superiority that Severus enjoyed in numbers (some eastern legions, like the Legio II Traiana Fortis in Egypt and the Legio VI Ferrata in Palestine had refused to join him), Niger had asked for help to some eastern monarchs. Theoretically, since Lucius Verus’ victorious campaigns in the east, the small kingdoms of Osrhoene and Adiabene were Roman vassals, but it seems quite clear that, either during the last confused years of Commodus’ reign or taking advantage of the recent political turmoil in Rome, these kings were trying to shake off the Roman yoke by turning for Arsacid help.

The Arsacid šahanšah was then Walaxš V (who had been until recently king of Armenia until he’d seized the throne of Iran in 190 CE in yet another civil war), who had to fight a rival king in Media. Probably due to the still shaky situation in Iran, and perhaps due to lack of confidence in Niger’s chances, Walaxš refused to give open support, offering instead vague promises of friendship and support in an undetermined future, but in secret he encouraged the kings of Hatra, Adiabene and Osrhoene to support Niger. Perhaps at this moment he also abdicated the throne of Armenia into his brother Khosrov I the Great, so that Khosrov could too help Niger while preserving the fiction of Arsacid neutrality.

Thus, the kings of Osrhoene Abgar IX (actually only the king of Edessa since Verus had annexed most of Osrhoene to the empire), and Adiabene Narses besieged the fortified city of Nisibis in Roman-annexed Osrhoene, as the city’s garrison had proclaimed its allegiance to Severus.

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Map of the Near East before the annexations of Lucius Verus and Septimius Severus.

Walaxš’s lack of confidence in Niger’s chances was well founded, because in a lighting campaign Severus defeated Niger and by 194 CE he was in Antiochia and Niger has been killed while trying to flee to the Arsacid empire. Apparently, a large number of Niger`s followers, including many soldiers and officers, also sought refuge in Arsacid lands, which was a huge transference of military knowledge from Rome to the Arsacids.

Severus was victorious, but now he had several urgent problems to solve. First, he controlled now a divided army, formed by “victorious” European legions and “defeated” Asian ones. He needed to turn them again into a single army, and there was nothing better for that than turning them against a common enemy, if possible a foreign one, to avoid criticisms that he’s only won wars against fellow Romans. And second, there was the money issue. Severus was the issuer of one of the largest bribes in history: in order to win the unquestioned help of the soldiers, he increased their regular pay (the stipendium) from 300 to 500 denarii (some authors, based on Dio’s work, accept that he fully doubled it to 600 denarii), he also issued a large donativum for his accession to the purple of 250 denarii to each men, and later on during his reign he kept issuing even more largesses to the army (we’ll return to this point later, because it clearly had an impact on the Roman army of the III century). An immediate source of money to finance all this were the large fines imposed on eastern cities who had supported Niger, and also the confiscations of the property of Niger’s supporters, but another source of revenue to pay the troops would be the loot to be obtained in the lands of the kings who had “betrayed” Rome. And so, in 194-195 CE Severus launched his First Parthian War.

Severus’ First Parthian War was little more than a military walk, a punitive expedition in which Severus’ large army cowed the small eastern states between the Roman and Arsacid empires into submission. To give an idea of the kind of disproportion of forces involves, I’ll give a rough account of the forces employed by Severus in his first Expeditio Parthica. I’ve taken these estimates from Julio Rodríguez González’s Historia de las legiones romanas, an exhaustive 2-volume account of the history of every Roman legion.

Roman garrison:
  • Praetorian Guard: complete, perhaps leaving behind one cohort (13,500 infantrymen).
  • Equites Singulares Augusti: complete, 2,000 cavalrymen.
  • Several other bodyguard units (German guards, etc.): around 500 men.
European and African forces:

Usually, a whole legion would not be moved for a campaign fought far away, only a detachment (vexillatio). Normally, vexillationes were formed by 1,000-2,000 men (between 2 and 4 cohorts). According to Tacitus, legions or legionary detachments always moved with an equal number of auxiliary units, who due to their size could be moved around more easily than a full legion. Auxiliary units were classified mostly according to the following scheme:
  • Ala (500 cavalrymen).
  • Ala milliaria (1,000 cavalrymen).
  • Cohors auxiliaria (500 infantrymen).
  • Cohors milliaria auxiliaria (1,000 infantrymen).
Apart from auxiliaries, which formed part of the regular establishment of the Roman army, there were also mercenary and allied forces, which were only mobilized for a specific campaign. Allied forces were organized according to their own custom and led by their own officers, while with mercenaries the case could be the same as with allied units, or they could be vanquished enemies (usually Germans, Sarmatians, etc.) forced to lend warriors to the Roman army; in this case they were led by Roman officers and received the legal denomination of dediticii.
  • Legio I Adiutrix (based at Brigetio, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio I Italica (based at Novae, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Adiutrix (based at Aquincum, Lower Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Traiana Fortis (based at Nicopolis, near Alexandria in Egypt): a vexillatio.
  • Legio III Italica (based at Castra Regina, Raetia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio IV Flavia (based at Singidunum, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio V Macedonica (based at Potaissa, Dacia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VII Claudia (based at Viminacium, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio X Gemina (based at Vindobona, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XI Claudia (based at Durostorum, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia): the whole legion. This was the legion that originally hailed Severus as Augustus.
  • Legio XXII Primigenia (based at Mogontiacum, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
Eastern forces:

Except for a couple exceptions, these were the legions that had supported Niger. Most probably, due to their geographic position, they took part as a whole in the campaign (also for political reasons, in order to “reintegrate” them again with the western legions). But due also to them being defeated forces, it’s possible that they’d suffered serious losses, and given the celerity with which Severus undertook his Parthian expedition, there must have not have been time to fill again their ranks.
  • Legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra, Arabia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Gallica (based at Raphanaeae, Syria): the whole legion.
  • Legio IV Scythica (based at Zeugma, Syria): the whole legion.
  • Legio VI Ferrata (based at Caparcotna, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion. It was the only eastern legion (together with the II Traiana in Egypt) who had refused to join Niger).
  • Legio XII Fulminata (based at Melitene, Cappadocia): the whole legion.
  • Legio XV Apollinaris (based at Satala, Cappadocia): the whole legion.
  • Legio XVI Flavia Firma (based at Samosata, Syria): the whole legion.
Without taking into account mercenaries and allies, these numbers imply a force between 102,000 men (at most) and 80,000 (lower estimate) men. Which was a real steamroller if we take into account the puny armies Severus had in front of him (Walaxš V kept himself out of the way during this first campaign). Upon knowing that Severus was concentrating his armies at Zeugma to cross the Euphrates, Abgar of Osrhoene and Narses of Adiabene hurried to lift the siege of Nisibis and to send peace embassies to Severus; Khosrov of Armenia did the same. Severus crosed the Tigris and occupied Arbela, the capital of Adiabene, imposed heavy war indemnities upon the “defeated” foes and then prepared to march southwards, against Hatra and Ctesiphon.

In the meantime though, he took the titles Adiabenicus and Arabicus (but not Parthicus, a sign that there had been no real fighting against the Arsacids proper) and most importantly, he appointed his elder son Lucius Septimius Bassianus (the future emperor Caracalla) as Caesar, in a clear violation of the pact he’d struck with Clodius Albinus. Albinus immediately reacted by having the three British legions proclaim him Augustus, and crossed the Channel into Gaul with the whole British army. Upon receiving news of this, Severus immediately cancelled further operations and headed west with the vexillationes of the western legions; at the bloody battle of Lugdunum (February 19, 197 CE), he defeated Albinus and had him killed. Severus was now the sole master of the Roman empire.
 
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6.3. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE SECOND PARTHIAN WAR OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS AGAINST WALAXŠ V.
6.3. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE SECOND PARTHIAN WAR OF SEPTIMIUS SEVERUS AGAINST WALAXŠ V.

After Lugdunum, Septimius Severus was the undisputed master of the Roman empire. But there were still unsolved problems in the East. He’d still not punished the Arsacid king Walaxš V for his involvement in the affairs of Rome’s vassals, the previous campaign had been called off before reaching a satisfactory end and most probably he still needed money: despite the new wave of executions and confiscations amongst Albinus’ supporters and episodes like the sack of Lugdunum (the city never recovered after this bloody episode), he still had to pay the permanent pay rises to the praetorians, legionaries and auxiliaries, plus the donativa they expected after each victory and at each anniversary of Severus’ accession to the purple (especially for his ten-year anniversary, the decennalia). Plus, as we will see, Walaxš V had put aside any pretense and had attacked directly Roman territory.

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The Arsacid king of kings Walaxš V.

For these reasons, Severus decided to return to the East, this time to conduct a campaign against the Arsacid empire proper. This campaign would be led with forces even larger than the previous one. The eastern legions would have had their ranks filled, and apart from the garrison of Rome and the vexillationes from European and African legions, Severus raised three new legions for this campaign: Legiones I, II and III Parthicae. Of these, Legiones I and III Parthicae were probably raised in the East, but Legio II Parthica was raised in Pannonia and Illyria, the areas which had supported Severus’ bid for power and was intended from the start as an elite unit. While Legiones I and III Parthicae would become in future the garrison of Roman Mesopotamia, Legio II Parthica would be posted at Castra Albana near Rome, and would be intended as a counterweight against the Praetorian Guard. Together with the Praetorian Guard and the Aulici (like the Equites Singulares Augusti, etc.) this meant the creation of a 30,000-strong central reserve quartered at or near Rome and which would accompany the emperor in all his travels and campaigns, and would be also a further assurance against revolts by border legions (like the one which had brought Severus to the purple).

Guessing Severus’ intentions, Walaxš V decided to attack first while Severus was still fighting Albinus. He first occupied Adiabene, and had its pro-Roman king Narses drowned in the Great Zab. Nisibis was besieged but resisted thanks to the competent defense of its commander Iulius Laetus. According to Dio, the Arsacid vanguards even crossed the Euphrates into Syria, while according to Herodian Walaxš V’s armies also invaded Armenia to punish the pro-Roman stance of its king Khosrov. Then, when the defenses of Rome’s eastern provinces seemed to have floundered completely and before Severus had time to react and send reinforcements, the bane of the Arsacids struck again: the Syriac Chronicle of Arbela states that there was a great uprising “amongst the Medians and Persians” (which to the author of the Chronicle probably meant simply “in Iran”) and Walaxš V had to leave Mesopotamia quickly with his army and launch a campaign against the rebels that was fought mainly “in Khorasan” (an anachronic term that implies that the rebellion perhaps had engulfed as far away as Parthia itself).

This gave time to Severus to mobilize the vast war machine of the empire and send massive reinforcements to the East; these kind of “Parthian Expeditions” launched by Trajan, Verus, Severus, etc.) meant the weakening of the European borders of the empire, and could only be afforded if the European enemies of the empire stood quiet and did not raise trouble. In the III century, this situation became increasingly rare, and accordingly the Romans had to fight their Iranian forces only with their eastern forces, without reinforcements from Europe.

For this second expedition (197-198 CE), Severus assembled an even larger forcer than the one he employed in the previous war. Again, the estimates have been taken from Julio Rodríguez González’s Historia de las legiones romanas.

Roman garrison:
  • Praetorian Guard: complete, perhaps leaving behind one cohort (13,500 infantrymen).
  • Equites Singulares Augusti: complete, 2,000 cavalrymen and reinforced by 2,000 more Mauri cavalrymen.
  • Several other bodyguard units (German guards, etc.): around 500 men.
  • Legio II Parthica, plus auxiliaries.
European and African forces:
  • Legio I Adiutrix (based at Brigetio, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio I Minervia (based at Bonna, Lower Germany): a vexillatio.
  • Legio I Italica (based at Novae, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Adiutrix (based at Aquincum, Lower Pannonia): the whole legion (disputed).
  • Legio II Traiana Fortis (based at Nicopolis, near Alexandria in Egypt): a vexillatio.
  • Legio III Augusta (based at Lambaesis, Numidia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio V Macedonica (based at Potaissa, Dacia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VIII Augusta (based at Argentorate, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
  • Legio X Gemina (based at Vindobona, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XI Claudia (based at Durostorum, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XIII Gemina (based at Apulum, Dacia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XXII Primigenia (based at Mogontiacum, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XXX Ulpia Traiana Victrix (based at Vetera, Lower Germany): a vexillatio.
Eastern forces:

These legions must have replenished the losses suffered in the 193-194 civil war, but some of them must’ve suffered the brunt of the Arsacid offensive during the two previous years, so it’s possible that again some of them were not in very good shape.
  • Legio I Parthica (newly raised): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra, Arabia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Gallica (based at Danaba, Syria Phoenicia): the whole legion (probably).
  • Legio III Parthica (newly raised): the whole legion.
  • Legio IV Scythica (based at Zeugma, Syria Coele): the whole legion.
  • Legio VI Ferrata (based at Caparcotna, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion.
  • Legio XII Fulminata (based at Melitene, Cappadocia): the whole legion (probably).
  • Legio XV Apollinaris (based at Satala, Cappadocia): the whole legion (probably).
  • Legio XVI Flavia Firma (based at Samosata, Syria Coele): the whole legion (probably).
Again, taking into account mercenaries and allies, these numbers imply a force between 182,000 men (higher estimate) and 116,000 (lower estimate). To these forces, we should add the small army of king Abgar of Osrhoene and the substantial army of Khosrov I of Armenia, that joined forces with Severus.

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The Euphrates river at Zeugma.

The preparations this time were also much more extensive than during the previous campaign. The army assembled at Zeugma in Syria Coele, and there Severus had a large fleet of supply boats built, to carry downstream the supplies necessary for the army. Also, he had two great “war machines” built (Dio doesn’t give more details about them) for taking fortified cities. When everything was ready, the huge Roman army marched downstream the Euphrates past Dura (the last Roman stronghold) into Arsacid Mesopotamia. Resistance was inexistent; it quickly became another military walk. Severus’ army reached the latitude of Ctesiphon (near modern Baghdad, where the two great Mesopotamian rivers come closer to each other) and there they abandoned the supply fleet and marched on land to the Tigris, crossed it, invested Ctesiphon and took it easily by assault.

Karte_Seleucia_Ktesiphon.png

Map of the area of Ctesiphon between the III century BCE and the VII century CE. The Tigris is a river very unstable, prone to sudden inundations and riverbed changes. This has made the task of modern archaelogists quite complicated when trying to excavate teh many cities that existed in the area: Seleucia (Greek foundation), Ctesiphon and Vologesias (Arsacid foundations) and Veh Ardashir (Sasanian foundation), with the great royal Sasanian palace complex marked by the Taq-e Kisra to the east.

The only hint at difficulties found by the Roman army in Dio’s account is his assertion that by this point the Roman army was hungry, which was the main reason why the Roman soldiers became particularly vicious in their looting and foraging, and also that they suffered of diseases, probably dysentery and other water and mosquito-borne diseases that in the Mesopotamian summer and in a land crisscrossed by irrigation canals, was something not uncommon. The point about supplies running low can point to two causes (they’re not mutually exclusive): a policy of scorched earth by the scarce Arsacid forces in the theatre, or a miscalculation (or excessive optimism) on the part of Severus, perhaps due to the great size of his army.

After burning, looting and destroying Ctesiphon and taking most of its inhabitants as slaves, the Roman army began its return journey north, still suffering from hunger and disease. They took the route of the eastern bank of the Tigris, which was rich in farmland and had still not been pillaged. This path seems to have alleviated somehow the Roman supply troubles, but Severus abandoned it to take another swing against the fortified city of Hatra, with unfruitful results (rumors of a plot against Severus arose, and he ordered the execution of several successful military commanders like Iulius Laetus and Tiberius Claudius Candianus). After raising the siege, Severus’ army reached the security of northern Mesopotamia. The campaign, despite the fiasco at Hatra, had been a great success by Severus: he’d managed to gain lots of booty, lots of prestige (which he promptly capitalized by assuming the title of Parthicus Maximus and by raising his younger son Geta to the status of Caesar).

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The Diyala river, one of the rivers the Roman army had to cross in their return march to the north.

The fiasco at Hatra still rankled, and Severus decided to give it a second try before leaving the East. The results were still worse than during the first attempt, with a near mutiny among his troops and yet another bout of illness among his troops. Severus’ was forced to raise the siege again; placed on a rocky deserted waterless plain and protected by a double circuit of stone walls, with the only spring in the vicinity inside them, Hatra proved a nut too hard to crack for Severus, as it had for Trajan.

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Plan of the ancient city of Hatra.

Still, Severus capitalized his eastern campaign with one final act; he formally annexed all of Osrhoene (except for its capital city Edessa) and all of Adiabene west of the Tigis, as well as Hatran territory up to the Khabur river, and formed a new Roman province, which he called Mesopotamia, with capital at Nisibis. The new province would not be governed by a senatorial legate, but by an equestrian praeses. It woul be garrisoned by Legio I Parthica, based at Nisibis, and Legio II Parthica, based at Singara. Both legions would also be commanded by equestrian praefects instead of senatorial legates. It also allowed Severus to take a new title, that of propagator imperii. This new Roman province provided Rome with several important strategical advantages:
  • It allowed the Romans to attack Ctesiphon from a nearer start position.
  • It was dangerosly closer to Media.
  • It inserted a strategic wedge between Arsacid Mesopotamia and Armenia ruled by an Arsacid king who was always changing sides between both empires.
It also won the Romans a renewed animosity from the Arsacids and later the Sasanians, who always considered this annexation as "unlawful", which led to continued wars between Rome and Iran in the following centuries.
What shocks more about this campaign is the total lack of attacks or any kind of reaction by Iranian forces. The only credible reason for this utter inactivity can only be the chaotic situation in Iran proper, where Walaxš V must’ve been immersed in a life-or death fight against rebel clans, with the situation being serious enough that he decided to allow Severus to sack, burn and pillage Mesopotamia and his capital Ctesiphon and will. Had the Arsacid forces been united behind the leadership of Walaxš V, they could’ve made life very difficult for Roman foraging parties during the Ctesiphon episode and later, and they would’ve been able to harass the Roman column non-stop during its retreat north along the Tigris (exactly as happened with Julian’s expedition in the 360s).

Professor Touraj Daryaee, from University of California at Irvine, qualified this war as the real beginning of the end for the House of Aršak, and I agree with him. Walaxš V was to be the penultimate Arsacid šahanšah of Iran, and it was during his reign when internal rebellions in Iran became serious enough as to paralyze totally any military response against a foreign invasion, which in turn weakened even more the prestige of the dynasty. Walaxš V kept his throne, but he left to his heirs a badly shaken realm, teeming with discontent amongst the great clans in Iran.
 
Just a little appendix about the sources. In my account, I've followed mainly Dio's account, because it makes more sense overall:

Cassius Dio said:
After this Severus made a campaign against the Parthians. For while he had been occupied with the civil wars they had taken advantage of their immunity and had captured Mesopotamia, whither they had made an expedition in full force. They had also come very near seizing Nisibis, and would have succeeded, had not Laetus, who was besieged there, saved the place. In consequence Laetus acquired still greater renown, though he had already shown himself a most excellent man in all his relations, both private and public, whether in war or in peace. (...) As the Parthians did not await his arrival but retired homeward (their leader was Vologaesus, whose brother was accompanying Severus), he constructed boats on the Euphrates and proceeded forward partly by sailing and partly by marching along the river. The boats thus built were exceedingly swift and speedy and well constructed, for the forest along the Euphrates and that region in general afforded him an abundant supply of timber. Thus he soon had seized Seleucia and Babylon, both of which had been abandoned. Later, upon capturing Ctesiphon, he permitted the soldiers to plunder the entire city, and he slew a vast number of people, besides taking as many as a hundred thousand captives. He did not, however, pursue Vologaesus, nor even occupy Ctesiphone, but, just as if the sole purpose of his campaign had been to plunder this place, he was off again, owing partly to lack of acquaintance with the country and partly to the dearth of provisions. He returned by a different route, because the wood and fodder found on the outward march had been exhausted. Some of the soldiers made the return journey by land up the Tigris, and some in boats.

Severus now crossed Mesopotamia and made an attempt on Hatra, which was not far off, but accomplished nothing; on the contrary, his siege engines were burned, many soldiers perished, and vast numbers were wounded. He accordingly retired from there and shifted his quarters. While he was engaged in this war he put to death two distinguished men. One was Julius Crispus, a tribune of the Pretorians; and the reason was that Crispus, vexed at the war's havoc, had casually quoted some verses of the poet Maro, in which one of the soldiers fighting on the side of Turnus against Aeneas bewails his lot and says: "In order that Turnus may marry Lavinia, we are meanwhile perishing all unheeded." And Severus made Valerius, the soldier who accused him, tribune in his place. The other man that he put to death was Laetus, for the reason that Laetus was proud and was beloved by the soldiers, who used to declare they would not go on a campaign unless Laetus led them. He tried to fasten the responsibility for this murder, for which he had no evident reason save jealousy, upon the soldiers, making it appear that they had been rash enough to commit the deed contrary to his will.

He himself made another expedition against Hatra, having first got ready a large store of food and prepared many siege engines; for he felt it was disgraceful, now that the other places had been subdued, that this one alone, lying there in their midst, should continue to resist. But he lost a vast amount of money, all his engines, except those built by Priscus, as I have stated above, and many soldiers besides. A good many were lost on foraging expeditions, as the barbarian cavalry (I mean that of the Arabians) kept assailing them everywhere in swift and violent attacks. The archery, too, of the Atreni was effective at very long range, since they hurled some of their missile by means of engines, so that they actually struck many even of Severus' guards; for they discharged two missiles at one and the same shot and there were many hands and many bows hurling the missiles all at the same time. But they inflicted the greatest damage on their assailants when these approached the wall, and much more still after they had broken down a small portion of it; for they hurled down upon them, among things, the bituminous naphtha, of which I wrote above, and consumed the engines and all the soldiers on whom it fell. Severus observed all this from a lofty tribunal. When a portion of the outer circuit had fallen in one place and all the soldiers were eager to force their way inside the remainder, Severus checked them from doing so by ordering the signal for retreat to be clearly sounded on every side. For the place enjoyed great fame, containing as it did a vast number of offering to the Sun-god as well as vast sums of money; and he expected the Arabians to come to terms voluntarily, in order to avoid being forcibly captured and enslaved. At any rate, he allowed one day to pass; then, when no one came to him with any overtures for peace, he commanded the soldiers to assault the wall once more, though it had been built up during the night. But the Europeans, who alone of his army had the ability to do anything, were so angry that not one of them would any longer obey him, and the others, Syrians, who were compelled to make the assault in their place, were miserably destroyed. Thus Heaven, that saved the city, first caused Severus to recall the soldiers when they could have entered the placed, and in turn caused the soldiers to hinder him from capturing it when he later wished to do so. Severus, in fact, found himself so embarrassed by the situation that, when one of his associates promised, if he would give him only five hundred and fifty of the European soldiers, to destroy the city within the hearing of all: "And where am I to get so many soldiers?" — referring to the soldiers' disobedience.

But Herodian's tale is much more garbled, and places the siege of Hatra before the fall of Ctesiphon:

Herodian said:
Severus now remained in Rome for a long time, during which his sons were partners with him in governing the empire.note He was then seized with a desire to win glory for victories not only over fellow countrymen and Roman armies but also barbarians; using as an excuse for his action the friendship shown to Niger by Barsemius, king of the Hatrenians, he led his army off to the East.

When he arrived there his intention was to invade Armenia also. But the king of the Armenians forestalled him by sending money, gifts, and hostages to support his plea for peace and by promising pacts and good will. After affairs in Armenia had thus turned out to his satisfaction, Severus marched against the Hatrenian kingdom. At this time Abgarus, the Osrhoenian king,note fled to Severus and gave him his children as a guaranty of his support; he also brought a great number of archers to fight in the Roman army.

After passing through the region between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the country of the Adiabenes, Severus hurried on into Arabia Felix,note the country which produces the fragrant plants we use in our perfumes and incense. When he had destroyed many towns and villages there and had plundered the countryside, he came into the territory of the Hatrenians, where he encamped and laid siege to the city of Hatra.

This city, located on top of a lofty mountain, was surrounded by a high, strong wall manned by many bowmen. After making camp, Severus' soldiers pressed the siege with all the power at their command, endeavoring to capture the city. Engines of every type were brought up to the wall, and all the known tactics were tried.

The Hatrenians fought back bravely; pouring down a steady stream of stones and arrows, they did considerable damage to the army of Severus. Making clay pots, they filled them with winged insects, little poisonous flying creatures. When these were hurled down on the besiegers, the insects fell into the Romans' eyes and on all the unprotected parts of their bodies; digging in before they were noticed, they bit and stung the soldiers.

The Romans found the air at Hatra intolerable, stifling from the hot sun; they fell sick and died, and more casualties resulted from disease than from enemy action.

When the army, for the reasons mentioned above, had abandoned all hope and the siege was at a stalemate, with the Romans losing instead of gaining ground, Severus led his troops away unsuccessful, fearing that he would lose his entire army. The soldiers were unhappy that the siege had not turned out as successfully as they wished; accustomed to victory in all their battles, they believed that failure to win was actually defeat. But Fortune, by furthering his affairs at this time, provided Severus a measure of consolation; he did not return home without some success, and the truth is that he accomplished more than he had expected.

The army, sailing in a large number of ships, was not borne to its intended destination on Roman-held shores, but after the current had carried the fleet a great distance, the legions disembarked on Parthian beaches at a spot within a few days' march of the road leading to Ctesiphon, where the royal palace of the Parthians was located. There the king was spending his time peacefully, thinking that the battles between Severus and the Hatrenians were no concern of his.

But the troops of the emperor, brought by the current to these shores against their will, landed and plundered the region, driving off for food all the cattle they found and burning all the villages as they passed. After proceeding a short distance, they stood at the gates of Ctesiphon, the capital city of the great king Artabanus. The Romans fell upon the unsuspecting barbarians, killing all who opposed them. Taking captive the women and children, they looted the entire city. After the king fled with a few horsemen, the Romans plundered the treasuries, seized the ornaments and jewels, and marched off.

Thus, more by luck than good judgment, Severus won the glory of a Parthian victory. And since these affairs turned out more successfully than he had any reason to hope, he sent dispatches to the senate and the people, extolling his exploits, and he had paintings of his battles and victories put on public display. The Senate voted him the titles formed from the names of the conquered nations, as well as all the rest of the usual honors.

Both writers were contemporaries of the events, but Herodian's text is full of mistakes: Hatra is on a perfectly flat plain, and it's not located in Arabia Felix (the southern shore of the Arabian peninsula, the current states of southern Yemen and Oman). Plus, his tale of the way the Romans reached Ctesiphon is a bit hard to believe, to put it mildly.
 
6.4. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE PARTHIAN WAR OF CARACALLA AGAINST ARDAWĀN V.
6.4. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE PARTHIAN WAR OF CARACALLA AGAINST ARDAWĀN V.

Walaxš V died in 208 CE, and designed as heir his elder son, who ascended the throne as Walaxš VI (208-228 CE), but very soon the succession was contested by his younger brother, who supported by part of the great clans was proclaimed king as Ardawān V (208-224 CE), and a new civil war ensued. Ardawān V seems to have been able to win the support of a majority of the nobility in Media and Parthia, but was unable to dislodge his brother Walaxš VI from Ctesiphon and Mesopotamia (although he seems to have had Elymais under control); it’s possible that the powerful Sūrēn clan of Sakastan also supported Walaxš VI. Meanwhile, in the vassal kingdom of Pārs, its ruling dynasty was about to be overthrown by a newcomer, a certain Pābag supported by his two sons Šābuhr and Ardaxšir, who soon would begin to act as if they were a fully independent country, attacking and annexing other vassal kingdoms of the Arsacid empire. And it was in the middle of this chaotic situation that the Roman emperor Caracalla (188-217 CE), who reigned between 211 and 217 CE as Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus, decided to launch yet another Expeditio Parthica.

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Silver drachm of Walaxš VI.

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Silver drachm of Ardawān V.

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Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus, AKA Caracalla.

Caracalla is one of the most polemic Roman emperors; among the main sources (Dio, Herodian and the HA), neither offers a flattering portrait of him; Dio in particular, who knew him in person, has left us a portrait so full of personal hatred that it’s often easy to detect personal biases and lies deliberately inserted by Dio in order to further worsen his name.

When Septimius Severus died at Eburacum (modern York) in 211 CE in the middle of a campaign against the Caledonians and Maetae, he took the uncommon decision of appointing both his sons, Caracalla and his younger brother Geta, as co-rulers of the empire. Both brothers hurried to return to Rome, where Caracalla, apparently to prevent a plot by Geta to assassinate him, had him killed by loyal Praetorians while Geta sought refuge in the arms of their mother Iulia Domna. It was an inauspicious start for his reign, as Geta had been well liked by the army, which cherished the memory of their father. Caracalla was able to control the Praetorians and Urbaniciani (who were posted at the same camp, the Castra Praetoria) thanks to a sizeable donativum, and immediately after this he went to the camp of Legio II Parthica at Alba. There, he was refused entry to the camp, and was accused of fratricide. Again, Caracalla had to promise them another large donativum to win their support.

In view of the situation, and to avoid the discontent among the troops to develop into something dangerous, Caracalla followed his father’s example and ordered a further 50% increase on the soldiers’ regular pay (stipendium), on top of the increase that his father had already authorized, as well as the increase in numbers of the Roman garrison and the recruitment of three new legions and unknown numbers of auxiliary units. One can only imagine the impact this had on the imperial Treasury.

For further security, he then launched a bloody purge of all the real or supposed supporters of Geta, which according to Dio amounted to 20,000 executions only in Rome. Obviously, the wave of confiscations that followed the purge must have alleviated somehow the pressure on the imperial Treasury caused by Caracalla’s generosity towards the army. Severus had already ordered an important devaluation of the Roman silver coin, the denarius, and Caracalla continued this trend:
  • 193-194 CE: 78,5% silver content.
  • 194-196 CE: 64,5% silver content.
  • 196-211 CE: 56,5% silver content.
And Caracalla began issuing the antoninianus to pay his troops; in theory it was worth two denarii, but in reality its silver content was worth only 1,5 denarii (42,3% silver content). This was the sharpest devaluation in the history of Roman coinage. By contrast, the Arsacid coinage of Walaxš V and his successors remained stable at 77,9% silver content. Dio hints at Caracalla’s financial difficulties with the anecdote of this exchange between the emperor and his mother Iulia Domna:

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXVIII 10,4:
Once when Julia chided him for spending vast sums upon them (the soldiers) and said, "There is no longer any source of revenue, just or unjust, left to us," he replied, exhibiting his sword, "Be of good cheer, mother: for as long as we have this, we shall not run short of money."

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Antoninianus minted by Caracalla.

Which hints clearly that Caracalla planned to wage war to raise money. And if this was his goal, it was clear that only in the East could he find enemies worthy of being looted.

Unfortunately for the Arsacids, Caracalla was a fervent admirer of Alexander the Great, and his great dream was to follow in his steps. But his first campaigns were fought in Europe, either because the circumstances forced him to do so, or because he wanted to secure his European borders before engaging the Arsacids; both goals are not mutually exclusive. Anyway, Caracalla would spend all the remaining years of his rule from 212 to 217 constantly on campaign. He became extremely popular among the troops, as he dressed like them, marched with them and often fought at front line (apart from his pay raises); Cassius Dio in his work despised the emperor for his “populism” amongst the troops, but it should be noted that when other emperors like Trajan deployed the same qualities, Dio had no problem with their behavior.

Caracalla is first attested at Mogontiacum in Upper Germany in 212 where he conducted a campaign against the Alemanni (first mention of this name in Roman history, in Cassius Dio’s work) in 212-213. Caracalla defeated the Alemanni apparently in a decisive way, because they did not stir again until 20 years later, and took the title Germanicus Maximus, which was registered by the Arval Brethren at Rome on 20 May 213. In his account, Dio also tells that Caracalla paid large subsidies to the Germanic peoples:

Cassius Dio 14, Epitome of Book LXXVIII 3-4:
Many also of the people living close to the ocean itself near the mouths of the Albis sent envoys to him asking for his friendship, though their real purpose was to get money. This was made clear by the fact that, when he had done as they desired, many attacked him, threatening to make war, and yet he came to terms with all of them. For even though the terms proposed were contrary to their wishes, yet when they saw the gold pieces they were captivated. The gold that he gave them was of course genuine, whereas the silver and the gold currency that he furnished to the Romans was debased; for he manufactured the one kind out of lead plated with silver and the other out of copper plated with gold.

This passage of Dio suggests that Caracalla bought peace with some Germanic peoples by way of subsidies, but that he perhaps also recruited Germanic mercenaries; removing the young warriors from troublesome border peoples by recruiting them into the Roman army as mercenaries was a proved and trusted way of ensuring the peace in specific sectors of the border (but one that, given the state of public finances, was not very advisable, and which, as Dio's text shows, could and would cause resentment among his Roman subjects).

Dio also delighted in describing Caracalla`s deceitful and murderous character in the way he tricked the Alemanni:

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXVIII 13,5:
For he summoned their men of military age, pretending that they were to serve as mercenaries, and then at a given signal — by raising aloft his own shield — he caused them all to be surrounded and cut down, and he sent horsemen round about and arrested all the others.

After the German campaign, Caracalla moved to the Balkans and visited Macedonia and Greece (always in the footsteps of Alexander the Great). In Macedonian and Greek lands, Caracalla conducted some kind of military experiment reported by both Dio and Herodian that has puzzled historians ever since:

Cassius Dio 7, Epitome of Book LXXVIII 1-2:
He organized a phalanx, composed entirely of Macedonians, sixteen thousand strong, named it "Alexander's phalanx," and equipped it with the arms that warriors had used in his day; 2 these consisted of a helmet of raw ox-hide, a three-ply linen breastplate, a bronze shield, long pike, short spear, high boots, and sword. Not even this, however, satisfied him, but he must call his hero "the Augustus of the East"; and once he actually wrote to the senate that Alexander had come to life again in the person of the Augustus, that he might live on once more in him, having had such a short life before.

Herodian, 4.8.2-3:
Caracalla himself went about in Macedonian dress, affecting especially the broad sun hat and short boots. He enrolled picked youths in a unit which he labeled his Macedonian phalanx; its officers bore the names of Alexander's generals.
He also summoned picked young men from Sparta and formed a unit which he called his Laconian and Pitanate battalion.

Neither Dio nor Herodian make clear if the “Macedonians” chosen for the phalanx were picked amongst men already enrolled in the army, or if he recruited a full Macedonian phalanx (16,000 men) ex novo. With any other emperor, the first option would be the most plausible, but with Caracalla, nothing can be discarded. As for the Spartan unit, the tombstone of a certain Marcus Aurelius Alexis, found in Greece, states that the man took part in Caracalla’s eastern campaign, and the portrait carved on the stone shows him in Roman military gear carrying a club, a weapon that the Romans found useful in close-quarter combat against armored cataphracts.

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Tombstone of Marcus Aurelius Alexis.

Crossing the Hellespont with an army formed by the Roman garrison and vexillationes from several European legions (and maybe the Macedonian phalanx?) he spent the winter of 215-216 in Nicomedia, Dio’s native city, where to Dio’s mortification, he had to suffer further humiliations in front of his fellow citizens.

Meanwhile, Caracalla had been taking diplomatic steps for his cherished great eastern enterprise. According to Dio, he summoned king Abgar of Edessa for a meeting, and then had him put in chains and the city of Edessa annexed into the empire (as capital of the new province of Osrhoene) but when he later tried to mediate between the king of Armenia and his sons, the Armenians refused the offer, distrustful of Caracalla`s intentions. He also spent time drilling the “Macedonian phalanx” and building two great siege engines for use against Parthia (according to Dio). When the weather allowed it, he departed Nicomedia for Antiochia, and from Antiochia he made a trip to Alexandria where, for unclear reasons (according to Dio, because the Alexandrians had mocked him) his troops massacred its inhabitants and looted the city. After this he returned to Antiochia while his army (western forces and eastern legions) concentrated in the area between Zeugma and Edessa.

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View of the north Mesopotamian plain from the citadel of Edessa (modern Sanliurfa, Turkey). Places like Edessa, Nisibis and Singara were extremely important strategically because from there the garrison had excellent views of the surrounding plains and thus of possible enemy troop movements, and were also endowed with water springs which allowed them to resist protracted sieges.

For an account of the forces mobilized for Caracalla’s expedition, I will as usual resort to Julio Rodríguez González’s Historia de las legiones romanas.

Roman garrison:
  • Praetorian Guard: complete, perhaps leaving behind one cohort (13,500 infantrymen).
  • Equites Singulares Augusti: complete, 4,000 cavalrymen.
  • Several other bodyguard units (Speculatores, Aulici, etc.): around 500 men.
  • Legio II Parthica, plus auxiliaries.
European and African forces:
  • Legio I Adiutrix (based at Brigetio, Upper Pannonia): the whole legion.
  • Legio II Adiutrix (based at Aquincum, Lower Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Italica (based at Lauriacum, Noricum): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Traiana Fortis (based at Nicopolis, near Alexandria in Egypt): a vexillatio.
  • Legio III Augusta (based at Lambaesis, Numidia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio III Italica (based at Castra Regina, Raetia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio IV Flavia Felix (based at Singidunum, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio V Macedonica (based at Potaissa, Dacia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio X Gemina (based at Vindobona, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XIII Gemina (based at Apulum, Dacia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • “Macedonian phalanx”??
  • Laconian “battalion”.
Eastern forces:
  • Legio I Parthica (based at Singara, Mesopotamia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra, Arabia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Gallica (based at Danaba, Syria Phoenicia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Parthica (based at Nisibis, Mesopotamia): the whole legion.
  • Legio IV Scythica (based at Zeugma, Syria Coele): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VI Ferrata (based at Caparcotna, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion.
  • Legio X Fretensis (based at Aelia Capitolina, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion.
  • Legio XII Fulminata (based at Melitene, Cappadocia): the whole legion (probably engaged in the Armenian theater).
  • Legio XV Apollinaris (based at Satala, Cappadocia): the whole legion (probably engaged in the Armenian theater).
  • Legio XVI Flavia Firma (based at Samosata, Syria Coele): the whole legion.
Without taking into account neither allies nor mercenaries, these numbers imply a force between 114,000 men (higher estimate) and 92,000 (lower estimate), plus a minimum of 20,000 men engaged in the Armenian theater. Also, if the “Macedonian phalanx” was a newly recruited unit, we should add a further 16,000 men to the grand total.

Now we get to thick of the plot. It’s perhaps one of the strangest parts to be found in all Roman history: considering Caracalla’s antecedents (his trickery of the Alemanni and Abgar of Edessa), he wrote to Ardawān V … offering to marry his daughter! Both Dio and Herodian agree in this:

Dio, Epitome of Book LXXIX, 1:
After this Antoninus made a campaign against the Parthians, on the pretext that Artabanus had refused to give him his daughter in marriage when he sued for her hand; for the Parthian king had realized clearly enough that the emperor, while pretending to want to marry her, was in reality eager to get the Parthian kingdom incidentally for himself.

Herodian, 4.10.1-4:
Not long after this, Caracalla, desirous of gaining the title Parthicus and of being able to report to the Romans that he had conquered all the Eastern barbarians, even though there was peace everywhere, devised the following plan. He wrote a letter to the king of Parthia (his name was Artabanus) and sent to him an embassy laden with gifts of expensive materials and fine workmanship.

He wrote to the king that he wished to marry his daughter; that it was not fitting that he, emperor and son of an emperor, be the son-in-law of a lowly private citizen. His wish was to marry a princess, the daughter of a great king. He pointed out that the Roman and the Parthian empires were the largest in the world; if they were united by marriage, one empire without a rival would result when they were no longer divided by a river.

The rest of the barbarian nations now not subject to their authority could easily be reduced, as they were governed by tribes and confederacies. Furthermore, the Roman infantry were invincible in close-quarter combat with spears, and the Parthians had a large force of highly skilled horse-archers.

The two forces, he said, complemented each other; by waging war together, they could easily unite the entire inhabited world under a single crown. Since the Parthians produced spices and excellent textiles and the Romans metals and manufactured articles, these products would no longer be scarce and smuggled by merchants; rather, when there was one world under one supreme authority, both peoples would enjoy these goods and share them in common.

But here the coincidences between both chronicles cease. Dio implies that Ardawān refused flatly, while according to Herodian, Ardawān bit the bait. In this point, it’s impossible to reconcile both chronicles. It’s also difficult to understand what role played in all this mess Walaxš VI, who still clung to Ctesiphon and Mesopotamia, and the kingdom of Armenia. Herodian and Dio are silent in this respect. According to Armenian sources, Khosrov I was king of Armenia until 217, but his sons, including his heir Tiridates, were held prisoners by the Romans between 215 and 217 (perhaps an echo of this is found in Dio’s reference to the Armenian dispute?), which caused a full-scale anti-Roman revolt in Armenia, which forced Caracalla to send an army into Armenia to put it down with inconclusive results. After Caracalla’s death, Tiridates II would rise to the Armenian throne.

Thus, Caracalla was busy in the north with a war in Armenia, and instead of attacking Walaxš VI in Mesopotamia, which would have been the easiest prey, he chose to go after Ardawān, who controlled most of the Arsacid empire. This suggests that perhaps he’d reached some sort of secret agreement with Walaxš VI. And, if Herodian is right in his tale of events, perhaps Caracalla had also some understanding with Ardawān, otherwise it’s difficult to understand how the Arsacid king, who came from a house and a culture used to uprisings and plots, did not smell the rat in Caracalla’s offer. Let’s see both accounts:

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXIX, 1:
So Antoninus now ravaged a large section of the country around Media by making a sudden incursion, sacked many fortresses, won over Arbela, dug open the royal tombs of the Parthians, and scattered the bones about. This was the easier for him to accomplish inasmuch as the Parthians did not even join battle with him (…)The barbarians took refuge in the mountains beyond the Tigris in order to complete their preparations, but Antoninus suppressed this fact and took to himself as much credit as if he had utterly vanquished these foes, whom as a matter of fact he had not even seen; and he was particularly elated because, as he himself wrote, a lion had suddenly run down from a mountain and fought on his side.

Herodian, 4.10.5 – 4.11.9
At first the Parthian king did not approve of the proposals in Caracalla's letters, saying that it was not proper for a barbarian to marry a Roman. What accord could there be when they did not understand each other's language and differed so radically in diet and dress? Surely, the king said, there are many distinguished Romans, one of whose daughters he could marry, just as for him there were the Arsacids; it was not fitting that either race be bastardized.

The Parthian's initial replies were of this type, and he declined Caracalla's offer of an alliance. But when the emperor persisted and with many gifts and oaths swore to his enthusiasm for the marriage and his good will toward the Parthians, Artabanus was won over; addressing Caracalla as his future son-in-law, he promised him his daughter in marriage. When the news was made public, the barbarians prepared for the reception of the emperor of the Romans and rejoiced in the hope of permanent peace.

Having crossed the rivers unopposed, Caracalla entered the barbarians' land as if it were already his. Sacrifices were offered to him everywhere; the altars were decked with wreaths, and perfumes and every kind of incense were scattered in his path. Caracalla pretended to be delighted by the barbarians' attentions and continued his advance. He had now completed the greater part of his journey and was approaching the palace of Artabanus. The king did not wait to receive the emperor but came out to meet him in the plain before the city, welcoming his son-in-law, the bridegroom of his daughter.

All the Parthians, crowned with the traditional flowers and wearing robes embroidered in gold and various colors, celebrated the occasion, dancing wildly to the music of flutes and the throbbing of drums. They take delight in such orgiastic dancing, especially when they are drunk.

Abandoning their horses and laying aside their quivers and bows, the whole populace came together to drink and pour libations. A huge mob of barbarians gathered and stood about casually, wherever they happened to be, eager to see the bridegroom and expecting nothing out of the ordinary.

Then the signal was given, and Caracalla ordered his army to attack and massacre the spectators. Astounded by this onslaught, the barbarians turned and fled, wounded and bleeding. Artabanus himself, snatched up and placed on a horse by some of his personal bodyguards, barely escaped with a few companions.

The rest of the Parthians, lacking their indispensable horses, were cut down (for they had sent the horses out to graze and were standing about). They were unable to escape by running, either; their long, loose robes, hanging to their feet, tripped them up.

Naturally they did not have their quivers and bows with them; what need for weapons at a wedding? After slaughtering a great number of the enemy and taking much booty and many prisoners, Caracalla marched away from the city unopposed. En route he burned the towns and villages and permitted his soldiers to carry off as much as they could of anything they wanted.

Such was the nature of the disaster which the barbarians suffered when they were not anticipating anything of the kind. After harassing most of the Parthian empire, Caracalla, since his troops were weary by now of looting and killing, went off to Mesopotamia. From there he sent word to the Senate and the Roman people that the entire East was subdued and that all the kingdoms in that region had submitted to him.

The senators were not unaware of what had actually happened (for it is impossible to conceal an emperor's acts); nevertheless, fear and the desire to flatter led them to vote the emperor all the triumphal honors. Thereafter, Caracalla spent some time in Mesopotamia, where he devoted himself to chariot-driving and to fighting all kinds of wild animals.

In Dio’s account, Caracalla just attacks Ardawan’s territory, and loots everything he can, without opposition. Dio’s texts has some confusing points though: he stated that Caracalla looted Arbela, implying that Arbela stood in Media, but Arbela (modern Irbil) is located west of the Zagros, not in Media. Furthermore, the text seems to imply that Caracalla did not cross the mountains behind which “the barbarians” sought refuge, and which could only have been the Zagros.

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Aerial photograph of the citadel of Arbela (modern Irbil, Iraq).

Herodian’s account is much longer and has some internal logic; the Iranians were taken by surprise by Caracalla’s ruse, and were massacred defenseless while Ardawān barely managed to escape with his life; after this it’s easy to see why the Romans were able to loot and burn around at leisure. Also, Herodian text seems to suggest that Caracalla’s campaign went further than Adiabene and Arbela, for he explicitly states that Caracalla “harassed most of the Parthian empire”.

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The Great Zab river descending from the Zagros mountains to enter the Mesopotamian plain near Arbela.

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A Kurdish village on the Iranian side of the mountains.

Dio also offers and important detail lacking in Herodian’s text: Caracalla opened the graves of the Arsacid kings in Arbela and scattered their bones around. This is also quite a difficult point; Arbela was a relatively unimportant city, and until recently had been the capital of the vassal kingdom of Adiabene. Why should the Arsacid kings of Iran be buried there, in a place where Zoroastrianism was not even the main religion (leaving aside the point that modern and “classical” Zoroastrianism forbids the inhumation or cremation of corpses)?

Although the idea of Ardawān V swallowing Caracalla’s ruse seems quite strange, it seems quite possible, when comparing both texts (bear also in mind that we don’t have Dio’s complete text, only its epitome by Xiphilinos) that after looting Arbela, and independently of what happened there, Caracalla managed to cross the Zagros with his army and enter Media proper, where he reached some important Zoroastrian sanctuary and there he desecrated the graves of Ardawān’s ancestors.

After this, Caracalla’s army retreated to winter quarters in Roman Mesopotamia and Osrhoene, where Caracalla was murdered on April 8 217 CE near Carrhae in Osrhoene in a complot organized by one of his Praetorian Prefects, Macrinus.
 
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6.5. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE LAST BATTLE BETWEEN THE ARSACIDS AND ROME: NISIBIS 217 CE.
6.5. THE END OF THE ARSACID DYNASTY. THE LAST BATTLE BETWEEN THE ARSACIDS AND ROME: NISIBIS 217 CE.

Whatever had happened at Arbela, Ardawān V was now in an impossible situation. In the worst case, if we try to harmonize Dio and Herodian’s accounts, he’d been tricked by Caracalla in a most humiliating way, he’d escaped from death or capture at the last minute, most of his entourage at Arbela had been massacred, the graves of his ancestors had been desecrated and large parts of Adiabene and possibly Media had been looted by the Romans.

This was the worst defeat suffered by an Arsacid king at the hands of the Romans by far, and worse: it was a personal affront of the worst kind, and a direct attack to the fitness of the Arsacids to defend Iran against foreign foes. Who could believe that a šahanšah who could not even defend his own family could defend the Iranians against foreign attacks? Perhaps Ardawān, or even the House of Arsāk itself (as Walaxš VI had done nothing either, and had probably been in an agreement with Caracalla), had lost the farr that Ohrmazd and the yazdān had invested on them centuries ago. So, probably propelled both by personal hatred and by the sheer necessity of dispelling any doubts about his ability as king and the divine favor bestowed on his house, Ardawān promptly mounted a massive counteroffensive against the Romans by gathering all the forces loyal to him in Iran proper, crossing the Zagros as soon as the passes were free of snow and ice and marching at full speed directly towards the Roman army scattered around in northern Mesopotamia and eastern Syria.

On a certain level, this was a gilded opportunity for the Romans. No Roman general ever had been able to bring a great Arsacid army into a pitched battle, it had always been the Arsacids who, with their superior mobility, had chosen the where and when to engage the Romans, usually coming to close combat with the Romans only when they’ve been thoroughly “softened” by repeated harassing. But this time, Ardawān was coming directly to blows with the Romans, he had neither the will nor the time for the usual indirect Iranian tactics.

Had the Romans been led by another leader, they could have profited from this opportunity, but Macrinus was not exactly a great general. Dio, in the snobbish tone of his last books, gives a less than flattering description of the man:

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXIX, 11:
Macrinus was a Moor by birth, from Caesarea (Note: in Mauretania Caesariensis, modern northern Algeria), and the son of most obscure parents, so that he was very appropriately likened to the ass that was led up to the palace by the spirit; in particular, one of his ears had been bored in accordance with the custom followed by most of the Moors (Note: this custom was considered intrinsically “barbarian” by Romans and Greeks). But his integrity threw even this drawback into the shade. As for his attitude toward law and precedent, his knowledge of them was not so accurate as his observance of them was faithful. It was thanks to this latter quality, as displayed in his advocacy of a friend's cause, that he had become known to Plautianus, whose steward he then became for a time. Later he came near perishing with his patron (Note: Plautianus had been Severus’ Praetorian Prefect, who fell in disgrace and was executed), but was unexpectedly saved by the intercession of Cilo, and was appointed by Severus as superintendent of traffic along the Flaminian Way. From Antoninus he first received some brief appointments as procurator, then was made prefect, and discharged the duties of this office in a most satisfactory and just manner, in so far as he was free to follow his own judgment.

Herodian gives a somewhat more impartial portrait of the man:

Herodian, 4.12.1:
Caracalla had two generals in his army: Adventus, an old man, who had some skill in military matters but was a layman in other fields and unacquainted with civil administration; and Macrinus, experienced in public affairs and especially well trained in law. Caracalla often ridiculed Macrinus publicly, calling him a brave, self-styled warrior, and carrying his sarcasm to the point of shameful abuse.

When the emperor learned that Macrinus was overfond of food and scorned the coarse, rough fare which Caracalla the soldier enjoyed, he accused the general of cowardice and effeminacy, and continually threatened to murder him. Unable to endure these insults any longer, the angry Macrinus grew dangerous.

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Marcus Opellius Macrinus.

The Praetorian Guard was usually led by two Praetorian Prefects (it was an old Roman custom to duplicate posts); normally one of them was a man of military experience (thus the one who really led the Praetorians in battle) and the other was a juridical expert, who acted as the emperor’s main counsellor in legal matters. Herodian’s text makes clear that Macrinus was the “juridical” prefect, and thus a man with little or no experience in military affairs.

Macrinus was also in a very, very delicate situation. He had orchestrated the murder of an emperor who was idolized by the troops in the middle of an ongoing campaign, and if he wanted to survive, he needed to convince the troops that he’d not been involved in the murder of Caracalla and that he was a valid military leader.

In the first task he more or less succeeded. Luckily for him, no other commanders came forward to claim the purple, and the tribunes of the Praetorian Guard, who probably were also part of the plot, first offered the purple to Adventus (Marcus Oclatinius Adventus, the other Praetorian Prefect), who refused, and then to Macrinus. Macrinus (according to Dio) then displayed for four days the by then traditional comedy of refusing the throne, until finally “under pressure of the troops”, and “for the good of the res publica” he assumed the title of Augustus. The troops accepted Macrinus mostly because they needed an emperor to lead them in battle as soon as possible, as Ardawān was approaching quickly with a huge army.

He duly informed the Senate in Rome of his appointment as Augustus by the army, and the venerable assembly was aghast at the news: not only was Macrinus a man of most humble origins, but he was not a senator, but an equestrian. It was the first time ever that an emperor had not been chosen from among the ranks of the senatorial ordo. It was a prelude of things to come.

Macrinus also took great care to give a state funeral to Caracalla and sent his ashes to Rome to be buried, and he also avoided taking any reprisals against Caracalla’s relatives and friends (this was to reveal itself later as a fatal mistake), refused to take reprisals against Caracalla’s informers and spies and asked the Senate to deify him (two acts that disappointed and enraged the conscript fathers). Herodian gives a detailed account of the events (the part of these events corresponding to Dio has arrived to us in a very fragmentary state):

Herodian, 4.14.1-8:
After Caracalla's death, the bewildered soldiers were at a loss as to what to do. For two days they were without an emperor while they looked for someone to fill the office. And now it was reported that Artabanus was approaching with a huge army, seeking a legitimate revenge for the Parthians whom Caracalla had murdered under a truce and in time of peace.

The army first chose Adventus as their emperor because he was a military man and a praetorian prefect of considerable ability; he declined the honor, however, pleading his advanced age. They then decided upon Macrinus, influenced by their tribunes, who were close friends of the general and were suspected of having been involved in the plot against Caracalla. Later, after Macrinus' death, these tribunes were punished, as we shall relate in the pages to follow.

Macrinus thus received the office of emperor not so much because of the soldiers' affection and loyalty as from necessity and the urgency of the impending crisis.

While these events were taking place, Artabanus was marching toward the Romans with a huge army, including a strong cavalry contingent and a powerful unit of archers and those mail-clad soldiers who hurl spears from dromedaries.

When the approach of Artabanus was reported, Macrinus called the soldiers together and addressed them as follows: "That all of you regret the passing of such an emperor, or, more accurately, fellow soldier, is hardly surprising. But to endure misfortunes and disasters with equanimity is the part of intelligent men.

Truly the memory of Caracalla is locked in our hearts, and to those who come after us will be handed down this memory, which will bring him everlasting fame for his great and noble deeds, his love and affection for you, and his labors and comradeship with you. But now it is time for us, since we have paid the last of the prescribed honors to the memory of the dead and have performed his funeral rites, to look to the present emergency.

You see the barbarian with his whole Eastern horde already upon us, and Artabanus seems to have good reason for his enmity. We provoked him by breaking the treaty, and in a time of complete peace we started a war. Now the whole Roman empire depends upon our courage and loyalty. This is no quarrel about boundaries or river beds; everything is at stake in this dispute in which we face a mighty king fighting for his children and kinsmen who, he believes, have been murdered in violation of solemn oaths.

Therefore let us take up our arms and our battle stations in the customary Roman good order. In the fighting, the undisciplined mob of barbarians, assembled only for temporary duty, may prove its own worst enemy. Our battle tactics and our stern discipline, together with our combat experience, will insure our safety and their destruction. Therefore, with hopes high, contest the issue as it is fitting and traditional for Romans to do.

Thus will you repel the barbarians, and by winning a great and glorious reputation you will make it clear to the Romans and to all men - and you will likewise confirm that previous victory - that you did not deceive the barbarians by fraudulently and treacherously breaking your treaty with them, but that you conquered and won by force of arms."

Dio, increasingly bitter in these last books of his work, spent a good part of Book LXXIX criticizing Macrinus for his obscure origins, his lack of culture and education (curious accusation, when he was a jurist) and his poor choices in appointments. One of these tirades is particularly interesting, as it makes clear that Adventus was rewarded for his part in the plot with the post of Urban Prefect in Rome and his advancement to the rank of senator:

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXIX, 14:
Another thing for which many criticized him was his elevation of Adventus. This man had first served in the mercenary force among the spies and scouts, and upon quitting that position had been made one of the couriers and appointed their leader, and still later had been advanced to a procuratorship; and now the emperor appointed him senator, fellow-consul, and prefect of the city, though he could neither see by reason of old age nor read for lack of education nor accomplish anything for want of experience. The reason for the advancement of Adventus was that he had made bold to say to the soldiers after the death of Caracallus: "The sovereignty belongs to me, since I am older than Macrinus; but since I am extremely old, I yield it to him." Yet it seemed that he must be jesting when he said this, and that Macrinus must be jesting, too, when he granted the highest dignity of the senate to such a man, who could not even carry on a respectable conversation when consul with anyone in the senate and who accordingly on the day of the elections feigned illness. Hence it was not long until Macrinus assigned the oversight of the city to Marius Maximus in his stead; indeed, it looked as if he had made Adventus city prefect with the sole purpose of polluting the senate-chamber, inasmuch as the man had not only served in the mercenary force and had performed the various duties of executioners, scouts, and centurions, but had furthermore obtained the rule over the city prior to performing the duties of the consulship, that is, had become city prefect before being senator. Macrinus had really acted thus in the case of Adventus with the purpose of throwing his own record into the background, since he himself had seized the imperial office while still a knight.

For further precaution, Macrinus also appointed his 9-year-old son Diadumenianus as Caesar (and thus his successor). Now, Macrinus only had to manage the issue of Ardawān`s quickly approaching army. The Roman army (which we must assume was the same army that Caracalla had led, so for the numbers see my previous post) assembled near the fortified city of Nisibis, capital of Roman Mesopotamia and there the two armies met at an undetermined date in the summer of 217 CE.

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Marcus Opellius Diadumenianus.

Dio’s record of the battle has arrived to us badly damaged, and is of little use to reconstruct the events of the battle, although he supplies some details lacking in Herodian’s report, which has survived complete.Let’s see Dio’s account first.

Cassius Dio, Epitome of Book LXXIX, 26-27:
Macrinus, perceiving that Artabanus was exceedingly angry because of the way he had been treated and that he had invaded Mesopotamia with a large force, at first of his own accord sent him the captives and a friendly message, urging him to accept peace and laying the blame for the past upon Tarautas (Note: one of the derogatory nicknames Dio used for Caracalla). But Artabanus would not entertain this proposal and furthermore bade him rebuild the forts and the demolished cities, abandon Mesopotamia entirely, and make reparation for the injury done to the royal tombs as well as for other damage. For, trusting in the large force that he had gathered and despising Macrinus as an unworthy emperor, he gave free rein to his wrath and hoped even without the Roman's consent to accomplish whatever he desired. Macrinus had no opportunity even for deliberation, but encountering him as he was already approaching Nisibis, was defeated in a battle that was begun by the soldiers in a struggle over the water supply while they were encamped opposite each other. And he came near losing his very camp; but the armour-bearers and baggage-carriers who happened to be there saved it. For in their confidence these rushed out first and charged upon the barbarians, and the very unexpectedness of their opposition proved an advantage to them, causing them to appear to be armed soldiers rather than mere helpers. But . . . . . . . . . . . . . . both then not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the legions? . . . . . . . . . . and the Romans . . . . . . . . . . . . and the enemy the noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . suspected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the Romans . . . . of the barbarians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . overcome by their numbers and by the flight of Macrinus, became dejected and were conquered. And as a result . . . . . . Mesopotamia, especially . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . These were the events that took place at that time; and in the autumn and winter, during which Macrinus and Adventus became consuls, they no longer came to blows with each other, but kept sending envoys and heralds back and forth until they reached an agreement. For Macrinus, both because of his natural cowardice (for, being a Moor, he was exceedingly timorous) and because of the soldiers' lack of discipline, did not dare to fight the war out, but instead expended enormous sums in the form of gifts as well as money, which he presented both to Artabanus himself and to the powerful men around him, the entire outlay amounting to two hundred million sesterces. And the Parthia was not loath to come to terms, both for this reason and because his troops were exceedingly restive, due to their having been kept away from home an unusually long time as well as to the scarcity of food; for they had no food supplies available, either from stores previously made ready, or from the country itself, inasmuch as the food either had been destroyed or else was in the forts. Macrinus, however, did not forward a full account of all their arrangements to the senate, and consequently sacrifices of victory were voted in his honour and the name of Parthicus was bestowed upon him. But this he declined, being ashamed, apparently, to take a title from an enemy by whom he had been defeated.

Moreover, the warfare carried on against the Armenian king, to which I have referred, now came to an end, after Tiridates had accepted the crown sent him by Macrinus and received back his mother (whom Tarautas had imprisoned for eleven months) together with the booty captured in Armenia, and also entertained hopes of obtaining all the territory that his father had possessed in Cappadocia as well as the annual payment that had been made by the Romans. And the Dacians, after ravaging portions of Dacia and showing an eagerness for further war, now desisted, when they got back the hostages that Caracallus, under the name of an alliance, had taken from them.

So, what can be learnt from Dio’s account? One, that Macrinus first tried to negotiate a peace with Ardawān before the battle, but this attempt failed. Two, that the battle was a Roman near-defeat due to the worthless leadership and personal cowardice of Macrinus “the Moor”. Three, that Macrinus had to buy peace with Ardawān (200 million sesterces), release all captives (Parthians and Armenians) and allow Tiridates to be crowned as king of Armenia. Dio also gives the reason for Ardawān’s change of opinion regarding a negotiated peace the fact that his troops had become “restive” after spending a long time away from their homelands, and the scarcity of supplies (two of the key weaknesses of the Arsacid military system). Dio states that this happened “in the autumn and the winter”, which means that after the battle Macrinus and Ardawān opened negotiations, which stretched until Ardawān’s army melted away. But as for the battle itself, Dio’s mutilated account gives us practically no information. Let’s read now Herodian’s account:

Herodian, 4.15.1-9:
Artabanus appeared at sunrise with his vast army. When they had saluted the sun, as was their custom, the barbarians, with a deafening cheer, charged the Roman line, firing their arrows and whipping on their horses. The Romans had arranged their divisions carefully to insure a stable front; the cavalry and the Moorish javelin men were stationed on the wings, and the open spaces were filled with light-armed and mobile troops that could move rapidly from one place to another. And so the Romans received the charge of the Parthians and joined battle.

The barbarians inflicted many wounds upon the Romans from above, and did considerable damage by the showers of arrows and the long spears of the mail-clad dromedary riders. But when the fighting came to close quarters, the Romans easily defeated the barbarians; for when the swarms of Parthian cavalry and hordes of dromedary riders were mauling them, the Romans pretended to retreat and then they threw down caltrops and other keen-pointed iron devices. Covered by the sand, these were invisible to the horsemen and the dromedary riders and were fatal to the animals.

The horses, and particularly the tender-footed dromedary, stepped on these devices and, falling, threw their riders. As long as they are mounted on horses and dromedary, the barbarians in those regions fight bravely, but if they dismount or are thrown, they are very easily captured; they cannot stand up to hand-to-hand fighting. And, if they find it necessary to flee or pursue, the long robes which hang loosely about their feet trip them up.

On the first and second days the two armies fought from morning until evening, and when night put an end to the fighting, each side withdrew to its own camp, claiming the victory. On the third day they came again to the same field to do battle; then the barbarians, who were far superior in numbers, tried to surround and trap the Romans. The Romans, however, no longer arranged their divisions to obtain depth; instead, they broadened their front and blocked every attempt at encirclement.

So great was the number of slaughtered men and animals that the entire plain was covered with the dead; bodies were piled up in huge mounds, and the dromedaries especially fell in heaps. As a result, the soldiers were hampered in their attacks; they could not see each other for the high and impassable wall of bodies between them. Prevented by this barrier from making contact, each side withdrew to its own camp.

Macrinus knew that Artabanus was making so strong a stand and battling so fiercely only because he thought that he was fighting Caracalla; the barbarian always tires of battle quickly and loses heart unless he is immediately victorious.

But on this occasion the Parthians resolutely stood their ground and renewed the struggle after they had carried off their dead and buried them, for they were unaware that the cause of their hatred was dead. Macrinus therefore sent an embassy to the Parthian king with a letter telling him that the emperor who had wronged him by breaking his treaties and violating his oaths was dead and had paid a richly deserved penalty for his crimes. Now the Romans, to whom the empire really belonged, had entrusted to Macrinus the management of their realm.

He told Artabanus that he did not approve of Caracalla's actions and promised to restore all the money he had lost. Macrinus offered friendship to Artabanus instead of hostility and assured him that he would confirm peace between them by oaths and treaties. When he learned this and was informed by envoys of Caracalla's death, Artabanus believed that the treaty breaker had suffered a suitable punishment; as his own army was riddled with wounds, the king signed a treaty of peace with Macrinus, content to recover the captives and stolen money without further bloodshed.

The Parthian then returned to his own country, and Macrinus led his army out of Mesopotamia and hurried on to Antioch.

Herodian’s text gives much more details about the battle itself. It says nothing about a previous skirmish, and implies that both armies had pitched camp in front of each other to fight a frontal battle. The terrain favored the Arsacid side because it was an open plain free of obstacles, but probably the Romans (according to Dio, and as was Roman standard practice) had some sort of fortified encampment behind them. What shows poor leadership on Macrinus’ side though is that, having had lots of time to choose the battlefield and prepare for the battle, he had neglected to build any kind of field fortifications.

Herodian states that the battle lasted three days, that “the Parthians” had a sizeable numerical advantage over the Romans (given the probable large numbers of the Roman army as discussed in the previous post, this meant that Ardawān had thrown into the fight practically every force he had available) and that they attacked at dawn of the first day, which is quite logical in an army numerically superior and seeking a decisive victory: they probably wanted to take maximum advantage of daylight hours. But Ardawān here did not show either outstanding qualities as a field commander, because despite having the advantage of numbers, he did not try to encircle the flanks of the Roman force until the third day, after having suffered grievous losses the two previous days. Instead, he fought the battle as a frontal encounter, to the Romans’ benefit.

The description by Herodian of the Roman array implies that the Roman heavy infantry was deployed in main bodies separated by spaces occupied by light infantry. The light infantry was to be used to sally forth in case that the Iranian cataphracts charged the Roman heavy infantry in got bogged down in front of the legionaries; their task would be to attack the cataphracts (or more likely their horses) in close combat, and to retreat again to safety behind the heavy infantry if the cataphracts retreated and another charge of cavalry came against the Roman line. It should be stated that despite Herodian’s (and other Greek and Roman authors) flamboyancy about these tactics, and his statement that “the Parthians” were weak and cowardly in close combat, this was a very dangerous activity, because the training and panoply of Arsacid and Sasanian cataphracts included close combat tactics with convincing weapons, like long swords, heavy war maces and pickaxes. Although it’s evident that their main weapon, the long kontos, was useless in close combat, they were by no means defenseless.

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A zurkhāneh in Iran. Still today in these "Houses of Strength" men and boys train in the varzesh-e pahlavāni ("heroic sport"), a tradition that dates back to the Arsacid era.

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Head of a Sasanian bronze war mace found in Pakistan.

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British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad in the full regalia of a Sasanian commander, VI-VII centuries CE.

Sadly, neither account lets us know how was the Roman heavy infantry arrayed. In his book Caracalla: A Military Biography, Ilkka Syvänne proposes that the bodies of heavy infantry could have been arrayed in four possible ways:
  • As single oblong formations (elongated hollow squares, with the light infantry inside them).
  • As double oblong formations, one in front and the other in reserve (as classical war manuals recommended for situations of numerical inferiority and/or enemy cavalry superiority).
  • As simple phalanxes, 16 files depth (the classical Hellenistic array, described by Arrian as being used by the Roman army in the II century CE in the East).
  • As double phalanxes, each 16 files depth.
Syvänne guesses (correctly in my opinion) that the last two formations would have been more probable, given that during the third day Macrinus kept sending reinforcements to both flanks of the army to avoid being surrounded; with squares this would have been difficult, but with phalanxes it would have been a matter of sending the back ranks into the flanks, weakening the center but without destroying the coherence of the Roman tactical array.

Another proposal by Syvänne (but with does not appear either in Dio or in Herodian) is that given that the Roman cavalry, originally posted in the flanks, disappears from the battle and is not mentioned in the events of the third day, when in theory it should have prevented the outflanking attempts by Ardawān`s forces, is that it met the initial charge of the Iranian cavalry. It’s possible, but it would have been a highly incompetent move by Macrinus (which is not impossible, either), given the overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of the Iranian cavalry.

Nowhere in Dio or Herodian’s texts do they imply that Ardawān’s army deployed infantry, although it’s almost sure that it included infantry.

As for the Arsacid army, Syvänne proposes (again without support from documentary sources, but based on what’s known from the Parthian and Sasanian way of war, through Islamic era treatises and Central Asian art) that it was arrayed in two lines with five bodies each (the most classical array for an Iranian / Central Asian cavalry army), and each of these bodies would have been formed by rhomboid or wedge formations. The first line would have been formed mainly by horse archers and the second line by cataphracts armed with kontoi.

It’s clear that Herodian did not understand any of these tactical intricacies, because he described “the barbarians” as just launching a frontal charge against the Romans, without further ado. He adds quite correctly that the Roman army suffered considerable damage by the Iranian archery (as was to be expected), and that the legionaries also suffered many casualties from a tactical experiment of Ardawān: cataphracts mounted on dromedaries or camels; apparently, as these animals are taller than horses, this allowed their riders to hit the Roman soldiers more effectively and with impunity from above, although this in turn bears into question which was the effectivity of Roman light infantry; it’s difficult to imagine camels/dromedaries charging with the same speed as a horse, so they must’ve been used with the animal either trotting at low speed parallel to the first rank of legionaries, or completely static. The fact that these cataphracted camels are never mentioned again in Roman or Eastern sources suggests that the experiment was not very successful, and that it was not repeated.

Another interesting point of Herodian’s account is that this time, it was the Romans who managed to fool the Arsacid cavalry with a feigned retreat, and inflicted losses on their cavalry with the use of caltrops (tribulus in Latin) but not nearly enough as to stop the relentless assaults by Ardawān’s army. But what is most underscored both in Dio and Herodian is the tenacity and ferocity with which the Arsacid army fought, for three consecutive days, with continued frontal assaults against the well-disciplined Roman infantry.

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A caltrop.

Dio states clearly that Macrinus lost the battle and fled the battlefield, abandoning his army. Herodian though says nothing of the sort, and implies that it ended in a draw and that both leaders, in view of the losses sustained by both armies, opened peace talks.

Herodian does not offer a timeline for the negotiations as Dio does, but the final result according to him is basically the same: all the prisoners are returned to Ardawān and “the booty” looted by Caracalla is also returned (which could be the same that Dio depicted as a tribute paid by Macrinus).

Nisibis was to be the last battle fought between the Arsacids and Rome. In less than a year, Macrinus and his son were dead and replaced by the colorful emperor Elagabalus, and seven years later Ardawān V died in battle against the army of Ardaxšir I, and the rule of the House of Aršak in Iran came to an end.

Politically, it could be said that both leaders lost the battle. Macrinus, who desperately needed to win a reputation as a successful battle commander to make his soldiers forget their idolized Caracalla, failed miserably. In less than a year, part of the army (led by Legio III Gallica) rebelled and Macrinus lost the throne, his life and that of his son (ironically, he'd tried to send Diadumenianus to Arsacid territory asking Ardawān to protect the boy, but the boy's companions handed him over to the supporters of Elagabalus). As for Ardawān V, considering the formidable army he’d gathered and the affront he needed to “wash with blood”, he also accomplished little: a costly draw, tempered by some war indemnities and the return of war captives. He also revealed himself as a mediocre commander and worse of all, he’d suffered serious losses among his followers in a moment in which the civil war in Iran was to become three-sided. Most scholars believe that the losses suffered by the forces of Ardawān V and his supporters at Nisibis were key in the success of the revolt by Ardaxšir I.
 
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7. PERSIA UNDER THE SELEUCIDS AND ARSACIDS.
7. PERSIA UNDER THE SELEUCIDS AND ARSACIDS.

After Alexander’s conquest of the Achaemenid empire, the country of Persia (Latin) / Persis (Greek) / Pārsā (Old Persian, OP) / Pārs (Middle Persian, MP) / Fārs (New Persian, NP) pretty much disappears from historical records until the rise of the House of Sāsān. This was the situation until the last decades of the XX century, when through numismatics it’s been possible to put together a sketch of the history of this part of Iran between 330 BCE and 224 CE.

For this post, I will follow two main sources:
  • The paper titled Fars under Seleucid and Parthian Rule, by Prof. Josef Wiesehöfer of Christian-Albrechts University Kiel; published in the compilation Age of the Parthians (The Idea of Iran), edited by Vesta Sarkosh Curtis.
  • The paper titled Ardaxšir I and the Sasanians’ Rise to Power, by Prof. Touraj Daryaee of University of California, Irvine; published in Anabasis: Studia Classica et Orientalia, No.1 (2010).
After conquering Persis and the murder of Darius III, Alexander behave as an Achaemenid ruler: his adoption of Persian court uses and costumes, his honoring of Cyrus the Great and his marriage policy. Plus, he appointed as satrap of Persis his friend Peucestas, who while remaining totally loyal to Alexander, maintained and enhanced his persophile policies and managed to attract the nobility of Persis to his side. Apparently, neither Peucestas nor his master touched the Achaemenid administrative arrangements nor the fundamental Persian notion of kingship. Wiesehöfer thinks that this is the only way that it can be explained why there’s zero reports of unrest in Persis at the time, and why the new satrap could levy troops there for Alexander’s army without difficulty.

Everything was not so rosy though, because Zoroastrian tradition has carried to this day an implacably hostile portrait of Alexander as a barbarian and an enemy of the “Good Religion”.

Peucestas’ efforts to strengthen his ties with the Persian nobility continued after Alexander’s death. In 319 BCE, he held a great banquet at Persepolis including native Persian lords and following Persian custom and protocol. And from this era there’s also archeological evidence of construction activity in Persepolis, in a temple built directly under the great terrace in which, in typical Hellenistic fashion, there’s a display of syncretism in the choices of the gods honored (Zeus for Ohrmazd, Apollo for Mihr, Athenea for Anahid, etc).

After the death of the diadochos Eumenes, Antigonus Monophtalmos took control over Persis and deposed Peucestas, with Seleucus I Nicator finally gaining possession of Persis in 312 BCE. From this date until the end of the reign of Antiochus III in 187 BCE, Persis remained a loyal and quiet Seleucid province and from an unknown date onwards, Persis was ruled by a dynasty of local rulers, who in their coinage called themselves fratarakā of the gods (fratarakā ī bayān) and who were subordinated to the Seleucid kings.

Wiesehöfer believes that the first fratarakā to rule as an independent ruler of Pārs was Wahbarz, followed by his successor Wādfradād I. Wiesehöfer identifies Wahbarz with the Oborzus that according to the Greek chronicler of the II c. CE Polyaenus massacred 3,000 Greek military settlers in Pārs, which he commemorated in his coinage and which was probably the act that marked his breakaway from Seleucid rule. But the period of Persian independence must’ve been short. Probably, Wādfradād I was the Persian ruler whom the Seleucid ruler Demetrius II asked for military help in his eastern expedition against the Arsacid king Mihrdad I in 140 BCE (according to Strabo). The defeat of Demetrius II probably meant the end of the independence of Pārs, although the Arsacids, still hard-pressed both on West and East by the Seleucids, Sakas and Tokharians, probably decided to leave the fratarakās in place in Pārs as vassal rulers.

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Silver drachm of the fratarakā Wahbarz.

By this time, the capital of Pārs must’ve been still Persepolis, as archeology shows intense construction activity just below the main terrace. Both Wiesehöfer and Daryaee agree that these rulers did not see themselves as successors or continuators of the Achaemenids; they never used the title of “Great King” or “King of Kings”. They were not either magi (priests) themselves, although they claimed divine protection and election in their coinage (Daryaee speculates that maybe they had a “priestly” function in that they were the guardians of the tombs of the Achaemenid kings near their capital Persepolis, that in local Persian oral lore would have become “gods” in their own right).

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The cliff at Naqsh-e Rostam near Persepolis and Istakhr, where several Achaemenid kings had their tombs carved in the rock and several Sasanian kings would choose as the place to have their great rock reliefs carved up.

After the Arsacid takeover, the rulers of Pārs used the title of šah (“king”) in their coinage, and eventually they moved their capital from Persepolis to nearby Istakhr. Up to now, the names of the kings of Arsacid Pars that are known through their coinage are (in chronological order):
  • Dārāyān I.
  • Wādfradād II.
  • Dārāyān II.
  • Ardaxšahr / Ardaxšīr I.
  • Wahuxšahr.
  • Wādfradād III.
  • Manūčihr I.
  • Ardaxšahr / Ardaxšīr II.
  • Manūčihr II.
  • Nāmbad.
These are only the kings for whom legible coins have survived, we don’t know if this is a complete list, or the time periods of each reign.

These kings seem to have been loyal subjects to the Arsacid kings, as Strabo (64 BCE – 24 CE) in his works does not tell about any disturbance there. Neither does any posterior document, except the Syriac Chronicle of Arbela, by the end of Arsacid rule. This docility is also confirmed by the fact that apparently the Arsacids never deemed necessary to remove the local dynasty from the throne of Pārs, and that their right to mint coinage was never revoked. Their coins also followed closely Arsacid models.

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Coin of the king of Pārs Dārāyān II. Notice the fire altar on the reverse.

In turn, local rule inside Pārs seems have been also quite decentralized, as judging from Tabari´s account of the rise of Ardaxšir I, the were also minor “sub-kings” or “lords” inside the country, in turn subjected to the overall rule of the Persian kings at Istakhr.

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Irrigated farmland in Fars. The topography of this Iranian province is quite mountainous, with dry mountain ranges separating fertile, irrigated valleys that have been under intense cultivation since ancient times.

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Despite its proximity to the Persian Gulf, Fars is a relatively cold region due to its high altitude. Here you have a picture of the Ghalat mountain near Shiraz (the modern capital of Fars) in winter.
 
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8.1 THE REVOLT OF ARDAXŠIR I. THE OBSCURE ORIGINS OF THE HOUSE OF SĀSĀN IN PĀRS.
8.1 THE REVOLT OF ARDAXŠIR I. THE OBSCURE ORIGINS OF THE HOUSE OF SĀSĀN IN PĀRS.

Modern scholars mostly agree that the Sasanians were newcomers in Pārs, and not members of the traditional nobility of the area; most probably they were even completely unrelated to the royal family of Pārs. Graeco-Roman sources are practically useless to reconstruct the rise of the Sasanians in this province, and so the only ancient sources left are Middle Persian ones, Islamic ones (above all, Tabarī and Ferdowsī) and Armenian ones (especially Agathangelos and Movses Khorenats’i). These are the sources mostly used by modern scholars.

In this post, I will use mainly one paper by a modern scholar:
  • Ardaxšir and the Sasanians’ Rise to Power, by Professor Touraj Daryaee, from University of California, Irvine published in Anabasis: Studia Classica et Orientalia No.1 (2010).
I will follow mainly Daryaee’s paper for a general view of the questioned origins of the House of Sāsān, and then in a following post I will resort to other two works, which tie the Sasanians with eastern Iran and previous conflicts which had happened within the Arsacid royal house and some of the great clans of Iran, especially the Sūrēn.

Working with Perso-Islamic sources is difficult because the conception of writing history in these eastern cultures was different from the one prevalent in the Graeco-Roman world. The renowned American Iranologist R.N.Frye notice time ago how, in these histories, facts and people are always made to fit into preexisting patterns, usually of religious or cultural origin. For example, Darius I was helped by seven Persian families to overthrow the “false king” Gaumata, Aršak I entered the Iranian plateau with a following of seven clans, and there were supposedly seven great “Parthian” clans during the Sasanian era.

The origins of the Sasanian family are surrounded in mystery, as there are scarcely two ancient sources, eastern of western that agree between them. Graeco-Roman and Armenia sources are markedly hostile to the Sasanians for historical reasons and seem to compete between them to give Ardaxšir I the humblest origins possible:
  • Agathias (VI century CE) mentions that Ardaxšīr’s mother was married to Pābag whose lineage was obscure, but whose profession was a leather worker, while Sāsān was supposedly a soldier who spent the night at the house of Pābag, and Pābag then gave his wife to Sāsān.
  • George Syncellus (IX century CE) stated that Ardaxšīr was an unknown and undistinguished Persian.
  • George of Pisidia (VII century CE) mentioned that he was a slave by station.
  • John Zonaras (XII century CE) said that he was from an unknown and obscure background.
In their own way, these sources reflect that in the West there was almost no knowledge about the origins of the Sasanians.

Meanwhile, Tabarī and Ferdowsī both stated that Ardaxšir I came from aristocratic origins, from among the nobility of Pārs. Most scholars tend to take Tabarī’s account as authentic or more acceptable; in it Pābag was the son of Sāsān, while the VI century Middle Persian book Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān, like Ferdowsī’s Šāhnāme both stated that Pābag’s daughter married Sāsān. And the Zoroastrian “sacred encyclopedia, the Bundahišn, gives another genealogy:

Ardaxšīr the son of Pābag, whose mother (is said) to be the daughter of Sāsān, son of Weh-āfrīd

The royal inscriptions of Ardaxšir I state that Pābag was his father, and Sāsān their “ancestor”, but without implying that Sāsān was Pābag’s father. And the inscriptions of Šābuhr I follow the same scheme; plus in both cases Sāsān is not called “king”, but merely “lord”, while Pābag is called “king”. Then, why did the family call themselves “Sasanians”, if Sāsān was such an obscure character? If that was not enough, Sāsān is a very rare name in western and central Iran. Before Ardaxšir I, it’s completely unattested in Pārs, Media and Parthia and it only appears in “eastern Iran”, the large land area inhabited or ruled by Iranian peoples east of the Arsacid empire proper: Soghdiana, Bactria, Sakastan, etc.

Ardaxšīr of course claimed Sāsān as the patriarch of the dynasty. An ostraca was found in Central Asia by Soviet archaeologists in the late 1980s which contained the epigraphic form ssn designating Sāsān as a deity. But because of its absence in the Avesta and the Old Persian documents, it is difficult to know how it was related to the Zoroastrian religion. Recent scholarly research seems to show that the deity represents Sesen, an old Semitic god which is found in Ugarit as early as the second millennium BCE. Be that as it may, in the first century CE coins can be found in Taxila in Gandhara with the name Sasa, which may be connected to Sāsān because the emblem on the coin matches the "coat-of-arms" for Šābuhr I.

Tabarī mentions the mysterious Sāsān as the ruler and custodian of the Anāhīd fire-temple at Istakhr, while his son Pābag became later king of Istakhr. This seems to be in accordance with the ŠKZ inscription, and so it represents the “official” position. Early Islamic sources based on Sasanian tradition emphasize the religiosity of Sāsān and his devotion and even mention him as an ascetic. In fact, Sāsān’s lineage is said to originate in India, the bastion of asceticism (according to Bal’ami). Only in this way could Ardaxšīr claim to have both priestly and royal lineage, meaning the story of Pābag as the king of Istakhr marrying the daughter of the priest (Sāsān) of the most important fire-temple at Istakhr. It is in this manner that Ardaxšīr could manufacture the double (king-priest) lineage topos which is such an important part of Sasanian religious and political tradition. And it’s not surprising that in the priestly tradition the religious origin of Ardaxšīr is emphasized, becoming connected with royalty, while the epic / royal tradition such as the Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān emphasizes the royal origin and then its connection with the religious tradition of Ardaxšīr.

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Aerial photograph of the remains of Istakhr.

Some iconographical features of Pābag’s coinage and imagery have provided scholars with some clues, which could help to shed some light into this mess. On the earliest coinage of Pābag with his elder son, Šābuhr, his headgear is unlike any of the Arsacid or Persis kings. It is only Šābuhr who presents himself on the obverse wearing the headgear (the bejeweled kolah / kulaf) symbolizing kingship or political power. The royal narrative informs us that Pābag dethroned the king of Istakhr, Gozīhr (according to the East Roman historian Agathias, whose informant Sergius apparently had access to the royal Sasanian archives). Pābag however, had designated his elder son, Šābuhr, and coins were struck showing the two on either side. Ardaxšīr did not accept this and removed his brother and those who stood before him and subsequently had coins minted in the image of his father and himself. But in the joint coinage of Ardaxšīr-Pābag, the father bears the kingly crown of Persis.

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Silver drachm with Šābuhr (wearing the bejewelled kolah of Persian kings) in the obverse and his father Pābag in the reverse, wearing what scholars believe to be some kind of priestly headgear.

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Silver drachm with Ardaxšīr in the obverse and his father Pābag in the reverse, wearing this time the royal kolah.

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Drawing of a graffito from Persopolis assumed by scholars to represent Pābag.

In several extant sources sources Pābag is said to have been the priest of the fire-temple of Anāhīd at the city of Istakhr and this must have been a stage for the rallying of the local Persian warriors who were devoted to the cult of this. Pābag’s priestly function can also be seen in an extant graffito from Persepolis. Or could it be that the inability of the Persian royalty in the face of Arsacid power caused a priest-king to take the lead and revolt? This is a difficult question to answer, but it would not be the only time in the history of Iran that a holy man or religious leader rose up and attempted the conquest of the Iranian Plateau. Sāsān and Pābag were the priests / caretakers of the Anāhīd fire-temple at Istakhr and so Pābag’s function in relation to the fire-temple may have given backing to Ardaxšīr’s claim to rulership after the initial civil wars.

Anāhīd is important, since she was an object of devotion for heroes, warriors and kings in the Zoroastrian sacred text, the Avesta (for example in Yašt V, Ābān Yašt). During the Achaemenid period, in the beginning of the fifth century BCE, Artaxerxes II also worshipped Anāhīd (Anahita) along with Mīhr (Mithra) and Ohrmazd (Ahurā Mazdā). Thus, her cult must have been an old one in Persis and the temple may have been a location where the Persian tradition was kept alive. Her warlike character was the symbiosis of ancient Near Eastern (Ištar), Hellenic (Athena) and Iranian traditions which was used to legitimate kingship in the Sasanian period.

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The goddess Anāhīd in a Sasanian silver jar.

Scholars may never know who Sāsān really was but his dual function of priest-king of Persepolis-Istakhr seems to be a well-established tradition. Daryaee suggests that if Pābag was anyone of rank, he was a local ruler at best, taking Tabarī’s assertion that he ruled a small area by the salt lake of Bakhtagān to the south of Istakhr the south called Khīr. And it's Pābag who first aspired to rule in Istakhr and took it over with his elder son Šābuhr, and not by the order of Ardaxšīr as Tabarī wrote. To Daryaee, this is made clear by Pābag’s coins with his elder son, Šābuhr.

Bakhtegan_Lake.jpg

Lake Bakhtagān.

Daryaee also notices Pābag’s name as an important pointer to his religious function as Pābag is a hypocrastic from Pāb, which means “father” in Middle Persian. Furthermore, Ardaxšīr at the time may have been in the south at Dārābgird far away from the Pābag-Šābuhr takeover of Istakhr. Daryaee suggests Ardaxšīr was an usurper in his own family who upon seeing his father taking charge of Istakhr and nominating his elder son and the brother of Ardaxšīr, began his campaign initially not against the Arsacid king Ardawān, but against his own father and then brother.

Daryaee points out that the German scholar Michael Alram suggested that Šābuhr and Ardaxšīr could have been portraying the dead image of Pābag on their early coinage. If so, then Ardaxšīr was only rebelling against his own brother. This could also explain why Ardawān did not send troops at first to meddle in the family feud. Again, these are only mere speculations and show that Ardaxšīr probably did not have a strong claim to any throne and was not in line for rulership.

When Ardaxšīr finally became the sole ruler of Iran, he constructed an elaborate genealogy which is captured in the late book Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān:

Ardaxšīr the Kayānid, the son of Pābag, from the race of Sāsān, from the family of King Dārāy.

When looking at this line, Daryaee notices that every possible connection to divinity, royalty and nobility was being exploited by Ardaxšīr, which to him likely suggests that he was heir to none of them! The Kayānid dynasty in the Avesta, the mysterious protective deity Sāsān, and the connection to Dārāy (probably the conflation of the Achaemenids, Darius I and Darius III, and the kings of Pārs, Dārāyān I and Dārāyān II) all suggest to him that the first Sasanian king falsified his lineage. Ardaxšīr’s falsified connections, however, would have given him the prestige of being the first human to be shown receiving the diadem of rulership from Ohrmazd, something that was never shown in Achaemenid reliefs. A noble Persian would not have needed to be shown receiving the diadem from Ohrmazd; only an upstart would be in need to make the claim of being from the race of the yazdān. Looking at the early Sasanian rock reliefs, they show the king and the gods as having similar physical features, size, clothes, horses and harnesses. In terms of proportion, the Sasanian king is an exact mirror image of the yazatas / yazdān.

Perhaps it’s because of this “sacrilege” that some Zoroastrian texts like the Dēnkard and the Nāme-ye Tansar (Letter of Tansar) questioned Ardaxšīr’s legitimacy and his attempt at changing the tradition.

Perso-Arabic sources state that Ardaxšīr was the argbed (castellan) of Dārābgird in eastern Pārs when he began his campaign. However, the earliest physical evidence for Ardaxšīr can be found at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah (literally meaning “the Glory of Ardaxšir”, a city founded by him, near modern city of Fērōz-ābād, also known in late Sasanian and early Islamic times known as Gōr), on the southern fringes of Pārs. Daryaee thinks that it is from here, far from Khīr, the stronghold of Pābag, and Istakhr, the stronghold of the kings of Pārs, and still further away from the king of kings, Ardawān, that Ardaxšīr began his campaign. Daryaee thinks that Ardaxšīr moved from the remote Dārābgird to Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah which was behind the mountains and still defensible, but closer to the center of power in Persis, Istakhr, when Pābag’s revolt took place against the king of Pārs at Istakhr. However mountainous the road from Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah to Istakhr is, it’s still an easier route to traverse than from Dārābgird to Istakhr.

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Remains of Dārābgird.

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Remains of Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah, the city founded by Ardaxšīr I. Notice how both it and Dārābgird are built following a circular plan.

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Superimposed sketch of the main streets, gates and roads of Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah.

Ardaxšīr’s beginnings may be connected to his first rock-relief which shows him receiving the diadem of rulership from Ohrmazd in front of his retinue at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah. Based on the date supplied by Šābuhr I’s inscription at Hajjīābād, Daryaee agrees with the German scholar Josef Wiesehöfer that the year 205/206 CE (which Šābuhr I chose as the beginning of the Sasanian era) does not mark the date of Ardaxšīr’s uprising but rather Pābag’s rebellion and movement from Khīr to Istakhr. This date coincides with the rule of the Arsacid king Walāxš V (192–207 CE) and the wars with the Roman emperor Septimius Severus.

As we have seen in previous posts, the Arsacids were not only involved in a bitter war with the Romans, but also with dynastic squabbles and provincial revolts. Septimius Severus, first in 196 CE, and then again in 198 CE invaded the Arsacid realm and was able to sack Ctesiphon. At the same time, we hear of the revolt by the Medes and the Persians against the Arsacid king in the Syriac Chronicle of Arbela which caused internal problems. The kings of Pārs could not rely on their Arsacid overlords anymore to support them in the face of local uprisings, such as that of Pābag.

Daryaee is reluctant to accept the “official” version of history where according to Tabarī, Ardaxšīr was the argbed of Dārābgerd at this time and told his father Pābag to revolt against the Arsacids in 211/212 CE. To him, it’s more probable that between 205/206 and 211/212 CE Pābag had taken the throne at Istakhr and then chosen his eldest son Šābuhr as the heir. Ardaxšīr as an act of rebellion would then have moved from Dārābgerd to Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah and built himself a fortification from where he could launch his attack against his elder brother when Pābag died.

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Ardaxšir’s first investiture rock-relief at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah.

Ardaxšir’s rock-relief at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah would then have been the symbol of his rebellion against his father, or more probably against his brother. Pābag must have died sometime before 211/212 and so by this date both Ardaxšīr and Šābuhr minted coins with the title of “king,” with the image of their recently deceased father on their coins. Daryaee also cites the important notice in the Zainu’l-Akhbar (a chronicle written in the XI century at the Ghaznavid court by Abū Sa’id al-Dahhāk) which to him seems to corroborate the thesis that Ardaxšīr indeed proclaimed himself king in 211/212 CE. According to the Zainu’l-Akhbar, when Ardaxšīr began his conquest Ardawān came to face him. What´s noteworthy to Daryaee is that the text states:

and twelve years had passed from the rule of Ardaxšīr when he killed Ardawān.

This clearly places Ardaxšīr’s claim to kingship and local investiture (at Istakhr or Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah) in 211/212 CE. The event of 211/212 CE which is the defeat and death of his elder brother Šābuhr also most probably coincided with his coronation relief at Naqš-e Rajab and the coinage that Ardaxšīr minted without his father’s image.

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Ardaxšīr's "second" investiture relief, at Naqš-e Rajab near Istakhr.

Between 211/212 CE and the defeat of the Arsacid ruler Ardawān in 224 CE Ardaxšīr consolidated his power in the province of Pārs and the adjoining regions. In 216/217 CE he would certainly begin his propaganda campaign against the Arsacids as their prestige had been marred by the Roman actions at the Arsacid family sanctuary. How could a dynasty who was not even able to protect their own family be able to defend the Iranians? The kings of Pārs had been defeated by 211/212 and others a bit later as they may have been involved in aiding the Arsacid king of kings at Nisibis and therefore would have been ill prepared to fight the upstart. Ardaxšīr might have felt that a new house had to wrest away control of the royal throne, as the old one (the Arsacids) had been soundly humiliated. Daryaee also adds that apparently other brothers of Ardaxšīr were also worrisome to him and he had them killed at this time. Once he had the province of Persis and the adjoining regions under control he began to call himself “King of Iranians,” (šāh ī ērān) in his coinage.

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Gold coin of Ardaxšīr I as “King of Iranians,” (šāh ī ērān).

Thus, he still refrained himself from taking the title of “King of Kings”, which would’ve been an open defy to Ardawān V. The šāh ī ērān title would probably refer to his conquest of Pārs and the wresting of Istakhr from the hands of the local rulers and those in his family who contended for his rule over it. According to Daryaee, it’s then that he had his rock-relief at Naqš-e Rajab, close to Istakhr, carved. Thus, one may surmise that the Naqš-e Rajab relief represents his victory over the kings of Pārs and the control of Istakhr as the center. The investiture scene is at the center of this event. That may well be the reason that Ardawān is still not under the hoof of Ardaxšīr’s horse on this relief, as he is at the Naqš-e Rustam relief. The importance of the local kings also made Ardaxšīr mindful to respect them as seen in the iconographical remains of this period. He also co-opted them into his genealogy and adopted their characteristic dress and headgear, thus representing himself as the continuer of the old Persian tradition existing at Istakhr.

Having consolidated his power in Pārs and having subdued the kadagxwadāyān “petty-lords”, he conquered adjoining regions which would have alarmed Ardawān. Then the fateful battle of Hormozdgan in 224 CE brought the defeat and death of Ardawān and brought about a new phase of Ardaxšīr’s rule. The Battle of Hormozdgan was carved in the location where he rose up in Pārs, at Ardaxšīr-Xwarrah. By then he could claim to be the “King of Kings of the Iranians”, and he reflected this in his coinage.

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Silver drachm of Ardaxšīr I as King of Kings of Iran.
 
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Thank you for posting these texts! It's really interesting to read as I yet know nothing about this remarkable country and period in history. Iran is the only real "country" that the Romans trampled on that survived their onslaught and even fought them back :)

Traditionally, Germans are proud of being descendants of a people that the Romans couldn't conquer, but Germany hardly has any history to speak of in that period, let alone continuity with the later eras. Iran on the other hand, even if they didn't much like write anything down, still qualifies as a real country and even one with traceable history between them and now even if likely the people were all exchanged and transplanted during the chaotic times that passed.

(How continuous is the ethnic / genetic heritage from pre-Islamic Iran to today? Didn't the Arabic and later Turkish invasions and then the various civil wars and plagues pretty much wipe out much of the population and facilitate a full exchange of the genetic stock?)
 
Yes, thank you very much for writing these, @Semper Victor :)

These chapters are awesome to read and help feel a void in my historical knowledge that was bothering me for quite a while now xD


Looking forward to the continuation of the saga... :D
 
Thank you for posting these texts! It's really interesting to read as I yet know nothing about this remarkable country and period in history. Iran is the only real "country" that the Romans trampled on that survived their onslaught and even fought them back :)

Traditionally, Germans are proud of being descendants of a people that the Romans couldn't conquer, but Germany hardly has any history to speak of in that period, let alone continuity with the later eras. Iran on the other hand, even if they didn't much like write anything down, still qualifies as a real country and even one with traceable history between them and now even if likely the people were all exchanged and transplanted during the chaotic times that passed.

(How continuous is the ethnic / genetic heritage from pre-Islamic Iran to today? Didn't the Arabic and later Turkish invasions and then the various civil wars and plagues pretty much wipe out much of the population and facilitate a full exchange of the genetic stock?)

Many thanks for your kind words. As for the genetic makeup of the current Islamic Republic of Irn, I have no idea, but I wouldn´t be surprised if, like in all the areas of the globe that have not been heavily settled by Europeans during the modern and contemporary eras (the Americas, Australia and New Zealand) and which have been subjected to scientifically rigorous genetic study, the genetic makeup of the population has not changed much since the Neolithic. In Central Asian cemeteries related to the Andronovo culture (possibly the cultural ancestors of the Indo-Iranian speaking peoples) from the Bronze Age, the genetic makeup is similar to that of modern Central Asian populations, and that's an area much more sparsely settled than the Iranian plateau and which has seen many more migrations.

The ethnic / cultural heritage though is another thing altogether. After the fall of the Sasanian empire, the Iranian plateau was not ruled as an unity by an Iranian-speaking dynasty until the rise of the Safavids, who were themselves of Turkish origin, but became quickly Persianized. This doesn't mean that there were not Iranian-speaking dynasties in Iran or outside of it, but they were mostly located in what Khodadad Rezakhani calls "East Iran" and ruled only parts of the Iranian plateau (like the Saffarids, the Samanids and many Turco-Mongol dynasties who became culturally Persianized, like the Ghaznavids, Ilkhans, Timurids, etc.).

What's really astounding though is that despite the fact that in the Islamic era, Iran was the only territory belonging to the first wave of Muslim conquests that did not become culturally Arabized. Instead, Persian culture revived after the IX century and experienced its maximum influence and expansion under Muslim dynasties that were mostly of them not even of Iranian origin. By the XVI century, New Persian was such a prestigious language that it was the language of high culture in the Ottoman and Mughal empires, apart from the Safavid empire and the Uzbek khanate.

For further information about the cultural history of Iran and the persistence of the "Idea of Iran", I'd recommend an excellent book by Michael Axworthy titled Iran: Empire of the Mind, which should be a compulsory reading for anybody interested in Iranian history. And if after that you want to make further inroads and have lots of time available:D, you could try to read the national epic of Iran, the Shahname, which to Iranians is the founding stone of their cultural heritage.

Today, the only part of Iran where the population doesn't speak an Iranian language as their native tongue is Azerbaijan, where they speak Azeri, a Turkish language, although there are small Arabian or Turkish speaking minorities in other parts of the country. Here you have an ethnolinguistic map of the modern state of Iran:

Ethnicities_and_religions_in_Iran.png
 
Yes, thank you very much for writing these, @Semper Victor :)

These chapters are awesome to read and help feel a void in my historical knowledge that was bothering me for quite a while now xD


Looking forward to the continuation of the saga... :D

And thanks to you too :). Don't worry, the saga will go on, I still have quite a lot of stuff to go through.
 
8.2 THE REVOLT OF ARDAXŠIR I. THE POSSIBLE EASTERN ORIGINS AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF SĀSĀN.
8.2 THE REVOLT OF ARDAXŠIR I. THE POSSIBLE EASTERN ORIGINS AND CONNECTIONS OF THE HOUSE OF SĀSĀN.

I will try to explain now a topic quite recent in Iranian historiography, which is the possible origin and connections of the Sasanians in “East Iran”, and which could have been key in their success. This is still a disputed topic, and should be taken merely as a further expansion of the basic narrative of my previous post, which sticks more closely to the surviving documentary and numismatic evidence. Also, as you will see, in some important topics this “eastern hypothesis” merely complements the basic, established narrative that I explained in my previous post, but in some key aspects, it directly contradicts it. It’s because this that I want to emphasize the more hypothetical nature of this second narrative, which is far less supported in surviving textual sources. It’s far more recent, and its main basis comes from numismatics, reinterpretation of late literary works (especially Ferdowsī and the epic cycle of Sistān) and some oblique and obscure references found in documentary sources, interpreted in a new way with the support of the aforementioned resources.

In this post, I will use mainly two works by modern scholars:
  • The Sistani Cycle of Epics and Iran's National History: on the Margins of Historiography, by Saghi Gazerani.
  • The paper Dynastic connections in the Arsacid Empire and the Origins of the House of Sasan, by Professor Marek Jan Olbrycht from University of Rzeszów, published in the book The Parthian and Early Sasanian empires: adaptation and expansion, a collection of scholarly papers edited by Vesta Sarkosh Curtis, Elizabeth J. Pendleton, Michael Alram and Touraj Daryaee and published in 2016.
  • The paper Ardashir’s Eastern Campaign and the Numismatic Evidence, by the expert in numismatics Michael Alram, from the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, published in the Proceedings of the British Academy No.133 (2007).
This will be a difficult enterprise, because the main narrative is the one provided in Olbrycht’s paper, but Gazerani and Alram make important contributions, which in some cases support Olbrycht’s narrative and in others undermine it.

In a previous post of mine, I already made reference to Olbrycht’s paper and his reconstruction of the eastern Indo-Parthian kingdom ruled by the Gondopharid dynasty. I will take over now the narrative from where I left it in that post. One important precision that I forgot to make in that post is that Ardawān II, the king who replaced the Sinatrucid line, was only an Arsacid on his mother’s side (according to Tacitus’ Annales). Understandably, this would have risen quite a wave of opposition in a society so preoccupied about the dynastic principle s was the ancient Iranian one, especially if there were other candidates to the throne who could claim to have full Arsacid ancestry on their father’s side, and additionally, given that all the main clans (the Arsacids included) intermarried between them, there were probably also several candidates with Arsacid ancestry on their maternal line who felt they were equally entitled as Ardawān II to the throne.

And another important precision made by Classical authors about Sanatruk is that before becoming the Arsacid šahanšah, he’d lived “for a long time” among “the Scythians”. Usually, this has been interpreted by historians meaning that Sanatruk had lived among the nomadic Iranian peoples that lived in the Eurasian steppe to the north of the Arsacid empire, but both Olbrycht and Gazerani raise the interesting possibility that in fact they had been living amongst the Sakas. The Sakas were the Scythian people who’d invaded eastern Iran in the II century, and who finally had been repulsed by one of Mihrdat II’s generals, a man who would later receive Sakastan (literally, “the land of the Sakas” as his fiefdom), an event which most scholars assume marked the beginning of the House of Sūrēn as an important power in Iranian politics. Their rule over Sakastan would endure until the Muslim invasion in the VII century CE.

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Sakastan was a very badly defined area, which corresponded roughly to the ancient Achaemenid satrapy of Drangiana, which geographically corresponds to the Sistān basin and the valley of the Helmand river (although sometimes the term “Sakastan” described very loosely all the territories east of the Iranian plateau, south of Bactria and west of the Indus river). Today, this territory is divided between Iran and Afghanistan. According to ancient accounts, the Sakas were driven out by Mihrdat II’s general towards the east. And here, numismatic evidence has led modern historians to record the existence of an Indo-Scythian kingdom that would have endured in the ill-defined region of the ancient territories of Arachosia, Bactria and Gandhara until the rise of the Gondopharids in the late I century BCE. Some other Saka leaders advanced further east into India, where they founded several dynasties, the last of which would perdure until the IV century CE. The most important Indo-Scythian kings were Maues, Azes I and Azes II. All of them minted coins with Greek inscriptions, although apparently several “satraps” or warlords under their suzerainty also minted coins. The names of these kings and most of their satraps are Scythian, but surprisingly Maues was succeeded by a king who bore the typically Parthian / Arsacid name “Vonones”, suggesting that, as it was usual in ancient times, ethnical borders were very fluid.

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Silver tetradrachm issued by Maues.

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Silver tetradrachm issued by Vonones.

The Sūrēn established in Sakastan a domain where they ruled practically as independent kings. And since the XIX century, there’s been historians and scholars who have tied the rule of this clan in Sakastan with one of the most important cultural legacies of ancient Iran, the Sistani Cycle of Epics (SCE), which included many separated tales (all of which were written down in Islamic times in New Persian) and most of which was also included in Iran’s national epic, Ferdowsī’s Šāh-nāma in the late X – early XI centuries CE in New Persian. These stories would’ve been initially composed, recited and popularized by the Parthian minstrels, the gōsān, probably under the patronage of the great clans who wished to have their actions immortalized, and over time they became part of the popular lore of eastern Iran, and especially of Sistān.

Starting with Theodor Nöldeke in the XIX century, several scholars have noticed intriguing parallelisms between the Arsacid victor at Carrhae, Surena (as described by Plutarch) and the most important heroic character of the Šāh-nāma, Rostam. The most important of these is the fact that Plutarch wrote that Surena had the right to crown the Parthian king, and that this privilege was hereditary in his family, and in the Šāh-nāma and other stories of the SCE, the same is said about Rostam. And because of this and other reasons, there’s an increasing consensus among scholars that the House of Rostam was actually the House of Sūrēn, and that it was this clan who acted as patrons for the gōsān who composed all these tales, “in pahlavani style” to borrow an expression from Ferdowsī. Another of these coincidence is that in the Šāh-nāma Rostam is continuously ridiculed by his enemies for having Saka blood, which would have been quite possible for a Suren: their territory bordered the Saka kingdom, and probably part of the Sakas had not fled Sakastan after the Arsacid reconquest of the territory.

Thus, Sanatruk having been living “among the Scythians” could actually mean that he’d been living among the Indo-Scythians to the east of the Arsacid empire, or that he’d been living amongst the Sūrēn, or both.

This would actually explain the extraordinary powers and privileges enjoyed by the Sūrēn under the Sinatrucids, and why they fought so bitterly against the takeover by Ardawān II; it would also explain why some other noble clans joined with Ardawān II; in Tacitus’ Annales, the nobles who supported him are said to do so “for fear of being under the rule of the house of Abdagases”, who as I wrote in my previous post was probably a Sūrēn.

And it would also explain the sudden appearance of the Indo-Parthian kingdom, although here begins the disagreement between Olbrycht and Gazerani; which could be summarized in a very simplistic way as this: Olbrycht thinks that the Gondopharids were a branch of the Arsacids, while Gazerani thinks that they were actually the main branch of the Sūrēn clan, which seceded from the Arsacid empire outright and built an eastern empire for themselves by conquering the main Indo-Scythian kingdom in Bactria, Arachosia and Gandhara.

That the first Gondophares was not an Arsacid vassal is made clear by his coins. In the reverse, he is shown being crowned by Nike (the Greek goddess of Victory), and uses the titles “autokrator” and “great king of kings”, which would have been unthinkable in a vassal of the Arsacid king of kings. An interesting detail is that it bears a sign that scholars assume to have been a tamga of the Gondopharids:

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The Gondopharid "tamga".

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Detail of the great "victory" relief near Ardaxšir-Xwarrah. Notice the caparison of the knight supposed to be Šābuhr I.

In the Eurasian steppes, nomads used tamgas mainly for marking cattle and horses, and to make clear their ownership by a family or clan: thus these signals acted like kind of an “heraldic” sign for a family or clan. This same sign had appeared before in Arsacid coinage minted during the reigns of Ūrūd II and Frahād IV, and interestingly it appears again decorating the caparison of one of the companions of Ardaxšir I in his great relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah where he portrayed his victory over Ardawān V.

The Indo-Parthian kingdom was defeated by the Kushan king Kujula Kadphises in the second half of the I century CE, and it lost Bactria, Gandhara and eastern Arachosia to the growing Kushan empire. Their rule continued then in a much reduced area, mainly in Sakastan proper, parts of western Arachosia, and Gedrosia. Their coins became increasingly smaller and debased, and the last known king of the dynasty was a contemporary of Ardaxšir I; he minted coins under the name “Farn-Sāsān”, which bear in the reverse a fire altar very similar to the one that appears in the coinage of Ardaxšir I. The coins of Farn-Sāsān bear the longest lineage of any known coin in Antiquity:

Farn-Sāsān, son of Adūr-Sāsān, grandson of Tiridat, great-grandson of Sanabar, king of kings.

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Bronze coin of Farn-Sāsān.

Nothing is known about Adūr-Sāsān and Tiridat, but scholars know coins of Sanabar, and Indo-Parthian king who ruled around 100 CE. It’s not clear if Farn-Sāsān copied the motive of the fire altar from Ardaxšir I’s coins or if it was Ardaxšir who copied Farn-Sāsān; Olbrycht defends the second possibility and Alram the first one. In any case, Ardaxšir I annexed the Indo-Parthian kingdom in 224/225 (the chronology is disputed) and deposed Farn-Sāsān; the next we know, from Šābuhr I’s inscription at the ŠKZ, is that his father had named a certain Ardaxšir (perhaps a member of the Sasanian family) as “King of the Sakas” under the overall suzerainty of the Sasanian šahanšah.

Olbrycht refutes also the traditional etimology for the name Sāsān. Instead, he makes references to studies by D.N.McKenzie and V.Lipshits who derive it from the Old Iranian term sasana, which means “to defeat an enemy”. And he also states that documents (mainly ostraca) found at Old Nisa, Merv and Kosha-depe in Turkmenistan (that is, in the ancient lands of Khwarazm and Parthia proper), the name Sāsān is attested abundantly, especially in compound names like Sasandat and Sasanbuxt. The name is also attested in Soghdiana and Armenia. Thus, Olbryctht believes that Sāsān was a deity worshipped in the local Zoroastrian pantheon in Parthia proper and Chorasmia / Khwarazm, and thus it was a Parthian name. In the ŠKZ, the name is borne by several Parthian grandees, including a Sūrēn.

Olbrycht now comes to the very controversial point of Ardaxšir I’s genealogy and the identity of the “mysterious” Sāsān who was his ancestor. As I explained in my previous post, there’s hardly two ancient sources in agreement in this matter. But Olbycht analyzes them and makes five groups with them:
  • The Šāh-nāma states that Sāsān the Elder was a scion of king Dara, the last Kayanid king (in the Šāh-nāma, the mythical Kayanid kings are a distant echo of the Achaemenids, and Dara is a reflex of Darius III), who fled to India and lived in obscurity there, until his descendant Sāsān the Younger came to Pārs and there the ruler of Istakhr called Pābag gave him his daughter in marriage. As we saw in the previous post, the Kārnāmag ī Ardaxšīr ī Pābagān gives a compatible genealogy, and the Bundahišn’s genealogy is also compatible with this.
  • Among the western sources, the late Roman / Byzantine authors Agathias and Syncellus present quite convoluted but very similar stories that Olbrycht rationalizes as a statement that Sāsān was Ardaxšir’s biological father, while Pābag was his adoptive one.
  • The Armenian authors Agathangelos and Movses Khorenats’i state clearly and without doubts that Ardaxšir was Sasan’s son.
  • Tabarī states that Sāsān was a newcomer in Pārs who married a princess named Rambihišt of the Barangizid family (totally unknown outside of Tabarī’s story), and that Pābag was born from this marriage, and that Ardaxšir was his son (this is the genealogy generally most accepted, with variations, as for example in Daryaee’s proposal that I exposed in my previous post). That Sāsān was a newcomer in Pars is implicit in Tabarī’s story, but nothing is said about him coming from India or elsewhere.
Olbrycht points something strange in early Sasanian rock inscriptions. Despite having been made in less than a century, and by two kings who were father and son, there are discrepancies between them. In his great relief at Naqš-e Rustam, Ardaxšir I names “king Pābag” as his father, and “lord Sāsān” as his “ancestor”. But in his genealogy in the ŠKZ, Šābuhr I goes only as far as the “divine king Pābag” and Sāsān is totally absent. But some lines later, when Šābuhr enumerates the members of his father’s court, first amongst them is named a certain “Sāsān the lord”. But Šābuhr I only calls himself son of king Ardaxšir and grandson of king Pābag. The absence of Sāsān from Šābuhr I’s official genealogy is very telling, and I agree with Olbrycht in that it must have been a deliberate omission. Especially if we take into account, as Olbrycht points out, the text inscribed by Šābuhr I’s son, the šahanšah Narseh, in the late III century CE at Paikuli in Iraqi Kurdistan. In it, Narseh is explicit: since the gods gave glory and rulership to the family of Sāsān. And from hence onwards in Sasanian documents, Sāsān is always the main genealogical focal point.

It’s in trying to decipher the reason for this absence that Olbrycht’s narrative steers boldly into uncharted (an unsourced) territory.

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One of the "Heir apparent" coins.

Olbrycht begins with a discussion about one of the most puzzling coin types issued by Ardaxšir I, the so-called “Heir apparent” coins. They were issued during the last decade of Ardaxšir I’s rule (229/230 – 239/240 CE) and in them we can see the confronted heads of Ardaxšir I, bearing his ceremonial crown, and a young beardless person bearing the bejewelled tiara (the kolah). Ever since the first specimens of these coins were discovered, they were assumed to represent Ardaxšir I and his heir, prince Šābuhr (the future Šābuhr I). But today this notion has been largely discredited, because Šābuhr had been already depicted previously in the great victory relief at Ardaxšir -Xwarrah as a fully bearded man. In his paper, Michael Alram also analyzes the same coin. Detailed analysis of the chemical composition of these billon and copper coins made by him gave an interesting result: these coins had a chemical composition identical to the last issues of Farn-Sāsān, which implies that they were minted in Sakastan. As for the identity of the beardless person in the coin, Alram offers several possibilities, but he can’t confirm any of them. These possibilities are:
  • This person is Ardaxšir, the man that Ardaxšir I installed as king of the Sakas, and was perhaps a member of the Sasanian family, possibly one of Ardaxšir I’s younger sons. Alram also point out an interesting fact: in the victory relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah, three people are shown on the “victorious” Sasanian side: first to the right and the largest figure is Ardaxšir I himself, immediately after him, we find his elder son Šābuhr, and after Šābuhr comes a young beardless man, who has usually been assumed to be a page. Could this person and the one in the “Heir apparent” coins be one and the same, and could this person be Ardaxšir king of the Sakas, one of the younger sons of Ardaxšir I?
  • It could be a local deity.
  • It could be a Zoroastrian priest, an interesting possibility that Alram names because the rock inscription of the famous priest Kirdir at Naqš-e Rajab (carved after Šābuhr I’s reign) depicts him as a beardless man.

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Kirdir's relief at Naqš-e Rajab.

Olbrycht shows no doubt, and immediately declares the first possibility to be correct (which is perhaps not so clear). But then he goes further, and assumes (something that in my opinion is even less clear) that the “Heir apparent” coins with the “two Ardaxširs”, father and son, are a sign that Ardaxšir I intended to make the king of the Sakas his heir, instead of his elder son Šābuhr. As we all know, it was Šābuhr who succeeded his father on the throne, and Olbrycht supports here that he did so by displacing his younger brother. It’s interesting to notice that in Šābuhr I’s ŠKZ inscription, Ardaxšir is named as “king of the Sakas” at his father’s court, but when he enumerates the members of his own court, it’s his own son Narseh (the future šahanšah) who holds that title.

Olbrycht goes then (in quite an abrupt way, to resume after it the issue of Ardaxšir I’s succession) to analyze the seizing of power in Iran by Ardaxšir I from his base in Pārs.

The Arsacid empire was divided by the civil war between the brothers Walaxš VI (Mesopotamia and Maishan / Mesene, basically the coastal strip at the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris) and Ardawān V (Media, Parthia, Kirman, Azerbaijan and Elymais), while in Armenia ruled their cousin Tiridates II (it’s not clear if he took sides in the war). Olbrycht assumes that the eastern Indo-Parthians would have been allies of Ardaxšir I because of their ancient feud against the Younger Arsacids (although I don’t see him as clearly as Olbrycht, given how Ardaxšir I disposed of them after his victory).

According to Tabarī, the first conquest of Ardaxšir I outside Pārs was Kirman, where he defeated its king Walaxš and installed another son of his (confusingly enough, also called Ardaxšir) as king. This conquest was quite significative, because Ardawān II had in his days close ties with Kirman, and it had been since then one of the main bases of the Arsacid family; also the name Walaxš is an Arsacid royal name and it’s possible that this was a member of the Arsacid family, perhaps even a son of Ardawān who Ardaxšir I ousted from Kirman. Strategically it would have made sense because Kirman is the territory that stands between Pars and Sakastan, and if the Indo-Parthians were Ardaxšir I’s allies, this united their territories. Alarmed by this, Ardawān V ordained his vassal the king of Elymais to eliminate Ardaxšir I. But he was himself defeated and Elymais was in turn annexed by Ardaxšir. This left all southern Iran, from the limits with Mesopotamia to Sakastan and the Kushan border, in the hands of Ardaxšir I and his supporters. Now, Ardawān V had to intervene in person.

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Rayen castle near Kerman, a fortified town dating back to Sasanian times.

Tabarī wrote about three battles between Ardawān and Ardaxšir; the first two were close affairs with large losses on both sides, but were ultimately won by Ardaxšir. The final battle was fought at Hormozdgan; this battle was a total victory for Ardaxšir, and Ardawān died during the battle. Things are so confused that even now scholars are not sure where this decisive battle took place. Many Internet sites (and some books who should know better) place it “near Bandar Abbas, by the Gulf Coast”, simply because Bandar Abbas lies in the modern Iranian province of Hormozgan. But Tabarī himself stated that the battle took place in Media, and modern scholars place it near the modern city of Shushtar in the Iranian province of Khuzestan (ancient Elymais).

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View of the environs of Shushtar.

Following Tabarī’s narrative, Ardaxšir then concentrated in controlling western Iran (Media and Atropatene / Azerbaijan), and in 226 CE he entered Ctesiphon, eliminating Walaxš VI. Some ancient sources state that he took the title of šahanšah at the plain of Hormozdgan immediately after his victory, while others say he did so after entering Ctesiphon.

Tabarī speaks explicitly of the hatred and ferocity that Ardaxšir I deployed in his treatment of the survivors among the Arsacid family. He mercilessly hunted down all of them, killing every one of them who fell in his hands. The survivors amongst the Arsacid family and their supporters took refuge in the only two western territories that stayed loyal to the Arsacids: Armenia, where an Arsacid was still king, and Hatra. And only then did Ardaxšir begin his eastern campaign to bring the eastern parts of the Arsacid empire under his rule, where compared to the west, he found practically no resistance.

The XIV century Arabic Nihayat al-arab though gives a different chronology, stating that Ardaxšir I’s eastern campaign took place before the fall of Ctesiphon. Alram support Tabarī’s account, but Olbrycht puts forward the possibility that perhaps Ardaxšir launched two eastern campaigns: one before taking Ctesiphon, which would have been simply “mopping up” and securing his position amongst the eastern clans who anyways already supported him, thus securing his rearguard and gathering forces for the resistance he anticipated he would find in the west, and another later, perhaps, as Alram suggests, after the fighting with the Roman emperor Alexander Severus was over (after 233 CE), and which would have taken him further than the previous eastern border of the Arsacid empire, perhaps to Chorasmia and Bactria.

Olbrycht points out that the sources don’t speak of any opposition against Ardaxšir I’s rise to the throne in eastern Iran, and how according to the ŠKZ, all the principal dignitaries in the court of Ardaxšir I were of eastern origin:
  • Ardaxšir, king of Kirman (according to Tabarī, one of Ardaxšir I’s sons).
  • Sadaluf, king of Abrenag (in Khorasan).
  • Ardaxšir, king of Merv (also in Khorasan, nothing is known about his lineage or possible relation to the Sasanian family).
  • Ardaxšir, king of the Sakas (perhaps another of Ardaxšir I’s sons, as discussed above).
Olbrycht also states (and he might be making an important point here) that in the III century CE, Sakastan was one of the most important provinces / kingdoms in Iran, and one that was given more than once by the ruling šahanšah to the one amongst his sons whom he wanted to succeed him. Thus, later in the century Narseh was king of the Sakas, and also Bahram III.

A fact that has been known for some time and that Olbrycht also point out is the fact that several of the great “Parthian” clans supported the rise of Ardaxšir I, instead of siding with their fellow “Parthians” the Arsacids. According to the ŠKZ, in Ardaxšir I’s court could be find in high-ranking positions member of the great “Parthian” clans of Sūrēn, Kārin and Andegan (the Waraz clan is also named, although its origins are unclear). In his History of the Armenians, Khorenats’i also points out how the Armenian king Khosrov, who was an Arsacid, was informed that “the Parthians” preferred the rule of Ardaxšir I over that of their “own kinsman”. Khorenats’i wrote:
After Artashir, son of Sāsān, had killed Artavan and gained the throne, two branches of the Pahlav family called Aspahapet and Suren Pahlav were jealous that their own kinsman Artashes should rule, and willingly accepted the rule of Artashir, son of Sāsān.
The “Pahlav family” were the Parthians at large, and the “Sūrēn Pahlav” was the Sūrēn clan. As for the “Aspahapet”, it’s not clear. It could be a reference to the Ispahbudhan clan who appears in later Sasanian history in Abaršahr / Khorasan, or to an unnamed general, or generals, or “the army chiefs” in general, for in Parthian and Middle Persian spāhbed meant “general”.

Khorenats’i also wrote that the “House of Karin Pahlav” opposed “Artashir” (Ardaxšir), but according to Olbrycht, this claim must have referred to one of the subsidiary branches of the clan, since it’s known that members of the clan called Peroz Karin and Gog Karin held prominent offices at Ardaxšir’s court, according to the ŠKZ. The Armenian chronicler Agathangelos wrote of a certain “Karinas”, sent along with “Zekas” as Ardaxšir’s envoys to Ardawān V: they are called “the most important clan leaders and generals”. “Karinas” was clearly a member of the Parthian Karin clan. “Zekas” is mentioned in the ŠKZ as Zik, and Olbrycht thinks that he probably represented a Persian family. According to Tacitus, the Sūrēn and Kārin clans had already tried to depose the Arsacid kings Ardawān II and Gōdarz II in the I century CE, and in both cases they’d sent embassies to Rome to ask that the Romans send hem an heir of the Sinatrucid line to put on the throne, and always making abundantly clear that only a member of the Arsacid royal line could be allowed to rule; the merely wanted to exchange an “unjust” Arsacid for a “just” one.

According to Movses Khorenats’i the Armenian king Khosrov was frustrated because his “relatives” had submitted to Ardaxšir. Khosrov sent messengers asking his Parthian relatives “in the lands of the Kushans” (in eastern Iran) to come to his aid against the Persians. But the Sūrēn and Aspahapet clans did not agree. Khosrov was informed that his “kinsman Vehsachan with his branch of the Karen Pahlav had not given obeisance to Artashir”. Ardaxšir is said to have slaughtered all this branch of the Karen Pahlav. One child was rescued, who according to Khorenats’i became the ancestor of the Armenian family Kamsarakan.

NOTE: I should make an aside here. Khorenats’i got his chronology wrong. The Armenian king who ruled at the time of Ardaxšir I’s rise and waged war against him was Tiridates II (c. 194/195 – 252 CE). Khosrov II the Great was his son, who would later be murdered by a “Parthian” nobleman, “Anak the Parthian”, whom Khorenats’i states was a member of the Suren clan. Khorenats’i’s confusion can probably be explained because Tiridates II’s father was also called Khosrov (Khosrov I of Armenia, brother of the Arsacid šahanšah Walaxš V).

For Olbrycht, all this represents that Ardaxšir was helped in his uprising against Ardawān V by a coalition of several great “Parthian” houses which included the Sūrēn and at least part of the Kārin, and possibly also the Indo-Parthian kingdom. Alram and Gazerani see no distinction between the Indo-Parthians and the Suren, but perhaps Olbrycht’s hypothesis fits better with the fact that the members of the Sūrēn clan held important offices in Ardaxšir I’s court, while the Indo-Parthian dynasty of Farn-Sāsān was dispossesed of its lands and titles by Ardaxšir I.

And finally Olbrycht presents his conclusions. For him, Sāsān had been an Indo-Parthian prince, with Arsacid blood (thus agreeing with the tradition preserved in the Sāh-nāma) that settled in Pārs and married the daughter of Pābag, who was perhaps the custodian of the temple of Anahid at Istakhr; Ardaxšir was born from this union. Olbrycht believes that Ardaxšir I, for political reasons (to gain the support of the local Persian nobility and avoid being seen as a “foreign” king) hid his real biological relationship with Sāsān, and could perhaps have reinforced this by having his father-in-law Pābag adopt him (another assumption by Olbrycht, although adoption existed in ancient Iran, and its proceedings and formalities are described in a surviving Middle Persian law treatise). Later, Šābuhr I would have had additional reasons to hide Sāsān from public view, because of his supposed relation with Sakastan, whose king would’ve supposedly been his younger brother and rival heir.

I agree with Olbrycht that this would explain the strange fact of the clear manipulation of his lineage by Šābuhr I, but I’m not so sure about Ardaxšir I. It would have been beneficial during his early rise in Pārs, but once he became šahanšah and had won the allegiance of many clans outside Pārs, there would have been no real political reason to keep on with this fiction. On the contrary, one of the main points of Olbrycht’s reasoning (and one which actually gives some strength to them) is that Ardaxšir was actually related to the Arsacids, and that it was because of this that he gathered supports outside Pars. Then again, why hiding them after Hormozdgan? Later Sasanian kings proudly displayed Sāsān as their ancestor and forgot completely about Pābag.

In short, Olbrycht aligns himself with the genealogy given in the Sāh-nāma and the Armenian tradition, and which appears in a very distorted way in the western accounts of Agathias and Syncellos. In his support, Olbrycht also quotes the work of one who was perhaps the greatest expert in ancient Iran in the Graeco-Roman tradition, the IV century author Ammianus Marcellinus. Ammianus had been for many years an officer in the Roman army in the east, and had been a member of an elite unit charged with intelligence activities, amongst them spying. In his Res Gestae, Ammianus shows an impressive familiarity and knowledge of Iranian governance, geography, religion, traditions, history ... almost everything, and thus he’s perhaps the most trusty amongst western sources, probably because he was the only one who’d actually lived inside the Sasanian empire and who could probably speak fluentPersian, apart from Latin, Greek and Aramaic. Ammianus, in his Res Gestae, makes no difference at all between Arsacids and Sasanians:
Hence to this very day the over–boastful kings of that race suffer themselves to be called brothers of the Sun and Moon, and just as for our emperors the title of Augustus is beloved and coveted, so to the Parthian kings, who were formerly low and obscure, there fell the very greatest increase in distinction, won by the happy auspices of Arsaces. Hence they venerate and worship Arsaces as a god, and their regard for him has been carried so far, that even down to the memory of our time only a man who is of the stock of Arsaces (if there is one anywhere) is preferred to all in mounting the throne. Even in any civil strife, which constantly arises among them, everyone avoids as sacrilege the lifting of his hand against an Arsacid, whether he is bearing arms or is a private citizen.
Thus, Ammianus implies that Aršak was an ancestor of Šābuhr II (309–379 CE). In the extant fragments of his Res Gestae there are no references to Sāsān and the early Sasanians. Ammianus was well informed and must have heard of Ardaxšir’s rebellion, but evidently he considered him an Arsacid de facto.
 
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9.0 THE CONSOLIDATION OF ARDAXŠIR I’S RULE.
9.0 THE CONSOLIDATION OF ARDAXŠIR I’S RULE.

As I wrote in my previous post, the available sources contradict themselves in what were the immediate steps taken by Ardaxšir I after defeating and killing Ardawān V at the battle of Hormozdgan. I will follow here mainly the account by Tabarī, which is the most detailed and complete source for the events that followed.

Modern scholars have been able to determine the exact date of the battle: April 28, 224. Tabarī states that Šābuhr, Ardaxšir’s son, took part in the battle (as the great relief at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah seems to show) and that he killed Dāḏbondād, who was apparently Ardawān’s secretary (again, as shown in the aforementioned relief), while Ardaxšir himself killed Ardawān, and later he dismounted and trampled the head of Ardawān’s corpse with his feet. Again, according to Tabarī Ardaxšir assumed the title of šahanšah then and there, and some modern scholars have suggested that in this date was also lit the fire of Ardaxšir (each Sasanian šahanšah would have a regnal fire henceforth).

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The relief of Ardaxšir I's investiture as šahanšah of the Iranians at Naqsh-e Rostam, near Istakhr. Ardaxšir I is receiving the ring from the supreme Zoroastrian god Ohrmazd, and both are represented as equals in size and attire. The defeated Ardawān V is being trampled under the hooves of Ardaxšir's horse, while Ahriman, the supremen malign demon of Zoroastrianism, is being trampled under the hooves of Ohrmazd's horse. The symbolism is obvious.

Tabarī states that after his victory at Hormozdgan, Ardaxšir and his army travelled north to Media and entered its capital, Hamadan (ancient Ecbatana), and from there to Ādurbādagān (Azerbaijan), Armenia and from here he turned south and entered Asōristān (corresponding to the ancient satrapy of Babylonia, central and southern Mesopotamia) where he took the city of Ctesiphon. And from here he returned to his homeland in Pārs.

Modern historians have analyzed Tabarī’s accounts, comparing with the numismatic evidence and other sources, and have been able to provide some details to the skeleton provided by Tabarī. The fall of Ctesiphon (and the deposition and death of Walaxš VI) must have taken place in 226/227 CE, judging by the dating in the last coins minted by Walaxš IV and the first Sasanian coins minted in the city.

The chronology of events after the fall of Ctesiphon is less clear. According to Tabarī, Ardaxšir returned to Istakhr and from there launched an eastern campaign, marching first into Sakastan, then to Gorgān and Abaršahr, Marv (the furthest point under Arsacid control in the east) and that then he crossed the formed Arsacid eastern border and went as far as Balkh (in Tokharistan, ancient Bactria, then part of the Kushan empire) and Khwārazm (ancient Chorasmia).

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Silver drachm of Ardaxšir I minted in Hamadan.

The main basis of operations for these far-reaching campaigns seems to have been the great fortified stronghold of Marv, and according to Tabarī “he killed a great number of people there and sent their heads to the temple of Anahid in Istakhr”. Following Tabarī’s account, then he returned to Pārs and settled for a time at Ardaxšir-Xwarrah, where he received envoys and embassies “from the kings of the Kūshān, and of Tūrān, and of Makrān”. After that, he crossed the Persian Gulf and conquered Bahrayn and perhaps parts of the Arabian coast.

Modern scholars have some problems with this account of events. By 230 CE, Ardaxšir began his attacks against Roman Mesopotamia, so he must’ve turned his attention back to the west, so his great eastern campaign must’ve taken place between 227 and 230 CE, which seems quite a short space of time if he attained so much. It could be explained, as I explained in my previous post, by the fact that he faced practically no resistance in eastern Iran, hence his only serious fighting must’ve been done in his expeditions from Marv. These expeditions, ignored by classical Graeco-Roman authors, would be important for the Iranian empire, for they extended the control of Ardaxšir I over a longer stretch of the lucrative Silk Road, and by attacking Balkh (one of the largest cities in Bactria) he inflicted a serious blow to the Kushan empire, which had already passed its glory days.

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Map of ancient Central Asia, showing itst regions and cities.

Still, modern scholars dispute about the time of the first inroads of Ardaxšir I against Rome’s eastern territories, as well as his first attacks against Armenia and Hatra. As I’ve already written in previous posts, Armenia was ruled by the Arsacid Tiridates II, cousin of the two Arsacid brothers deposed and killed by Ardaxšir I. And, if the accounts by Islamic authors about Ardaxšir I’s bloodthirsty annihilation of all members of the Arsacid family (and, generally speaking, of anybody who opposed him), it’s not strange that Armenia became a refuge for all those Iranians who were opposed to Ardaxšir. Also, king Sanatruq II of Hatra (207/08 - 229/230 CE), who had been until then an Arsacid vassal and the most reliable Arsacid ally against Rome, refused to acknowledge Ardaxšir I.

Cassius Dio talks in his last book about the rise of Ardaxšir I, and his sequence of events does not match well with Tabarī´s. According to Dio, Ardaxšir I tried first to take Hatra unsuccessfully, then marched “into Media and Parthia”, and then he attacked Armenia, where he was refused by its king Tiridates with the help of “some Medes” opposed to Ardaxšir.

What seems clear is that Tiridates II did not stand meekly waiting for Ardaxšir to appear in his doorstep, but that he accepted refugees from Iran and encouraged revolts in Media and Ādurbādagān against the rule of Ardaxšir. And one should consider also that Armenia had a sizeable army, trained and armed in the Iranian way, and that it had been one of the strongest vassal kingdoms of the Arsacid empire. Also, it’s quite possible that its king Tiridates may have sought to restore Arsacid rule in Iran with himself on the throne. Coins bearing the name of Artavasdes, one of Ardawān V’s sons, have been found at Khorramabad, Nehāvand and in other parts of Media and Azerbaijan near to ancient Armenia. These coins ceased to be minted in 227 CE, but point towards open resistance against Ardaxšir’s rule.

The Šāh-nāma also offers a sequence of events broadly in accordance with Tabarī, but with some details absent from Tabarī`s accounts: after his victory at Hormozdgan, Ardaxšir returned briefly to Pārs and then marched to Rayy (near modern Tehran, by then one of the most important cities in Media) and then launched a campaign “against the Kurds”, which could point to a campaign against Artavasdes (whose coins have been found mostly precisely in the environs of what is now Iranian Kurdistan). Also, as discussed in the previous post, the XIV century Arabic encyclopedia, the Nihayat al-Arab, states that Ardaxšir launched first his eastern campaign and then went to Rayy, after which its sequence of events closely matches the one by Ferdowsī.

Another ancient source is the late Roman anonymous Acta Martyrum, which deals mainly with the Christians who were persecuted under Decius. This source states that:
The war began in the spring, the Parthian ruler [Ardawān] was forever annihilated, they [the Sasanians] thereupon attacked Mesopotamia, Zabdicene [modern Colemerik in south-east Turkey, located on the route from Armenia to Mosul] and Arzanene [a province in the ancient kingdom of Armenia] and in one year they conquered those countries … and finally all the Parthians fled to the high mountains and abandoned all their cities and countreis to the Persians.
Then there’re the Armenian sources, which point towards an even more aggressive stance of Tiridates II against Ardaxšir I. In his History of Saint Gregory and the Conversion of Armenia, the V century author Agathangelos, Tiridates II launched a campaign to assert his own claims to the throne of Iran. Accordingly, Accordingly, he would’ve opened the Caucasus passes to a large army of “Huns” (a clear anachronism) allowing them free pass to ravage Mesopotamia while he himself assembled a large army of Armenians, Iranian refugees, Georgians (Iberians) and Albanians and launched repeated raids into Media and Ādurbādagān, hoping to incite its nobility to revolt against Ardaxšir. Although he would’ve been able to ravage the country at will, he failed in his goal to arise a general revolt against the new ruler, and retreated to Armenia.

The only solid dates that we have for all this mess are:
  • April 28, 224: Battle of Hormizdgan.
  • 226/227: First Sasanian coins minted in Ctesiphon.
  • 227: End of the coinage of Artavasdes.
  • 233/234: First Sasanian coins minted in Sakastan and Marv.
Which seem to confirm, on very broad traces, the sequence of events given by Tabarī. In his book Emperor Alexander Severus: Rome’s Age of Insurrection, AD 222-235, John S. McHugh offers this chronological reconstruction of events (which I find quite plausible): Ardaxšir would have spent the years 224-227 campaigning against a coalition of minor Mesopotamian kings (according to the Nihayat al-Arab) and besieging unsuccessfully the city of Hatra. By this time, Ardaxšir had already conquered Mayshan / Mesene with its commercial ports on the Gulf coast, so an attack on Hatra made sense in order to control the trade routes in their entirety up to the Roman border. Such a campaign would have also threatened the interests of another great commercial city, Palmyra, with its commercial outposts in lower and central Mesopotamia. According to McHugh, the campaign mentioned by Dio “into Media and Parthia” would have been launched by Ardaxšir in 228 CE in response to the invasion by Tiridates II of Armenia, and immediately after repulsing it, Ardaxšir would have invaded Armenian territory in the same year. The Sasanian king failed in his attempt to destroy Tigranes II, and would have then exited Armenia through the southwestern province of Arzanene, and would have entered the Roman province of Cappadocia and raided it, turning then east into Zabdicene (which had for capital the fortified city of Bezabde), and was part of the Roman province of Mesopotamia. As Ardaxšir´s army had entered the heavily defended province from the rear, the Roman garrison would’ve been unable to react, and this action spread panic in the province and caused a great impact across the empire, as the Roman coinage of the second half of the year 228 CE reflects. The raiding of Roman territory would have served Ardaxšir to cover up his failure against Tiridates II (his first real defeat), and would also have given his troops plenty of easy loot.

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Location of Arzanene within the ancient kingdom of Armenia.

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Eastern Roman provinces in the early III century CE.

Another factor to consider is the possible involvement of the Romans in helping both Hatra and Armenia. Latin inscriptions found inside Hatra and dated to 235 CE state clearly that by then there was a Roman garrison in the city, and that Hatra, which had resisted sieges by Trajan and Septimius Severus, had changed sides and had become a Roman vassal. It’s possible that, in face of Ardaxšir I`s attack, Tiridates of Armenia also asked for Roman help; after all, since Nero’s times Armenia had been a kind of “joint protectorate” under Rome and the Arsacids, even if after the battle of Nisibis Roman influence had waned a bit there. If this was the case, then Ardaxšir would have felt perfectly justified to attack Roman territory (looking back to his career, this was not a man who did things half-heartedly), and we should also remember that neither the Arsacids nor the Sasanians acknowledged the Roman annexation of northern Mesopotamia.

This first invasion of Roman Mesopotamia by Ardaxšir is attested by Herodian, and it’s also him who talks about a second invasion by Ardaxšir the following year 229 CE. And this time it was a full-scale invasion oriented towards conquering Roman Mesopotamia.
 
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10.0 THE ROMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 217 AND 228 CE.
10.0 THE ROMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN 217 AND 228 CE.

Just like had happened in the Iranian empire, the decade that followed the battle of Nisibis was a time of considerable political upheaval in the empire of the Romans. As I wrote in my post about the battle of Nisibis, Macrinus had refrained from slaughtering Caracalla’s relatives for fear of this emperor`s popularity among the troops, and this was to prove a fatal mistake for him. We know that Caracalla’s mother Iulia Domna had accompanied her son to the east, and while Caracalla reenacted the role of Alexander the Great, she stayed in Antiochia and took charge of the daily administration of the empire.

Out of fear, Macrinus even maintained her bodyguard of Praetorians, but Iulia Domna was already terminally ill with breast cancer, and died shortly afterwards. Her extended family had also travelled with her to the East: her sister Iulia Maesa, and the two daughters of Maesa; Iulia Soaemias and Iulia Mamaea. After Domna’s death, Macrinus took away their bodyguard and sent them packing from the palace at Antiochia towards the Syrian city of Emesa, which was the ancestral seat of the family. This was a second fatal blunder by Macrinus; the family was immensely rich and very influential in this part of Syria, and Maesa immediately began plotting and scheming to install her 14-year-old grandson Elagabalus (son of Iulia Soaemias), who was hereditary supreme priest of the god El Gabal in Emesa, as emperor. Given the great concentration of troops in the area, it was easy for her to find officers sympathetics to her cause. She spread the rumor that Elagabalus was really Caracalla’s natural son (thus implying an incest with her daughter Soaemias), and together with the bribing of some high officers and the distribution of some juicy donativa among the rank and file, Legio III Gallica revolted against Macrinus, and other units soon followed (including even part of the Praetorian Guard and the elite Legio II Parthica). Macrinus gathered the units that remained loyal to him, and both armies clashed near Antioch on 8 June 218. Macrinus was defeated and fled the battlefield; both him and his son were promptly apprehended and executed.

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Denarius of Iulia Maesa. On the obverse, IVLIA MAESA AVG.

But Elagabalus was to prove a disappointment for Maesa and for the army. He was an inexperienced and headstrong teenager obsessed with the cult of El Gabal, and his four years as emperor were to be a constant scandal for the inhabitants of Rome, especially for the conservative-minded Senate, and most dangerously for the army, who thought Elagabalus` behavior most unbecoming for an Augustus. Poor Cassius Dio, who at his ripe old age, already embittered by the reigns of Caracalla and Macrinus, thought who had seen everything, was up for four more years of silent rage and disappointment; Elagabalus is only second to Caracalla in the treatment that Dio gave him in his poisonous last book of the Roman History (he consistently calls him “Sardanapalus”, after the legendary Assyrian king).

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Denarius of Iulia Soaemias. On the obverse, IVLIA SOAEMIAS AVG.

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Aureus minted by Elagabalus. On the reverse, the rock that was venerated as El Gabal in a triumphal chariot.

Always the astute politician, Maesa realized that Elagabalus had become a liability and began plotting again to have him removed, putting in his place her other grandson Severus Alexander, the 13-year-old son of Iulia Mamaea. She outmaneuvered both Elagabalus and Soaemias, and both were killed by the Praetorians at the Castra Praetoria in Rome on March 11, 222 CE.

Severus Alexander was immediately and without trouble acclaimed as Augustus by the garrison of Rome and by the border legions, and was recognized as such by the Senate. Maesa and Mamaea, who were conscious of how much the last emperors had rocked the boat of the Roman state, tried to present the new reign as a “return to normality”, and made a great show of treating the Senate with respect and return to conservative policies. Although they tried, this proved impossible. For starters, the supposed devolution of attributions to the Senate (to the good old ways of the Antonine era) was a mere façade, because the rise of equestrians in the administration and the army was not stopped or reversed. But the wort problem was the imperial Treasury. The increase of army numbers by Septimius Severus and Caracalla and their repeated pay rises had clearly left the budget unbalanced.

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Denarius of Iulia Mamaea. On the obverse, IVLIA MAMAEA AVG.

The initial responsibility for this policies lays with Maesa and Mamaea, for the 13-year-old Severus Alexander was clearly not fit to rule; shortly after 222 CE, Maesa disappears from the historical record (probably died of natural causes), and Iulia Mamaea became the real ruler of the empire, assuming the title Augusta alongside her son (not an unprecedented step, other empresses had enjoyed the rank before) and also assuming a high profile in government (appearing in coins, assuming the title Mater Castrorum, etc.). Although the senatorial ordo supported the new regime enthusiastically (Cassius Dio enjoyed even a revival of his political career when he was already an old man, and painted Severus Alexander in the most positive way possible in the last pages of his work), the army began soon to show signs of discontent.

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Silver denarius of Alexander Severus. On the obverse, IMP.CAESAR.SEV.ALEXAND.AVG.

Macrinus had already tried to limit military expenses (yet another fatal error), by reducing the pay of new recruits to pre-Caracalla levels; this allowed him to pay the war indemnity to Ardawān V, and to increase the silver content of the denarius back to a 57,85% (which was not bad given that his reign lasted only from 11 April 217 to 8 June 218).

It’s possible that Mamaea and Alexander tried to limit expenses in another, “softer” way, by keeping military units understrength, which would have displeased army officers (especially the more “hawkish” ones) and by other cuts. The new regime also displeased the army because it took an eminently civilian profile, and what the army wanted was another soldier-emperor like Septimius Severus and Caracalla. Instead, what they got was an empire ruled by a woman and by a boy that even as he grew into a man showed no inclination for military affairs, and stayed always in Rome and never went to the borders and did not start any “preemptive” wars like had become de rigueur by then.

But in parallel to this, archaeology has also shown that the Mamaea / Alexander government also embarked on a lavish program of construction and restoration public buildings in Rome and across the empire, which would have only served to anger the soldiers even more. The extension of the public dole that Alexander did for the poor in the city of Rome would not had helped in this respect either.

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Remains of the Aqua Alexandrina, the last great aqueduct built in ancient Rome, built by Severus Alexander to provide water for the Baths of Caracalla, which were finished during his reign.

All this is reflected in Herodian, who clearly disliked Mamaea and accused her of “avarice” and of being “too controlling” with her son, while portraying Alexander himself as a humane and sympathetic character (although Herodian contradicts himself, because in all decisions taken after 224 CE, he shows them as being taken by Alexander alone). The HA’s portrait of Severus Alexander’s is completely distorted, and is little more than a homily on good government, with little relation to real history. The portrait in Dio (who knew him personally, and had enjoyed the ultimate honor of a shared consulship with him) is also that of a just and honorable man, but powerless (or too “soft”) in the face of the “unruly” soldiery.

As a matter of fact, one anecdote from Dio is quite telling about the situation in Rome during the second half of the 220s. Cassius Dio had been appointed as governor of Upper Pannonia, which is quite puzzling in itself. This was one of the most exposed and heavily garrisoned provinces in the empire, and the choice of an elderly senator with no previous military experience as governor is quite a bizarre one. Once in Pannonia, Dio became a martinet, decided to “impose discipline” amongst the troops, which “had grown soft” under Caracalla and Septimius Severus. As can be imagined, by the end of his tenure, all the soldiers in Pannonia hated his guts. Since the reign of Septimius Severus, the Praetorian Guard in Rome was drawn from the soldiers in the border legions, and especially soldiers from the Danube provinces, like the two Pannonias. Obviously, they had been informed about Dio’s deeds in their homeland (perhaps against their own relatives or close friends), and were expecting Dio with sharpened blades. When Dio arrived in Rome, Severus Alexander appointed him consul for a second time (a rare honor) and then announced that he himself would share the consulship with Dio (an even rarer honor) …. And then told him that he should better spend his consular year outside the city of Rome, because not even him, the emperor, could guarantee his safety in face of the anger of the Praetorians. This doesn’t offer a very flattering picture of Alexander, unable to even control the Praetorians in Rome. Another example of the utterly lack of control over the Praetorians is the murder of one of their Prefects, the renowned jurist Ulpianus, also in front of the emperor, and a three-day battle with the Roman plebs, in which the Praetorians inflicted (and apparently also suffered) heavy losses, and set fire to a large area of the city.

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Reconstruction of the "civilian" city of Carnuntum, capital of Upper Pannonia; in the background, the encampment of Legio XIV Gemina and the cannabae that surrounded it.

Expenditure on the army is estimated to have been between 286–370 million denarii a year, excluding funds spent on the fleet, pensions, donativa and the purchasing of resources and food for the upkeep of the troops. Herodian accuses Mamaea of greed in her insatiable desire to raise revenue. The emperor supposedly criticized his mother for this (Herodian had to keep his idealized image of the emperor), but he must have been as concerned as her about the financial situation. The late Roman historian Zosimus, probably basing his account on a lost source, explicitly states that the emperor himself was responsible for the careful husbanding of limited resources; beset as he was by “so many difficulties”, Zosimus wrote that:
he was infected with an insatiable avarice, amassing riches with the utmost solicitude, which he confided to the care of his mother.
There is a common topos of senatorial history: the ‘bad’ emperors such as Commodus, Caracalla and Maximinus Thrax are routinely accused of avarice as they looked to impose additional taxes on the rich. ‘Good’ emperors found the necessary money from cutbacks in imperial spending on ostentatious displays of wealth, characterized in our sources as “moderate dignified government”. Consequently, Mamaea was blamed for the financial measures introduced; otherwise, the idealized image of Alexander Severus in all senatorial sources would have been tarnished.

Herodian refers to the “confiscation of some people’s inherited property”. The historian also alludes to a significant number of treason trials for maiestas (a common way for emperors deprived of funds to raise money) which resulted in the guilty being spared the death penalty. However, conviction would have led to exile and the confiscation of their estates, which were added to the imperial fiscus. Dio’s fictional account of the speech of Maecenas to Augustus is the part of his history which reveals the most about the senatorial attitudes of his time. Dio attempted here to offer solutions to the problems facing the empire in the time of Alexander Severus. He recognized the importance of achieving a sustainable and secure revenue in order to provide the resources for the army, who secured the safety of the empire. However, this should be done without drawing on the assets of the elite. Instead, the senatorial historian, himself the owner of vast estates in Italy and in his native Bithynia, urged the emperor to rely purely on the resources of the state itself, through income raised from state owned mines and imperial estates. He also advocated the sale of all properties acquired by the state during the civil wars, with the profits used to provide cheap loans to encourage the cultivation of deserted land, thus increasing revenue. He suggested that any shortfall between income and expenditure could be met through indirect taxation on produce. Wealth was primarily based on land, yet the elite resented any attempt by the state to draw upon their assets in supporting the costs of empire. Emperors that threatened their privileges and wealth were systematically characterized as greedy and avaricious, labels that were now applied to Mamaea, while Alexander Severus was held up as a paragon of imperial virtue and good government.

The supply of gold and silver was finite. Supply did not match demand, especially silver, which was used to pay the soldiers, and this had led to a steady debasement of the silver coinage. As we’ve already seen, Caracalla had introduced the antoninianus, which was meant to be equivalent to two denarii but contained barely 50 per cent silver, the same precious metal content as a single denarius. The gold content of the aureus (the Roman gold coin) had also been reduced slightly by Septimius Severus, with fifty being struck to a pound of gold rather than forty-five. An increasing lack of confidence in the intrinsic value of the coinage is reflected in the jurist Paul’s (another of the great jurists who worked for Severus Alexander) definition of coins as a “price” (petrium) rather than a “commodity” (merx). Severe penalties were imposed on those who failed to accept the theoretical value of the coin. A probable lack of confidence in the antoninianus had led to it being discontinued by Elagabalus. Alexander Severus appears to have attempted to halt this decline in confidence by refusing to debase the coinage any further, retaining an exchange rate of one aureus to twenty-five denarii despite the need to balance imperial income and expenditure. It is perhaps for this reason that a series of coins were issued carrying the legend IMP.SEV.ALEXANDER. AUG. RESTITVTOR. MONETAE and IMP. SEV.ALEXANDER.AUG.RESTITVTA.MONITA (“restorer of the coinage”). However, the purity of the coins was not restored to levels seen before Septimius Severus, suggesting this assertion was merely an attempt to restore trust in the precious metal content.

The urgent necessity to raise bullion is reflected also in the sale of imperial estates. Amphora stamps indicate imperial property acquired in Baetica, Spain, by Septimius Severus during the civil wars was sold to private owners at this time. Excavations on the massive mountain of discarded amphorae at Monte Testaccio in Rome show no private names from 198–230 CE, when they reappear. Alexander Severus appears to have relinquished state control of the trade in oil to the capital and returned it to private ownership, so reducing costs and raising revenue. Furthermore, spending on the upkeep of fortifications was reduced to a minimum and units not kept at full strength. This would lead to accusations of “rapacity and miserliness” by the soldiers.

There’s also evidence for an increased effort to raise tax revenues, with Alexander Severus continuing the policy of previous emperors to appoint curatores and imperial procuratores to supervise the finances of cities, which meant an increased centralization of the fiscal apparatus in the hands of the imperial government. There is a large body of evidence from this period for tax avoidance. This may be a reflection of an increased tax burden or the preservation of a large number of imperial rescripts from the reign of Alexander Severus in the late Roman legal compendiums.

This was the troubled empire that would have to meet the new enemy who’d risen in the East.
 
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11.1 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. FIRST ROMAN REACTIONS.
11.1 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. FIRST ROMAN REACTIONS.

Severus Alexander had unwittingly been the short-term beneficiary of a protracted period of peace, a consequence of the aggressive campaigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla against the Caledonians and Maetae in northern Britannia, the Arsacids in the East and the Alamanni on the Rhine. This was, however, a mixed blessing. On the one hand it allowed the new regime the opportunity to build secure foundations to his rule, but it also deprived the emperor of the opportunity to display the martial virtues considered essential by the soldiers. These men were willing to risk their lives serving an emperor, who was their ultimate commander-in-chief, if they felt confident in his virtus and military abilities.

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Map of the war theater in northern Mesopotamia.

Caracalla had pursued an aggressive war against a weakened Arsacid Empire to establish this reputation, and he was loved by his men. Even Elagabalus had led men in war, rallying fleeing soldiers to turn the tide of battle at Antioch against Macrinus’ army. Alexander Severus failed to use the peaceful interlude from his accession in 222 to 228 CE to build up these martial credentials. Rome had never been averse to launching an unprovoked military campaign against some weak and surprised foe. The wars of Alexander Severus would, however, be entirely reactive, with the army led by an emperor lacking any military experience. In this respect, the contrast with the aggressive, experienced and battle-hardened Ardaxšir I couldn’t be starker.

The best Graeco-Roman source for this era, Cassius Dio, stops precisely at 229 CE (the year of Dio’s second consulship), and apart from a brief description of unrest in the Roman east, he tells nothing about this war. This means that the only contemporary source available is Herodian, who kept writing up to 238 CE. Any other Graeco-Roman documentary sources date to the IV century (including the HA) or later (Zonaras, Syncellus, etc.).

Let’s then see the extract from Herodian 6.2.1-6.2.2 where Herodian deals with Ardaxšir’s first incursion into Rome’s eastern provinces:
In the fourteenth year, however, unexpected dispatches from the governors of Syria and Mesopotamia revealed that Artaxerxes, the Persian king, had conquered the Parthians and seized their Eastern empire, killing Artabanus, who was formerly called the Great King and wore the double diadem. Artaxerxes then subdued all the barbarians on his borders and forced them to pay tribute. He did not remain quiet, however, nor stay on his side of the Tigris River, but, after scaling its banks and crossing the borders of the Roman empire, he overran Mesopotamia and threatened Syria.

The entire continent opposite Europe, separated from it by the Aegean Sea and the Propontic Gulf, and the region called Asia he wished to recover for the Persian empire. Believing these regions to be his by inheritance, he declared that all the countries in that area, including Ionia and Caria, had been ruled by Persian governors, beginning with Cyrus, who first made the Median empire Persian, and ending with Darius, the last of the Persian monarchs, whose kingdom was seized by Alexander the Great. He asserted that it was therefore proper for him to recover for the Persians the kingdom which they had formerly possessed.
Here Herodian attributes to Ardaxšir a desire to rebuild the Achaemenid empire, when this first incursion had been little more than a collateral effect of his Armenian campaign. According to McHugh’s chronology, this first incursion would have happened in 228 CE. Let’s see nowthe following passage from Herodian 6.2.3-6.2.4 stating which was Alexander’s reaction:
When the Eastern governors revealed these developments in their dispatches, Alexander was greatly disturbed by these unanticipated tidings, particularly since, raised from childhood in an age of peace, he had spent his entire life in urban ease and comfort. Before doing anything else, he thought it best, after consulting his advisers, to send an embassy to the king and by his letters halt the invasion and disappoint the barbarian's hopes.

In these letters he told Artaxerxes that he must remain within his own borders and not initiate any action; let him not, deluded by vain hopes, stir up a great war, but rather let each of them be content with what was already his. Artaxerxes would find fighting against the Romans not the same thing as fighting with his barbarian kinsmen and neighbors. Alexander further reminded the Persian king of the victories won over them by Augustus, Trajan, Verus, and Severus. By writing letters of this kind, Alexander thought that he would persuade the barbarian to remain quiet or frighten him to the same course.
And according to Herodian 6.2.5, this was Ardaxsir’s response:
But Artaxerxes ignored Alexander's efforts; believing that the matter would be settled by arms, not by words, he took the field, pillaging and looting all the Roman provinces. He overran and plundered Mesopotamia, trampling it under the hoofs of his horses. He laid siege to the Roman garrison camps on the banks of the rivers, the camps which defended the empire. Rash by nature and elated by successes beyond his expectations, Artaxerxes was convinced that he could surmount every obstacle in his path.
By now, having seen his previous career, it’s quite clear that strongly worded letters were not going to stop Ardaxšir. But it’s quite clear that the Roman eastern defenses floundered completely in front of Ardaxsir’s attack. According to Dio’s Epitome of Book LXXX, this was due to the soldier’s lack of discipline:
But the situation in Mesopotamia became still more alarming and inspired a more genuine fear in all, not merely the people in Rome, but the rest of mankind as well. For Artaxerxes, a Persian, after conquering the Parthians in three battles and killing their king, Artabanus, made a campaign against Hatra, in the endeavor to capture it as a base for attacking the Romans. He actually did make a breach in the wall, but when he lost a good many soldiers through an ambuscade, he moved against Media. Of this country, as also of Parthia, he acquired no small portion, partly by force and partly by intimidation, and then marched against Armenia. Here he suffered a reverse at the hands of the natives, some Medes, and the sons of Artabanus, number either fled, as some say, or, as others assert, retired to prepare a larger expedition. He accordingly became a source of fear to us; for he was encamped with a large army so as to threaten not only Mesopotamia but also Syria, and he boasted that he would win back everything that the ancient Persians had once held, as far as the Grecian Sea, claiming that all this was his rightful inheritance from his forefathers. The danger lies not in the fact that he seems to be of any particular consequence in himself, but rather in the fact that our armies are in such a state that some of the troops are actually joining him and others are refusing to defend themselves. They indulge in such wantonness, license, and lack of discipline, that those in Mesopotamia even dared to kill their commander, Flavius Heracleo (…).
The entire Roman garrison in the East (including Egypt) amounted to 12 legions, plus auxiliaries. Even if we account for the poor state of discipline in the army (I will later address this issue) and the possibility that due to budgetary difficulties the units could’ve been kept understrength, on paper this war a potent force, more than enough to repeal any attack from Iran.

The real problem though, was not there (although these were also real problems, too). The same initial floundering had also happened when Walaxš IV had attacked at the start of the joint reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. And when Walaxš V had attacked taking advantage of Septimius Severus’ problems with Albinus in the west, and in those two cases there were no references to lack of funds or indiscipline. Due to this, some historians have come to believe that the fault lay in the eastern legions themselves, and that they would’ve been “second rate” legions, unable to hold their own without the help of reinforcements from the “hardened” western legions. This is quite an unfounded assertion.

In my opinion, the problem lay in the Roman command system. Rome had 12 legions with their attached auxiliaries in the East, that’s right, but those legions were under the separate control of 7 separate provincial governors, none of whom had control over more than two legions. This was deliberate; it was a system designed to disperse authority and avoid large concentrations of troops under a single commander, which was always politically dangerous for the ruling emperor. The result of course, was a total lack of coordination in any Roman response; each governor had to fight a battle on his own, relying only on his own forces, while the Arsacids or Sasanians enjoyed total unity of command under their šahanšah, and could concentrate at will against any Roman force.

This was an intrinsic weakness of the Roman military system, and one which until the late II and early III century had only showed itself in the East against the Iranians, which were the only enemy able to put in the field large enough armies to overwhelm any provincial garrison. In Europe and Africa until then this had been no problem either (except for the isolated case of the Dacians), because the Germanic and Sarmatian tribes due to their political divisions were unable to put large enough armies in the field as to be really a menace. But already under Marcus Aurelius the Marcomanni and Quadi had been able to launch large scale attacks, and the apparition of the Alamanni under Caracalla pointed in the same direction. Also under Severus Alexander, a large tribal kingdom or confederacy under the overall rulership of the Gothic people was coalescing in southern Ukraine (until the second half of the III century, Graeco-Roman authors would refer to them as “Scythians” which would become a formidable foe for Rome, able to put large cavalry armies on the field.

In the victorious counterattacks of the II century against Arsacid invasions, more than the reinforcements from the West, what had really helped was the displacement of the ruling Augustus to the East, thus establishing unity of command and enabling the dispersed Roman forces to act as a single army. Another alternative was to nominate a generalissimo, a ruling commander over all the forces in the theater, but this was a very risky move. Nero had been lucky with Corbulo, and perhaps would have been lucky too with Vespasian, who nevertheless ended up taking the purple thanks to his control of the army mobilized against the Jewish rebellion. The counterattack against Walaxš IV was under the nominal control of Lucius Verus, who was Marcus Aurelius’ co-Augustus. But the real control of the campaign was under a series of experienced commanders; after the Roman victory the two Augusti left the more successful amongst them, Avidius Cassius, as overall commander in the east … and Cassius ended up rebelling against Marcus Aurelius, who had to stop the war against the Marcomanni to deal with him.

The memory of Avidius Cassius’ rebellion seems to have remained, and Septimius Severus avoided carefully having any comparable commander. He even divided or modified the borders of the three most heavily garrisoned provinces in the empire (Britannia, Upper Pannonia and Syria, with three legions each) so that no governor had command over more than two legions. He also reinforced the central reserve in Rome, and he personally attended to each border crisis by going there himself with reinforcements. In the long time, as menaces multiplied, this would become an impossibility as the ruling Augustus could not be in more than one place at any given time.

Then we have the issue of military indiscipline so bemoaned by Dio; his account sounds very alarming, because he implies issues of desertion to the enemy (not specifically to Ardaxšir’s army, though) and open mutiny. To this day, scholars have been unable to identify the “Flavius Heracleo” of Dio’s account. Some believe he was the prefect of one of the two legions that garrisoned the province (I and III Parthicae), but he could also have been the commander of some sort of auxiliary unit. Most authors seem to discard the possibility that he’d been the equestrian governor (praeses) of the province, though. Also, inscriptions from Lambaesis in Numidia attest to the temporary transfer of two veterans and a certain Virilis from Legio III Augusta to III Parthica, perhaps this could be related with the issue of restoring discipline in the Mesopotamian legions. Also, if Flavius Heracleo was a legionary commander, this was a major offense, and in these cases the legionaries would’ve hurried to proclaim an Augustus of their own choosing to avoid retribution.

Dio, Herodian, the Epitome De Caesaribus, the HA and Zosimus all refer to several revolts in the eastern provinces between the first Sasanian invasion in 228 CE and the arrival of Severus Alexander with a huge army in Antioch in the summer of 231 CE, which means that due to the protracted absence of the emperor from the east. The situation there degenerated into utter chaos (which was a grave mistake by Severus Alexander and his council, even if they had reasons for acting in this way, as we will see).

According to the Epitome De Caesaribus:
Under his rule [that of Alexander Severus], Taurinius, who had been made Augustus, on account of fear, threw himself into the Euphrates.
There are no other epigraphic or literary references to this Taurinius (which implies that this passage of this IV century CE work must be treated with some caution), but the fact that he ended his life by throwing himself into the Euphrates suggests that he led a revolt in Mesopotamia and that he may have killed himself whilst attempting to escape to Sassanid territory, perhaps due to the arrival of the forces of the legitimate emperor to the East.

Zosimus (late V century – early VI century CE), writes about a separate revolt:
The soldiers after this event [the murder of the Praetorian Prefect Ulpian], forgetting by degrees their former regard for Alexander, appeared unwilling to put his commands in execution, and in order to avoid being punished for their negligence, excited public commotions, in which they promoted a person, named Antoninus, to the empire. But he, being incapable of sustaining so weighty a charge, declined, it. They chose in his stead Uranius, a man of low and servile condition, whom they immediately placed before Alexander, dressed in purple, by which they intended to express more strongly their contempt for the emperor.
Uranius appears to have been connected to the city Edessa. In 252/253 CE, a certain Uranius Antoninus defended Edessa and parts of Syria after the total defeat of Roman forces at the Battle of Barbalissos and the capture of all legionary bases in the area by Ardaxšir’s son and successor, Šābuhr I. Some scholars suggest he could have been a claimant to the throne of Oshroene, which had been absorbed by Caracalla into the empire in 214 CE, and the two were close relatives, perhaps father and son. Some coins issued by Emesa around 252 CE carry the name of L. or C. Julius Aurelius Sulpicius Uranius Antoninus. On the reverse, some issues depict the star of Emesa, symbolizing the sun god Elagabal, whilst others show the image of the black stone in the temple. The usurper clearly wished to associate himself with Caracalla, and may have been a distant relative of Iulia Maesa and Iulia Domna.

The assertion of a familial link to an imperial house made it easier for soldiers to switch loyalty having previously made a solemn oath (the sacramentum) to protect the emperor and his family. Uranius may also have been a priest of Elagabal, as the reverse side of the coins show the image of the god. Zosimus described Uranius as “a man of low and servile condition”, which apparently excludes a connection to the Severans. However, Dio himself called Iulia Domna “plebeian”. The fact that Uranius appears to have been brought before the emperor by Roman soldiers clad in the imperial purple suggests his revolt only ended in the late summer of 231 CE when Severus Alexander arrived in the East. Uranius may even have presented himself as a relative of the legitimate emperor defending the empire in the face of Sasanian aggression, hence his decision not to engage Alexander Severus in battle but attempt to persuade him of his honorable intentions in an imperial audience. This would have been a mistake, as any attempt to assume military or political powers without having them conferred by the legitimate authorities would have to be punished severely to pre-empt further insurrections.

The IX century Byzantine chronicler Syncellus describes the whole affair in a most succinct way:
A certain Uranius was named emperor at Edessa in Osrhoene, and, in taking power in opposition to Alexander, he was killed by him when Alexander drove out the Persians who were raiding Cappadocia and besieging Nisibis.
Another source confirming the usurpation is the V century CE writer Polemius Silvius, in his calendar that chronicles festivals, the birthdays of emperors, consular years and key events and which refers to Uranius with additional nomenclature, as well as an otherwise unknown usurper:
Elagabalus Antoninus was slain. After which Marcellus and Sallust Uranius Seleucus and Taurinius, the tyrants were made Caesars.
As I wrote before, the absence of the emperor for such a protracted period from the East of time is striking. The war on the borders of the empire in Mesopotamia had been waged between the rival claimants for the throne of Iran for a long time. The warning signs were long in evidence before the actual attacks on Roman territory in late 228 CE. Yet Severus Alexander didn’t arrive in the East until the late summer of 232 CE. This was clearly an error of judgement on the part of the emperor, Iulia Mamaea and their advisors. By the reign of Severus Alexander, the emperor was virtually obliged to lead the army in person, especially during periods of crisis. The emperor was titled imperator and “fellow soldier”. Septimius Severus, Caracalla and even Elagabalus had all led armies into battle. Furthermore, Severus Alexander had increased his personal identification with the army by adding his name to all the legions, as had Commodus and Caracalla before him. For example, Legio I Minervia Antoniniana became Legio I Minervia Severiana Alexandriana at the start of his reign. However, in times of stress an absent emperor became an increasingly abstract concept for the soldiers.

When news of Ardaxšir I’s aggression reached Rome, the emperor assembled his concilium and listened to their advice. Caution prevailed and an embassy was sent to Ardaxšir demanding that he cease his aggression and remain within the established territories of the Arsacid empire. And we’ve also seen how did Ardaxšir respond to this letter. The governors of Rome’s eastern provinces demanded the presence of the emperor, beset as they were by external invasion and internal insurrection, but the emperor took four years before arriving in Antioch; this had disastrous consequences, but Severus Alexander was not, as Herodian implied, simply “lingering” in Rome. Herodian, 6.3.1:
When the bold actions of this Eastern barbarian were disclosed to Alexander while he was passing the time in Rome, he found these affronts unendurable. Though the undertaking distressed him and was contrary to his inclinations, since his governors there were calling for him, he made preparations for departure.
Given that probably many army units were understrength due to the financial difficulties of the fiscus, and that the emperor lacked any military credentials, the imperial concilium’s first reaction, trying to negotiate with Ardaxšir, was probably a reasonable one … only if the enemy hadn’t been Ardaxšir, and if the emperor’s credibility hadn’t been already low amongst the soldiery. In the worst case, lengthy negotiations would have bought time for the Romans to prepare for war. Instead, they had to prepare themselves in haste, leaving the eastern governors to fend for themselves against Ardaxšir’s onslaught.

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From 229 CE onwards, the coinage of Severus Alexander showed martial themes in an increasing way. Denarius of Severus Alexander; on the reverse, MARS VLTOR (Mars the Avenger).

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Coin of Severus Alexander. On the reverse, VIRTVS AVGUSTI, exalting the military virtues of the emperor, shown in military attire.

From 230 CE onwards, there is evidence of extensive preparations for war, and one that is specifically remarked in several sources is the large recruiting campaign across the whole empire led by Severus Alexander, which points once more towards understrength units. And for this, Severus Alexander and Mamaea needed time; time to recruit and train troops to meet the challenge of an aggressive and experienced enemy. This is reflected in Herodian 6.3.1-6.3.2:
He assembled for army service picked men from Italy and from all the Roman provinces, enrolling those whose age and physical condition qualified them for military service.

The gathering of an army equal in size to the reported strength of the attacking barbarians caused the greatest upheaval throughout the Roman world.
Amongst the epigraphic remains, a badly damaged inscription found in Capua appears to record the appointment of a certain L. Fulvius Gavius Numisius Petronius Aemilianus, who was tasked with the raising of soldiers in Transpadanum (northern Italy) during Severus Alexander’s reign; this could be related with the refence in the HA that Severus Alexander raised a new legion, Legio IV Italica, for the eastern campaign, although this piece of information by the HA is treated as spurious by most scholars.

The Armenian chronicler Agathangelos also recorded “troops being raised from Egypt to the Black Sea and even the desert”. This is supported again by archaeological and epigraphic evidence recording levies raised in Mauretania, Palmyra, Osrhoene and probably in Arabia. The Roman fort at Ain Sinu in northern Iraq provides further evidence of Severus Alexander’ extensive recruitment. The fort itself commands a pass controlling the road to Nisibis from Hatra across the strategic Jebel Sinjar mountain range that rises above the vast plain of northern Mesopotamia. The fort itself held detachments from Legio III Parthica, but next to the fort an extensive castellum was built without the usual administrative buildings, covering 11,5 hectares. By comparison, the legionary fortress of Legio II Parthica at Alba near Rome covered 10,5 hectares. The open area inside the castellum suggests that it was used as a cavalry training area; these auxiliary forces, probably light cavalry, would have been drawn from the area between the Tigris and Euphrates, the old Parthian province of Arabaya which was now controlled by Ardaxšir’s enemy and Rome’s new ally, Hatra. Unsurprisingly, Severus Alexander’s preparations seem to have been concerned with countering the Sasanian cavalry advantage.

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Denarius of Severus Alexander. On the reverse, the legend FIDES MILITVM ("Loyalty of the soldiers"), with the personification of Loyalty holding two legionary standards. It was usually a bad sign when an emperor started issuing such coins; they were almost invariably a sign of discontent in the army. From 228 CE onwards, these legends become also increasingly common in the coinage of Severus Alexander.

According to Herodian, Ardaxšir I’s army entered Roman Mesopotamia and besieged the main military bases there. This means that the main Sasanian force besieged the main Roman fortresses of Nisibis, Singara, Carrhae and Edessa, but the sources say nothing about any of them falling into Ardaxšir’s hands. What seems clear is that the Romans took refuge in their fortified cities and left the countryside to Ardaxšir’s cavalry, who was able to pillage them at leisure, probably crossing the Euphrates and raiding also into Syria and Cappadocia. Herodian does not give numbers for the Sasanian army, but his assertion that “The gathering of an army equal in size to the reported strength of the attacking barbarians caused the greatest upheaval throughout the Roman world” implies a huge army. The highly unreliable HA gives a number of 150,000 men, with 700 elephants and 1,500 war chariots, which is completely fanciful, and anachronistic (there’s no evidence whatsoever for chariots being ever used by the Sasanians, and elephants would be used only after Ardaxšir I’s reign). The fact that, despite having three whole years to campaign practically unopposed, Ardaxšir I did not manage to conquer any of the great Roman fortresses implies that the Sasanians were not still as proficient in siege warfare as they would become later, and that the army probably only took the field in spring and summer, returning home every autumn, which was too short a time if they were trying to force the Roman garrisons to surrender by hunger.

Then there’s the affair of chronology and Ardaxšir’s eastern campaign, as attested in eastern sources. If by 233/234 CE, Ardaxšir’s first coins area attested in Sakastan and Marv, and Severus Alexander’s great counterattack was launched in the summer and spring of 232 CE and the emperor returned to Europe in early 233 CE, then Ardaxšir’s eastern campaign must’ve been launched immediately after the pause in hostilities in the West.
 
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11.2 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. THE ROMAN ARMY MOVES TO THE EAST.
11.2 THE WAR OF SEVERUS ALEXANDER AGAINST ARDAXŠIR I. THE ROMAN ARMY MOVES TO THE EAST.

In the late spring of 232 CE, emperor Severus Alexander left Rome to travel East by land, taking with him most of the central reserve quartered at Rome, with only a minimal garrison left to ensure order in the capital. Only those Praetorians who were nearing the end of their sixteen years of service and awaiting discharge remained behind. However, the discipline and loyalty of the Praetorians remained an issue, having only recently threatened the life of the consul Cassius Dio, angered by his severe imposition of discipline on the Pannonian legions. Apart from the Praetorians, Equites Singulares Augusti and other special contingents (Speculatores, Aulici, Osrhoenian Archers, etc.), the presence of Cohors XIV Urbana is also attested in the East.

As well as the central reserve in Rome, detachments from the Rhenish, Danubian and African legions were also sent to the East, which meant a weakening of the European borders of the empire (the estimates have been taken from the same source as in my previous posts, Julio Rodríguez González’s Historia de las legiones romanas):
  • Legio I Adiutrix (based at Brigetio, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio I Minervia (based at Bonna, Lower Germany): a vexillatio. According to the epigraphic evidence, the legate of this legion was M. Marius Tittius Rufinus.
  • Legio I Italica (based at Novae, Lower Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Adiutrix (based at Aquincum, Lower Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Italica (based at Lauriacum, Noricum): a vexillatio.
  • Legio II Traiana Fortis (based at Nicopolis, near Alexandria in Egypt): a vexillatio.
  • Legio III Augusta (based at Lambaesis, Numidia): a vexillatio. Probably under its legate, Cn. Petronius Probatius Iunius Iustus.
  • Legio III Italica (based at Castra Regina, Raetia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio IV Flavia Felix (based at Singidunum, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VII Claudia (based at Viminacium, Upper Moesia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VII Gemina (based at Legio, Tarraconensis): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VIII Augusta (based at Argentorate, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
  • Legio X Gemina (based at Vindobona, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XIV Gemina (based at Carnuntum, Upper Pannonia): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XXII Primigenia (based at Mogontiacum, Upper Germany): a vexillatio.
  • Legio XXX Ulpia Traiana Victrix (based at Vetera, Lower Germany): a vexillatio.
As you can see, the number of vexillationes from the western legions moved to the East was higher than in previous campaigns, which hints both towards the size of the enemy forces, to the discipline problems and revolts in the East, or to both.

As for the eastern legions, there’s a problem with respect to previous campaigns. The epigraphic habit that keeps historians so well informed about the whereabouts of Roman legions began to wane in the early III century, and the first area of the empire where this phenomenon is attested is precisely the East. Due to this scarcity of epigraphic sources, the estimate is especially precarious, but I will provide it anyway (by the same source used above):
  • Legio I Parthica (based at Singara, Mesopotamia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra, Arabia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Gallica (based at Danaba, Syria Phoenicia): the whole legion.
  • Legio III Parthica (based at Nisibis, Mesopotamia): the whole legion.
  • Legio IV Scythica (based at Zeugma, Syria Coele): a vexillatio.
  • Legio VI Ferrata (based at Caparcotna, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion (probably).
  • Legio X Fretensis (based at Aelia Capitolina, Syria Palaestina): the whole legion (probably).
  • Legio XII Fulminata (based at Melitene, Cappadocia): the whole legion (unconfirmed, but quite probable).
  • Legio XV Apollinaris (based at Satala, Cappadocia): the whole legion (unconfirmed, but quite probable).
  • Legio XVI Flavia Firma (based at Samosata, Syria Coele): the whole legion (unconfirmed).
Given the state of unrest in the East (with some legions in open rebelllion or on the verge of rebelling), and the fact that these legions (at least the Mesopotamian and probably the Syrian ones) had been fighting against Ardaxšir’s army for three years, it’s probable that some amongst them were not at full strength; that would be especially true of Legiones I and III Parthicae, which were the garrison of Mesopotamia and who must’ve been besieged by Ardaxšir’s army every campaign season.

We don’t know if the emperor would have moved with his core forces collecting the detachments from the European garrisons along the way, or if every sub-unit took its own separate route. The first option simplified control over the troops, which given the situation of unrest amongst the army would’ve been politically important, but that would’ve also worsened the foraging situation. Until the reign of Caracalla, soldiers had to pay for their rations and equipment out of their own pay. However, as part of his attempts to curry favor with his troops after the murder of Geta, Caracalla had removed this obligation. Provincials were increasingly expected to provide this in kind in time of emergency, which after 230 CE became the normal state of affairs. The payment of soldiers through the annona militaris (the name that received this tax in kind) was not introduced by Alexander Severus, but became established practice through the necessity of adapting to the crisis caused by repeated barbarian incursions. From the compilations of imperial law rescripts of the late Roman era, we have quite a lot of complaints and appeals to the emperor made by peasant communities along the great military axis of the empire (the Upper Rhine-Upper and Middle Danube-Thrace-Bithynia-Galatia-Cappadocia-Cilicia axis), where the repeated movements of large army contingents probably reduced these communities to utter destitution.

There’s also traces of unrest amongst the European troops mobilized to go to the East. Many of their men would have resented leaving behind their families for a campaign that many could expect never to return from. A number of these legions lost their honorary epithets of Alexandriana, Severiana or Severiana Alexandriana; three from Upper Germany, and one each from Upper and Lower Pannonia. Legio VIII Augusta from Upper Germany lost its title in 231 CE, as did XXII Primigenia based at Moguntiacum, which had not been restored by 232 CE. Legio II Adiutrix in Lower Pannonia, suffered a similar fate in AD 230, whilst Legio X Gemina from Upper Pannonia had it removed in 232 CE but restored in 234 CE. This can only have been in response to unrest caused by the resentment of men who were to march far from home to fight against the Sasanians.

This does not mean that the Roman state did not provide for the troops; the annona militaris could not have covered the needs of such large armies over protracted periods of time, and it was necessary to transport large quantities of foodstuffs over large distances between provinces. Contributions raised for the eastern campaign are also attested for example in provinces like Pamphylia, which lay outside the main military routes. In times of war, the a rationibus (one of the main imperial secretaries, charged with control of the Treasury) was responsible for ensuring that the necessary finances were available to oil the wheels of war, whilst the Prefect of the Annona planned, organised and supervised the collection, transportation and storage of grain. The a vehiculis, or praefecti vehiculorum, was tasked with its transport along the roads. Demands for supplies and resources were sent out by the ab epistulis (there were two of them, one for the Latin correspondence of the emperor, and another one for the letters written in Greek) to the provinces.

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Roman road between Antioch and Chalcis in northern Syria.

To facilitate the movement of grain and soldiers across the empire, a huge road repair program was initiated, focused on Pannonia, the Balkan provinces, Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, which is attested in epigraphy. Supplies and reinforcements by sea were guaranteed by the appointment of P. Sallustius Sempronius Victor, initially with responsibility for ridding the seas around Sardinia of pirates. The island must have been used as a base for their raids along the coast of Italy and Gaul. Once this had been achieved, his ships were to patrol the sea lanes, ensuring the provisions sent to the army in the East reached their destination. He must have carried out his instructions well, as he was later appointed to the post of Procurator of Bithynia and Pontus, and at the end of the reign was made Procurator of Mauretania Caesariensis.

Epigraphy allows us to know the names of some of the key commanders in the East. Rutilius Pudens Crispinus could have been the legate of Syria Phoenice; he was a senator was a close amicus of the emperor and a man of his utter confidence; an inscription from Palmyra attests to his presence in the city in 232 CE, alongside the emperor and his army:
The Senate and people have placed this in honour of Julius Aurelius Zenobius and Zabdilas, the son of Dichmalchus, the son of Nassumus, leader of the army on the arrival of the divine Alexander, perpetual deputy of Rutilius Crispinus, the leader of the cavalry bands; overseer also of the distribution of the corn, a liberal man, not sparing even his own private property, most creditably, administering the affairs of state, and on that account approved of by the divine Jaribolus and Julius [Philippus], the most illustrious prefect and sacred praetor, and also a great lover of his country, in the year 554 [Palmyrene dating].
Another man implied in the eastern expedition was the equestrian C. Furius Sabinius Aquila Timesitheus (who would raise to be the de facto ruler of the empire under Gordian III). For this campaign. he was made Procurator provinciae Syriae Palaestinae ibi Exactor Reliquorum Annonae Sacrae Expeditionis. This over-arching commission gave him responsibility for collecting the annona and resources in the eastern province necessary for the logistical requirements of the campaign against the Sasanian king.

For the key post of governor of Mesopotamia (Praeses Mesopotamiae), there’s no epigraphic evidence. The governor of this province created by Septimius Severus was always an equestrian, and John S. McHugh, following some lines from Herodian, proposes for this post the future emperor Maximinus Thrax, a man of proved military experience. The court also accompanied the emperor, as well as his mother Iulia Mamaea. During this time, the imperial authorities also kept minting coinage infused with propagandistic messages directed to infuse confidence to the inhabitants of the empire about the sure victory that would come.

As I said, the emperor left Rome probably in the late spring of 232 CE. The journey would take about five months and cover 2,000 miles, suggesting he arrived at Antioch in the late summer, perhaps September, of that year. This was at the very end of the campaigning season. Herodian is frustratingly vague on the exact route of the emperor and his vast army, merely stating that it:
was completed with all speed, first to the garrisons of the Illyrian provinces, where he collected a large force; then on to Antioch
Upon reaching Antioch, Alexander Severus again offered a diplomatic settlement to Ardaxšir. It is likely that this move was highly unpopular with the soldiery, who had just undertaken an arduous march and seen Rome’s Eastern provinces looted and soldiers killed. They would have wanted a satisfactory restoration of Roman honor that could only have been achieved at the point of a sword. However, the emperor and his advisors well understood the risks of war. Defeat would undermine the credentials of the emperor to rule and no doubt lead to further revolts. The loyalty of the Praetorians and soldiers from Pannonia remained problematic, whilst the situation in Mesopotamia itself had not been restored, with several claimants to the imperial throne still at large.

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Plan of the Roman city of Antioch-on-the-Orontes, largest Roman city in the Levant.

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Modern reconstruction of Antioch. The island in the Orontes river lodged the imperial palace (the ancient royal palace of the Seleucid kings).

An embassy was sent to Ardaxšir, suggesting a little optimistically a "friendly alliance". The emperor hoped that the size of the army he had brought to the East would intimidate his foe. In Herodian’s words (Herodian 6.4.4):
He thought it best to send another embassy to the Persian king to discuss the possibility of peace and friendship, hoping to persuade him or to intimidate him by his presence. The barbarian, however, sent the envoys back to the emperor unsuccessful.
He was sadly mistaken; the Roman embassy returned to Antioch empty-handed. And Ardaxsir sent promptly an embassy to Severus Alexander in Antioch. According to Herodian 6.4.4-6.4.6:
Then Artaxerxes chose four hundred very tall Persians, outfitted them with fine clothes and gold ornaments, and equipped them with horses and bows; he sent these men to Alexander as envoys, thinking that their appearance would dazzle the Romans.

The envoys said that the great king Artaxerxes ordered the Romans and their emperor to withdraw from all Syria and from that part of Asia opposite Europe; they were to permit the Persians to rule as far as Ionia and Caria and to govern all the nations separated by the Aegean Sea and the Propontic Gulf, inasmuch as these were the Persians' by right of inheritance.

When the Persian envoys delivered these demands, Alexander ordered the entire four hundred to be arrested; stripping off their finery, he sent the group to Phrygia, where villages and farm land were assigned to them, but he gave orders that they were not to be allowed to return to their native country. He treated them in this fashion because he thought it dishonorable and cowardly to put them to death, since they were not fighting but simply carrying out their master's orders.
This was a plain-out public insult to Severus Alexander’s face. Only the sacred and sacrosanct rules of ancient diplomacy prevented the emperor from executing the ambassadors; instead they were arrested and forcibly settled on land in Phrygia. Despite all his efforts, war could no longer be avoided.

The emperor advanced into Mesopotamia and relieved Nisibis. This city must’ve been the subject of several sieges, as it could not have survived a prolonged siege lasting several years. Probably, the fortress city was besieged from the start to end of each campaigning season, with Sasanian forces withdrawing each fall. The approach of the emperor’s considerable army forced Taurinius to throw himself in the Euphrates, whilst Uranius, attempting to defend his actions in a cloak of legitimacy, was brought before the emperor, who passed a sentence of death. Enemy forces either withdrew or were ejected from Rome’s provinces.

Despite the lateness of the year, the emperor planned an offensive into Sasanian territory beyond the Tigris. Not much could have been achieved at this stage, but it would help to raise morale in the army. However, his plans were thrown into disarray by a rebellion, quoted in Herodian 6.4.7:
This is the way the affair turned out. While Alexander was preparing to cross the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and lead his army into barbarian territory, several mutinies broke out among his troops, especially among the soldiers from Egypt; but revolts occurred also in Syria, where the soldiers attempted to proclaim a new emperor. These defections were quickly discovered and suppressed. At this time Alexander transferred to other stations those field armies which seemed better able to check the barbarian invasions.
Legio II Traiana was the only Egyptian unit we are aware of as taking part in the campaign. The enigmatic Syrians who joined the revolt were probably legionaries from the Legio III Gallica from Syria Phoenice. A significant number of inscriptions have been found with the legion’s name chiselled out. Removal from the historical records was the usual response to betrayal. Legio IV Scythica was transferred from Syria Palaestina to Alexandria by the emperor. It is highly unlikely that Alexander Severus would transfer a rebellious legion to such a vital province; Legio IV Scythica was moved to Egypt to take the place of Legio II Traiana. This coincides with the appointment of a dux to the province, no doubt with instructions to suppress any signs of revolt amongst the Egyptian soldiers left behind, veterans of Legio II Traiana or their families.

The number of edicts passed by the emperor’s jurists Modestinus and Paul suggest disciplinary issues continued to concern him. The laws they reaffirmed or laid down to counter ill-discipline are draconian and clearly meant to act as a deterrent rather than serve the ideals of justice. Desertion was severely punished: those caught were to be punished with death, and those caught with the intention of joining the enemy were to be tortured before being fed to the beasts in the arena. Loss of weapons was confirmed as another capital offence, as was insubordination, the failure to follow commands, the striking of an officer or vacating of a post. The penalty for insubordination by whole units was in theory its dishonorable discharge. Soldiers caught stealing from the baths were also to be dishonorably discharged. These laws stipulated that such men lost the privileges that usually accrued to veterans, including their entitlement to land at the end of their period of service. It appears that upon his arrival in the East, the emperor was met by an army in the process of disintegration. There can be little surprise that rebellious units would have attempted to raise a pretender to the throne to escape punishment.

All in all, this did not bode well for the Romans if they had to fight Ardaxšir I.
 
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