85% of the Soviet armoured vehicle park on 1.1.1936 is missing from HoI4 (updated to NSB)

[Fulmen]

In reality it is estimated that anywhere between 50-70% of all Red Army tanks were inoperable at the outset of Barbarossa, most due to poor maintenance and lack of spare parts.

This is a falsehood which I've covered on page 1 of this thread.

Yes, this is really the right moment. If the USSR had at least a month to mobilize like France, this could turn the war significantly. The USSR began momilization just a few days before the war, and the Army was split into three echelons - on the border, on the way to the border, and just started to move towards the border. If the decision to mobilize had been made a month before the war. Then there would be more troops on the border, they would have had time to prepare positions (trenches, fortifications, AA and AT defenses, organize a front line), tanks would not enter battle in small groups and there would be fuel for them. In reality, the concentration of troops on the border is a precedent for starting a war, the game does not simulate this issue. And you can concentrate your entire army on the border and this will not have any diplomatic, economic or military consequences.

I think you overestimate the Red Army here. Mobilising earlier could've well resulted in more troops being encircled at the border, and maybe an earlier Barbarossa.

Kotkin straight up calls a few of Stalin's generals idiots, for wanting to move forces straight to the border just prior to the German attack. It was fortunate for Stalin that he only agreed to this in a limited scope.

 

[Crecer13]

no, it's far more than political decisions. The red army in 1941 lacked competent officers and had a whole lot of organisational issues

This is a falsehood which I've covered on page 1 of this thread.



I think you overestimate the Red Army here. Mobilising earlier could've well resulted in more troops being encircled at the border, and maybe an earlier Barbarossa.

Kotkin straight up calls a few of Stalin's generals idiots, for wanting to move forces straight to the border just prior to the German attack. It was fortunate for Stalin that he only agreed to this in a limited scope.

This is a falsehood which I've covered on page 1 of this thread.



I think you overestimate the Red Army here. Mobilising earlier could've well resulted in more troops being encircled at the border, and maybe an earlier Barbarossa.

Kotkin straight up calls a few of Stalin's generals idiots, for wanting to move forces straight to the border just prior to the German attack. It was fortunate for Stalin that he only agreed to this in a limited scope.

I absolutely disagree. The problem here was not in the Generals, but in intelligence, which could not analyze the German actions and give real information to Stalin. Stalin moved his troops to the border, but too late and these troops entered the battle in small groups as they arrived at the front, they were disorganized and quickly defeated. So early mobilization could really turn history.

Zhukov told Stalin to move the troops to the border earlier.

 

[GrandVezir]

Kotkin straight up calls a few of Stalin's generals idiots, for wanting to move forces straight to the border just prior to the German attack. It was fortunate for Stalin that he only agreed to this in a limited scope.

My understanding (based on all the sources I've read over 40+ years) is that the overall Soviet strategy was that the frontier and reserve armies would form a triple echelon, like was later employed at Kursk:

• First echelon to slow and channel the attacks.
• Second to stop and pin any breakthroughs, and
• Third to counterattack, cut off any spearheads, &c.

Only the Red Army in 1941 lacked the organization and leadership necessary to pull it off, and was genuinely surprised by the speed and ferocity of the German attack (leaving aside the question of strategic surprise, which probably was felt much more harshly by the Red Air Force than the army).

So Stalin didn't send the army to the frontier, at least in part, because keeping large forces off of the line was actually the plan. In game terms: let the Wehrmacht spend its precious planning bonuses on the org-wall at the frontier, stop any penetrations with heavy piercing and soft attack from the second echelon, and light mechanized go brrrr from the third.

 

[Sarmatian]

no, it's far more than political decisions. The red army in 1941 lacked competent officers and had a whole lot of organisational issues

Whatever problems plagued Red Army, they were still present in 1942.
In 1942, Wehrmacht grabbed huge swathes of territory, but there were very few big encirclements. The war was very different than it was 6-9 months before, and Red Army was in actually worse state in 1942 than it was in 1941 - less equipment, fewer planes, fewer tanks, fewer trained soldiers, but they still managed to spend most of 1942 in orderly withdrawal, fighting limited counterattacks and delaying actions, blunting the edge of Wehrmacht bit by bit until they overextended and left themselves vulnerable for a major counterattack.

It was a series of wrong decisions and assumption at the top that led to a chain of disasters after June 22nd, 1941.

Popular culture had presented the war in the east as a conflict where both sides had a chance of victory, but in reality it was never like that. Conquering USSR was simply outside Germany's capabilities. Thus, we can not have realistic situation in game, because Germany would stand no chance.

 

[Koba133]

Whatever problems plagued Red Army, they were still present in 1942.
In 1942, Wehrmacht grabbed huge swathes of territory, but there were very few big encirclements. The war was very different than it was 6-9 months before, and Red Army was in actually worse state in 1942 than it was in 1941 - less equipment, fewer planes, fewer tanks, fewer trained soldiers, but they still managed to spend most of 1942 in orderly withdrawal, fighting limited counterattacks and delaying actions, blunting the edge of Wehrmacht bit by bit until they overextended and left themselves vulnerable for a major counterattack.

It was a series of wrong decisions and assumption at the top that led to a chain of disasters after June 22nd, 1941.

Popular culture had presented the war in the east as a conflict where both sides had a chance of victory, but in reality it was never like that. Conquering USSR was simply outside Germany's capabilities. Thus, we can not have realistic situation in game, because Germany would stand no chance.

Germany had a real chance, both in 1941 and 1942. Moscow and/or Leningrad were besieged and could have been taken with a different course of action. (Early drive towards Moscow, finnish help towards Leningrad etc...). Losing Leningrad or Moscow would likely trigger a soviet defeat. Even in may 1942 after the battle of Kharkov I'd say there germans were closer to victory than the soviets. Fall blau was far from the best strategic option for the Germans, and even then they could have bombed the Baku oil fields in August 1942 forcing the soviets to look for a separate peace. It was a close call

 

[qer]

Germany had a real chance, both in 1941 and 1942. Moscow and/or Leningrad were besieged and could have been taken with a different course of action. (Early drive towards Moscow, finnish help towards Leningrad etc...). Losing Leningrad or Moscow would likely trigger a soviet defeat. Even in may 1942 after the battle of Kharkov I'd say there germans were closer to victory than the soviets. Fall blau was far from the best strategic option for the Germans, and even then they could have bombed the Baku oil fields in August 1942 forcing the soviets to look for a separate peace. It was a close call

They have 0 chance of winning the war. Barbarossa went completely in their favour with huge encirclements on an scale never seen before or after and they couldn't defeat the Red army. Logistics where also a huge problem and where one of the most important factors in limiting the advance of German forces. Even if somehow they took Moscow or Leningrad, which I seriously doubt it, the Soviets will keep on figthing as that was the nature of the war in hand. By 1942 the only viable attack was in the south, specially considering the Soviet troop deployment in the center sector, but the strategic goals to be achieve where outside the German capacities, specially in the Caucasus. If bombed Baku could be repaired and there where other sources of oil available, as well as lend lease.

Realistically the only way for the germans to obtain their strategic objectives in 1941 regarding the East was to change those objectives, but the moment they enter a total war with the USSR, they lose the war. The same but with even more stacked odds could be said about the Japanese, or the Italians entering the war. The expectations of all axis nations where completely at odds with the material reality at the time

 

[Ffire]

pe	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	Total
T-18	78	435	-	-	-	-	513
T-24	1	25	-	-	-	-	26
T-26	-	19	1,032	1,405	1,449	1,378	5,283
T-27	-	365	1,593	919	14	-	2,891
T-28	-	-	-	41	51	32	124
T-35	-	-	-	1	10	7	18
T-37	-	-	-	138	953	1,140	2,231
T-41	-	-	14	-	-	-	14
BT-2	-	3	-	-	-	-	3
BT-5	-	-	393	1,005	1,103	-	2,501
BT-7	-	-	-	-	2	500	502
Total	79	847	3,032	3,509	3,582	3,061	14,110

A current bias in soviet tank production statistics is that they count every tank coming out of the factory as "produced". But a significant part of those were tanks coming out from a major overhaul/refit/repair. That's a way to achieve your production quotas, which is imporant in a country where if you fail to you'll be pay with a bullet in the head or at least 10 years in labor camp. You can be sure that all your class 4 tanks are accounted in the production figures.

And when we talk about reliability, I remember reading a letter writen by or to Stalin about the Soviet air force mid 30s losing 600+ planes each year due to accidents and lack of maintenance. He noticed that this amount of planes itself was more than many foreign air forces.
There's no reason to think you don't have that kind of trouble with tanks.

 

[Koba133]

They have 0 chance of winning the war. Barbarossa went completely in their favour with huge encirclements on an scale never seen before or after and they couldn't defeat the Red army. Logistics where also a huge problem and where one of the most important factors in limiting the advance of German forces. Even if somehow they took Moscow or Leningrad, which I seriously doubt it, the Soviets will keep on figthing as that was the nature of the war in hand. By 1942 the only viable attack was in the south, specially considering the Soviet troop deployment in the center sector, but the strategic goals to be achieve where outside the German capacities, specially in the Caucasus. If bombed Baku could be repaired and there where other sources of oil available, as well as lend lease.

That's false. Losing Moscow would be a devastating blow to soviet industry and national morale, and capturing it was possible in august-september when the process of displacement of industry was ongoing. Also losing Moscow meant Leningrad was doomed (the main road of supply came from Moscow). Thus all the north-west front would see a soviet collapse.

about lend lease : yes theorically the USA could replace Baku's oil supply, but you have to take into account that the allies shipping was heavily strained in 1942-1943, so they wouldn't be able to actually supply it when it mattered.

 

[Highlord Alarak]

Germany had a real chance, both in 1941 and 1942. Moscow and/or Leningrad were besieged and could have been taken with a different course of action. (Early drive towards Moscow, finnish help towards Leningrad etc...). Losing Leningrad or Moscow would likely trigger a soviet defeat.

Yeah, Napoleon also though that taking Moscow would trigger a Russian defeat.
In reality, while it would certainly cripple morale and logistics of the Red Army, Germans would basically be stuck trying to secure a burned husk of a city filled to the top with resistance fighters, all with Soviets constantly harassing them from the outskirts. Germany might actually lose faster in this scenario, as they wouldnt have nearly as much forces to commit to the southern part of the front and thus probably wouldnt make it anywhere near Stalingrad.
Germany would have to push to the East even more if they wanted a real chance at winning the war - that is where all the tank production is now located, that is where Soviets are getting their lend-lease from. But that is a completely unrealistic scenario.

but you have to take into account that the allies shipping was heavily strained in 1942-1943, so they wouldn't be able to actually supply it when it mattered.

Majority of lend-lease was done through Pacific routes, where American transports were sailing completely unopposed due to flying Soviet flags.

 

[Koba133]

Yeah, Napoleon also though that taking Moscow would trigger a Russian defeat.
In reality, while it would certainly cripple morale and logistics of the Red Army, Germans would basically be stuck trying to secure a burned husk of a city filled to the top with resistance fighters, all with Soviets constantly harassing them from the outskirts. Germany might actually lose faster in this scenario, as they wouldnt have nearly as much forces to commit to the southern part of the front and thus probably wouldnt make it anywhere near Stalingrad.
Germany would have to push to the East even more if they wanted a real chance at winning the war - that is where all the tank production is now located, that is where Soviets are getting their lend-lease from. But that is a completely unrealistic scenario.

i don't see why an encirclement of Moscow would lead to a different scenario than the capture of Kiev or any other big city. You're conflating the situation of Moscow in august 1941 and Stalingrad in November 1942. An early drive towards Moscow (desperately asked by Halder, Guderian and most of the officers of the army group center) would have led to an early Vyazma-Briansk without soviet reserves like it happened in november, resulting in a soviet defeat in detail.

 

[qer]

That's false. Losing Moscow would be a devastating blow to soviet industry and national morale, and capturing it was possible in august-september when the process of displacement of industry was ongoing. Also losing Moscow meant Leningrad was doomed (the main road of supply came from Moscow). Thus all the north-west front would see a soviet collapse.

about lend lease : yes theorically the USA could replace Baku's oil supply, but you have to take into account that the allies shipping was heavily strained in 1942-1943, so they wouldn't be able to actually supply it when it mattered.

So how would they took Moscow exactly? If as some apologist said the army group center went straight for Moscow, they would face the same logistical challenges as they faced in November without having their flanks secure, thus exposing themselves to counterattacks. Even if they take Moscow, it would probably be the same scenario as Stalingrad: a commitment in taking the city would mean an Stalingrad one year earlier. The proposed encirclement of Moscow would be even more taxing in regards to logistics and would face the exact same problems. Overall the possibility of Germany winning the war is on the miracle side and relay on a huge amounts of what if and ignoring soviet growing capabilities.

 

[Highlord Alarak]

i don't see why an encirclement of Moscow would lead to a different scenario than the capture of Kiev or any other big city. You're conflating the situation of Moscow in august 1941 and Stalingrad in November 1942. An early drive towards Moscow (desperately asked by Halder, Guderian and most of the officers of the army group center) would have led to an early Vyazma-Briansk without soviet reserves like it happened in november, resulting in a soviet defeat in detail.

Most of the German forces that were supposed to advance at Moscow were tied up specifically in Vyazma encirclement, holding it together. Its not hoi4 where the encircled troops instantly run out of supply and die, it can (and did in case of Vyazma) take weeks to be completed, if at all possible (you conveniently leave out Leningrad and its suburban areas such as Krasnaya Gorka fort, which were able to hold out for years despite being completely encircled). German forces would just be tied up holding the encirclement around Moscow and/or on occupation duties, unable to be moved anywhere (since that would mean an immediate counterattack), while Soviets would basically have free reign across the front.

 

[Koba133]

So how would they took Moscow exactly? If as some apologist said the army group center went straight for Moscow, they would face the same logistical challenges as they faced in November without having their flanks secure, thus exposing themselves to counterattacks. Even if they take Moscow, it would probably be the same scenario as Stalingrad: a commitment in taking the city would mean an Stalingrad one year earlier. The proposed encirclement of Moscow would be even more taxing in regards to logistics and would face the exact same problems. Overall the possibility of Germany winning the war is on the miracle side and relay on a huge amounts of what if and ignoring soviet growing capabilities.

No ? In august-september there is no rasputitsa or snow. That's quite a bit of a difference. Also, the panzer groups that were detached to help the encirclement of Kiev would not do this expensive back and forth, and simply follow the convenient supply lines towards Moscow. We like to think of the eastern front having gigantic distances, but the distance between Smolensk and Moscow is less than the distance between Paris and the german border. And the AGC was in Smolensk as soon as July.

So all in all the logistical challenges would be much easier in August/September than in November, and the relative strength of the opponents more favourable to the Germans.

 

[Koba133]

Most of the German forces that were supposed to advance at Moscow were tied up specifically in Vyazma encirclement, holding it together. Its not hoi4 where the encircled troops instantly run out of supply and die, it can (and did in case of Vyazma) take weeks to be completed, if at all possible (you conveniently leave out Leningrad and its suburban areas such as Krasnaya Gorka fort, which were able to hold out for years despite being completely encircled). German forces would just be tied up holding the encirclement around Moscow and/or on occupation duties, unable to be moved anywhere (since that would mean an immediate counterattack), while Soviets would basically have free reign across the front.

yes but the actual Vyazma Briansk encirclement happened later that the proposed early drive towards Moscow, and the soviet have 700 000 more reserves that did not exist in september.

 

[Sarmatian]

i don't see why an encirclement of Moscow would lead to a different scenario than the capture of Kiev or any other big city. You're conflating the situation of Moscow in august 1941 and Stalingrad in November 1942. An early drive towards Moscow (desperately asked by Halder, Guderian and most of the officers of the army group center) would have led to an early Vyazma-Briansk without soviet reserves like it happened in november, resulting in a soviet defeat in detail.

No.

Wehrmach didn't have the capabilities to conquer USSR, simple as that. Lend lease or no lend lease.

We can engage in interesting "what ifs", like what if Germany wasn't in control of the nazis and actually went for a regime change rather than conquest, trying to win hearts and minds of ordinary Soviet citizens and stuff like that...

... but with Germany and and war goals being what they were when Barbarossa started, Germany lost the war the moment they declared it.

It is actually a massive, gigantic feat they managed to push as far as they did and to last as long as they did.

 

[Koba133]

No.

Wehrmach didn't have the capabilities to conquer USSR, simple as that. Lend lease or no lend lease.

We can engage in interesting "what ifs", like what if Germany wasn't in control of the nazis and actually went for a regime change rather than conquest, trying to win hearts and minds of ordinary Soviet citizens and stuff like that...

... but with Germany and and war goals being what they were when Barbarossa started, Germany lost the war the moment they declared it.

It is actually a massive, gigantic feat they managed to push as far as they did and to last as long as they did.

The mistake you make is to think the wermacht needed to "conquer the USSR". Of course it's impossible. But the losses of Leningrad and Moscow, possible in 1941, or alternatively the loss of the caucasus oil supply in 1942, would have crippled the soviet capabilities to push back the germans, or even provoked a collapse like in 1917.

And Uncle Joe himself said that without lend lease the USSR would have been toasted.

 

[Fulmen]

I absolutely disagree. The problem here was not in the Generals, but in intelligence, which could not analyze the German actions and give real information to Stalin. Stalin moved his troops to the border, but too late and these troops entered the battle in small groups as they arrived at the front, they were disorganized and quickly defeated. So early mobilization could really turn history.

Mobilising earlier wouldn't have been the end-all solution to the Red Army's problems. The USSR needed at least another two years to reach the materiel requirements of the Red Army. Alternatively considerably downsizing the army would've set much more realistic goals in the amount of required materiel, but there would still have been for example a massive lack of the required motorisation. And neither giving the USSR two more years of peace or downsizing the army would have solved the atrocious leadership problems the Red Army suffered from.

Also, you presume the Germans would've just sat there and let the Russians mobilise in May-June 1941, when they themselves were about to attack.

but they still managed to spend most of 1942 in orderly withdrawal, fighting limited counterattacks and delaying actions

It sounds like you're buying into Soviet "historiography" here (which unfortunately has made its way to many Western history books throughout the decades). What do I mean by that? Soviet history books, and many Russian history books today, have long maintained that after the Winter Offensive of 1941-42 Stalin stopped attacking on a broad front, and instead began selecting major strategic axis of advance along which to concentrate his forces. This is patently incorrect. A large part of the Eastern Front, not just in 1942, but throughout the entire war, was omitted from Soviet history books specifically in order to hide the Red Army's incompetence.

In reality the Russians launched offensives in the spring of 1942 from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. In fact the success of Blau was in large part due to the Russian offensives at Kharkov and the Crimea that were launched and failed just prior to the German offensive in June. The winter of 1942-43 saw another broad offensive from Leningrad to Rostov, most of which ended in failure for the Russians. To quote Glantz: "In virtually every campaign, regardless of what season of the year it was, Stalin adhered to a policy of amounting as many strategic offensives, in as many sectors as possible, on the presumption that if you pressure the Germans everywhere, they will break somewhere. And that is a policy he will follow almost to the war's end."

I strongly recommend you give this lecture by Glantz a watch or a listen. It talks a lot about the forgotten battles of the Eastern Front (the ones the Russians left out from their history books). Very interesting stuff.

I also recommend this lecture by Kotkin that goes into some of the things I've alluded to in this thread in earlier posts.

A current bias in soviet tank production statistics is that they count every tank coming out of the factory as "produced". But a significant part of those were tanks coming out from a major overhaul/refit/repair. That's a way to achieve your production quotas, which is imporant in a country where if you fail to you'll be pay with a bullet in the head or at least 10 years in labor camp. You can be sure that all your class 4 tanks are accounted in the production figures.

That's an interesting point. Do you have any sources to back it up as applying to a significant portion of Russian tank production?

And when we talk about reliability, I remember reading a letter writen by or to Stalin about the Soviet air force mid 30s losing 600+ planes each year due to accidents and lack of maintenance. He noticed that this amount of planes itself was more than many foreign air forces.
There's no reason to think you don't have that kind of trouble with tanks.

The numbers I've seen for both tanks and aircraft do not back up these kinds of peacetime losses. I vaguely remember something like the letter about too many aircraft being lost to accidents that you mention, though I can't quote any numbers for it. You have to also realise that the Russian air park was absolutely massive. By June 1941 they had some 35,000 aircraft, trainers included (many of which later saw combat use).

 

[qer]

No ? In august-september there is no rasputitsa or snow. That's quite a bit of a difference. Also, the panzer groups that were detached to help the encirclement of Kiev would not do this expensive back and forth, and simply follow the convenient supply lines towards Moscow. We like to think of the eastern front having gigantic distances, but the distance between Smolensk and Moscow is less than the distance between Paris and the german border. And the AGC was in Smolensk as soon as July.

So all in all the logistical challenges would be much easier in August/September than in November, and the relative strength of the opponents more favourable to the Germans.

But that would leave the army advance flanks over exposed as I said before. And funny that you mention the distance between Paris and the German front, because their logistic situation was far better and didn't need the advance- stop- advance nature of the attack that we see in Barbarossa due to logistics. Also in September and October you are also getting mud adding to the difficulty. The encirclement in Kiev wasn't a bad move based on previous german experiences, and honestly I think it falls under the myth popularize by post war german generals of saying that everything wrong was due to the mustache man and the SS, instead of accepting the fact that they were at fault too (or God forbid, that Hitler took some decisions that weren't bad on the operational level).

 

[Sarmatian]

Mobilising earlier wouldn't have been the end-all solution to the Red Army's problems. The USSR needed at least another two years to reach the materiel requirements of the Red Army. Alternatively considerably downsizing the army would've set much more realistic goals in the amount of required materiel, but there would still have been for example a massive lack of the required motorisation. And neither giving the USSR two more years of peace or downsizing the army would have solved the atrocious leadership problems the Red Army suffered from.

Also, you presume the Germans would've just sat there and let the Russians mobilise in May-June 1941, when they themselves were about to attack.



It sounds like you're buying into Soviet "historiography" here (which unfortunately has made its way to many Western history books throughout the decades). What do I mean by that? Soviet history books, and many Russian history books today, have long maintained that after the Winter Offensive of 1941-42 Stalin stopped attacking on a broad front, and instead began selecting major strategic axis of advance along which to concentrate his forces. This is patently incorrect. A large part of the Eastern Front, not just in 1942, but throughout the entire war, was omitted from Soviet history books specifically in order to hide the Red Army's incompetence.

In reality the Russians launched offensives in the spring of 1942 from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. In fact the success of Blau was in large part due to the Russian offensives at Kharkov and the Crimea that were launched and failed just prior to the German offensive in June. The winter of 1942-43 saw another broad offensive from Leningrad to Rostov, most of which ended in failure for the Russians. To quote Glantz: "In virtually every campaign, regardless of what season of the year it was, Stalin adhered to a policy of amounting as many strategic offensives, in as many sectors as possible, on the presumption that if you pressure the Germans everywhere, they will break somewhere. And that is a policy he will follow almost to the war's end."

I strongly recommend you give this lecture by Glantz a watch or a listen. It talks a lot about the forgotten battles of the Eastern Front (the ones the Russians left out from their history books). Very interesting stuff.

I also recommend this lecture by Kotkin that goes into some of the things I've alluded to in this thread in earlier posts.

That's an interesting point. Do you have any sources to back it up as applying to a significant portion of Russian tank production?



The numbers I've seen for both tanks and aircraft do not back up these kinds of peacetime losses. I vaguely remember something like the letter about too many aircraft being lost to accidents that you mention, though I can't quote any numbers for it. You have to also realise that the Russian air park was absolutely massive. By June 1941 they had some 35,000 aircraft, trainers included (many of which later saw combat use).

I am not "buying" into anything. I've read a lot of Glantz, but thanks for the recommendation. Stalin continued to mismanage the war well into 1945, but to a lesser extent gradually.

Bogging down to minute details, or focusing on simple quotes without context will give you a distorted picture, or to put it simply, you might miss the forest from the trees.
On the whole, between rasputsitsas in 1942, Soviets didn't try as much counteroffensives as they did in 1941. But my main point was that there was much fewer massive encirclements. Red Army didn't suddenly turn super competent within 6 months. That simple fact should illustrate that massive losses during 1941 could have been avoided with a different strategic approach, without the need to into details about troops positioning and orders, which is out of the scope of the thread.

The mistake you make is to think the wermacht needed to "conquer the USSR". Of course it's impossible. But the losses of Leningrad and Moscow, possible in 1941, or alternatively the loss of the caucasus oil supply in 1942, would have crippled the soviet capabilities to push back the germans, or even provoked a collapse like in 1917.

And Uncle Joe himself said that without lend lease the USSR would have been toasted.

Conquer in this case meant force surrender. I didn't mean they needed to occupy every sq cm of SU.

Lend lease requires a topic of its own, but suffice to say to grasp the big picture:

1) lend lease amounted to 4% total of Soviet ear time production

2) vast majority of it arrived after 1942.

Sure, there are a lot of nuances and caveats in it, but it is safe to say that LL only started arriving in significant quantities after Wehrmacht was already spent. It certainly helped shorten the war and save lives, but the outcome was decided before it started arriving

 

[Sarmatian]

you're arguing that Hitler's strategic decisions were actually wise, against the advice of most of the Wermacht's High command. Let that sink in

Some of Hitlers decisions were wise, and Wehrmacht high command was actually not that unified in terms of what should be done. They made a lot of blunders, and tended to blame everything on Hitler after the war.

Hitler was not that bad in strategy. Stalin was far worse and Stalin's blunders actually impacted the course of the war much more