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Um, no. The action being referred to came sixty years after the Charge of the Light Brigade immortalized by Tennyson. And it was rather more successful. You might want to skim the linked article before deciding you know what it's about.
It's never too late to change your mind. Well, OK, sometimes it is.
Hell, the US experimented with pigeon-guided missiles. Wasn't worth the effort, not surprisingly, but Fu is a better pigeon trainer than B.F. Skinner.
Ah... I hate to break this to you, but...
Perhaps you have been misled by the reasonably high quality of the modern American interstate highway system (built during the 1950s and on). As of the Second World War, the US road network was still woefully unsuited to heavy truck traffic, especially in the West.
Certainly this was true in 1919, the time of the first US attempt to move a caravan of motor vehicles from coast to coast, called the Transcontinental Motor Convoy. It consisted of 81 vehicles and 297 men, including an engineering detachment.
The convoy was specifically intended as a test of America's ability to shift troops to the West coast in case it was attacked by "an Asiatic enemy," and it did not go well by modern or semimodern standards. The convoy took sixty days to cover roughly 3500 miles (slightly less than 6000 km). Most of this time was taken traveling on poor roads in the American West.
They had 230 breakdowns and accidents of various types. Nine of their 81 vehicles were lost en route. The convoy took 21 nonfatal casualties during the two month trip, despite the fact that no one was shooting at them.
They'd have done better to take the train.
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"In Illinois [the convoy] started on dirt roads, and practically no more pavement was encountered until reaching California. ...two days were lost in western part of this state [Nebraska] due to bad, sandy roads. From Orr's Ranch, Utah to Carson City, Nevada, the road is one succession of dust, ruts, pits, and holes. This stretch was not improved in any way, and consisted only of a track across the desert. At many points on the road, water is twenty miles distant, and parts of the road are ninety miles from the nearest railroad."
-Lt. Dwight Eisenhower, writing a report on the progress of the convoy (he was one of the officers attached to it).
Incidentally, his experiences on the convoy led Eisenhower to think longingly of "good, two-lane highways" with decent grading and pavement. After seeing the German autobahn system during the Second World War, Eisenhower made the creation of an advanced road network in the US a priority during his time as president... roughly 10 to 15 years after this story takes place.
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Now, the Pan-Asians are invading 20 years later. There are more paved roads in the American West, and as you say, motor vehicles are now widely available for use by the invaders. But the situation is still not good, and there are still very few road and rail lines to support the Pan-Asian advance. The idea of the Pan-Asians having anything like a solid and continuous front on the ground is almost laughable; the transportation infrastructure simply does not exist.
On the other hand, the Americans will be forced to cluster their own forces at points on the same railroads and highways the Pan-Asians are advancing along, because they don't have any more logistics lines running west than the Pan-Asians have running east. So they won't really have a continuous front either.
Ignoring Hearts of Iron terms (where one "straight leg" infantry division can guard the entire 150-mile border between two provinces and repel an enemy attack in division strength reliably), nothing but light and very mobile pickets could possibly be covering parts of the line not strongly contested.
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I believe that this compounds the partisan problem faced by the Pan-Asians. Firstly, it limits the effects of Kharash. Siwan Khan simply does not have enough Mongols to form an effective cordon and "sweep" all civilians in the western United States out of the way. He can depopulate the cities, he can ravage and harass the countryside, but large numbers of citizens ranging from mountain families to Boy Scout troops will take to the hills and act as partisan units.
Since the people who can successfully take to the hills are exactly the ones who would make effective partisans anyway, this means that Kharash may be less effective in the long run than Siwan or Fu would expect.
Making matters worse from their perspective, it will not be difficult for the US to infiltrate small forces around the Pan-Asian flanks, especially if those forces can bypass the major roads.
Which may not be as hard as it sounds; at this time, the US still maintains active horse cavalry units. Indeed, it was only 50 years ago that it faced very dangerous and skilled native light cavalry on the same terrain the Pan-Asians are trying to advance through.
Unlike motorized forces, horse cavalry can operate independent of civilization for fairly long periods, because they do not need gasoline or a constant supply of spare parts. They also perform fairly well off roads, better than most wheeled vehicles not designed for all-terrain use. It is likely that any surviving American cavalry units (quite a few of which were based on the Great Plains) will be itching to start working around the main Pan-Asian front line forces. That could give them the opportunity to make some quite nasty raids in regiment or company strength, in the tradition of Forrest, Sheridan, Stuart, and Grierson. Or possibly Custer, depending on circumstances.
The Mongols may be in for a surprise or two. They're the world's most legendary horsemen, but their true glory days are centuries past. And the U.S. Cavalry is not to be despised.
Meanwhile, the Mongols are no doubt trying to do the same to the Americans, which probably helps to explain why the Americans have been pushed back something on the order of a thousand miles in a matter of months.
@Simon_Jester; Now I'm thorougly confused. I have no problem believing a 1919 trek would have been very difficult. But the begginings of the Highway system were in 1926, right?
I have admittedly not done any in-depth research - but Wiki lead me to believe that by 1940 there were at least the great east-to-west roads; Route 10 through 20, 30, 40, 50, 66, 70, 80 and 90. Is this all bollocks? Weren't these roads built yet by 1940? I know Route 66 at least was, since it's mentioned it was used for emigration to the West in the 1930s Dust Bowl.
Even if they're it, that's nine good paved roads, most of them going coast to coast, which is far, FAR better than the Germans had in Russia.
For the rest, you are of course right. Even in HoI2 terms, there isn't a continuous front, neither Pan-Asian or American. In realistic terms, operations would have to follow the above mentioned routes. I've been mentioning the great routes as the focal points of battles though. Last Chance, for example is on Route 36.
Karash has indeed not been 100% effective, which accounts for there being a resistance at all. But the mere threat of annihilation will make most families run. Would you let your family stay behind in even nominally Pan-Asian occupied territory if you could help it? Now, there are a lot of unmarried country boys who will take to the hills, perhaps after helping sending off older parents, married siblings etc. Many of them may choose to run too, to join the regular army though. So in short, there is a resistance, and it's making its presence felt on the Pan-Asian supply system. But again, it's far, far less than what the Germans experienced in Russia.
Regarding harassing US cavalry operations, I agree that would make sense. Perhaps that accounts for some part of the strain on the Pan-Asian TC. These things would be too small scale to appear on map, off course. On that level of things, the US isn't using any cavalry - which is a bit silly of the AI, since Cav is actually in this low unit density theatre. It can move faster than INF, concentrate and overwhelm isolated infantry units, even if they are actually more numerous. This is basically how much of the Pan-Asian advance has been made possible.
Thanks for this extensive piece of feedback!
I have admittedly not done any in-depth research - but Wiki lead me to believe that by 1940 there were at least the great east-to-west roads; Route 10 through 20, 30, 40, 50, 66, 70, 80 and 90. Is this all bollocks? Weren't these roads built yet by 1940? I know Route 66 at least was, since it's mentioned it was used for emigration to the West in the 1930s Dust Bowl.
Even if they're it, that's nine good paved roads, most of them going coast to coast, which is far, FAR better than the Germans had in Russia.
For the rest, you are of course right. Even in HoI2 terms, there isn't a continuous front, neither Pan-Asian or American. In realistic terms, operations would have to follow the above mentioned routes. I've been mentioning the great routes as the focal points of battles though. Last Chance, for example is on Route 36.
Karash has indeed not been 100% effective, which accounts for there being a resistance at all. But the mere threat of annihilation will make most families run. Would you let your family stay behind in even nominally Pan-Asian occupied territory if you could help it? Now, there are a lot of unmarried country boys who will take to the hills, perhaps after helping sending off older parents, married siblings etc. Many of them may choose to run too, to join the regular army though. So in short, there is a resistance, and it's making its presence felt on the Pan-Asian supply system. But again, it's far, far less than what the Germans experienced in Russia.
Regarding harassing US cavalry operations, I agree that would make sense. Perhaps that accounts for some part of the strain on the Pan-Asian TC. These things would be too small scale to appear on map, off course. On that level of things, the US isn't using any cavalry - which is a bit silly of the AI, since Cav is actually in this low unit density theatre. It can move faster than INF, concentrate and overwhelm isolated infantry units, even if they are actually more numerous. This is basically how much of the Pan-Asian advance has been made possible.
Thanks for this extensive piece of feedback!
I wanted to drop by leaving a comment to say that I’m enjoying the story. But more than that, you’re the new WritAAR of the Week!
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The roads existed, but there just weren't that many of them. Among other things, the total number of great east-to-west roads is on the order of ten, and the Pan-Asians are advancing along a front of something like 1500 to 2000 miles. They can't restrict themselves to advancing only along the roads or they'll get channelized, which will cripple them if the US ever amasses enough manpower to slow them down.
That is both realistic and reasonable. What I'm trying to say is that by the standards of 1940s Europe (excluding Russia), or just about any modern developed nation, the ratio of good roads to space in the western US circa 1940 is quite low. The strategic problem of trying to advance along major highways separated by hundreds of miles is pretty hard to deal with. Especially if the Army Corps of Engineers starts getting creative and mining the highways, blowing bridges, and so forth.
If they make it to the Mississippi, this is going to become a truly serious problem, because the Mississippi is a very disagreeable river from the point of view of trying to force crossings.
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I'm not trying to argue that you've represented it in a way that's fundamentally wrong. But I think it's an interesting question, in an appalling sort of way. On the one hand, the vast majority of the civilian population would flee. On the other, virtually 100% of the people who stayed behind will be radicalized into partisans and good enough at "bandit" skills to be fairly effective.
And with the entire civilian population fled, massacred, or in hiding, it's impossible for the Pan-Asians to stage reprisals against those same civilians. It'll also be nearly impossible to find civilian informants who know the terrain well enough to flush out the partisans. Which makes it harder to stop guerillas once they get started.
And, of course, the Pan-Asians are trying to control something like a million square miles of land with no more than a few hundred thousand soldiers. Look at what Lawrence of Arabia managed to do to the Turks and you'll see why this is a problem. At a certain point, the ratio of force to space becomes so low that it's impossible to stop mobile guerilla units from wrecking your transportation infrastructure. And since the Pan-Asians are relying so heavily on such a small number of transportation corridors, that's going to seriously bite them.
Cavalry forces operating behind the front would tend to increase TC strain, but also strengthen partisan operations; it might be more realistic to increase partisan levels than to take the TC hit.
You're welcome.
You've been on the internet since at least 2003. Surely you've noticed that it's packed with nerds?
Granted. But even by nerd standards I think it funny that of all the stuff to say "too unrealistic", this one (horses over broken terrain) is the one picked.
The mongol cavalry troops would be great at suppressing and removing partisans if they got to be too much of a problem. They are very mobile, well armed and trained, and battle hardened.
Could transmitters like the ones from the Pacific naval battles be used to increase the accuracy of the rocket bombs?
Could transmitters like the ones from the Pacific naval battles be used to increase the accuracy of the rocket bombs?
True, but Mongols on the steppes of Russia is rather different from Mongols in the Rocky Mountains.
In horsemanship; I'd still go with the Mongols over Jed from Red Dawn. Rocky Mountains or not.
Good update. Nice to see that Duhrn was as hard to kill as I though he would be.
Spolier ahead for new readers, so be warned.
I have reached that point when we know the result of the bombing of No 10. I just can say that El Pip and Trekkaddict would be quite mad at this. To allow good old Edward to survive... I begin to suspect that the real Dr. Evil is not Fu, but you, The Yogi...
Excellent work, indeed.
I have reached that point when we know the result of the bombing of No 10. I just can say that El Pip and Trekkaddict would be quite mad at this. To allow good old Edward to survive... I begin to suspect that the real Dr. Evil is not Fu, but you, The Yogi...
Excellent work, indeed.
On the other hand, much of the American West is terrain they are not familiar with (forests and mountains). And there just are not that many Mongols; they have something on the order of 100,000 cavalry to cover something like a million square miles.
Moreover, the Mongol cavalry are greatly needed on the front, because they're one of Siwan Khan's main mobile ground elements. Detaching large numbers of Mongols to rear area patrol might suppress partisan operations, but it would also make it a lot easier for the Americans to consolidate a defensive front.
Yes. Bombs that home in on a preplanted transmitter were feasible using 1940s-ish technology (as in, 1940 technology plus a little extra from Fu plus a little Mad Science).
The real challenge is engineering a powerful enough transmitter down into something that won't be horribly obvious. I'm not sure how Fu managed it in the Pacific, because the normal hand-portable radios of that era had a range of no more than a mile or so. But if he could do it there, he could do it here, and it would significantly improve the accuracy of the Dragon cruise missile.
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So would I, to a point. But just being a good rider doesn't guarantee you'll be able to suppress partisans effectively, especially when you've got the equivalent of a squad to control every hundred square miles of land.
I guess I was wrong in assuming there were forests and mountains in Mongolia. I stand corrected. However; I would argue they've been in the West long enough to get familiar with forests and mountains. They also don't have to cover a million square miles all at once; they need to cover the areas with the activity, clear them out, and move on in force.
You are correct. They wouldn't be able to be used in an anti-partisan role until the front gets really bogged down at the Mississippi or elsewhere. Then supply efficiency and security might become more important concerns for a bit.
Thanks. I have no idea how he would have managed it. If the infrastructure situation is so bad then it was a mistake for whoever the Pan-Asian commander is to order the destruction of the bridge, instead of attempting to capture it intact.
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No, riding skill doesn't guarantee effective partisan suppression. Spreading out a squad of cavalry every hundred miles like you describe, would in all likelihood guarantee failure. Like I said before; the mongols would have to concentrate in an active area until it was clear and move on.
Mongolia has both forests and mountains. The Siberian Taiga extends into the north of Mongolia and there are two mountain ranges which cross the country, along with the Gobi Desert which is worse than anything in the American Southwest.
I'm pretty sure that the Yogi has been a little bit reticent about discussing the logistics of the Mongol cavalry because the modern setting reduces their historical advantages. In medieval times, Mongol forces had no logistical tail, they could carry everything they needed as long as they had good grazing land.
Start adding the modern accouterments like ammunition and fuel and a tail is created. Give everyone radios and the Mongol communication advantage is removed. When both sides have rifles, the Mongol weaponry advantage is removed. The merit based promotion system is now standard in other armies.
What made the Mongols good was that they were essentially a modern army dropped into the 12th century. Transport them to modern times and the great disparity is removed.
Also, the Kharash policy, as the Yogi knows from researching his other story, was not standard. It was focused acts of terrorism to achieve a strategic objective. In the WW2 timeframe the concept of an "open city" is well understood, basically, "we've already won, so open the city so we don't have to destroy it."
In the 12th century, this was a new concept. The point of killing everyone and herding the survivors was a tactic that would be used sparingly and very early in the campaign. The goal wasn't killing the people in the first city, the goal was to not have to kill the people in the next ten cities. This way the Mongols could ride up and shout 'open the gates, give us your nobility, and let us install officials, and you will not be harmed' 'or option B, swift brutal crushing." Option B had to be a credible threat to make sure that option A occurred.
Also, in Mongol culture, it is (and was) taboo to get blood on yourself. This is why the Mongols killed from a distance whenever possible and disliked most forms of torture. The story of them having a banquet on top of the Russian princes and crushing them to death is told to show how creatively and frivolously they were able to be cruel. What they were actually doing was giving their enemies the most honorable death possible by refusing to spill their blood.
What I'm getting at is that the Mongols will not operate at full tactical efficiency when trying to fight in, say, the Cascades. They've seen mountains, certainly; they've seen forests, certainly. But unless I'm sorely mistaken, their preferred combat tactics rely on having plenty of open room. The reason they got so good at cavalry tactics in the first place was because they spend most of their time as nomads out on the steppe.
As for acquiring terrain familiarity in a matter of months, the experiences of invaders in other parts of the world aren't promising in that respect. It takes a long time to get used to the particularly nasty features of any given environment, and the native enemy can surprise you many times before your troops fully master the right tactics for the landscape.
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The infrastructure situation isn't that bad, and if the Pan-Asians have competent engineers they can replace it. And if they didn't, they probably wouldn't have made it this far in the first place, since the Americans have no doubt already gotten into the habit of blowing bridges where possible.
The problem the Pan-Asians face isn't so much that the American infrastructure is bad as that there isn't nearly enough of it to sustain a continuous front. Where there are significant roads or bridges, those roads and bridges will usually be pretty good. But this is all taking place before the US spent about two or three decades busily setting up its current highway system. A lot of the roads just aren't there yet, or are hundred mile long dirt tracks that might as well not exist at all as far as truck traffic is concerned.
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That would be an effective tactic for suppressing the partisans; I'm not saying it wouldn't. But the anti-partisan sweeps would take a very long time to have a significant effect, and would require Siwan Khan to dedicate a large percentage of his total army to rear area security... which is about as much as you can hope for from partisan operations in any event.
The best partisans will either disrupt logistics or prod the enemy into pulling back a lot of troops back to stop them. They're not going to defeat an entire army by themselves or anything, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to.
But by the same token, I don't think it's reasonable to assume that Siwan's Kharash tactics will have been as effective as the average armchair strategist might think at eliminating the partisan threat.
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That said, Siwan Khan appears to be doing it for a different reason. It might be a practical solution to the partisan problem (if not a 100% effective one); I'm not sure. But in a modern context, it doesn't make as much sense as it did in the 12th century.
So I think a big part of the reason is simply that Siwan is a brute. He sees no problem with doing this, and is probably pleased to do it. The long-term consequences aren't going to be the same as they were when Fu tried it back in his salad days.
I strongly suspect that this one had a double intent. Being crushed alive may be an honorable death in Mongol eyes, but I'm sure the Mongols involved knew quite well that it was an extremely painful and unpleasant way to die. And sitting on them while they expire doesn't strike me as necessary for the honor of the thing.
Thus, crushing Russian princes most likely served a double purpose. On the one hand, it was an honorable way to kill off a troublesome enemy ruler in Mongol culture, thus satisfying the Mongols that they had shown respect to their defeated enemy. On the other hand, it sends a message to all potential troublemakers: "continue to make trouble and we will kill you slowly and painfully in a way you would never have imagined before." As opposed to "make trouble and we will give you an honorable death."
As you say, the Mongols were very competent. It seems likely that they knew quite well what kind of psychological effect some of their actions would have on the foreigners they conquered.
They definitely weren't a modern army. They were however very fierce fighters, accustomed to immense hardships, superb horsemen and had long traditions of warfare. What set them apart from the run of the mill steppe warrior who is also a fierce fighter, good horseman and acustomed to hardship is that they were very disciplined (the average steppe warrior hates having to follow orders), very motivated (the average steppe warrior, when not defending his tribe, is only interested in quick booty and loses interest in fighting quickly when faced with difficulty) and above all led by brilliant leaders who knew how to lead large armies and who could get skilled foreigners to help them whenever native Mongol talent did not suffice. (f.ex. siege engineers)
The Mongols are still unique fighters in modern times because they are still accustomed to hardship (meaning they don't need as much supplies and don't become demotivated if they have to go without C-rations for a month), still super horsemen (which is an advantage in the US southwest and midwest although not that much), they are fierce warriors who hae clung to their horse warrior traditions and know how terrifying a cavarly charge is, and of course they are accustomed to bloodshed and death which does make them veterans of light warfare in HoI terms.
They are superior to US light cavalry in many regards because of their nomad experiences with maintaining horses in the outback (they know where to get fodder and don't rely on supplies as much), because of their cavalry and close fighting traditions (advantageous under the circumstances they fought Indy's forces) and because of their high fighting spirit (which is Fu Manchu's merit).
We don't know how good they are at handling other aspects of modern warfare - using artillery, taking caution when facing entrenched enemies, and coping with being under sustained aerial or artillery bombardment themselves. Fu probably arranged for them to undergo some training in modern weapons before deployment to America, but I doubt he has turned them into totally fearless modern warriors.
I think US trained cavalry would be superior to them in knowing how to use modern weapons to their best advantage (gas, artillery, machine guns), in fire discipline, and in holding out under sustained fire. The Mongols will probably be quicker to panic when they are being shot at without having something to shoot back at. They are probably also not very useful outside their role as scouts/skirmishers/foragers/assaulters of opportunity.
I seriously doubt that the cavalry charge is a standard tactic of the Imperial forces in America. Their charge on Indy's regiment was more of an accident than a planned attack - the Mongols where near the front lines, the US troops laid down a smoke screen to cover their withdrawal, the Japanese commander noticed this and decided to use the opportunity to bring his cavalry up close to the US trenches under the cover of the enemy's smoke screen. Had the wind blown the smoke away while the Mongols were still approaching, Indy's regiment would have turned their machine guns and support artillery loose on them, with the result that their formation would be broken up and turned away before they could even start their charge. The smoke screen was the deciding tactical element, it allowed the cavalry to approach unnoticed and therefore without coming under defensive fire until they got close enough to charge the Americans in a gallop across the trenches.
Note that this is still different from the way the combatants of WW1 imagined the use of cavalry. The WW1 vision was that infantry would break through the trench lines, and only then would cavalry be released to break into the enemy rear and attack unprotected troops / attack logistics units / kill messengers and staff personnel / overtake and envelop routed enemy infantry. They were NOT intended to go in close with a trench line and charge the enemy with sabres and lances, rather they would come with horse drawn artillery and would fight dismounted whenever necessary.
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Quite true - although the Australian Light Horse did exactly that at Bathsheeba using their bayonets as improvised swords / lances
In extremis a cavalry charge against a trench line can succeed - you need very motivated cavalry against poor infantry plus you need artillery support to KO any supporting heavy weapons.
This was the case at Bathsheeba - it's also the case in Yogi's story
It also requires the terrain to be quite open (but not so open that your cavalry gets shot at by every part of the enemy army as it moves out of their own lines), and the enemy trenches to not actually be real trenches but more like foxholes. Like this:
A deep WW1 style trench line may be a bit too much because
(1) the trenches may at many points be too wide to jump across for the horses
(2) tossing a grenades into a trench while your horse jumps across is not going to actually kill all the enemy troopers
(3) panicked enemy troopers are unlikely to flee from a deep trench out into the open, maybe they'll flee down the trench lines though
(4) if the enemy does not flee the trench line, how does the cavalry troop get the enemy troopers out, short of dismounting and charging the trenches with submachine guns and grenades like a regular infantryman?
It also requires the terrain to be quite open (but not so open that your cavalry gets shot at by every part of the enemy army as it moves out of their own lines), and the enemy trenches to not actually be real trenches but more like foxholes. Like this:
(actual trench at Beersheba, according to http://users.netconnect.com.au/~ianmac/bersheba.html)
A deep WW1 style trench line may be a bit too much because
(1) the trenches may at many points be too wide to jump across for the horses
(2) tossing a grenades into a trench while your horse jumps across is not going to actually kill all the enemy troopers
(3) panicked enemy troopers are unlikely to flee from a deep trench out into the open, maybe they'll flee down the trench lines though
(4) if the enemy does not flee the trench line, how does the cavalry troop get the enemy troopers out, short of dismounting and charging the trenches with submachine guns and grenades like a regular infantryman?
You know - if Yogi was looking for a picture of Indy's position you may have just found it
Edit - actually he already had one - and it's not alot deeper.
Wow, what a great discussion you guys have going on!
I'd just like to throw a quick comment for now, and that is to remind you that the first trench line WAS taken solely by infantry, allowing the Mongols to pass through it slowly and carefully. They charged only the much weaker second line.
The second trench line was much less substantial than Indy's, so that pic is quite fitting.
I'd just like to throw a quick comment for now, and that is to remind you that the first trench line WAS taken solely by infantry, allowing the Mongols to pass through it slowly and carefully. They charged only the much weaker second line.
The second trench line was much less substantial than Indy's, so that pic is quite fitting.