BOOK II: THE REFORMATION
PART TWO: THE COUNTER REFORMATION
I
The Origins of an Inadequate Response
PART TWO: THE COUNTER REFORMATION
I
The Origins of an Inadequate Response
It is somewhat commonplace in contemporary historiography to shy away from the term “Counter Reformation” and prefer, in its place, to use “Catholic Reformation.” Such historiography, if we were to follow Thomas Carlyle, is defeatist in that it concedes, implicitly, of the glorious event and nature that is “Reformation.” But as I’ve given consideration the idea of a benign “Reformation” discounts the obvious falsity of that disposition. As hitherto stated, the Reformation as a benign and glorious event is purely Protestant in stock and lineage—it is blind to the realities that the Reformation unleashed near two centuries of sectarian conflict, unleashed the most brutal war then seen in Europe,[1] saw the dissolution of the monasteries and the plight of over 20,000 religious as a result, and was moved by political considerations.
Given the political nature of the Reformation, at least in its inception, where German princes and English nobles saw the Reformation as an instrumental tool for their own self-advancement and power, the Counter Reformation was a deeply inadequate response to a purely political event in its genesis and carried on as a political event despite the theologizing done by various Protestant Reformers. The Catholic response was theological and intellectual, responding to the Protestant ecclesiological and theological criticisms rather than to the more obvious matter of Protestant usurpation and political dissidence. In this respect the Counter Reformation was no Counter Reformation at all. For the legacy of the Protestant Reformation was not the schism of the Western church but the fracturing of Christendom, the division of Europe along politico-religious lines, the elevation and subsequent enslavement of the aristocracy to the power of debt-finances, and finally the ascension of the bourgeois professionals who benefited from the laxed economic laws of Protestant policy-makers.
The real Counter Reformation was the Evangelical Wars, were religious and theological concerns were never really the focal point, but wrapped up in the prevailing political zeitgeist. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church hunkered down in its intellectual mentality following Protestant revolution and never recovered politically. Where Catholicism and politics intertwined it was not moved at the reunification of Christendom but the defense of Europe from external invasion and, as became the case in France and the Habsburg dominions, a form of Gallicanism or Austrianism where the political establishments attempted to curb what public influence the church held apart from the political establishment. That is, these states saw themselves in conflict with the church over public loyalty and sought to subordinate the church to the state in much the same manner as happened in England, Denmark, and the German Protestant principalities.
Irrespective of these facts the Counter Reformation was born in 1538 at the Council of Rodez which would last until 1555. The choice of Rodez, a small communal municipality in southern France, seems like an odd choice. But the prominence of France as the “first daughter of the church” wielded its influence to secure Papal blessings for the council. Moreover, with political tensions arising throughout much of northern France, Germany, and northern Italy, the location of Rodez was a safe spot for the senior churchmen to convene as time permitted them to discuss the theological and intellectual topics of the day.
SCREENSHOT 1: The Council of Rodez is called, 1538.
Nicholas I, the son of the great duke and king Charles IV, was the leading French political voice in lobbying for the council to be held in France. While the First Italian War (1520-1523) ended in French victory, it did not exterminate the Protestant cause in northern Italy but French soldiers could guarantee safe passage of senior clerics into France through maintenance of the roads through northern Italy. Pope Boniface IX, hearing the petitions of Nicholas, was not swayed by the Angevin prince despite having been the beneficiary of Nicholas’ father’s actions during the First Italian War. What really swayed Boniface in selecting Rodez was the French control of the College of the Cardinals. Eleven of the senior cardinals were from France: Armagnac, Armor, Anjou, Berry, Bordeaux, Burgundy, Lyon, Orleans, Paris, and Rethel. The pressure of the “French Lobby” as modern historians have taken to calling it, outweighed the pressure from the Spanish and Italian churchmen. And given France’s recent role in the Italian Wars in fighting off the Protestants, Pope Boniface felt duty-bound to reward France with the council.
The main force within the College to secure the Council of Rodez was Cardinal Bishop Jacques de Siorac, the Cardinal Bishop of Angers. The leading French churchman, and the Bishop-advisor to Nicholas I, Siorac was a precursor to Cardinal Richelieu in every way. In fact, Richelieu gave credit to Siorac as one of his major inspirations and role models. Siorac was much a politician as he was a theologian. A fierce traditionalist, a man who by modern standards would be charitably labelled reactionary, he was also the leading voice in French intervention in the Italian Wars and sought, with the emerging Angevin Dynasty, to strengthen the position of the Angevin lands and the church’s role with the Angevin rulers. While he was unable to secure Angers as the seat of the council, Siorac’s forceful and skillful maneuvers would have certainly merited commentary by Machiavelli if the latter had lived to grow aware of the influence of Siorac over French and clerical policy in the 1520s-1540s.
Siorac was aware of the “dual threat” posed by the Protestant Reformation: theological and political. He hoped that the council would address both, but as the fate of history moves the council would only address the theological concerns and miss the political problems that faced the church and the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, Siorac, in opening the council, declared, “Never before the in history of the church is the matter of her integrity under threat.” By integrity he was referring to the church’s role as the walls of Christendom holding the disparate polity together. At the same time Siorac noted the fateful circumstances that led to this “accidental” but “beneficial” construction—those who argue that the church always wanted political power and cozied up with Constantine and Theodosius know the slightest amount of Roman or church history. The privileged political position that the church found itself in by the sixth century was purely circumstantial. The civil and political collapse of the Roman Empire in the West left the church as the last remaining institution of law and order in what was the former territories of the Roman Empire in the west. Peoples, tribes, and kings, all looked to this last vestige of the old order for refuge, which the church gave. With this accidental and newfound power the church tried to legitimate itself through illegitimate means—like the Donation of Constantine—but this was all after the fact.
FIGURE 1: Cardinal Bishop Jacques Siorac (1497-1557), the leading French churchman during the Counter Reformation and the leading conciliar father. He was considered to be the next likeliest pope after the death of Boniface in 1557 but died just after the convocation to elect a new pope began. Siorac remains a legendary and polarizing figure in French history, no less than his devotee Cardinal Richelieu. His successor, Cardinal Bishop Jean de Rély, who served as Siorac’s young aide at the council, would be elected pope in 1568 as Alexander VII.
The church felt compelled by the forces of historical necessity to maintain the order and legality which remained after the collapse of the Roman Empire in the west. Lives hung in the balance—quite literally so, as the church was seen in this period of pacification of the Arian Germanic tribes as the great lawgiving force. Thus, the coronations and bestowing of legal order by the Germanic kings of the western territories was always in union with clerics. The Protestant Reformation brought a wrecking ball to the walls of not only the church, but to Christendom, the last atrophied vestige of the Roman Empire according to Peter Heather.[2]
Yet, the biggest problem with the formation of the Council of Rodez was its lack of political orientation. Whatever political orientation might be derived esoterically—the call for Christian theological unity would necessarily have political ramifications—the reality is that the church was woefully inadequate to deal with the real problems facing Europe: the birth of nation-states and the subordination of religious institutions to the state. Moreover, the Protestant Reformation took the attention of the Roman church away from the growing threat of the Ottomans in the east as the Protestants were a more immediate threat to Catholic hegemony. This would have disastrous consequences for Lithuania and Hungary, in particular, who bore the brunt of Ottoman invasion as the Evangelical Wars began and consumed central Europe. France would, soon enough, find itself split between fighting in Germany, Italy, the Mediterranean, and North Africa to combat the Protestant Alliance and the Ottoman invaders who were knocking on the doorsteps of Vienna and Rome.
The council’s concern to stop clerical abuse and excess, the formation of new monastic orders and religious practices, and the confrontation with anti-sacramental theology were all well and good. But it missed, to paraphrase a modern euphemism, “the bigger picture.”
[1] This timeline’s “Evangelical Wars,” our timeline’s Thirty Years’ War.
[2] See Peter Heather’s Restoration of Rome.
SUGGESTED READING
Carlos Eire, Reformations
Peter Heather, The Restoration of Rome: Barbarian Popes and Imperial Pretenders
Carlos Eire, Reformations
Peter Heather, The Restoration of Rome: Barbarian Popes and Imperial Pretenders