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If the cost of the conflict might outweigh a German Europe then I dread to think what it might be.

It was to teach militarism a lesson of restraint…
By setting fire to the globe and digging millions of graves.
I wonder how far after the war the author is writing and if in TTL the Great War is merely a bloody prologue to something worse.
 
If the cost of the conflict might outweigh a German Europe then I dread to think what it might be.


By setting fire to the globe and digging millions of graves.
I wonder how far after the war the author is writing and if in TTL the Great War is merely a bloody prologue to something worse.

Almost certainly. The entente is far, far too powerful to lose, and everyone is going to end up hating them eventually. International relations will be Germany's to lose, basically. Decolonisation, whatever the federation manages to incorporate, is going to hit all three hard if not handled properly. If the axis revenge are patient and wait until the middle of the crisis (in Africa and Asian colonies especially), then a lot of damage could be done, and nukes may be used liberally.
 
View attachment 652381

Our author has quite the tightrope to balance here, pitting the futility of war against the righteousness of the sacrifice. So far he seems to be just about holding steady in his position.

Look. We went for a night out with the lads. Had a couple too many. Next morning, I wake up, and apparently we've acquired a subcontinent. Could have happened to anyone, really.

Good to know Searle-Wilson hasn't dropped off the rope. Reviewing the chapter - for the first time in a month or so - as I posted it, I was struck by how forcefully I'd ended up having him make the argument for war, and worried I'd over-egged it.

Giving in to tyranny is always cheaper in the short run. But if you maintain liberalism and freedom of action on sufferance, you will not have them for long.

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.

Funnily enough, it still works - perhaps even better - in the original context (from NPR):

WITTES: He was writing about a tax dispute between the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the family of the Penns, the proprietary family of the Pennsylvania colony who ruled it from afar. And the legislature was trying to tax the Penn family lands to pay for frontier defense during the French and Indian War. And the Penn family kept instructing the governor to veto. Franklin felt that this was a great affront to the ability of the legislature to govern. And so he actually meant purchase a little temporary safety very literally. The Penn family was trying to give a lump sum of money in exchange for the General Assembly's acknowledging that it did not have the authority to tax it.

SIEGEL: So far from being a pro-privacy quotation, if anything, it's a pro-taxation and pro-defense spending quotation.

WITTES:
It is a quotation that defends the authority of a legislature to govern in the interests of collective security. It means, in context, not quite the opposite of what it's almost always quoted as saying but much closer to the opposite than to the thing that people think it means.

Wilhelmite Germany was incredibly tacky and tasteless wasn't it? It's not quite as bad as his entry into Jerusalem in 1898, but it's up there.

All the evidence does point at the former, so I'd go with that.

Not in the scope of this work I know, but had it been any other power than Prussia that unified Germany I do think things would have turned out differently.

We're not entirely innocent when it comes to parades on the Sovereign's birthday (which I do love), but generally speaking, yes.

Agreed.

Lederhosen and Beer instead of Jackboots and, well, still Beer.

I actually have notes on a Bavaria>Germany Vicky save tucked away for a rainy day. I know far too little about the location and the period to do it proper justice as my knowledge stands, but I am of a mind to do at least something with it one day.
Would love for someone to do a Germany and Britain figure out a way to split the world and Europe AAR at some point, as it is indeed constantly teased by history and alt-historians.
I too must confess to one day want to explore a Germany/British late-19th/early 20th century alliance.

I mean, not for the "challenge" you understand, but for the fun.

The main obstacle is that, if you play Germany, you need to be careful with Britain. Too careful for it to be a real power-sharing arrangement.

As the UK, it takes superhuman strength of will not to give in to the temptation to knock Germany down a peg.

If the cost of the conflict might outweigh a German Europe then I dread to think what it might be.

By setting fire to the globe and digging millions of graves.
I wonder how far after the war the author is writing and if in TTL the Great War is merely a bloody prologue to something worse.

It is possible to f**k for virginity. It's just conceptually convoluted.

Searle-Wilson is writing in 2017. I haven't yet decided on whether we'll have a WWII. Certainly the insistence with which I have referred to this one as The Great War (and the thrust of the introduction) means that, as IOTL, a Second World War will have to be less psychologically devastating than this one for Britain at least, if not the other participants.

Almost certainly. The entente is far, far too powerful to lose, and everyone is going to end up hating them eventually. International relations will be Germany's to lose, basically. Decolonisation, whatever the federation manages to incorporate, is going to hit all three hard if not handled properly. If the axis revenge are patient and wait until the middle of the crisis (in Africa and Asian colonies especially), then a lot of damage could be done, and nukes may be used liberally.

The Entente, particularly Britain, will also be ending up with more settlement to patrol than IOTL, thanks to the Spanish and Italians being on the other side ITTL (and also a pretty major Asian development later in the war).

The challenge for any AAR that reaches the Atomic Age is how to avoid inadvertently getting to a point where the only logical conclusion is Nuclear Winter.
 
2
The Decision-Makers


I have never been a believer in the force of arms. I find the whole affair [war] rather unedifying.
Sir James Orme-Hennigan, 1907

I have spent most of my political life now on the grand security project, and I do not intend to have it scuttled by a case of the nerves at the point of contact.
Austen Chamberlain, 1908

I have the utmost appreciation for the concerns of the Foreign Office. However, there are more pressing matters, which this government must attend to before addressing foreign concerns.
David Lloyd George to Austen Chamberlain, September 13th, 1911


The people who made the decision to go to war can roughly be divided into three camps; the war camp, the peace camp, and the undecided. Crucially, the last of these counted the Prime Minister as one of its members. Had he been unequivocally in one of the other two, it is hard to see the decision taking as long, and being driven so much by the progress of the crisis itself. That progression was, in turn, affected very much by Britain’s drawing itself in and out of the diplomacy of the crisis as the two camps wrestled for supremacy. As this book owes its existence to the fact that the war camp won, and more of them will continue to play major roles throughout the war than the members of the other two, we shall look at them first.

The three men at the head of the war camp were Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Spencer-Churchill, and War Secretary John Edward Bernard ‘J. E. B.’ Seely. Early in the crisis, the peace camp would nickname them ‘Cerberus.’ Partially, this was for the Hound of Hades’ connection to the underworld, into which they believed the war camp was leading the nation, but also simply for the fact there were three of them, so the name came naturally. Towards the end of September, the three would begin to use the name themselves; Cerberus guarded against the dead returning to the world, and they too were guarding against an apocalypse.

Another insult thrown was that of ‘The Triumvirate,’ implying that through war they meant to end the very liberal parliamentarism they professed to be protecting. As in the Roman triumvirates, there was clearly a primus inter pares, Chamberlain. Since at least his own term as Prime Minister in 1897-1900, and arguably since his first stint in the Foreign Office (1893-97), Chamberlain had been working to create the system of alliances - colloquially named the Entente for the trilateral treaty at its centre – that constituted Britain’s ‘grand security project,’ as he himself called it.

The son of Joseph Chamberlain, a major figure in the Salisbury government who almost caused it to collapse by pushing for protectionist tariff reform [1], Austen had become an MP in 1886 at only 22. He had originally intended to follow in his father’s footsteps as a Conservative, but early exposure to Sir William Sinclair had converted him to the Liberals. As Joseph had planned for Austen to be his political heir, the apparent betrayal permanently estranged father and son, the latter’s attempts at reconciliation failing even after the former’s 1906 stroke took him out of politics. Shorn of his dominating father’s influence, Chamberlain quickly embraced a position as Sinclair’s mentee.

It was the undying loyalty he showed in the elections of 1886-92 that prompted Sinclair to appoint him as Foreign Secretary after the unexpected death of Lord Walden in 1893. Once in office though, Chamberlain proved a similar willingness to defy his new mentor as the old. While Sinclair was an avowed isolationist, Chamberlain soon adopted the opinion of the Foreign and War Offices that German power posed genuine threat to Britain, and could no longer be ignored. Following the Prime Minister’s heart attack in 1897, he manoeuvred himself into No 10, and from there co-ordinated the creation of the Entente Cordiale.

Though his own party’s division over the treaty he had negotiated saw him turfed out of office in the election of 1900, and his subsequent resignation as leader of the Liberals, the new Conservative government cemented the shift in foreign policy he had worked for. Upon the Liberals’ return to power, Asquith reappointed Chamberlain to the Foreign Office with a mandate to further build what had now developed into the idea of a fully-fledged ‘architecture’ of alliances to oppose Germany. It was he, together with Ambassador Sir James Colville, who saw the cracks in the Russo-German alliance and successfully leveraged them to create the ‘tripwires’ in the Balkans and Central Europe that would, hopefully, deter Germany from an attempt at solidifying the coup of 1894-98.

Therefore, when the Germans chose to trip the wire despite the open secret of its existence, Chamberlain’s mind was set. If this aggression was allowed to go unpunished or – worse - Britain’s allies went to war without it and were defeated, all his work to avert the nightmare of Britain alone against a German continent would be for naught. As his main allies, he found two other young guns in Churchill and Seely.



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Cerberus: (L-R) Austen Chamberlain, Winston Spencer-Churchill, and J. E. B. Seely

The former had not yet been influential for as long as Chamberlain, but had certainly made enough of a splash in his short time as an MP. A descendant of the Duke of Marlborough and a veteran of the Boer War, who had famously been captured by the guerrillas in 1903 and effected a daring escape with three other men, Churchill had been mentored by Lloyd George in much the way Chamberlain had been by Sinclair. As Financial Secretary, he had been the then-Chancellor’s second-in-command during the authoring of – and electoral battle over – the People’s Budget and Act of Union 1910.

His transfer to the Admiralty had come as the result of his conduct during the negotiations over Canadian accession to the Imperial Federation. Having gone to Canada with the intent to conclude negotiations almost completely in favour of the Canadian proposal from the outset, he had presented his negotiation to the PM as a hard battle. When his deception was revealed upon the announcement of the outcome to the world, it drove an irreconcilable wedge between Churchill and his mentor [2]. As it was politically untenable to sack a popular minister, he instead transferred him to the Admiralty, a military department where his thrusting personality could be put to use without impinging on Lloyd George’s own interests; the PM put it in his diary as ‘throwing the bomb where some aggressive reorganisation was necessary.’

Aggressive reorganisation is exactly what Churchill had embarked upon. Along with Admiral John Fisher, he had done much to improve co-ordination between the different fleets and the actual process of mobilising for combat operations via the creation of a Naval War Staff. Importantly, he had, along with the third man of Cerberus, massively increased the funding and clarified the organisational structure of Britain’s embryonic intelligence operations.

J. E. B. Seely was the least prominent of the three. He had served as an officer in the British Army, earning a DSO at the head of the British cavalry charge at Rustenburg, the one major battle of the Boer War before the descent into guerrilla fighting. Subsequent experience convinced him of the need for army reform. On the advice of Churchill, a close personal friend, he stood for election as a Liberal in 1905. Thanks to his position at Lloyd George’s side, Churchill was able to get Seely the position of Under-Secretary of State for War in 1905, and War Secretary in the reshuffle that followed the ousting of Asquith from the leadership.

Similarly to Churchill, he quickly embarked on a rapid programme of reorganisation and modernisation. With almost nine months on his friend, Seely’s project had come much farther by the outbreak of war, and he had successfully secured funding for the largest peacetime expansion of the British Army in its entire history. Specifically, he secured the expansion of the British Expeditionary Force, which was to cross the Channel in the case of a German invasion of France, from 150,000 to 250,000 men. In all, the 100,000 new troops represented an expansion of the Army by a third of its previous strength. As we shall see, perhaps no British military decision pre-war was as decisive to the outcome of the early war.

Opposed to Cerberus were, as informally acknowledged heads of the peace camp, Chancellor Sir James Orme-Hennigan and Home Secretary Henry J. Calthorpe. In contrast to the young thrusters of the war camp, both were old Sinclairites, and much of their isolationism sprung from this. In keeping with the classical theme of the Cabinet’s insults, the war camp took to calling them ‘Janus’; while Orme-Hennigan spoke niceties to Lloyd George, Calthorpe laid into Cerberus with increasingly colourful invective as Cabinet meetings lengthened along with the shadows of war.


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Janus: (L-R) Sir James Orme-Hennigan and Henry J. Calthorpe

The younger son of a coal magnate, the Chancellor had spent much of his early life up close and personal with the health consequences of his family business. Unlike his brother though, this had not been coupled with a programme of preparation to take over, and so the arguments against unions and government intervention had not been drilled into him the same way. First elected at age 33 in 1881, he became one of Sinclair’s more radical disciples. Sinclair himself found Orme-Hennigan too forward in his enthusiasm, fearing the conservative vote would be lost with someone of the frontbench who would easily fall prey to accusations of ‘champagne socialism’ and the ubiquitous one of ‘Labour in a Liberal coat.’

It was the People’s Budget that made Sir James frontbench material. As one of its most ardent and vocal defenders in the 1909-10 Constitutional Crisis, Lloyd George felt that he would make a good guardian of the new settlement in its early years. The two were not exactly friends, but the new PM had long been known to the more radical Sinclairites as a potential ally with the political acumen and wile to get to, and stay on, the frontbench despite pushing the envelope.

Already inclined to it - perhaps because coal had been one of the industries least affected by foreign competition when he moved into full-time politics - Orme-Hennigan was the very definition of a classic Sinclairite when it came to foreign policy. His isolationism stemmed from no great pacifist impulse or sober assessment of the German threat to British goals on the world stage. It was, above all, built on a dislike for the fact that foreign entanglements inevitably led to increased military spending, which, in turn, would crowd out spending on the Sinclairite social settlement [3]. It was an isolationism born of a stubborn refusal to countenance the idea that any foreign development could ever be worth stalling or, God forbid, reversing the progress of the National Insurance system. As far as he was concerned, the ‘wider still and wider’ of Elgar’s Land of Hope and Glory was in reference to the extension of that system, not of Britain’s borders or world power [4].

Henry J. Calthorpe, on the other hand, was more of a conviction opponent of the war. The closest thing to an outright pacifist in the cabinet, his own military career had ended in 1860, in Hyderabad Province, when then 18-year old Lieutenant Calthorpe had almost lost his leg to a cannonball. The flag-bearer of the Liberal tradition of anti-imperialism, he, of all the decision-makers, was closest to making the argument that the consequences of German victory would be less terrible than the consequences of prolonged continental warfare.

Moving from the military to the police, and then into politics at 43, Calthorpe was not only the oldest cabinet member during the September Crisis – at 70 – but by far the one to have entered Parliament the latest in life. In fact, both faces of Janus were at least two decades older than the oldest member of Cerberus, John Seely. Whether this meant they didn’t understand how Britain’s place in the world power structure had changed since their youth, or that their life experience gave them a better understanding of the consequences of such momentous action as declaring war (certainly Calthorpe had more personally experienced the ill effects of war than Seely or Churchill, whose experiences had been medals and fame, respectively), has been debated to death, and the reader will be allowed to make their own judgements as the arguments and crisis are laid out in detail in the next chapter.


What mattered is that it was Cerberus who succeeded in convincing the most important man in the undecided faction, the man who would have to lead Britain if it chose to go to war; Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Whether it was a joint commitment to thematic unity, or simply a measure of the Cabinet’s social makeup, the PM also received a Classical Greek designation. This one requires rather less parsing, as the position of the King’s First Minister as primus inter pares lends itself naturally to the moniker of ‘Zeus.’

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Zeus: David Lloyd George

David Lloyd George is one of the towering figures of early-20th Century history. He is the only Prime Minister to have had Welsh as their First Language, and, once he had secured No 10, spoke it to his aides as a way of keeping others in the dark. His youth had seen poverty and triumph, as he managed to rise from his family’s poor prospects after his father’s death to be the head partner of his own law firm. Self-taught in economics, and particularly impressed by Henry George, Lloyd George was first elected in 1891 and became another of Sinclair’s converts. Unlike many of the most radical though, he was also ruthless at playing the game.

It was this that convinced Herbert Asquith that Lloyd George was the man to devise the People’s Budget. Bringing along Winston Churchill as Financial Secretary, the new Chancellor massively expanded the coverage of National Insurance, paying for his largesse by reintroducing income tax and introducing the Georgists’ Holy Grail; Land Value Taxation. It was the national profile and association with the popular Budget (meaning both the spending and taxation measures) afforded by this battle that made him the frontrunner when the Cabinet decided they could not take more of Asquith’s grand constitutional schemes.

Lloyd George himself proved to have similar grand schemes, but for Whitehall. Unconvinced by the results of ministers treating departments as their own personal fiefdoms, and generally distrusting of the dull conservatism of civil servants, Lloyd George had by September 1911 already created the core of what would develop into the Cabinet Office over the course of the war. Initially a small operation that acted as a sort of ‘Department for the Prime Minister,’ the No 10 Office was to be able to co-ordinate all things and allow No 10 more grip of the big picture. It was this same distrust, of the ability of existing structures and institutions to deliver the even bigger ideas he had, that put Seely and Churchill where they were and allowed them to drive their reforms at break-neck speed for Whitehall. It was those bigger ideas that that would inform much of Lloyd George’s thinking during the September Crisis; on the one hand, war could derail his plans, on the other, it would be a prime political tool to cut through Whitehall excuses about caution. On war itself, he seems to have been largely agnostic.

There were, of course, many more undecided, being by far the largest faction in Cabinet at the beginning of the Crisis. These include the two women attending (Lady Millicent Hawkins and Isabel Wilkinson, Ministers for Education and Health, respectively), Attorney General Andrew Ebbets, Financial Secretary Andrew Faulkner-Crawford, Minister for the Federation Lord Crewe, and Chief Secretary for Ireland Colin Ryan. The last was perhaps the most influential undecided save for the PM himself, being the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party in Westminster and having been made Chief Secretary as a condition of the Supply and Confidence Agreement that underpinned the government’s majority [5].

Many of these people would go on to hold important offices throughout the war. Others would resign or be sacked, choosing as many different paths forward as there were of them. Some stayed on the backbenches, some made it back to the frontbench, others joined the war effort more directly by signing up to fight on the frontlines. Some of their stories will thus continue to be touched on, due to decisions made in government or otherwise. In September-October 1911 though, they were all at the centre of government when the most consequential decision of all was made.


[1] – Originally a prominent member of the Liberal Party, he had switched to the Conservatives in 1873 over the issue of Irish Representation, and first been elected at the following election. A consistent isolationist and protectionist, the Conservative Party nonetheless kept him – even as the party moved to interventionism – due to his ability to consistently deliver seats in the Birmingham area.

[2] – On a personal level, the rivalry was almost entirely one-sided. Churchill himself believed that politics was to be conducted like a game of sport, in which actions ‘on the pitch’ had no implications for relationships off it. Lloyd George, on the other hand, was a master of the political-personal grudge.

[3] – Seely’s victory in the autumn 1910 budget battle had only confirmed this to Orme-Hennigan. There has been much idle speculation, as there was at the time, that the Chancellor’s opposition to the war came as much from a dislike of the idea the War Secretary might be proven right as from any other concerns.

[4] - In a way, this is the polar opposite of the Salisbury Settlement of 1881-1891, in which an extreme conservatism in domestic affairs was balanced by the most aggressive empire-building in British history, certainly in terms of Westminster’s active involvement and encouragement.

[5] – Cabinet positions are not a common benefit of Supply and Confidence Agreements for the smaller party in the Westminster system, but the creation of the Imperial Commonwealth of Ireland as part of the Act of Union 1910 had been one of the Liberals’ main goals when entering government.
 
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The challenge for any AAR that reaches the Atomic Age is how to avoid inadvertently getting to a point where the only logical conclusion is Nuclear Winter.

Nuclear winter is never the logical conclusion. ;)

Will give the update a proper read once I’ve finished watching Thatcher’s stalking disaster on The Crown.
 
The three men at the head of the war camp were

Drumroll please...

Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain,

The hero of many a Vicky2/HOI AAR, if Super Churchill is out for whatever reason.
First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Spencer-Churchill,

We all know him well. Or we think we do.

and War Secretary John Edward Bernard ‘J. E. B.’ Seely.

The forgotten one that sometimes comes up if a debate starts getting nasty.

the peace camp would nickname them ‘Cerberus.’ Partially, this was for the Hound of Hades’ connection to the underworld, into which they believed the war camp was leading the nation,

There is no way that this was the actual reason. Far too neat. Probably made up by historians/movie producers afterwards.

but also simply for the fact there were three of them,

Much more likely from Parliament.

Another insult thrown was that of ‘The Triumvirate,’

Well, that's a tad unfair. Say what you will, but Churchill is Parliamentarian to the core, and Austen is a gentleman.

He had originally intended to follow in his father’s footsteps as a Conservative, but early exposure to Sir William Sinclair had converted him to the Liberals.

Sinclair disease. Still rather rife amongst the conservative youth.

It was the undying loyalty he showed in the elections of 1886-92 that prompted Sinclair to appoint him as Foreign Secretary after the unexpected death of Lord Walden in 1893. Once in office though, Chamberlain proved a similar willingness to defy his new mentor as the old. While Sinclair was an avowed isolationist, Chamberlain soon adopted the opinion of the Foreign and War Offices that German power posed genuine threat to Britain, and could no longer be ignored. Following the Prime Minister’s heart attack in 1897, he manoeuvred himself into No 10, and from there co-ordinated the creation of the Entente Cordiale.

Hum...lots of his political roadblocks seem to die suddenly and unexpectedly...

An ancestor of the Duke of Marlborough

Well, technically yes, since the present day lot are related to him, but I think you mean descendant of.

and a veteran of the Boer War, who had famously been captured by the guerrillas in 1903 and effected a daring escape with three other men,

Oof. This story again. Definitely famous and a media sensation, but the actual war experience of Churchill in the army is...er...

As Financial Secretary, he had been the then-Chancellor’s second-in-command during the authoring of – and electoral battle over – the People’s Budget and Act of Union 1910.

And he never touched economics again.

With almost nine months on his friend, Seely’s project had come much farther by the outbreak of war, and he had successfully secured funding for the largest peacetime expansion of the British Army in its entire history. Specifically, he secured the expansion of the British Expeditionary Force, which was to cross the Channel in the case of a German invasion of France, from 150,000 to 250,000 men. In all, the 100,000 new troops represented an expansion of the Army by a third of its previous strength. As we shall see, perhaps no British military decision pre-war was as decisive to the outcome of the early war.

Now that is significant. Especially as the British Army is the only professional standing army in Europe and so well-trained it freaked the Germans out into retreating a few times in the early weeks. If they have double the manpower already, and hopefully increased shell and bullet production, the war on the Western Front may deadlock a few miles further east, which is all the difference.

perhaps because coal had been one of the industries least affected by foreign competition

...right...

As far as he was concerned, the ‘wider still and wider’ of Elgar’s Land of Hope and Glory was in reference to the extension of that system, not of Britain’s borders or world power [4].

Disgusting. How dare he not wish to paint the map pink. Execute him at once!

The closest thing to an outright pacifist in the cabinet,

Lots of ex-military in the cabinet and parliament generally. Only really hasn't been a mainstay feature in modern times.

Prime Minister David Lloyd George

That guy.

This one requires rather less parsing, as the position of the King’s First Minister as primus inter pares lends itself naturally to the moniker of ‘Zeus.’

Slut in Chief? I can't think of amore insulting nickname to give an Edwardian-era PM.

the Cabinet decided they could not take more of Asquith’s grand constitutional schemes.

I miss Asquith.

Lloyd George had by September 1911 already created the core of what would develop into the Cabinet Office over the course of the war. Initially a small operation that acted as a sort of ‘Department for the Prime Minister,’ the No 10 Office was to be able to co-ordinate all things and allow No 10 more grip of the big picture.

That was him? Wow, he really did shake things up.

[2] – On a personal level, the rivalry was almost entirely one-sided. Churchill himself believed that politics was to be conducted like a game of sport, in which actions ‘on the pitch’ had no implications for relationships off it. Lloyd George, on the other hand, was a master of the political-personal grudge.

This weird game of gentlemanly politics that off and on played out over the past few centuries is finally starting to die around this point, but Churchill is nothing if not old-fashioned in personal practices.

Nuclear winter is never the logical conclusion. ;)

Depends how you feel about humans.

Will give the update a proper read once I’ve finished watching Thatcher’s stalking disaster on The Crown.

No interest in the show. Except that whatever controversial topics it's covered before now, will pale in comparison to the ribbing it will take for daring to cover this period. Thatcher and Diana? Ballsy.
 
Well, technically yes, since the present day lot are related to him, but I think you mean descendant of.

I'd like to say that sentence started off as saying the Duke was an ancestor of WSC's, but...

Thanks for the spot.
 
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No interest in the show. Except that whatever controversial topics it's covered before now, will pale in comparison to the ribbing it will take for daring to cover this period. Thatcher and Diana? Ballsy.

Never watched a minute of it in my life. Literally watching it this time for Diana.

Apologies BBB, just when I sat down to read the update my stepdad came in with the Risk board. So reading postponed until I’ve conquered Eurasia.
 
Never watched a minute of it in my life. Literally watching it this time for Diana.

Apologies BBB, just when I sat down to read the update my stepdad came in with the Risk board. So reading postponed until I’ve conquered Eurasia.

I think you'll like the general thrust of how they portray Mrs Thatcher. Also, Emma Corrin is simply divine as the Princess of Wales.

But, Densley, you can never hold onto Asia.
 
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I think you'll like the general thrust of how they portray Mrs Thatcher. Also, Emma Corrin is simply divine as the Princess of Wales.

Tbh, the royals are so beastly that whenever Thatcher turns up it’s blessed relief. I’ve been fascinated by the idea of Gillian Anderson as Maggie ever since it trailed, so it’s interesting to see it in the flesh. Only two episodes in, mind.

But yes, as I say, I’m basically just watching for Diana.

People always say that, but it's too easy to be underestimated whilst taking over Asia 'because you'll never manage it', whilst everyone focuses on South America.

I had a lucky break with the draw pretty much getting the Western Hemisphere on a lock, as well as Africa, so it’s basically a case of pincering up thru Egypt and down from Greenland. Some very heavy fighting in Russia and Afghanistan (the dice obviously have a sense of humour) and things are still fairly balanced. But then I’ve never beaten my stepdad at anything, so we’ll see. We’ve broken for the night and tension is high going into tomorrow’s session.
 
The cabinet giving each other Classical nicknames and sparring over the war all feels a bit 'Play up! Play up! and play the game!' to me. Nice to know that the ruling classes are treating impending mass slaughter with all due severity.

No doubt war will change the outlooks of many of them. And of course a few will not survive. I suppose it's only with the dubious benefit of hindsight that this Greek chumminess acquires something of a facetious quality. The post-war really is going to be fascinating.

David Lloyd George is one of the towering figures of early-20th Century history. He is the only Prime Minister to have had Welsh as their First Language, and, once he had secured No 10, spoke it to his aides as a way of keeping others in the dark.

 
The idea of Lloyd George being Zeus is enough to make my head spin :)

All in a all an excellent pen portrait of the three cliques driving the early decision making.
 
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Nuclear winter is never the logical conclusion. ;)

Will give the update a proper read once I’ve finished watching Thatcher’s stalking disaster on The Crown.

Logical here being 'what options are left for the characters?' rather than, you know, actually logical.

Drumroll please...

The hero of many a Vicky2/HOI AAR, if Super Churchill is out for whatever reason.

We all know him well. Or we think we do.

The forgotten one that sometimes comes up if a debate starts getting nasty.

There is no way that this was the actual reason. Far too neat. Probably made up by historians/movie producers afterwards.

Never underestimate the ability of Classics nerds to justify using their knowledge in daily life.

Much more likely from Parliament.

Well, that's a tad unfair. Say what you will, but Churchill is Parliamentarian to the core, and Austen is a gentleman.

Sinclair disease. Still rather rife amongst the conservative youth.

Hum...lots of his political roadblocks seem to die suddenly and unexpectedly...

Well, technically yes, since the present day lot are related to him, but I think you mean descendant of.

Political insults don't often make much sense.

The man ruined a generation of perfectly fine Tories.

I hadn't noticed I'd done that... I'm sure it's jsut coincidence.

Oof. This story again. Definitely famous and a media sensation, but the actual war experience of Churchill in the army is...er...

And he never touched economics again.

Now that is significant. Especially as the British Army is the only professional standing army in Europe and so well-trained it freaked the Germans out into retreating a few times in the early weeks. If they have double the manpower already, and hopefully increased shell and bullet production, the war on the Western Front may deadlock a few miles further east, which is all the difference.

...right...

Precisely why I had him captured as an actual, serving soldier this time around.

Hah!

It will certainly be utterly decisive in freeing up French forces to blunt the Spanish-Italian advances.

Disgusting. How dare he not wish to paint the map pink. Execute him at once!

Lots of ex-military in the cabinet and parliament generally. Only really hasn't been a mainstay feature in modern times.

That guy.

Slut in Chief? I can't think of amore insulting nickname to give an Edwardian-era PM.

I miss Asquith.

I'm not saying military experience makes for better leaders, but the quality of Anglo-American leadership cratered come Clinton and Major. Okay, it may be more about a generation that can't remember the war.

I think we all do a little.

That was him? Wow, he really did shake things up.

This weird game of gentlemanly politics that off and on played out over the past few centuries is finally starting to die around this point, but Churchill is nothing if not old-fashioned in personal practices.

Depends how you feel about humans.

No interest in the show. Except that whatever controversial topics it's covered before now, will pale in comparison to the ribbing it will take for daring to cover this period. Thatcher and Diana? Ballsy.

Indeed. This is true, and it coming early in the war will have quite an effect.

I'm certainly not advocating for the return of the social dynamics that enabled it, but goddamn would policy-making be better if it weren't coloured by petty personal rivalries.

Never watched a minute of it in my life. Literally watching it this time for Diana.

Apologies BBB, just when I sat down to read the update my stepdad came in with the Risk board. So reading postponed until I’ve conquered Eurasia.
People always say that, but it's too easy to be underestimated whilst taking over Asia 'because you'll never manage it', whilst everyone focuses on South America.
Tbh, the royals are so beastly that whenever Thatcher turns up it’s blessed relief. I’ve been fascinated by the idea of Gillian Anderson as Maggie ever since it trailed, so it’s interesting to see it in the flesh. Only two episodes in, mind.

But yes, as I say, I’m basically just watching for Diana.

I had a lucky break with the draw pretty much getting the Western Hemisphere on a lock, as well as Africa, so it’s basically a case of pincering up thru Egypt and down from Greenland. Some very heavy fighting in Russia and Afghanistan (the dice obviously have a sense of humour) and things are still fairly balanced. But then I’ve never beaten my stepdad at anything, so we’ll see. We’ve broken for the night and tension is high going into tomorrow’s session.

I notice you never told us who won. The people demand answers, Densley.

The cabinet giving each other Classical nicknames and sparring over the war all feels a bit 'Play up! Play up! and play the game!' to me. Nice to know that the ruling classes are treating impending mass slaughter with all due severity.

No doubt war will change the outlooks of many of them. And of course a few will not survive. I suppose it's only with the dubious benefit of hindsight that this Greek chumminess acquires something of a facetious quality. The post-war really is going to be fascinating.


It wouldn't be as tragic without a little non-chalance. Although, to be fair, to treat the oncoming storm with the appropriate severity would probably induce a crippling decision paralysis in any reasonable person.

The idea of Lloyd George being Zeus is enough to make my head spin :)

All in a all an excellent pen portrait of the three cliques driving the early decision making.

Thank you, on both counts.
 
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Declaring War

I do not see that war is an inevitability. The mutual commerce of nations is such that we must believe Berlin, too, can see the benefits of continued peace.
Andrew Faulkner-Crawford, September 23rd, 1911

Our efforts have failed. The Prussian arms now preparing to take themselves to all parts of the continent are not doing so for the purposes of mutual co-operation between nations. We must now choose between the possibility of salvation, or the certainty of subjugation.
Winston Spencer-Churchill, October 1st, 1911

I had other plans for the day, you know.
David Lloyd George, October 1st, 1911


When the German Ultimatum to Austria arrived in Vienna, on September 14th, 1911, the biggest news in Westminster was the tabling of the Government of Scotland Bill by a cross-party group of Scottish Liberals and Conservatives the previous day. It was this that had prompted Lloyd George to dismiss a letter from the Foreign Secretary, which argued that Cabinet should meet to discuss the escalating Slovak Crisis. It was not until Austria’s outright rejection of the German letter two days later that finally made the Prime Minister sit up and pay attention.

With war an inevitability if the Germans responded as expected to the Austrian refusal, Chamberlain was given the go-ahead to offer British mediation. In practice, this meant assurances to Berlin that London and Moscow would talk to Vienna. The Foreign Secretary had hoped for a joint Russo-British warning to Berlin, but the Prime Minister knew there was no way to get Cabinet to support such an action, especially as he himself was opposed to risking war over Austria. These were Chamberlain’s first warnings that the tripwires he had set across the Balkans could activate without the final, crucial result of British involvement.

In an attempt to strengthen the future argument in Cabinet, he had the British Embassy impress upon Emperor Franz Joseph that concessions to the Slovak position would have to be made. If Britain were coming to the defence of a federal system similar to its own fledgling Imperial Federation, Liberals, and perhaps even some Irish Nationalists, could be convinced of a moral argument to defend Austria against militarist imperialism. If Germany happened to accept the terms, then all the better; Austria would have been moved toward liberal democracy, remained in the Entente sphere, and all without war.

In the end, Germany would reject the counteroffer outright, again. At least partially, this was because, while Russia made more explicit to Berlin the implicit guarantee of Austria that had come with the offer to mediate, Britain descended into paralysis. In the emergency Cabinet meeting on September 19th, discussing the outcome of the negotiations in Vienna and the letter being handed to the German government, Janus first voiced their categorical opposition. In that meeting, the mood was with them. A Central European dispute was not for Britain, much less the definitive proof Germany wished for world power that Chamberlain believed it was.

When the German rejection on the 26th came, and Russia, Austria, and the Germans all mobilised their armies, the paralysis in London grew worse. In that day’s emergency meeting, Cerberus had fully formed, aware that France – even without its promise to Britain under a sub-protocol of the Anglo-Russian Convention to mobilise in exactly a situation like this – would almost certainly mobilise its armed forces in the next few days. Earlier that day, Chamberlain had, in fact, called the French Embassy to enquire on the thinking in Paris. The ambassador had assured him, without prompting, that France would honour the sub-protocol.

Chamberlain’s nightmare scenario was now enfolding before his eyes. The Germans were barrelling through the Balkan tripwire, almost certain to trigger the French one, but Britain, the one power that was absolutely necessary for an Entente victory in the war now shaping up in Europe [1], was in danger of failing to honour its obligations. He made this point on the 26th, but was quickly attacked by Calthorpe;

The fate of the many thousands of Britons he wishes to condemn to death apparently mean nothing compared to the Foreign Secretary’s reputation. It turns out, under the previous Prime Minister, he has been making promises all over the continent he could not possibly have hoped to keep, and now we are all to bow down for the sake of his word.

Lloyd George’s diary reveals that he was, at this point, of much the same opinion as Calthorpe. Ultimately, he still believed both that a negotiated outcome was possible, if mediated by the right power or people, and that Germany would not attack France over a precautionary mobilisation. Even less did he believe the assumption voiced by Seely at the same meeting that Germany, if it attacked France, would also act to occupy Belgium and the Channel Ports of Antwerp and Ostend. Belgium’s neutrality was regulated by the 1842 Treaty of London, in which both Britain and Prussia had guaranteed her independence.

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The Kingdom of Belgium, 1911

France and Belgium were important to the undecideds for two reasons. First, it would be the proof Chamberlain was seeking that Germany intended to reduce the West European coast to a base from which it could choke Britain. Second, an invasion of France would mean the potential destruction of the only great power on the continent that could lay a claim equally strong to Britain’s to being a liberal democracy. Germany was run in equal parts by the Kaiser, the military, and a parliament deeply indebted to the former. Russia had briefly looked to move towards such a status in 1887, but the Czar had slowly rolled back the liberal reforms of that year, finally turning the Duma into a rubber-stamp parliament in 1903. Spain had fallen to military autocracy that same year, and Italy’s slow march toward liberalism had stalled when it joined the Kaiser Pact.

If France were not completely dismantled by the Germans, as many feared after the creation of the Breton state in 1887, it would certainly not survive as a parliamentary democracy that could potentially elect a government opposed to German hegemony. Lloyd George himself had argued in The Times against war with France in the summer of 1888 – when a dispute over the Eastern Congo had threatened to escalate – on the basis of French democracy. In the column, he had said ‘the Emperors, Kings, and aristocratic rulers will mock at the whole thing – two great democratic Powers at each other’s throats, quarrelling to make sport for the titled and throned Philistines of Europe.’

The fall of France might yet be suffered in silence though. It was, after all, a Great Power struggle on the continent that would lead to this. An invasion of Belgium would make a neutral stance completely untenable. Not only would the repudiation of the Treaty of London be the awaited proof of German ambition, but it would confirm that Germany did not merely seek power or security. The invasion of Belgium would make a mockery of Germany’s pretensions that its interest in the Slovak Crisis was about the right to self-determination for small nations; its ultimate aim could then not be seen as anything but the trampling down of liberalism and democracy on the continent.

The effect of such a move on most of the undecideds can be best seen through the reaction of Colin Ryan. Having started the meeting as one of the most vocal advocates of non-intervention, he withdrew into a deep silence after Seely’s initial statement on Belgium. Over the course of the following half-hour, he slowly returned to the conversation, now gently probing Seely on the reasons why Germany would choose such a reckless course of action. In his diary, he confided that the meeting had shook him to the core;


If Germany does invade Belgium, I cannot believe that it would allow Ireland the freedom of being left alone, whether we stay within the Union or separate entire. An independent Ireland might even be naught to them but an opportunity to occupy Britain’s western flank. Many I have known will be loathe to hear it, but if the Kaiser invades Belgium, then it will be abundantly clear that Ireland cannot have freedom without an Entente, and so a British, victory.

On the 26th though, the mood in London was still very much anti-war. Even as Cabinet debated what a German move into Belgium would mean for Britain – or indeed if a move alone was unconscionable, but rather the Treaty of London would require a clear intent to occupy the country – a massive peace march was winding its way up Whitehall to Trafalgar Square. There, numerous speakers would make their case for non-intervention, including – in one of his last public appearances – Angus MacDonald, father of Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald [2].

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Angus MacDonald speaking in Trafalgar Square, September 26th, 1911

Taking account of this, Lloyd George stuck to mediation. For this, he chose the Swedish. The logic was that, as a monarchy, they would be respected by the autocrats involved. As a constitutional monarchy, they would not be dismissed as being on those autocrats’ side by the French and his own party. Most importantly, they were the only country that could be considered a European power and yet were not surrounded by potential combatant nations on every border. The Swedish proved amenable to the proposal, and Sir James Carson was in the early process of negotiations with the Swedish government about how the offer for mediation would be laid out on October 1st, when events overtook them completely.

On September 28th, the Germans had delivered an ultimatum to the Belgian government; German troops would be allowed to use Belgian territory as a thoroughfare for their passage to Northern France, or Germany would be forced to make it so by violence. The Belgian government immediately forwarded the demand onto the British and French, indicating that it planned to say no. Hoping for mediation to be successfully agreed to before the Germans acted on the ultimatum, Lloyd George asked Chamberlain to request the Belgians hold off on a response.

In the emergency Cabinet meeting on the 30th, the fourth such emergency meeting that month, the German ultimatum was shared more widely. For many undecideds, this was what tipped the scales. Not only did it make it clear that Germany intended to invade France, but that she was willing to violate Belgian sovereignty in doing so. Also disturbing was the news that Italy and Spain were mobilising their armed forces. Though the Kaiser Pact, like the Entente Cordiale, was meant to be purely defensive, it seemed Spain and Italy could smell blood in the water. If Britain – as it outwardly seemed ready to do – was going to stay out, parts of Southern France and the island of Corsica were very much on the table in a quick and decisive occupation under the terms of the Cadorna-Moltke Plan [3].

Even with all this, Lloyd George held off on a decision. Janus still commanded a sizeable minority that was waiting to see if Germany would really act on its plan. As the very next day would show, this was wishful thinking, but such wishful thinking can, to an extent, be forgiven. After all, the past weeks of meetings had laid out such terrible options either way in the event of war, all they could really hope for was that Germany was bluffing. Lady Hawkins phrased it the following way in a letter to her brother, Lord Dalston;


I simply cannot conceive of it. It is the land of Luther and Beethoven and Goethe, of town planning and scientific progress, of industry and continental commerce. Yet it seems they are now intent on bringing all this crashing down, and for what? Some martial fantasy dreamt up by a Prussian lieutenant? I cannot see the gain in the devastation and humiliation of the continent when Germany has already built so much for herself.

The following day, the peace camp lost the argument. Germany, Italy, and Spain all declared war on France, and German troops crossed the Belgian border. Janus remained unconvinced, and made one last, desperate attempt to salvage their position. This time, they focussed their efforts on the costs of the war. If the forces arrayed against France were as extensive as they seemed, then British blood would have to be spilled, and in great measure, if France were not to bleed herself dry of every man of fighting age.

Cerberus, however, now had Zeus’ ear for good. In what most knew was an exercise with a foregone conclusion, they laid out the case for war. Germany’s aims were clear, and not only were the consequences of those aims anathema to the independence of British policy, but they were anathema to the moral values of British society, and the place Britons saw for themselves in the world. In a final barb, aimed at Calthorpe, Chamberlain pointed out that the mutual defence provisions of the Entente Cordiale, though ostensibly secret, were well-known to everyone by now; it was not Chamberlain’s word at stake, but Britain’s.


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Crowds in Central London celebrate the British declaration of war, October 3rd, 1911

The French request for the activation of that mutual defence clause arrived late on that same day. The 48-hour delay in both London and Washington can be attributed to two factors; the first was an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, in which the latter confirmed that Washington intended to honour the mutual defence clause. The American ambassador, George Hart, had assured Chamberlain of this a mere three days earlier, but Lloyd George insisted on hearing from the President himself, considering Hart to be one of ‘those diplomats who will lie to one’s face so as to avoid so much as the mildest discomfort.’

The second was that, despite the executive theoretically having the power to honour the clause without parliamentary approval via the Royal Prerogative, the Prime Minister wanted a motion to be passed confirming the support of the House for such action. Though Chamberlain cautioned him that it was a major gamble, Lloyd George insisted. He had also taken the time to read each of the morning papers on the 2nd, and was convinced that the swell of support would put sufficient pressure on all but the most ardently pacifist MPs. In the end, he would be proven correct, but at the cost of the resignations of Orme-Hennigan and Calthorpe. Had he decided against the motion, the Chancellor and Home Secretary might have been able to stay, but they could not vote for war.

The motion to support the Prime Minister’s triggering of the mutual defence clause went to a vote after a very short debate for such a momentous decision. Crowds gathered around Westminster and wherever they knew a telegraph or telephone would receive the results. At 11:22 AM, the news went out that the motion had passed, 503-105, with 99 abstaining or absent. Immediately, the roars of approval erupted all over the city. The philosopher and staunch pacifist Bertrand Russell, in Trafalgar Square at the time, described the experience;


For a moment, all my convictions were swept away on the tide of that great outpouring. An atavistic instinct gripped me to join it and, for a moment, I hated Germany. I hated all the Pact Powers and felt myself ready to sign up to beat them back. As the roar finally subsided, so too did my senses return, and the terror of the crime we were about to commit truly dawned on me.

Twenty minutes later, the Prime Minister requested His Majesty exercise the Royal Prerogative and make the motion official. Britain was at war.


[1] – The Russians alone could not win. France would not survive long enough without British help to allow the Americans to bring their weight to bear, if they even joined, that is. If France were beaten quickly, Russia would be alone again, and its defeat would then surely follow.

[2] – Ramsay MacDonald himself attempted to be anti-war without completely committing. He correctly judged that much of public opinion would turn on a sixpence if war were declared, and so resisted attempts by the trade unions to get Labour to commit completely to pacifism. What MacDonald wanted was the leeway to criticise the conduct of the war, without the simple attack of such pacifism making it supposedly insincere.

[3] – Devised after the exit of Russia from the Kaiser Pact, the plan called for a swift occupation of North-East France and most of the Southern Coast. Unable to defend four flanks (once Brittany was taken into account), France would certainly surrender if alone. If Britain had joined, the Pact expected it would take any British force too long to cross the Channel for it to matter; the Dover-Calais route would be long gone, and Cherbourg and Le Havre could be taken quickly. Before the Entente knew it, its Anglo-American component would be facing the prospect of an amphibious invasion if it wished to set foot on the continent.
 
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I really do try to avoid thinking about all of this deterministically, but it is amazing how much it never feels as if anything else is going to happen except war breaking out. It's like at the start of this century this great psychic wound opened up and everyone just thought, we need to have a war now. What realistically could have stopped it here, I wonder.

I notice you never told us who won. The people demand answers, Densley.

Oh I lost. It was going okay for the majority but the numbers were against me in the end.
 
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Massive prevarication and finally beingt forced into a decision by the actions of others - how typically British.
 
Massive prevarication and finally beingt forced into a decision by the actions of others - how typically British.

Be fair, they made this rod for their own back with the damn balkan trip wire plan. Chamberlain really made the noose and put it round his neck before complaining he was about to be hung, help!
 
Now it is all up to France. No fooling themselves with Attaque à outrance I hope.

France is in the kettle for certain and Germany, Italy and Spain are all stoking the fire. The first Entente priority must be to prevent a French collapse; the second... well, Spain and Italy both offer extended coastlines and Spain has rather slender manpower. There's no directly helping Austria or Russia, only piling on the pressure in the west can save them.

Germany will feel herself compelled to go all in against France - except for what is needed for defense against Austria and Russia. Or perhaps just a bit more in the south and east, for security... and a soupcon more to prop up the Italian, who are fighting on two fronts. And a tad more to compensate for the Austrian mountains. And a few divisions more to occupy the wide Polish plains.

And... what happened to our superiority in France?

At least I hope it will be so. If Germany has the technological superiority I fear they do, then Germany might just be able to smash the French, then pivot to break the Austrians and wreck the Russians. Otherwise Germany will, at some point, run out of manpower and collapse.

It all comes down to how badly the Pact nations get hurt in the opening offensive and whether France remains viable.